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ýr Abstract 
The  introduction  deals  with  theoretical  approaches  to  insanity  and  problems 
regarding  the  definition  of  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages,  especially  the  difficulties 
in  separating  the  concepts  of  madness  and  folly.  It  is  argued  that  the  widespread 
interpretation  of  madness  as  a  spiritual  metaphor  has  only  a  limited  application  to 
late-medieval  literature  and  that  there  is  a  need  to  consider  the  secular  as  well  as 
the  religious  import  of  madness. 
After  a  brief  examination  of  attitudes  towards  madness  in  a  variety  of 
discourses,  the  meaning  of  madness  in  the  medieval  romances  is  considered.  It  is 
argued  that  despite  the  theological  significance  of  madness  as  a  metaphor  for 
sinfulness,  insanity  here  may  be  seen  as  a  sort  of  social  alienation,  or  even  as  a 
rejection  of  civilized  values.  It  is  suggested  that  this  revaluation  of  madness  is 
related  to  the  increasingly  positive  perceptions  of  the  Wild  Man,  whose 
characteristics  the  mad  heroes  of  romance  share. 
Chapter  Three  discusses  the  dream  vision  of  Book  I  of  the  Vox  Clamantis; 
it  shows  how  Gower  repeats  the  commonplaces  of  medieval  didactic  writers, 
regarding  the  peasant  insurrection  of  1381  as  an  outbreak  of  demonic 
derangement.  It  is  seen  that  Gower  makes  use  of  the  'organic  analogy'  of  society 
to  show  this  madness  as  an  infection  of  the  entire  social  body.  The  sufferings  of 
the  nobility  at  the  hands  of  the  rioting  mobs  are  described  sympathetically  in  terms 
of  'grief-madness'.  Thus  Gower  presents  two  very  different,  class-based,  attitudes 
towards  insanity.  The  discussion  of  Chaucer's  Miller's  and  Summoner's  tales  in 
the  following  chapter  continues  the  investigation  of  the  link  between  madness  and 
social  class.  Here  it  is  seen  how  Chaucer  undermines  the  traditional  theological 
interpretation  of  madness  as  a  punishment  for  sin  by  encouraging  comparison  and 
contrast  of  the  many  allegations  of  insanity  in  the  texts. 
i  _...  . A  rather  different  approach  is  taken  in  Chapter  Five,  which  examines  the 
major  works  of  the  civil  servant  Thomas  Hoccleve.  Far  from  regarding  madness  as 
essentially  spectacular,  the  apparently  insane  narrator  of  Hoccleve's  major  poems 
stresses  that  insanity  is  a  hidden  and  undetectable  affliction.  This  conclusion,  it  is 
argued,  contradicts  the  standard  view  of  psychiatric  history  regarding  madness  in 
the  Middle  Ages.  The  relationship  between  madness,  expressions  of  interiority  and 
medieval  autobiography  is  considered. 
The  final  chapter  explores  the  association  of  madness,  female  unruliness 
and  mystical  rapture  in  The  Book  of  Margery  Kempe.  It  argues  that  the  Book 
displays  two  contradictory  attitudes  towards  madness.  Kempe  is  eager  to  present 
madness  as  a  moral  abomination  and  she  frequently  invokes  ecclesiastical  authority 
to  do  so.  Nevertheless,  she  herself  is  held  mad  by  many  of  her  contemporaries  on 
account  of  her  controversial  devotional  behaviour;  this  explains  why  madness  is 
presented  positively  elsewhere  in  the  Book,  as  a  blessed  condition  of  increased 
spiritual  insight.  In  this  sense  the  Book  contains  a  craftily  double-edged  attempt  by 
Kempe  to  vindicate  her  conduct. Contents 
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Thanks  largely  to  the  popularity  of  books  such  as  Michel  Foucault's  Madness  and 
Civilisation,  the  topic  of  madness  has  in  recent  years  become  fashionable  in 
philosophical,  critical  and  historical  scholarship.  As  the  Introduction  to  this 
dissertation  makes  clear,  representations  of  madness  in-medieval  literature  have 
already  received  attention  from  several  quarters.  The  present  work  is  a  further 
contribution  towards  an  understanding  of  the  meanings  -of  madness  'in  some 
selected  works  of  late-medieval  English  literature. 
The  extraordinary  popularity  of  madness  as  a  theme  in  late  medieval 
literature'is  not  easily  explained,  although  some  excellent  attempts  have  been  made 
to  do  so.  Penelope  Doob,  for  example,  has  argued  that  the  subject  of  madness 
appealed  to  a  didactic  age  which  found  in  insanity  an  ideal  metaphor  for 
sinfulness.  Despite  its  applicability  to  numerous  works  of  medieval  literature,  this 
theory  runs  the  risk  of  subordinating  all  medieval  representations  of  madness  to  a 
single  schema.  Few  attempts  have  been  made  to  examine  madness  in  the  light  of 
political  ideologies  and  events  or  to  show  how  individuals  made  use  of  the  theme 
of  madness  in  their  works.  This  dissertation  proposes  that  madness  in  the  English 
literature  of  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries  is  a  manifestation  of  individual 
and  sometimes  collective  opposition  to  the  increasingly  beleaguered  social, 
economic  and  political  systems  and  institutions  of  the  time.  This,  it  is  argued,  can 
only  be  shown  by  looking  at  literary  representations  of  madness  in  relation  to 
considerations  of  subjectivity,  social  class  and  gender. 
Given  the  rapid  growth  of  secondary  literature  about  madness  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  it  is  now  impossible  to  write  about  this  subject  without  reference  to  recent 
critical  ideas  about  the  history  of  madness.  This  is  the  concern  of  the  Introduction. 
As  well  as  discussing  various  theoretical  approaches  to  the  study  of  madness,  this 
chapter  also  outlines  some  of  the  difficulties  critics  have  encountered  in  defining 
madness. The  literary  works  discussed  later  in  this  work  exhibit  a  variety  of 
conventional  ideas  about  madness.  Interpretations  of  these  ideas  are  often  difficult 
or  contentious,  and  not  all  of  them  can  be  adequately  dealt  with  as  they  arise. 
Chapter  1  therefore  aims  to  give  an  overview  of  some  of  the  most  common  causes, 
symptoms  and  treatments  of  madness  in  the  medical,  theological  and  legal  texts  of 
the  late  Middle  Ages  and  to  discuss  their  origins  and  interpretations.  - 
The  remaining  chapters  focus  mainly  on  literary  texts  written  in  England  in 
the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries.  These  texts  are  all  concerned  with  madness, 
either  in  its  physical  or  its  metaphorical  sense.  The  selection  of  poetic  and  prose 
works  is  intended  to  illustrate  the  diversity  of  viewpoints  about  madness  in  the 
Middle  Ages.  In  the  interests  of,  concision,  however,  I  have  excluded  from 
consideration  those  texts  which  merely  touch  on  the  theme  of  madness  or  which 
illustrate  points  made  better  elsewhere.  Nevertheless,  it  is  hoped  that  this 
dissertation  casts  some  light  on  the  significance  of  the  language  of  madness  in 
works  not  discussed  here,  such  as  Pearl  or  the  mystery  plays. 
Given  the  significant  generic  and  stylistic  differences  between  the  texts 
discussed  here,  it  has  seemed  sensible  to  devote  each  chapter  to  a  separate  author. 
The  exception  is  Chapter  2,  which  examines  the  convention  of  the  mad  hero  in  its 
native  genre,  medieval  romance.  The  romances  demonstrate  the  structural  function 
and  moral  significance  of  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Here  madness,  as  in  many 
other  works  of  late-medieval  English  literature,  is  presented  as  the  product  of 
tensions  between  the  individual  and  society.  As  such  madness  is  sometimes 
condemned,  but  at  other  times  sanctioned  by  the  writers  of  romance,  depending  on 
their  social  positions  and  individual  perspectives. 
The  following  two  chapters  are  concerned  with  the  relationship  between 
madness  and  social  class  in  the  works  of  two  contemporary  authors.  Chapter  3 
shows  how  the  language  of  insanity  is  used  in  Gower's  Vox  Clamantis  to  describe 
the  rebels  who  stormed  London  in  1381.  This  use  of  the  terminology  of  madness, 
which  is  common  in  clerical  rhetoric,  eventually  gives  way  to  a  vision  of  a  whole society  plunged  into  melancholic  chaos.  Chapter  4  focuses  on  Chaucer's  Miller's 
and  Summoner's  tales,  which  contain  sophisticated  satires  of  the  kind  of  official 
rhetoric  found  in  Gower. 
Chapters  5  and  6,  on  Thomas  Hoccleve  and  Margery  Kempe  respectively, 
examine  texts  in  which  madness  is  seen  mainly  from  an  individual  perspective.  As 
well  as  enduring  frequent  allegations  of  insanity,  both  Hoccleve  and  Kempe  appear 
to  have  been  afflicted  with  madness.  While  both  authors  are  aware  and  make  use 
of  the  orthodox  connection  between  madness  -  and  sin,  the  very  different 
circumstances  of  their  lives,  in  particular,  the  difference  in  their  gender,  cause 
them  to  use  the  theme  of  madness  in  unique  ways.  These  chapters  emphasise  the 
importance  of  attending  to  individual  experiences,  as  well  as  official 
interpretations  of  madness.  I 1 
Introduction 
Modern  Perspectives  on  Madness  in  the  Late  Middle  Ages 
Despite  the  paucity  of  historical  evidence  regarding  medieval  concepts  of  insanity, 
there  is  now  a  formidable  number  of  books  and  articles  on  the  subject.  These 
studies,  professional  and  amateur,  span  a  dizzying  range  of  academic  disciplines 
including  the  history  of  psychiatry,  literary  criticism  and  philosophy.  1  This  makes 
the  history  of  madness  one  of  the  least  clearly  defined  yet  most  vibrant  areas  of 
academic  research.  We  shall  begin  with  a  brief  overview  of  previous  work  in  this 
field. 
-  This  Introduction  is  not  a  comprehensive  review  of  scholarship:  for  reasons 
of  space  alone,  a  complete  survey  of  all  works  touching  on  madness  in  the  Middle 
Ages  would  not  be  feasible  here.  This  discussion  is  therefore  restricted  to  a  small 
number  of  texts  which  seem  most  relevant  to  the  present  dissertation.  Its  aim  is  to 
outline  what  certain  influential  critics  and  historians  have  said  about  madness  in 
medieval  society  and  literature  and  to  assess  the  validity  of  the  various  critical 
approaches  they  have  employed.  The  chapter  will  also  identify  and  attempt  to 
address  a  number  of  difficulties  faced  by  criticism  in  defining  madness. 
Twentieth-century  discussions  of.  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages  have  tended 
either  to  follow  or  to  react  against  a  one-sided  Victorian  version  of  psychiatric 
history.  Nineteenth-century  assessments  of  medieval  attitudes  towards  madness 
were  often  disapproving  or  patronising.  The  medieval  period,  when  it'was  not 
glorified  as  a  vanished  age  of  social  harmony,  was  regarded  as  a  benighted  era  of 
barbarism  and  superstition.  2  The  psychiatric  reformers  of  the  eighteenth-century 
were  therefore  seen  to  have  rescued  the  insane  from  medical  neglect.  In  1887 
Tony  Robert  Fleury  painted  his  famous  'Pinel  Freeing  the  Insane',  which 
admiringly  depicts  the  occasion  in  1793  when  the  French  alienist  oversaw  the 
unchaining  of  the  mad  inmates  of  the  Bicetre  hospital.  For  the  Victorian 2 
progressivists,  as  Michel  Foucault  sardonically  notes,  the  image  of  Pinel's 
'philanthropic  liberation'  of  the  insane  symbolizes  the  beginning  of  'that  happy  age 
when  madness  was  finally  recognized  and  treated  according  to  a  truth  to  which  we 
had  too  long  remained  blind'.  3  Pinel's  English  contemporary,  the  Quaker  William 
Tuke,  shared  in  this  triumphant  -  spirit  of  reform,  opening  a  'humane'  lunatic 
asylum  at  York  in  1796. 
The  aims  and  ideals  of  these  early  psychiatric  reformers  are  encapsulated  in 
Chapters  in  the  History  of  the  Insane  in  the  British  Isles  (1882),  written  by  Tuke's 
grandson  Daniel  Hack  Tuke.  The  book  is  of  great  importance  for  the  early  history 
of  madness.  Tuke  gathers  information  about  popular  medieval  cures  and  remedies 
for  insanity  and  discusses  the  establishment  and  early  development  in  England  of 
hospitals  for  the  insane.  He  has  often  been  criticized,  however,  for  his  liberal  or 
progressive  view  of  the  superstitious  attitudes  of  the  Middle  Ages;  although,  as 
Micale  and  Porter  justly  point  out,  Tuke's  historical  account  is  less  progressivistic 
than  many  critics  have  wanted  it  to  be,  his  meliorist  assumptions  were  taken  up  by 
later  historians.  4 
Indeed,  the  disdainful  attitude  of  liberal  psychiatry  towards  medieval 
explanations  and  treatments  of  madness  reaches  its  pinnacle  only  in  the  twentieth 
century.  1941  saw  the  publication  of  A  History  of  Medical  Psychology  by  Gregory 
Zilboorg,  a  man  'deeply  rooted  in  nineteenth-century  culture'  and  steeped  in  the 
major  psychiatric  writings  of  that  time.  5  Predictably,  Zilboorg's  extraodinarily 
influential  work  shares  some  of  the  ideological  assumptions  of  °  the 
nineteenth-century  tradition  of  psychiatric  history  begun  in  England  by  Tuke  and 
his  contemporaries.  6 
It  has  been  pointed  out  that  Zilboorg  chose  the  term  'medical  psychology' 
rather  than  the  more  common  'psychiatry'  because  he  bel 3 
Middle  Ages.  The  titles  of  these  chapters  --  'The  Great  Decline'  and  'The  Restless 
Surrender  to  Demonology'  --  amply  indicate  the  strength  of  their  author's 
meliorist  assumptions  and  have  helped  turn  Zilboorg  into  the  Aunt  Sally  of 
revisionist  psychiatric  history. 
Zilboorg  sees  the  Middle  Ages  as  an  unenlightened  era  in  which  the  insane 
were  treated  cruelly  and  the  rational  study  of  psychology  was  all  but  eclipsed  by 
supernatural  explanations  of  abnormal  mental-  phenomena.  'Demonology',  he 
complains,  'was  to  rule  medical  psychology  for  sixteen  hundred  years',  so  that 
'the  human  side  of  psychology  was  overlooked'.  8  It  will  be  seen  that  Zilboorg's 
bleak  account  of  post-Galenic  attitudes  towards  insanity  and  his  contention  that 
demonology  governed  medical  psychology  throughout  the  Middle  Ages  do  not 
stand  up  to  scrutiny. 
9  Nevertheless,  these  perspectives  provide  a  useful  context  for 
Zilboorg's  major  project.  Having  described  the  plight  of  the  medieval  madman  in 
the  darkest  possible  terms,  Zilboorg  charts  the  triumphant  advance`  of  medical 
science  towards  a  more  complete  and  enlightened  understanding  of  mental  illness. 
This  is  the  classic  statement  of,  what  is  now  known  as  Whig  history,  the  essence  of 
which  has  been  crisply  summarized  by  Peter  Sedgwick.  'The  basic  perspective  of 
this  variety  of  psychiatric  history',  writes  Sedgwick,  'is,  roughly  speaking,  liberal, 
evolutionist  and  sympathetic  to  modern  diagnostic  categories  as  the  criterion  of 
reality  against  which  earlier  -discoveries  are  to  be  tested  and  found  wanting'.  10 
Other  twentieth-century  commentators  on  medieval  attitudes  towards 
madness  have  challenged  the  liberal  narrative  on  empirical  grounds.  In  a  chapter 
on  the  'Medieval  Care  of  the  Insane'  (1920),  J.  J.  Walsh  warns,  presumably  with 
Tuke  and  his  followers  in  mind,  that  'only  a  careful  study  of  the  details  of  actual 
historical  references  to  the  medieval  care  of  the  insane  will  serve  to  contradict 
unfortunate  traditions  which  have  gathered  around  the  subject  entirely  without 
justification  in  real  history'.  11  Walsh  argues  that  the  treatment,  of  insanity  in  the 
Middle  Ages  was  sympathetic  and  often  effective.  He  also  emphasizes  the  rational, 
rather  than  the  supernatural,  character  of  these  treatments.  12  Walsh  concedes  that 4 
religious  or  superstitious  attitudes  were  brought  to  bear  on  the  insane;  unlike 
Zilboorg,  however,  he  interprets  their  influence  as  essentially  benign.  13 
Unfortunately,  the  evidence  from  medieval  literature  often  contradicts  Walsh's 
optimism.  Nevertheless,  his  account  is  a  useful  corrective  to  the  one-sided 
psychiatric  history  promoted  by  Zilboorg  and  his  followers. 
Walsh's  call  for  the  careful  study  of  historical  references  to  madness  has 
been  heeded  by  a  number  of  more  recent  historians.  George  Rosen's  chapter  on 
the  late  Middle  Ages  in  his  Madness  in  Society  (1968)  counterbalances  the 
excesses  of  Zilboorg's  book  by  considering  various  discourses  about  madness. 
Although  a  professional  physician,  Rosen  looks  at  the  popular  and  religious,  as 
well  as  the  medical  discourse  on  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages. 
Rosen's  work  helped  to  shape  twentieth-century  ideas  about  madness  in  the 
Middle  Ages  and  lent  methodological  muscle  to  the  fledgling  discipline  of 
psychiatric  history.  By  far  the  most  influential  work  of  the  1960s,  however,  is 
Michel  Foucault's  Histoire  de  la  Folie  ä  läge  classique,  known  to  English  readers 
as  Madness  and  Civilisation.  Acclaimed  by  Roy  Porter  as  'the  most  penetrating 
work  ever  written  on  the  history  of  madness',  this  book  diverges  more  radically 
than  any  other  work  from  the  liberal  account  of  psychiatric  history  offered  by 
Zilboorg.  14  Foucault's  central  project  is  to  recover  what  he  calls  the  'experience' 
of  insanity  during  the  Enlightenment.  Indeed,  it  has  recently  been  argued  that  the 
medieval  concept  of  madness  is  not  Foucault's  main  concern  and  that  the  medieval 
material  merely  constitutes  'intriguing  marginalia'.  15  But  the  structural  importance 
of  Foucault's  discussion  of  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages  should  not  be 
underestimated.  Like  Zilboorg's  appreciation  of  medieval  'psychiatry',  Foucault's 
medieval  chapter  serves  as  a  springboard  for  his  discussion  of  madness  in  the 
Early  Modern  period.  Also  like  Zilboorg,  Foucault  gives  the  impression'that  the 
attitude  towards  madness  in  successive  epochs  was  stable,  the  product  of  each 
period's  monolithic  'world  view'  or  Geistesgeschichte.  16  Despite  these  structural 5 
and  methodological  similarities  between  the  works  of  Zilboorg  and  Foucault, 
Foucault's  history  of  madness  turns  the  liberal  or  Whig  narrative  on  its  head. 
Foucault's  ideas  about  medieval  madness  are  by  no  means  entirely 
original.  17,  Nevertheless,  they  remain  so  compelling  and  influential,  especially 
among  radical  critics  and  philosophers,  that  they  must  be  briefly  rehearsed  here. 
While  it  must  be  remembered  that  Foucault  is  primarily  concerned  with  madness 
in  the  European  and  particularly  the  French  Middle  Ages,  his  discussion  may  not 
unreasonably  be  taken  as  a  starting  point  for  a  consideration  of  the  English 
situation. 
ý-  Foucault  argues  that  in  the  Middle  Ages  and  Renaissance  madness  and 
reason  were  in  'free  trade'-  As  he  puts  it  in  his  earlier  work,  Mental  Illness  and 
Psychology,  'madness  was  allowed  free  reign;  it  circulated  throughout  society,  it 
formed  part  of  the  background  and  language  of  everyday  life'.  18  In  practical 
terms,  this  means  that  lunatics  were  at  liberty  to  share  the  streets  with  the  sane  and 
to  interact  with  them.  As  Richard  Howard's  breezy  English  translation  has  it, 
medieval  madmen  led  an  'easy  'wandering  existence'.  19  It  was  only-during  the 
Age  of  Reason,  says  Foucault,  that  the  insane  were  deprived  of  their  carefree  life 
and  began  to  be  confined  in  institutions  extensively  and  systematically.  For 
Foucault,  the  founding  of  the  H6pital  General  in  Paris  in  1656  marks  the 
beginning  of  the  'Great  Confinement',  a  period  of  some  one  hundred  and  fifty 
years  during  which-  the  mad  --  along  with  other  scandalous  embodiments  of 
'unreason'  such  as  criminals  and  the  poor  --  were  incarcerated  on-  an 
unprecedented  scale.  20 
Foucault's  powerful,  and  simple  argument  has  provoked  endless  defences 
and  often  bitter  attacks,  particularly  from  empiricist  historians.  A  number  of 
critics  have  noted  that  Madness  and  Civilisation  is  '  sometimes  factually 
inaccurate.  21  If  the  book  were  a  strategy  or  a  'fiction',  as  Foucault  latterly 
referred  to  many  of  his  texts,  this  apparent  carelessness  would  not  matter.  But  if, 
as  seems  likely,  the  book  is  the  work  by  Foucault  which  'stands  closest  to  a 6 
genuine  historical  endeavour',  then  Foucault  can  be  accused  of  negligence. 
22  A 
frequent  criticism  of  Madness  and  Civilisation  is  that  it  is  under-documented. 
Some  of  the  treatments  for  insanity  that  Foucault  sees  as  particular  to  the  Age  of 
Reason,  such  as  the  washing  of  the  shaven  head  in  vinegar,  are  in  fact  medieval 
commonplaces;  it  may  therefore  be  suspected  that  medieval  attitudes  towards 
madness  had  more  in  -common  with  those  during  the  Early  Modern  age  than 
Foucault  leads  us  to  believe.  23 
Moreover,  at  least  one  of  the  practices  that  Foucault  ascribes  -  to  the  late 
Middle  Ages  is  plainly  fictitious,  namely  that  of  exiling  the  insane  on  the  drifting 
Narrenschiffe.  These  'ships  of  fools',  claims  Foucault,  really,  existed  outside  the 
artistic  convention  made  famous  by  Sebastian  Brant  and  his  contemporaries.  As 
many  exasperated  commentators  have  pointed  out,  however,  'there  is  no  evidence 
that  any  actual  ships  of  fools  put  to  sea  with  groups  of,  the  mentally  ill  in  their 
indefinite  custody'.  24  The  critics  may  have  missed  the  point  of  Foucault's  claim, 
which  is  so  flagrantly  false  --  and  his  assertion  of  it  so  unusually  confident  . --  that 
it  is  presumably  meant  either  as  a  joke  or  as  an  indication  that  the  author  is  not  in 
the  business  of  writing  an  empirical  history.  25  Perhaps,  as  Allan  Megill  suggests, 
Foucault  should  be  read  'not  literally,  but  ironically'.  26 
, 
However  that  may  be,  Foucault's  picture  of  madness  and  madmen  in  the 
Middle  Ages  may  not  unfairly  be  seen  as  a  'romantic  chronicling-of  decline  from 
some  previous  age  of  greatness'. 
27  In  his  later  work,  Foucault  implicitly  rejects 
his  early  suspicion  that  scientific  positivism  has  lead  to  the  alienation  of  madness 
and  his  belief  that  the  madman  was  once  privy  to  truths  now  denied  to  him.  28 
Nevertheless,  these  ideas  have  been  taken  very  seriously  and  have  been  adapted 
and  developed  by  scholars  working  in  many  areas.  The  medieval  madman,  they 
argue,  was  considered  sacred  and  enjoyed  a  freedom  which  he  lost  only  in  the 
Great  Confinement.  Thus  Yannick  Ripa,  shifting  Foucault's  schema  forward  by 
nearly  two  centuries,  asserts  that  the  confinement  of  women  in  the  nineteenth 7 
century  signalled  'the  end  of  the  image  passed  down  from  antiquity  of  the  madman 
as  bearer  of  truths'  . 
29 
Other  critics  have  taken  up  Foucault's  early  claim  that  during  the  Great 
Confinement  'madness  forged  a  relationship  with  moral  and  social  guilt'  . 
30 
Shoshana  Felman,  for  example,  writes  that  'the  medieval  conception  of  madness  as 
something  cosmic,  dramatic  and  tragic  loses,  in  the  Classical  age,  its 
quasi-religious  mystery;  madness  is  now  desacralised,  and  through  its  exclusion 
takes  on  a  political,  social  and  ethical  status'. 
31  This  implies,  as  John  Saward 
says,  that  'the  fool's  place  in  medieval  society  was,  natural  and  normal;  he  was 
neither  an  outcast  nor  a  monster'. 
32  After  the  Middle  Ages,  however,  fools 
'would  not  be  treated  so  kindly.  No  longer  would  the  fool  be  the  guardian  of  truth; 
foolishness  is  now  a  disease  or  a  crime'. 
33  No  doubt  there  is  some  truth  in  each  of 
these  remarks;  but  a  number  of.  qualifications  and  objections  must  be  made  to 
them. 
First,  the  permissive  and  reverential  attitude  towards  madness  described 
above  is  not,  in  fact,  typical  of  the  Middle  Ages;  it  is  popular,  if  at  all,  only  at  the 
very  end  of  the  medieval  period.  It  was  not  until  the  time  of  Brant  and  Erasmus 
that  there  occurred  a  shift  or  break  in  the  experience  -of  madness,  after  which 
insanity  started  to  be  seen  as  universal  and  dramatic  or  satirical.  Foucault  himself 
makes  this  quite  plain.  'Up  to  the  second  half  of  the  fifteenth  century',  he  writes, 
'or  even  a  little  beyond,  the  theme  of  death  rules  alone.  [...  J  Then  in  the  last  years 
of  the  century  this  enormous  uneasiness  turns  on  itself;  the  mockery  of  madness 
replaces  death  and  its  solemnity'.  34  Foucault's  followers,  however,  have  either 
conflated  or  confused  the  medieval  and  Renaissance  eras:  what  they  call  the 
'medieval  conception  of  madness'  belongs  in  fact  to  a  later  period. 
35 
, 
This  chronological  blurring  may  be  attributed  not  to  a  lack  of  historical 
awareness,  but  to  the  difference  between  the  English  and  French  definitions  of 
madness.  Indeed,  folly  cannot  simply  be  equated  with  madness  or  insanity.  In  the 
Middle  Ages,  as  today,  European  languages  differed  in  the  extent  to  which  they 8 
differentiated  madness  and  folly.  In  Middle  English,  the  terms  'woodness'  and  the 
less  common  'madness'  were  generally  reserved  for  the  medical  conditions  of 
mania  or  melancholia.  'Folly',  while  it  could  overlap  in  meaning  with  these  terms, 
more  often  denoted  any  manifestation  of  irrational  or  sinful  behaviour  or  the  sort 
of  satirical  folly  that  became  fashionable  in  the  Renaissance.  The  French  term  folie 
encompassed  all  of  these  senses. 
36 
This  historical  difference  between  English  and  French  definitions  of 
madness  is  evident  in  twentieth-century  critical  works.  In  English,  madness  and 
folly  are  not  synonymous.  In  the  French  language,  however,  they  are 
indistinguishable;  both  fall  under  the  umbrella  concept  of  folie.  A  quotation  from 
Jean-Marie  Fritz's  French-language  book  on  the  medieval  discourse  about  madness 
neatly  illustrates  this  point.  For  Fritz,  the  heroes  of  early  romances  such  as 
Chretien  de  Troye's  Yvain  and  the  buffoons  of  the  sixteenth-century  satirical  plays 
known  as  the  sorties  are  all  fools  (fous).  37  In  English,  however,  a  distinction 
between  these  two  sets  of  figures  can  be  made  on  medical  grounds.  The  deranged 
heroes  of  the  twelfth-century  romances  are  clearly  madmen,  insofar  as  they  suffer 
from  mania  or  melancholia.  The  jesters  and  clowns  of  Renaissance  drama,  on  the 
other  hand,  present  no  such  medical  symptoms;  -  in  English,  such  figures  are  fools, 
not  madmen. 
The  distinction  between  the  positivist  or  medical  concept  of  madness  and 
the  more  general  notion  of  folly  is  common  in  European  languages  other  than 
French.  As  David  Cooper  writes: 
in  some  languages  a  distinction  is  made  between  madness  seen  in  a 
medical  perspective  (pazzia  in  Italian)  and  a  more  general  sense  of 
madness  (follia)  that  is  ,  often,  seen  as  something  creative, 
inspirational  and  often  satirical  (as  in  the  plays  of  Pirandello)  or  the  ° 
other  madness  of  the  repressive,  social  system,  every  form  of 
bureaucracy,  etc.,  for  which  I  prefer  the  English  word  "craziness". 9 
As  the  German  verrückt  is  opposed  to  the  true  delusion  of 
wahnsinn.  Or  like  the  Latin  delusion  (de-ludere  is  to  play,  or  mock 
at  fully,  differing  from  delirium  --  wandering  off  the  beaten  track  of 
the  plough).  In  French  there  is  only  delire  for  the  two  very  different 
senses.  38 
Since  they  do  not  distinguish  between  madness  in  its  medical  and  satirical  aspects, 
the  French  are  more  inclined  than  the  English  to  stress  the  positive  associations  of 
madness  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Indeed,  the  difference  in  meaning  between  English 
madness  and  French  folie  constitutes  more  than  an  interesting  semantic  distinction: 
it  has  been  largely  responsible  for  the  seemingly  endless  critical  controversy  about 
how  madness  was  regarded  in  the  Middle  Ages. 
In  distinguishing  between  madness  or  insanity  and  folly  it  should  not  be 
implied  that  madness  in  its  medical  and  positivist  aspect  was  always  incompatible 
with  'witty'  folly.  On  the  contrary,  some  fictional  characters  combine  the 
deranged  behaviour  of  the  madman  with  the  satirical  function  of  the  fool.  Such  a 
figure  is  the  madman  or  derve  in  Adam  de  la  Halle's  thirteenth-century  play  Le 
Jeu  de  la  Feuillde.  39  One  of  the  dervd's  functions  is  to  provide  comic  relief, 
humorously  wrenching  words  from  their  intended  meanings  in  the  manner  of  a 
Shakespearian  fool.  But  the  derve  also  suffers  from  delusions,  believing  first  that 
he  is  a  king,  then  that  he  is  a  toad,  and  finally  that  he  is  married  to  his  father.  As 
Edelgard  DuBrock  points  out,  this  'fou  is  both  a  real  madman  and  a  fool  who  is 
supposed  to  amuse.  In  this  latter  function  he  is  akin  to  the  court  jester  as  well  as  to 
the  sots  in  carnival  plays  and  the  later  sotties'.  40  It  is  the  double  nature  of  the 
derve^s  behaviour  that  leads  Michel  Foucault  to  talk  of  the  singularity  or  coherence 
of  the  medieval  madman  --  what  Foucault  calls  his  'densite  personelle'.  41 
Nevertheless,  DuBrock's  comment  shows  that  in  the  English  language  at  least,  it  is 
possible  and  perhaps  necessary  to  distinguish  between  madness  understood  in  a 
medical  context  and  foolish  buffoonery. 10 
There  are  further  historical  grounds  for  making  a  distinction  between  the 
madman  and  the  fool.  In  the  Middle  Ages  and  Renaissance  the  fool,  unlike  the 
madman,  was  often  a  professional.  The  Senchus  Mor,  a  fourteenth-century  book  of 
Irish  customary  law,  distinguishes  between  folly,  a  professional  affectation,  and 
madness,  which  is  understood  as  authentic  mental  disorder.  'A  fool',  says  the 
book,  'is  one  who  earns  wages;  a  madman  is  one  on  whom  the  magic  wisp  has 
been  thrown'.  42  The  reference  to  the  'magic  wisp'  is  obscure;  nevertheless, 
'artificial'  or  affected  folly  is  clearly  distinguished  from  insanity  here.  In  English 
law,  too,  'natural',  as  well  as  artificial  folly  was  held  to  be  distinct  from  madness. 
Among  literary  critics  the  failure  to  distinguish  between  madness  and  folly 
is  particularly  noticeable.  In  a  recent  essay  on  Beys's  seventeenth-century  play  The 
Illustrious  Madmen,  Dominique  Froidefond  appeals  to  Foucault  to  substantiate  her 
remarks  about  the  history  of  madness.  Although  the  ideas  she  discusses  are 
discernible  in  Foucault's  work,  they  are  overstated  by  her.  'Until  the  seventeenth 
century',  writes  Froidefond  of  the  madman,  'he  alone  had  the  freedom  to  do  and 
say  anything  with  impunity  because  he  was  under  the  special  protection  of  God'. 
By  the  time  of  Foucault's  Great  Confinement,  however,  'he  has  lost  his  former 
power  and  prestige'. 
43,  From  now  on  'the  insane  are  not  considered  innocent  since 
they  are  responsible  for  and  guilty  of  their  madness.  It  is  the  indelible  stain  of 
their  fault'.  44  This  view  of  medieval  attitudes  towards  madness  is  quite  mistaken. 
In  general,  the  medieval  madman  was  not  a  powerful  or  prestigious  figure  and  was 
rarely  seen  as  'innocent'.  In  fact,  one  could  argue  with  Penelope  Doob  that  unlike 
the  satirical  fool,  he  was  held  to  be  'responsible  for  and  guilty  of'  his  madness  at 
least  as  much  as  his  Early  Modern  counterpart,  although,  no  doubt  for  different 
reasons. 
45 
The  assertion  that  madness  was  considered  sacred  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
then,  is  somewhat  misleading;  and  it  seems  to  spring  from  a  confusion  of  genuine 
madness  and  holy  folly.  Furthermore,  Shoshana  Felman's  assertion  that  madness 
had  no  'political,  social  and  ethical  status'  before  its  supposed  exclusion  in  the 11 
Classical  age  appears  to  be  unhistorical  in  the  light  of  the  literary  and  social 
evidence. 
Foucault's  disciples  in  the  anti-psychiatric  movement  have  also  made  much 
of  the  supposed  freedoms  of  the  medieval  madman.  The  most  prominent  of  these, 
David  Cooper,  succinctly  summarizes  Foucault's  history  of  madness  as  follows: 
In  the  Middle  Ages  in  Europe  madness  was  respected  as  a  different 
way  of  being  and  knowing,  perhaps  a  privileged  -way  with  a  more 
direct  access  to  heaven.  It  was  only  after  the  so-called  European 
renaissance,  with  the  flourishing  of  mercantilism  and  the  earliest 
beginnings  of  capitalism,  that,  in  the  -seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries,  the  process  of  exclusion  of  the  mad  began.  46 
It  is  easy  to  see  the  appeal  of  Foucault's  argument  for  radical  historians  and 
critics.  For  Cooper  and  many  others,  the  advent  of  capitalism  marked  the 
beginning  of  the  banishment  of  the  insane.  This  view,  is  consistent  with  the 
widespread  romantic  tendency  to  regard  the  modern  madman  as  a  misunderstood 
social  marginal  or  even  a  dissenter.  47  But  Cooper's  bold  claims  have  not  gone 
unchallenged.  The  historian  Roy  Porter  has  shown  that  in  England  nothing  like 
Foucault's  'Great  Confinement'  occurred  until  the  early  nineteenth  century,  and 
that  when  it  did,  the  nature  of  confinement  --  and  the  reasons  for  it  --  were  quite 
different  from  those  described  by  Foucault.  48  Moreover,  the  insane  were 
sometimes  incarcerated  in  the  later  medieval  period.  As  Sedgwick  puts  it,  'the 
beginnings  of  the  new  ban  on  insanity  occur  before  the  Age  of  Reason  itself.  We 
see  it  in  the  late  Middle  Ages  and  the  Renaissance'.  49  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
medieval  texts  such  as  The  Book  of  Margery  Kempe  can  present  the  radical  or 
critical  aspects  of  insanity. 
So  much,  then,  for  the  simplistic  view  of  the  medieval  period  as  a  'Golden 
Age  of  permissiveness  towards  insanity'.  50  This  romantic  picture  of  the  Middle 12 
Ages  cannot  be  accepted  any  more  than  the  dystopic  vision  of  Zilboorg.  One 
important  way  of  discovering  medieval  attitudes  towards  madness,  it  is  suggested 
here,  is  to  examine  the  literary  evidence;  indeed,  much  of  the  most  valuable 
research  into  the  subject  of  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages  has  been  done  by  literary 
scholars.  Neither  Zilboorg  nor  Foucault  examines  medieval  literature  in  much 
detail  for  evidence  of  attitudes  towards  insanity.  Had  they  done  so,  they  might 
both  have  arrived  at  rather  different  accounts  of  the  medieval  relation  to  madness. 
In  the  last  thirty  years  there  has  appeared  a  number  of  works  dealing 
specifically  with  madness  in  medieval  literature,  such  as  Judith  Neaman's  doctoral 
dissertation,  The  Distracted  Knight  (1968).  Neaman  follows  her  discussion  of 
theological,  legal  and  particularly  medical  perspectives  on  madness  with  an 
examination  of  literary  texts  --  all,  as  her  title  suggests,  medieval  European 
romances.  With  admirable  efficiency,  she  sets  out  the  various  medical  categories 
of  madness,  demonstrating,  in  the  words  of  her  later  work,  that  'medieval  men 
knew  what  insanity  was'.  51  By  emphasising  the  rigour  of  medieval  medical 
categories  of  madness,  Neaman  takes  a  quite  '  different  line  from-Foucault,  who 
regards  the  positivist  accumulation  of  knowledge  about  madness  as  a  post-medieval 
development.  Neaman  also  argues,  contra  many  of  Foucault's  followers,  that  'in 
Christian  medicine,  as  in  Christian  theology,  true  madness  was  never  divine'.  52 
This  is  a  provocative  statement,  whose  implications  are  examined  in  Chapter  6; 
but  it  is  closer  to  the  truth  than  the  more  widespread  view  that,  madness  was 
respected  in  the  Middle  Ages. 
Along  with  recent,  thorough  studies  of  madness  and  folly  by  Jean-Marie 
Fritz  and  Muriel  Laharie  in  France,  Neaman'slater  book,  Suggestion  of  the  Devil 
(1975),  is  one  of  the  most  important  contributions  to  the  understanding  of 
medieval  concepts  of  madness.  The  book  covers  the  historical  genesis  of  madness 
in  medical,  legal  and  social  discourse.  Neaman  takes  pains  to  emphasize  the 
similarities  between  ancient  and  modern  attitudes  to  madness.  Such  a  long 
perspective  is  a  welcome  corrective  to  the  unconvincing  view,  encouraged  by  the 13 
followers  of  Foucault,  that  the  medieval  and  the  modern  experiences  of  madness 
are  essentially  different,  separated  by  an  absolute  'epistemological  break'. 
Nevertheless,  Neaman  remains  sensitive  to  the  differences,  as  well  as  the 
similarities,  between  medieval  and  modern  attitudes.  53 
Neaman's  taxonomical  rigour  is  typical  of  Anglo-American  studies  of 
madness  in  the  Middle  Ages.  The  best  known  and  respected  of  these  is  Penelope 
Doob's  scrupulous  study  Nebuchadnezzar's  Children:  The  Conventions  of  Madness 
in  Middle  English  Literature,  a  scaled-down  version  of  Doob's  doctoral 
dissertation.  54  Both  Doob's  approach  and  her  conclusions  differ  radically, 
however,  from  Neaman's.  Although  she  mentions  clinical  and  religious  forms  of 
insanity,  Doob  focuses  on  the  grave  moral  implications  of  madness  which,  she 
argues,  was  almost  always  seen  as  a  consequence  of  spiritual'  turpitude.  'It  is 
always  the  madness  of  sin  that  is  most  important',  she  writes,  'giving  power  and 
meaning  to  all  cases  of  madness'.  55 
Like  Neaman's  The  Distracted  Knight,  Doob's  book  is  concerned  primarily 
with  the  theme  of  madness  in  literature.  After  a  discussion'  of  the  causes, 
symptoms  and  cures  for  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages  she  applies  her  findings  to 
the  romance  Sir  Orfeo,  Hoccleve's  poems  and  the  figure  of  Herod  in  the  drama. 
Clearly;  the  present  dissertation  overlaps  with  Doob's  in  several  ways;  Doob's 
methods  and  conclusions,  however,  differ  from  mine. 
Doob's  central  thesis  --  ý  that  madness  in  medieval  literature  has  almost 
always  a  negative  moral  significance  --  is  convincing  to  an  extent.  It  is  doubtful, 
however,  that  this  is  the  only  meaning  madness  had  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Doob's 
sources,  as  she  says  in'her  doctoral  dissertation,  are  various,  including  'the  Bible, 
and  Apocrypha,  commentaries,  saints'  lives,  penitential  manuals,  sermons, 
exemplum  books,  romances,  physiological  and  theological  treatises'.  56  Her 
emphasis,  however,  is  primarily  on  religious  rather  than  secular  attitudes  towards 
madness.  For  Doob,  the  Church's  view  of  madness  as  a  divine  punishment  for  sin 
is  the  way  madness  'was  seen'  in  the  Middle  Ages.  This  assumption,  however, 14 
allows  the  moral  interpretation  of  madness  too  much  purchase.  Doob  claims,  for 
example,  that  even  medical  discussions  of  madness  were  subordinated  to  moral 
exegesis.  It  is  true  that  Bartholomeus  Anglicus  --  Doob's  chief  medical  authority  -- 
begins  his  section  on  frenzy  with  a  quotation  from  Deuteronomy.  57  Nevertheless, 
this  quotation,  however  prominent,  can  hardly  be  said  to  govern  Bartholomeus's 
thinking  about  madness.  Indeed,  Bartholomeus's  biblical  quotations  are  few  and  of 
no  substantial  importance;  he  is  clearly  not  attempting  to  subordinate  medical 
knowledge  to  a  theological  framework.  Richard  Neugebauer  is  closer  to  truth 
when  he  writes  that  Bartholomeus  'espoused  a  naturalistic  theory  about  the  origins 
of  madness'.  58  Like  most  major  medieval  medical  works,  Bartholomeus's  book  is 
primarily  rational  and  descriptive  rather  ý  than  moral  and  didactic;  even  the 
arch-progressivist  Gregory  Zilboorg  concedes  that  Bartholomeus's  ideas  are 
'classical,  reasonable,  and  extremely  advanced  for  his  age'.  59 
The  practice  of  applying  the  theological  conventions  of  madness  to  all 
medieval  literature  works  both  to  homogenize  texts  and  to  oversimplify  the  picture 
of  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages.  In  short,  text  and  context  are  intelligible  only  in 
terms  of  one  another.  The  danger  of  'such  an  approach  is  that  it  draws  the  critic 
into  a  hermeneutical  circle,  so  that  flexible  interpretation  and  the  recognition  of 
textual  difference  become  impossible.  60  Unfortunately,  it  cannot  be  assumed  that 
interpretations  or  uses  of  madness  in  medieval  texts  will  always  conform  neatly  to 
the  writings  of  the  Church  Fathers.  To  make  this  assumption  is  to  expose  oneself 
to  the  criticisms  which  have  often  been  levelled  against  so-called  'exegetical' 
critics  in  recent  years.  61  Although,  as  Albert  Friedman  points  out,  Doob 
'explicitly  forswears  Robertsonianism',  she  nevertheless  makes  the  fundamental 
exegetical  assumption  that  medieval  authors  were  so  informed  by  the  Christian 
essentialism  of  their  age  that  their  texts  can  carry  only  Christian  meanings. 
62 
Important  as  such  meanings  are,  other  aspects  of  madness  must  be 
examined  if  we  are  to  construct  accurate  and  meaningful  interpretations  of  literary 15 
texts.  Recent  criticism  has  all  but  destroyed  the  once  entrenched  myth  of  the 
Middle  Ages  as  a  period  of  Christian  essentialism.  As  Derek  Pearsall  warns, 
not  many  things  in  medieval  scholarship  are  easier  than,  to  multiply 
annotations  from  the  Patrologia  Latina,  and  the  sanctification 
offered  to  every  literary  interpretation  derived  therefrom  does  away 
with  the  need,  and  then  the  desire,  for  flexibility  and  sophistication 
in  a  specifically  literary  response. 
63 
While  acknowledging  the  views  of  the  Church  Fathers  about  madness,  critics 
should  not  allow  patristic  writings  to  foreclose  their  interpretations  of  madness  in 
works  written  a  thousand  years  after  Augustine.  This  '  is  not  so  much  a  spurious 
justification  for  interpretative  anachronism  as  a  recognition  of  the  diversity  of 
meanings  in  medieval  texts.  Chaucer,  to  take  one  example,  is  concerned  in  the 
Miller's  and  Summoner's  tales  not  only  with  the  traditional  didactic  value  of 
madness,  but  also  with  the  particular  relation  between  insanity  and  social  class 
around  the  time  of  the  Peasants'  Revolt. 
Similarly,  in  the  works  of  Thomas  Hoccleve  and  Margery  Kempe,  specific 
medical,  social  and  economic  explanations  of  madness  co-exist,  and  often  overlap 
with  conventional  moral  understandings  of  madness.  Both  writers  may  be 
Nebuchadnezzar's  children,  but  they  are  also  children  of  their  age.  It-is  difficult  to 
understand  the  function  of  madness  in  the  works  of  either  without  considering  the 
social  conditions  which  led  them  to  write  about  madness.  For  these  reasons,  this 
dissertation  is  concerned  not  only  with  the  moral  significance  of  madness  in 
medieval  texts,  but  also  with  the  relationship  between  madness  and  matters  of 
gender,  social  class  and  subjectivity.  Such  concerns  are  not  simply  marginal  issues 
or  historical  footnotes;  they  are  the  very  stuff  of  history.  An  approach  which  takes 
account  of  them  must  be  sensitive  to  the  particularity  of  texts  and  be 
methodologically  adaptable.  Some  chapters  of  this  dissertation  spend  considerable 16 
time  discussing  the  formal  features  of  texts;  in  others  it  has  seemed  necessary  to 
concentrate  more  on  the  exploration  of  a  text's  historical,  milieu.  As  Sheila  Delany 
says,  'culture  is  not  monolithic:  why  should  our  methods  be?  ',  64 
In  one  of  her  more  theoretical  reflections,  Doob  hints  at  a  central  problem 
of  the  interpretation  of  madness.  'The  simple  fact  of  madness',  she  says,  'is  like 
the  fact  of  a  biblical  narrative:  it  is  nothing  until  it  is  fleshed  out  with 
interpretation'.  65  The  simile  '  here  may  encourage  the  charge  of  Christian 
essentialism,  for  it  suggests  that  madness,  like  a  biblical  narrative,  could  be 
properly  interpreted  in  the  Middle  Ages  only  in  Christian  terms.  Doob's  comment 
also  poses  an  interpretative  paradox:  how  can  the  'fact'  of  madness  be  'nothing'? 
On  the  one  hand,  the  word  'fact'  suggests  a  positivist  methodology,  according  to 
which  madness  is  objectively  and  transparently  'there',  an  undifferentiated 
phenomenon  that  precedes  subjective  interpretation;  on  the  other  hand,  Doob's 
major  point  seems  to  be  that  madness  must  be  constructed. 
The  ambiguity  of  Doob's  formulation  encourages  consideration  of  the 
ontological  status  of  madness,  an  issue  that  has  bitterly  divided  psychiatric 
historians  in  the  twentieth  century.  Michael  MacDonald  points  out  that  until  fairly 
recently  most  historians  of  psychiatry  V 
have  been  philosophical  realists:  they  generally  believe  that  mental 
illnesses  are  actual  diseases  that  can  be  identified  in  historical 
sources.  They  may  grant  that  names  of  mental  maladies  changed 
over  time,  and  so  did  the  interpretations  that  succeeding  eras  placed 
on  them,  but  they  regard  madness  itself  as  a  timeless  and  universal 
phenomenon.  66 
But  mental  illnesses,  as  the  radical  psychiatric  'revisionists'  tend  to  argue,  may 
alternatively  be  seen  as  historically  contingent  'labels  that  authorities  and  laymen 
use  to  stigmatize  certain  kinds  of  unacceptable  behaviour'.  67  Since  neither  of  these 17 
ways  of  looking  at  madness  is  invalid,  what  is  needed  is  some  sort  of 
rapprochement  between  the  two  opposed  schools  of  thought. 
Universalist  and  positivist  approaches  to  the  history  of  madness  are 
common.  In  her  ambitiously  wide-ranging  book  Madness  and  Literature,  for 
example,  Lillian  Feder  treats  irrationality  not  so  much  as  a  social  construction,  but 
--  as  she  writes  in  a  passage  on  Thomas  Hoccleve  --  as  an  ahistorical  or  'perennial 
determinant  of  human  nature'.  68  For  Feder,  whose  chief  theoretical  debt  is  to  the 
ahistorical  psychoanalytical  ideas  of  Freud  and  Jung,  madness  has  essentially  the 
same  form  and  function  in  the  poems  of  Allen  Ginsberg  as  it  does  in  ancient  Greek 
drama.  But  while  there  may  be  many  similarities  among  the  representations  of 
madness  of  very  different  cultures,  the  specific  historical  and  social  factors  that 
shape  concepts  and  experiences  of  madness  in  any  particular  context  must  not  be 
ignored. 
The  tendency  to  globalize  the  concept  of  madness  has  affinities  with  the 
desocialising  methods  of  positivist  psychiatric  history.  Basil  Clarke  discusses  the 
history  of  madness  from  a  medical  perspective,  apparently  confident  that  this  can 
be  easily  kept  apart  from  history.  'The  socio-cultural  context  and  the  evaluations 
which  decide  the  form  of  the  conscious  historical  record';  writes  Clarke,  'are  an 
archaeological  stratum  overlying  the  biological'.  69  Elsewhere  he  writes  that 
the  separateness  of  the  rationalistic,  (including  the  medical)  and 
spiritist  approach  [...  ]  can  facilitate  getting  beyond  the  many 
accounts  of  church  miracles  or  apparent  medical  crudities,  for 
example,  which  tend  to  prevent  enlightenment  about  what  had  really 
happened.  70 
Clarke  is  right  about  one  thing  here:  in  the  Middle  Ages  supernatural  and  rational 
explanations  of  madness  were  separable.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  certain  naivety  in 
his  confidence  that  the  historian  of  psychiatry  can  arrive  at  'enlightenment  about 18 
what  had  really  happened'  simply  by  weeding  out  cultural  specificities  from  the 
historical  record.  In  fact,  such  an  approach  would  leave  nothing  to  examine;  the 
historian  of  madness  must  acknowledge  that  his  subject  exists  ý  at  the  crossover 
between  biology  and  culture.  7' 
Retrospective  clinical  diagnosis  in  historical  cases  is  sometimes  ,  possible 
and  even  unavoidable.  Indeed,  although  our  cultural  formations  have  transformed 
at  a  far  greater  rate  than  our  biology,  a  thoroughgoing  relativism  with  regard  to 
the  human  mind  is  as  worthless  as  any  universalist  psychiatry.  As  Nancy  Partner 
says, 
the  objection  that  we  are  making  an  unwarranted  assumption  in 
thinking  that  the  -  human  ,  mind  was  essentially  the  same  over 
centuries  of  changing  culture  is  a  counsel  of  utter  despair.,  If  the 
deep  structure  of  human  experience  could  change  so  rapidly  and 
profoundly,  altered  by  the  comings  and  goings  of  institutions  and 
beliefs,  then  there  could  be  no  discipline  of  history  at  all,  and  our 
endowment  of  memory  [...  ]  would-be  a  cruel  deception.  As  it  is, 
every  historian  brings  some  notion  of  psychology  to  the 
understanding  of  persons  encountered  through  evidence.  72 
This  means  assuming  the  existence  over  time  of  at  least  some  psychological  and 
physiological  constants.  It  is  quite  reasonable,  therefore,  to  diagnose  Margery 
Kempe  as  suffering  from  a  severe  postpartum  psychosis.  Moreover,  as  is  argued 
later,  Kempe's  experience  of  madness  interestingly  parallels  that  of  many  women 
in  later  times. 
Present-day  diagnoses  are  of  limited  value,  however,  to  the  interpreter  of 
six  hundred  year-old  texts.  The  categories  and  terminology  of  modern  psychology 
cannot  explain  medieval  madness  better  than  those  of  the  Middle  Ages;  there  is  no 
substitute  for  close  attention  to  the  historical  milieu  of  madness.  A  glance  at  the 19 
sterile  attempts  of  psychiatrist-critics  to  'diagnose'  illnesses  in  literary  figures 
according  to  modern  psychological  categories  reveals  the  dangers  of 
anachronism.  73  'Scientific  finality  in  the  description  of  mental  illness',  says 
Duncan  Salkeld,  'is  not  a  goal  worth  striving  for  and  a  pragmatic  approach  in  such 
matters  would  seem  more  viable'.  74  This  means  recognising  the  limited  purchase 
of  twentieth-century  concepts  such  as  'schizophrenia',  'personality  disorder'  or 
even  'mental  illness'  in  the  historical  study  of  madness. 
The  majority  of  historians  of  psychiatry  would  now  doubtless  agree  with 
Michael  MacDonald  that 
retrospective  diagnosis,  while`  not  necessarily  invalid,  yields 
disappointing  results.  A  more  fruitful  approach  to  the  history  of 
insanity  is  to  try  to  account  for  the  shifting  stereotypes  of  mental 
disorder  by  placing  them  in  their  historical  and  cultural  context 
rather  than  trying  to  "read  through"  them,  as  it  were.  75 
After  all,  as  MacDonald  points  out,  historians  do  not  study  insanity  itself 
(whatever  that  may  be),  but  other  people's  observations  of  the  insane.  The 
rejection  of  a  thorough-going  psychiatric  positivism  does  not  imply  that  mental 
illnesses  do  not  really  exist.  It  is  simply  that  we  must  be  more  flexible  in  our 
thinking  about  insanity.  Historians  should  think  of  madness  'like  heart-failure  or 
buboes,  as  a  physical  fact;  but  interpret  it,  like  witchcraft.  or  possession, 
principally  as  a  socially-constructed  fact'.  76  Margery  Kempe's  psychosis  is 
presented  as  a  'physical  fact';  but  it  is  also  an  equally  real  social  construction. 
This  emphasis  on  the  constructedness  of  madness,  of  course,  does  not 
imply  that  madness  is  not  real  to  its  sufferer,  or  that  first-person  experiences  of 
madness  are  irrecoverable.  Yannick  Ripa  writes  that 20 
We  should  always  remember  that  there  are  two  ways  of  looking  at 
madness:  it  can  be  observed  from  the  outside  or  experienced  from 
the  inside.  The  difference  between  experience  and  observation  is 
always  passed  over  in  silence  and  the  hidden  story  of  madness  is 
never  told.  77 
Ripa's  distinction  between  first  and  third  person  observations  of  madness,  however 
schematic,  is  legitimate.  The  validity  of  first  person  accounts  of  madness  in  the 
Middle  Ages,  however,  has  been  undermined  in  recent  years  for  two  not.  unrelated 
reasons.  First  is  the  prejudice  that  madness  cannot  be  perceived  by  its  sufferer; 
second  is  the  antihumanist  premise  that  medieval  people  had  no  concept  of 
subjectivity  or  interiority.  Both  of  these  assumptions,  it  will  be  seen,  are 
untenable.  In  fact,  it  will  be  argued  that  madness  in  the  late  Middle  Ages  was 
often  experienced  and  articulated  as  a  problem  of  the  subject  in  relation  to  his  or 
her  community.  This  study  of  madness  will  examine  not  only  how  the  mad  were 
seen,  but  also,  insofar  as  it  is  possible  and  relevant,  how  they  saw  themselves  and 
their  sickness. 
The  preceding  discussion  has,  it  is  hoped,  indicated  some  of  the  major 
problems  raised  by  the  most  important  secondary  texts  on  madness  in.  medieval 
literature.  Chief  among  these,  perhaps,  is  the  lack  of  critical  consensus  about  the 
definition  of  madness.  This  might  be  overcome  if  commentators  agreed  to 
distinguish,  albeit  weakly,  the  concepts  of  madness  and  folly.  To  fail  to  do  so  is 
simply  to  ignore  an  important  medical,  legal  and  literary  distinction  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  The  focus  of  this  dissertation  is  madness  --  acquired  melancholia  or  mania  -- 
rather  than  folly  or  idiocy. 
Another  general  problem  is  that  assumptions  about  what  madness  is,  how  it 
was  interpreted  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  how  best  to  discover  its  meaning  have  too 
often  been  governed  by  reductive  or  totalizing  theories.  Madness  was  not  regarded 
with  unmitigated  horror,  as  liberal  historians  have  tended  to  insist;  nor  was  it 21 
generally  seen  as  a  mark  of  innocence  and  sanctity,  as  the  disciples  of  Foucault 
have  implied.  In  fact,  the  texts  considered  in  this  dissertation  display  a  range  of 
often  contradictory  attitudes  towards  madness. 
As  far  as  method  is  concerned,  criticism  often  fails  to  appreciate  the 
specificity  of  literary  texts.  The  full  significance  of  madness  in  literature  cannot  be 
elicited  simply  by  applying  the  pronouncements  of  the  Church  Fathers  to  a  variety 
of  texts.  Certainly,  in  order  to  understand  the  various  meanings  of  madness  in 
medieval  texts  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  account  both  theological  and  medical 
ideas  about  madness,  ideas  which  remained  remarkably  stable  throughout  the 
Middle  Ages  and  achieved  the  status  of  conventions.  But  the  specific  material 
conditions  that  could  lead  to  madness  and  the  various  social,  psychological  and 
political  motivations  underlying  allegations  of  insanity  must  also  be  considered. 
While  this  dissertation  does  not  espouse  any  particular  theoretical  approach,  its 
recognition  of  authorial  intention  as  well  as  its  insistence  on  the  necessity  of 
historical  awareness  in  the  interpretation  of  texts  aligns  it  with  so-called  New 
Historical  principles  and  methods. 
It  has  also  been  argued  here  that  while  we  should  not  reject  the  idea  of 
'universal'  diseases,  we  can  only  properly  understand  madness  by  examining  it  in 
its  historical  context.  Finally,  we  must  allow  that  we  can  find  out  things  about 
madness  through  first  person,  as  well  as  third  person  observations:  no-one  has  a 
monopoly  on  knowledge  about  madness.  It  will  be  seen  that  many  medieval 
representations  of  insanity  are  concerned  with  the  tension  between  public 
perception  and  private  experience. 
This  Introduction  has  argued  for  an  opening  out  of  the  discussion  of 
madness  in  the  Middle  Ages  and  for  a  flexible  and  historically  aware  consideration 
of  literature  which  resists  any  kind  of  reduction.  This  is  not  to  say,  of  course,  that 
medieval  texts  shared  no  common  ways  of  understanding  insanity.  Since  it  is 
impossible  to  decide  what  differentiates  texts  without  first  considering  what  unites 22 
them,  we  shall  begin  our  study  of  literary  texts  with  an  examination  of  some 
conventional  ideas  about  madness  in  a  variety  of  discourses. 23 
Notes  to  Introduction 
1  As  Mark  Micale  and  Roy  Porter  write  in  a  recent  survey  of  writings  on 
historical  psychiatry,  'perhaps  no  area  of  the  humanities  today  attracts 
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Discovering  the  History  of  Psychiatry,  ed.  by  Mark  S..  Micale  and  Roy 
Porter  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1994),  p.  4.  ', 
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(New  York:  Random  House,  1965),  p.  241. 
4  Chapters  in  the  History  of  the  Insane  in  the  British  Isles  (London:  Kegan 
Paul,  1882).  On  page  12  Tuke  refers  to  the  'quaint  prescriptions'  for 
madness  in  the  past.  We  should  not,  however,  oversimplify  Tuke's 
viewpoint:  he  ends  his  book,  Micale  and  Porter  point  out,  with  a  'paean  to 
psychiatric  progress  written  by  Dr.  Stokes,  superintendent  of  the  Mount 
Hope  Retreat  in  Baltimore.  But  Tuke  declines  to  endorse  Stokes'.  vision. 
The  history  of  psychiatry  did  not  plot  a  path  of  progress'.  Micale  and 
Porter,  p.  10. 
5  Gregory  Zilboorg,  A  History  of  Medical  Psychology  (New  York:  Norton, 
1941);  '  George  Mora,  'Early  American  Historians  of  'Psychiatry: 
1910-1960',  in  Discovering  the  History  of  Psychiatry,  ed.  by  Mark  S. 
Micale  and  Roy  Porter  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1994),  53-80 
(p.  61). 24 
6  Zilboorg  was  strongly  influenced  by  continental  psychiatric  histories  of  the 
previous  century,  such  as  that  of  Dupouy,  who  'discussed  medieval 
psychiatry  almost  entirely  in  terms  of  "demonomanie"  and  "spiritisme"  and 
sorcery'.  Basil  Clarke,  Mental  Disorder  in  Earlier  Britain  (Cardiff: 
University  of  Wales  Press,  1975),  p.  1.  Zilboorg's  own  influence  in  the 
field  is  inestimable.  His  book,  along  '  with  Alexander  and  Selesnick's 
History  of  Psychiatry,  'provided  the  standard  version  of  psychiatric  history 
for  two  generations  of  medical  students  in  the  United  States'.  Discovering 
the  History  of  Psychiatry,  p.  15.  Zilboorg's  argument  remains  extremely 
popular:  Simon  Kemp  quotes  a  number  of  widely-used  psychiatric 
textbooks  from  the  1980s  which  echo  Zilboorg's  view  of  medieval  attitudes 
towards  madness.  Kemp,  'Modern  Myth  and  Medieval  Madness:  Views  of 
Mental  Illness  in  the  '  European  Middle  Ages  and  Renaissance',  New 
Zealand  Journal  of  Psychology,  14.1  (1985),  1-8  (pp.  1-2). 
7  Mora,  p.  61. 
8  Zilboorg,  pp.  98  and  128.  Such  pronouncements  are  hardly  consonant  with 
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Chapter  1 
Madness  in  the  Late  Middle  Ages: 
Conventions,  Practices  and  Attitudes 
It  is  neither  possible  nor  necessary  here  to  provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  medical, 
theological  or  legal  ideas  about  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Nevertheless,  a  brief 
description  of  the  conventions  of  madness  in  all  areas  of  medieval  culture  will 
enable  us  more  easily  to  identify  representations  of  madness  in  the  following 
chapters  and  to  place  them  in  a  broader  historical  context.  Naturally  there  are 
pitfalls  in  constructing  such  a  'backgrounds'  chapter.  Criticizing  certain  scholarly 
works  about  madness  in  Renaissance  literature,  Carol  Neely  has  warned  that 
medical  theory,  for  example,  is  too  often  conceived  of  'as  a  unified,  `  unchanging 
body  of  material  that  literature  reflects  or  draws  on'.  I  Neely's  comment  is  perhaps 
less  relevant  to  the  medievalist  than'  to  the  Renaissance  scholar:  the  comparative 
stability  of  medieval  medical  --  and,  for  that  matter,  theological  --  ideas  about 
madness  partly  legitimizes  a  'blanket'  approach.  Moreover,  the  proposition  that 
literature  'reflects'  medical  ideas  is  not  untenable.  Neely  is  correct,  however,  to 
imply  that  medical  theory  is  not  necessarily  homogenous.  A  reflection  on  the 
significance  of  the  conventions  of  madness  will  support  the  argument  that  there 
was  a  diversity  of  attitudes  towards  madness  during  the  late  medieval  period,  all  of 
which  might  be  manipulated  by  literary  authors. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  Middle  Ages,  '  didactic  writers  regarded  all 
disease  as  a  divine  punishment  for  sin.  lElfric  tells  how  a  man  who  joked  that  he 
was  St  Swithun  was  struck  lifeless  and  recovered  only  when  he  confessed  his  sin  at 
the  saint's  shrine.  2  Abbot  Leofstan  of  Bury  Saint  Edmunds,  meanwhile,  was 
afflicted  with  various  illnesses,  including  madness,  as  a  punishment  for  an  act  of 
impiety.  3  Madness  was  a  punishment  for  sin  in  literature  as  in  life.  The 33 
graphically  described  physical  and  mental  sufferings  of  Herod  described  in 
numerous  medieval  works  are  always  seen  as  the  consequences  of  spiritual 
turpitude.  Bede,  meanwhile,  relates  how  the  seventh-century  king  Eadbald  was 
punished  for  incestuously  marrying  his  father's  second  'wife.  'His  immorality', 
writes  Bede, 
was  an  incentive  to  those  who  had  [:  `..  ]  submitted  to  the  discipline 
of  faith  and  chastity,  to  revert  to  their  former  uncleanness. 
However,  this  apostate  king  did  not  escape  the  scourge  of  God's 
punishment;  for  he  was  '  subject  to  frequent  fits  of  insanity  and 
possessed  by  an  evil  spirit. 
4 
Here,  again  insanity  is  presented  not  only  as  the  punishment  of  an  individual 
sinner,  but  also  as  a  dire  warning  to  others  to  avoid  the  temptations  of  sin. 
Such  cautionary  tales  are  equally  widespread  in  the  late  Middle  Ages.,  A 
grim  cautionary  story  from  John  Mirk's  Festial  must  suffice  to  convey  the 
powerful  medieval  association  between  madness  and  sin. 
Ther  was  a  man,  a  curset  lyuer,  pat  was  an  officer  to  a  lord.  And  as 
he  rode  to  a  maner  of  De  lordes,  he  fell  wod,  and  so  vnbrydylt  his 
hors  pat  bare  hym  into  a  maner  of  De  lordes.  But  when  he  come  yn, 
anon  De  bayly  sagh  what  De  man  ayled,  and  made  anon  his  hynes 
bynd  hym  to  a  post  in  De  berne.  Then  when  De  bayly  had  ysoupyd, 
he  bade  on  of  his  hynes  go  loke  how  pys  man  dyd.  And  when  he 
come  to  De  berne,  he  segh  pre  grete  doggus  as  blacke  as  a  cole  on 
yche  a  side  plucke  away  hys  flesche.  [...  ]  Thus  who  so  lyueth  a 
fowle  lyfe,  he  may  be  sure  of  a  foule  ende.  5 34 
As  so  often  in  medieval  literature,  madness  here  is  only  one  element  of  a  divine 
punishment  that  ends  in  grisly  death.  Although  madness  could  be  seen  as  a  test  for 
improving  the  just,  it  was  more  commonly  seen  in  didactic  literature  as  a  token  of 
moral  taint.  'To  the  mediaeval  mind',  summarize  Claridge,  Pryor  and  Watkins, 
'madness  was  a  direct  result  of,  and  punishment  for,  unacknowledged  or 
unrepented  sin'.  6 
The  connection  between  sin  and  madness  is  made  clear  in  the  Old 
Testament.  Zechariah  prophesizes  that  those  who  attack  Jerusalem  will  be 
punished  with  insanity:  'On  that  day,  says  the  Lord,  I  will  strike  every  horse  with 
panic  and  its  rider  with  madness'  (Zechariah  12:  4).  In  Deuteronomy,  which  rests 
on  ancient  tradition,  Moses  warns  his  people  that  if  they  'will  not  obey  the  voice 
of  the  Lord  your  God  or  be  careful  to  do  all  his  commandments  and  his  statutes 
[  ... 
]  the  Lord  will  smite  you  with  madness  and  blindness  and  confusion  of  mind' 
(Deuteronomy  28:  15,28).  The  latter  passage  is  used  by  the  thirteenth-century 
writer  -  Bartholomeus  Anglicus  in  his  preface  to  his  discussion  of  madness, 
suggesting  the  influence  of  biblical  tradition  on  medieval  concepts  of  madness.? 
Original  Sin,  it  was  thought,  disposed  all  men  to  madness.  Indeed, 
medieval  theologians  and  didactic  writers  often  attributed  all  disease  to  the  Fall, 
even  if  they  also  discussed  madness  in  terms  of  its  immediate  physical  causes  such 
as  a  psychological  disturbance  or  an  imbalance  of  the  humours.  Humoral  theory 
stated  that  all  illness  is  caused  by  a  disequilibrium  in  the  balance  of  the  four 
humours:  blood,  phlegm,  yellow  bile  and  black  bile,  the  melancholy  humour. 
Before  the  Fall,  men's  bodies  combined  these  humours  in  ideal  proportion  and 
were  therefore  free  from  infirmities.  According  to  the  twelfth-century  theologian 
Hildegard  of  Bingen,  the  Fall  led  to  a  surplus  of  the  melancholy  humour  in 
Adam's  body.  This  imbalance  disposed  him  to  illness  and  melancholy  madness. 
8 
The  Fall  also  caused  mental  derangement  by  altering  man's  psychology.  In 
the  Galenic  'three-ventricle'  psychological  theory,  the  brain  was  divided  into  three 
areas.  The  rear  ventricle  was  memoria.  The  middle  ventricle,  known  as  cogitativa 35 
or  imaginativa,  contained  the  faculty  of  reason  or  estimation;  disorders  of  this 
faculty  caused  melancholia.  The  front  or  anterior  ventricle  housed  the  faculty 
called  imaginatio  or  phantasia,  disorders  of  which  resulted  in  mania. 
9  This  model 
is  widespread  in  the  literature  of  the  late  Middle  Ages.  The  author  of  the 
fourteenth-century  mystical  treatise  The  Cloud  of  Unknowing  attributes  mental 
disorder  to  the  Fall.  The  prelapsarian  imaginatio,  he  explains,  was  'obedyent  vnto 
Pe  reson'  such  that  no  'vnordeynde  ymage'  was  possible.  'Bot  now!,  he  laments, 
'it  is  not  so'.  Man's  first  sin  has  irrevocably  altered  his  physiology  so  that,  unless 
carefully  governed  by  -reason,  his  imagination  leads  him  into  the  error  of 
madness.  10 
Original  Sin,  then,  is  important  in  -the  sense  that  it  -'created  that 
physiological  degeneration  which  would  incline  man  to,  sin  and  serve  as  a 
mechanism  through  which  additional  sins  might  bring  about  earthly  punishment 
[...  ]  without  -  God's  direct  intervention'.  I  I  Dishearteningly,  this  physical 
imperfection  could  only  become  more  acute  as  history  unfolded:  the  myth  of  the 
postlapsarian  world's  gradual  decline  implied  a  corresponding  degeneration  of 
man's  mental  and  physical  condition.  12 
For  medieval  theologians  and  didactic  writers,  then,  all  disease  results  from 
sinfulness,  whatever  its  instrumental  causes;  in  this  sense,  all  men  are  born  with  a 
predisposition  towards  madness.  Nevertheless,  insanity,  unlike  idiocy,  was  thought 
to  be  acquired  rather  than  congenital.  In  the  seventh  century,  Isidore  of  Seville 
distinguished  insania;  an  acquired  mental  disease,  from  amentia,  a  congenital 
intellectual  deficiency.  13  Although  these  categories  soon  fell  out  of  official  use,  by 
the  thirteenth  century  madness  and  idiocy  were  widely  distinguished  along  the 
same  lines:  idiocy  or  'natural  folly'  was  considered  to  be  an  insuperable  condition 
of  intellectual  subnormality;  madness,  on  the  other  hand,  was  acquired  postnatally 
and  was  seen  as  essentially  temporary.  This  distinction  was  particularly  important 
in  legal  contexts,  since  the  property  of  idiots,  but  not  that  of  madmen,  was 
alienated  to  the  crown  for  their  lifetimes.  14  English  law  was  therefore  mainly 36 
concerned  with  establishing  idiocy;  medical  and  literary  authors,  meanwhile, 
displayed  far  more  interest  in  madness. 
If  theology  tended  to  reduce  the  explanation  of  madness  to  the  presence  of 
sin,  medical  and  literary  texts  emphasized  the  diversity  of  the  instrumental  causes 
of  madness.  Perhaps  the  best  guide  to  medieval  medical  ideas  about  madness  is 
provided  by  the  friar  known  as  Bartholomeus  Angliciis  in  his  De  Proprietatibus 
Rerum,  a  popular  thirteenth-century  encyclopaedia  translated'  into  English  by  John 
Trevisa  at  the  end  of  the  following  century.  Bartholomeus  was  perhaps  the  most 
widely  read  authority  on  madness  in  the  late  Middle  Ages  and  his  ideas  about 
madness,  -which  -are  ý  mostly  derived,  from  classical  medical  authorities,  may 
therefore  be  taken  as  typical  of  his  time.  15  There  are,  explains  Bartholomeus,  two 
main  sorts  of  'madness,  'madnes  bat  hatte  mania  and  madnes  bat  hatte 
malencolia'.  16  These  two  distinct  forms  of  madness,  we  have,  already  noted, 
affected  different  areas  of  the  brain:  mania  was  a  disorder  of  the'  imagination, 
melancholia  of  the  reason.  This  basic  division  of  madness  into  mania  and 
melancholia,  and  the  psychological  model  which  underpins  it,  is  central  in  most 
writings  about,  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Although  the  three-ventricle 
psychological  schema  did  not  persist  in  Western  thought  as  long  as  humoral 
theories,  it  was  more  widely  understood  in  the  Middle  Ages  and  is  particularly 
prominent  in  medieval  literature.  17 
Bartholomew  lists  a  number  of  the  instrumental  causes  of  both  mania  and 
melancholia.  'Pese  passiouns',  he  says, 
comep  somtyme  of  malencoly  metis;  and  somtyme  of  dringke  of 
stronge  wyn  that  brennep  be  humours  and  turnep  hem  into  askes; 
somtyme  of  passiouns  of  be  soule,  as  of  besynes,  and  grete  pou3tes 
of  sorwe,  and  of  to  greet  studie,  and  of  drede;  somtyme  of  be 
bitinge  of  a  wode'  hound  obir  of  some  obir  venemous  best; 
sometyme  of  corrupte  and  pestilente  aier  pat  is  infect;  somtyme  of 37 
malis  of  corrupt  humour  pat  hap  ke  maystrie  in  pe  body  of  man  to 
brede  siche  a  sikenes.  18 
The  causes  of  madness,  then,  were  remarkably  various:  thus  Jean-Marie  Fritz  has 
dubbed  the  medical  discourse  on  madness  'le  discours  infini'.  19  Many  of  these 
causes  imply  moral  fault  on  the  part  of  the  madman.  Penelope  Doob.  even  argues 
that  madness  was  always  considered  as'a  sign  of  spiritual  turpitude,  regardless  of 
its  precise  instrumental  cause.  20  Certainly,  as  Claridge,  Pryor  and  Watkins  state, 
'medical  literature,  though  bound  to  note  and  discuss  the  physiological  causes,  in 
no  way  contradicted  the  strong  belief  promoted  by  all  other  literature  of  the  time, 
that  madness  was  punishment  for  sin'.  21 
Moral  interpretations  of  madness  did  not  always,  however,  take  priority 
over  rational  ones.  Man  existed  at  the  nexus  of  the  natural  and  supernatural 
worlds.  Thus  medieval  people,  like  the  ancient  Greeks  from  whom  they  inherited 
many  of  their  medical  ideas,  could  consider  the  causes  of  madness  in  purely 
physiological  or  purely  theological  terms  or,  as  is  often  the  case,  both.  22  As 
Michael  MacDonald  explains: 
The  traditional  medieval  and  Renaissance  model  of  the  universe 
postulated  the  existence  of  both  natural  and  supernatural  forces  at 
work  in  a  hierarchical  order  of  powers  and  beings.  Man  existed  at 
the  point  of  convergence  between  the  natural  and  supernatural 
orders,  and  he  was  subject  to  both  kinds  of  powers.  This  model 
permitted  contemporaries  to  explain  mental  disorder  as  the 
consequence  of  events  that  occurred  on  any  of  the  several  planes  of 
existence,  acting  singly  or  in  concert.  23 
Man's  ability  to  keep  separate  the  natural  and  supernatural  realms  increased  with 
the  rediscovery  of  Aristotle  in  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries.  Aquinas  played 38 
a  particularly  important  role  in  stipulating  what  Walter  Ullman  calls  a  'double 
ordering  of  things',  according  to  which  'full  value  could  now  be  ascribed  to  the 
natural  and  the  supranatural'.  24  From  this  point  on  the  natural  world  could  be  an 
object  of  study  in  its  own  right  and  rational  and  supernatural  explanations  of 
madness  co-existed  in  both  imaginative  and  medical  works. 
From  a  modern  standpoint,  at  least,  the  -  most  irrational  medieval 
explanation  of  madness  is  that  of  demonic  possession.  According  to  many 
twentieth-century  psychiatric  historians,  the  theory  of  possession  entirely  displaced 
rational  thinking  about  madness  and  became  the  only  available  explanation  of 
insanity.  As  suggested  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  prevalence  of  such  one-sided 
views  may  be  attributed  to  the  influential  medical  history  of  Gregory  Zilboorg;  but 
the  many  historians  who  have  accepted  his  account  without  question  are  equally  to 
blame.  Despite  adducing  some  contrary  evidence,  Thomas  B.  Graham  falls  back 
on  Zilboorg's  work  to  support  his  contention  that  in  the  Middle  Ages  'demonology 
[...  ]  became  an  unshakable  basis  for  the  medieval  treatment  of  mental 
disorders'.  25  For  other  commentators,  the  mad  were  regarded  as  witches.  Another 
disciple  of  Zilboorg,  Derek  Coon,  asserts  that  'abnormal  behaviour  was  attributed 
to  supernatural  forces  such  as  possession  by  a  devil  or  the  curses  of  witches  and 
wizards'. 
26  Similarly,  Erwin  Ackerknecht  complains  that  'for  over  a  thousand 
years  the  mentally  ill  were  [...  ]  regarded  as  possessed  by  the  devil  and  by  evil 
spirits,  or  were  considered  to  be  witches  or  sorcerers  who  could  produce  the 
illness  in  others'. 
27 
Each  of  these  statements  is  in  some  way  misleading.  First,  the  popular 
misconception  that  madness  was  associated  with  witchcraft  in  the  Middle  Ages 
may  be  dismissed  as  an  anachronism.  Certainly,  allegations  of  witchcraft  were 
made  against  heretical  sects  in  the  late  Middle  Ages  in  Europe,  and  witchcraft 
trials  became  increasingly  common  during  the  period. 
28  But  witchcraft,  it  appears, 
was  only  rarely  associated  with  insanity:  very  few  of  the  medical,  theological, 
legal  and  literary  texts  dealing  with  madness  link  insanity  with  sorcery.  It  was 39 
certainly  not  until  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century  that  sorcery  became  a 
widespread  concern.  In  1484  Innocent  VIII  declared  war  on  witches  in  his  bull 
'Summis  desiderantes'.  Five  years  later  Kramer  and  Sprenger  produced  their 
Malleus  Maleficarum  (Hammer  of  the  Witches),  which  maintained  that  disbelief  in 
witchcraft  was  heresy.  29  Moreover,  trials  for  witchcraft  peaked  not  in  the  Middle 
Ages  but  in  the  seventeenth  century.  In  asserting  that  witchcraft  was  a,  major 
feature  of  the  Middle  Ages,  then,  Ackerknecht  and  Coon  have  'moved  history 
backwards,  describing  the  events  of  the  16th  and  17th  centuries  as  if  they  occurred 
during  the  ninth  through  12th  centuries'.  30  Coon  and  Ackerknecht  attribute  to 
medieval  people  the  much  later  concern  with  witchcraft,  rather  as  other  historians 
confuse  the  satirical  Renaissance  concept  of  folly  and  the  medieval  concept  of 
madness.  In  both  cases,  attempts  to  understand  medieval  attitudes  towards  insanity 
have  been  bedevilled  by  the  inaccurate  chronologies  of  historians  of  psychiatry. 
Unlike  witchcraft,  demonic  possession  did  indeed  have  a  relation  to 
madness  in  the  Middle  Ages  and  must  therefore  be  explored  more  fully.  Strictly 
speaking,  it  is  misleading  to  talk  of  possession  as  an  explanation  or  even  as  a  form 
of  madness:  madness  and  possession  were  not  identical  and  the  causal  connection 
between  them  was  reversible.  31  Michel  Foucault  cautions  that  many  mistaken 
views  about  madness  have  been  founded  on  errors  and  prejudices  arising  from  the 
confusion  of  madness  and  demonic  possession  and  reminds  us  that  'the  complex 
problem  of  possession  does  not  belong  directly  to  the  history  of  madness,  but  to 
the  history  of  religious  ideas'.  32  Nevertheless,  the  concepts  of  madness  and 
possession  are  inextricably  linked  in  the  Middle  Ages. 
The  Anglo-Saxons  believed  in  possession  by  elves:  Old  English  ifig  means 
'mad'  or  'frantic'.  33  Even  after  the  advent  of  Christianity,  'diseases  attributed  to 
"devils"  by  the  Church  were  still  attributed  to  elves'  by  the  common  folk'.  34 
Elf-lore  seems  to  have  survived  into  the  later  medieval  period,  but  was  by  that 
time  apparently  regarded  with  sophisticated  disdain:  in  Chaucer's  Miller's  Tale, 40 
for  instance,  John  the  carpenter  is  ridiculed  for  his  superstitious  belief  that 
Nicholas's  apparent  madness  is  caused  by  the  operations  of  'elves'  and  'wightes'. 
More  widespread  in  the  late  Middle  Ages  was  the  entirely  orthodox  belief 
in  possession  by  demons.  In  the  classical  world,  of  course,  possession  was  not 
necessarily  negative:  benevolent  daemons  could  inspire  artistic  creation  or 
prophecy,  as  Plato  notes  in  the  Phaedrus.  35  Christianity,  however,  denied  this 
possibility.  As  Michael  Screech  puts  it, 
the  one  fundamental  change  which  Christians"were  obliged  to  make  - 
to  these,  Platonic  teachings,  --  apart  from  replacing  classical 
polytheism  with  trinitarian  monotheism  --  was  to  rule  out  the 
'possession'  of  a  mortal  by  those  good  spirits,  those  good  daemons, 
whom  Christians'  termed  'angels'  ('messengers').  Only  evil 
daemons  ('devils')  can  'possess'  a  human  being.  In  this  way  the 
often  good  classical  daemons  become  the  evil  demons  --of 
Christianity.  36 
For  the  medieval  Church,  therefore,  demonic  possession  was  intimately  connected 
with  evil.  Accordingly,  religious  manuals  severely  rebuke  the  possessed,  although 
the  seventh-century  Penitential  of  Theodore,  reluctantly  concedes  that  'if  a  man,  is 
vexed  by  the  devil  and  can  do  nothing  but  run  about  everywhere,  and  [if  he]  slays 
himself  there  may  be  some  reason  to  pray  for  him  if  he  was  formerly  religious'.  37 
The  best-known  biblical  possession  cases  were  perhaps-  those  of  Saul  (I 
Kings  16:  14-23)  and  the  man  in  the  parable  of  the  miracle  of  the  Gadarene  swine 
(Mark  5:  1-15;  Luke  8:  27-35).  Both  of  these  men,  of  course,  richly  deserve  their 
punishments.  Simon  Kemp  is  right  to  stress  that  'demonic  possession  was  not 
thought  to  involve  a  witch  or  other  human  agent.  The  devil  or  devils  was  assumed 
to  act  on  his  or  their  own  initiative'.  38  Nevertheless,  possession'could  not  occur 41 
without  God's  ordination.  39  The  good  man  could  therefore  be  possessed  by  devils 
only  as  a  test  of  faith. 
Attitudes  towards  demonic  possession,  particularly  insofar  as  it  was  seen  as 
a  cause  of  madness,  appear  to  have  varied  among  different  social  groups.  Traugott 
Oesterreich  concludes  his  survey  of  medieval  cases  of  possession  with  the  remark 
that  they  'are  completely  similar  from  whatever  century  they  may  come'  and  'bear 
the  impress  of  the  stability  which  characterized  that  period'  "40  This-should  not 
imply,  however,  that  attitudes  towards  possession  were  the  same  among  all 
sections  of  medieval  society.  As  scholars  in  many  fields  are  increasingly  coming  to 
realize,  the  Middle  Ages  only  appears  a  'stable'  period  when  -  its  contents  are 
viewed  from  a  single  perspective.  All  of  Oesterreich's  examples  are  drawn  from 
Church  accounts  -  of  exorcisms;  but  a  brief  examination  of  other  sources  reveals 
that  not  everyone  in  the  Middle  Ages  credited  the  theory  of  demonic  possession. 
-  Demons  became  increasingly  numerous  and  ingenious  in  the  late  Middle 
Ages.  41  They  could  now  enter  a  person's  body  and  take  up  residence  in,  it.  In 
most  cases,  possession  was  sanctioned  morally,  as  in  Caesarius  of  Heisterbach's 
story  about  a  five-year-old  girl  who  was  possessed  by  a  demon.  As  she  was 
drinking  milk  her  father  said  to  her:  'I  wish  you  might  eat  the  devil  in  your 
greediness!  '.  Immediately  she  'felt  his  presence  and  was  harrassed  by  him  for 
many  years'.  42  Another  popular  story  about  possession  is  found  in  Gregory  the 
Great's  Dialogues.  A  nun  wanted  to  eat  a  lettuce  so  eagerly  that  she  neglected  first 
to  make  the  sign  of  the  cross  over  it.  She  was  immediately  possessed  by  a  demon 
and  suffered  convulsions.  The  abbot  was  summoned  and  he  prayed  for  her 
healing,  whereupon  the  terrified  devil  asked  what  he  had  done  wrong.  'I  was 
sitting  on  a  leaf  of  lettuce',  complained  the  demon,  'and  she  came  and  ate  me'.  43 
Such  stories  combine  humour  with  a  deep  superstition.  Nevertheless, 
another  amusing  German  anecdote  from  the  fifteenth  century  shows  that  among  the 
educated,  at  least,  demonic  possession  was  not  believed  in  lightly  as  a  cause  of 
madness.  In  his  Liber  de  Reformatione  Monasteriorum  Johann  Busch  relates  an 42 
anecdote  about  his  'cure'  of  a  possessed  woman.  An  agitated  ploughman  came 
running  from  the  fields  to  seek  Busch's  assistance  in  curing  his  wife,  whom  he 
thought  to  be  possessed  by  a  demon.  Examining  the  woman,  Busch  concluded  that 
the  woman's  'possession'  was  no  more  than  one  of  the  'many  fantasies'  which 
tormented  her.  In  order  to  'get  a  whole  brain  again',  Busch  advised  that  the 
woman  should  keep  to  a  sensible  regimen  of  food  and  drink,  including  a  quart  of 
hot  ale  taken  with  butter.  44  The  story  indicates  that  belief  in  possession  was  more 
common  among  the  uneducated  than  the  learned. 
Examining  representations  of  madness  in  Shakespeare's  plays,  Duncan 
Salkeld  notes  a  number  of  cases  of  what  he  calls  'spurious'  possession.  In  such 
cases  'the  spiritual  potency  of  -  the  terms  has  been  "emptied  out",  to  use 
Greenblatt's  phrase;  not  only  into  the  fiction  of  a  play  but  into  the  fiction  of 
characters  -  who  -  either  feign  -  possession,  or  are=  falsely  accused  of  it'.  45 
Representations  of  possession  in  medieval  literature  are  generally  less  playful.  The 
ranting  of  Herod  or  the  fractiousness  of  Noah's  wife  in  medieval  mystery  plays, 
for  instance,  may  be  attributed  to  their  possession  by  the  Devil.  Such  outrageous 
behaviour  doubtless  constituted  a  moral  lesson  as  well!  as  a  comic  spectacle. 
Nevertheless,  both  Chaucer's  Miller's  Tale  and  his  Summoner's  Tale  contain 
examples  of  'spurious'  possession.  By  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages,  moreover,  the 
terms  used  to  refer  to  possession  had  become  detached  from  their  original 
meanings.  '"Lunacy"  and  "demonic  possession"',  writes  Luke  Demaitre,  'referred 
more  consistently  to  the  intermittent  occurrence  of  the  attacks  than  to  their 
respective  causation  by  the  moon  or  the  devil'.  46 
Medical  writers  certainly  gave  little  credence  to  the  theory  of  possession. 
Popular  manuals  sometimes  discuss  the  phenomenon,  but  usually  without  any  hint 
of  moral  censure.  According,  to  the  fifteenth-century  Book  of  Quinte  Essence  the 
possessed  are 43 
born  vndir  Pe  constillacioun  of  saturne,  Pe  wickide  planete.  Forsope 
to  siche  men  deuelis  wole  gladly  appere,  and  minister  to  hem  her 
priuy  temptaciouns  wikinne  the  cours  of  her  bou3tis,  and  these  men 
pus  tormentid  wip  be  passiouns  of  malencoly  comounly  speke  wik 
hem,  stryue  and  dispute  wip  hem  silf  whanne  Pei  be  a-Toone,  pat 
ofte  tymes  obere  folk  may  heere  it.  47 
Such  men,  says  the  book,  are  'turmentid'  with  'noyous.  ymagynaciouns';  but  they 
are  not  blamed  for  their  conditions.  Moreover,  the  suggested  cure  for  possession 
here  is  medical,  not  superstitious.  The  focus  is  therefore  on  the  instrumental, 
rather  than  the  original  supernatural  causes  of  madness.  48 
The  major  medical  texts  of  the  Middle  Ages  have  practically  nothing  to  say 
about  -demonic  possession.  None  of  the  eminent  and'  widely-read  authorities  on 
madness,  including  Bartholomeus  Anglicus,  considers  demonic  forces  to  play  any 
part  in  the  onset  of  madness.  Jerome  Kroll,  goes  so  far  as  to  state  that  'no  major 
medical  work  taught  at  the  universities  prior  to  the  fourteenth  century  pays 
attention  to  demonology'.  49  There  is,  to  be  sure,  a  glancing  reference  to  demonic 
possession  in  the  thirteenth-century  Compendium  Medicine  of  Gilbertus  Anglicus. 
But  even  for  Gilbertus,  'possession  was  never  a  central  hypothesis'.  50  Basil 
Clarke  reminds  us  that  the  idea  of  demonic  possession  was  confined  mainly  to 
popular  tradition  and  that  in  the  received  medical  texts  explanations  of  mental 
disorder  were  'kept  within  the  framework  of  a  rational  pathology.  This  means 
excluding  demonic  explanations,  and  they  do  not  feature  in  the  '  main  textbooks, 
though  they  may  be  mentioned  as  believed  in  by  other  people'.  51 
Clearly,  belief  in  demonology  was  confined  mainly  to  popular  tradition. 
Abelard's  rejection  of  'the  idea  that  the  devil  caused  insanity',  for  example, 
certainly  shows  his  own  scepticism  about  demonic  possession;  but  the  fact  that 
such  denials  were  felt  to  be  necessary  also  indicates  that  such  superstitious  beliefs 44 
were  commonly  held.  52  We  can  say,  however,  that  demonic  possession,  which 
usually  implied  moral  taint,  was  a  far  from  universally  credited  cause  of  madness. 
Attitudes  towards  madness  caused  by  planetary  movements  were  also 
diverse.  Augustine  had  objected  to  astrology,  of  course,  because  it  restricted  free 
will.  In  the  thirteenth  century,  however,  Aquinas  stressed  that  a  person  has 
responsibility  even  for  astrological  madness.  A  person's  passions  may  be  affected 
by  the  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  but  he  or  she  still  has  the  responsibility 
for  opposing  those  passions.  In  doing  so,  Aquinas  implies,  he  opposes  also  his 
will,  which  is  free  and  'in  no  way  subject  to  the  movement  of  the  heavens'.  53  The 
wise  man,  according  to  the  theologians  at  least,  is  able  to  avoid  illness. 
The  medical  use  of  astrology  as  a  predictional  aid  to  anticipate  or  pre-empt 
the  threat  of  madness  was  hampered  by  the  church's  suspicion  of  astrology,  which 
was  proscribed  by  canon  law.  Both  Isidore  and  Bede,  -however;  acknowledged  the 
role  of  the  heavenly  bodies  in  influencing  human  health.  Aquinas  even  notes  that 
doctors  now  use  astrology  as  a  predictional  aid;  but  he  also  reflects  official 
suspicions  about  the  art,  warning,  'I  do  not  want  you  to  become  the  companions  of 
devils'.  54 
'Astrological  speculation  was  widely  regarded  as  a  token  of  overreaching 
and  deranged  imagination.  According  to  Archigenes,  for  example,  madness  can 
lead  the  educated  to  launch  'into  fantastic  astronomical  or  philosophical 
theories'.  55  Christian  thinkers  regarded  such  speculation  as  sinful.  For  Richard 
Rolle,  the  practice  of  astrology  violates  the  first  commandment.  'Alswa  in  is 
commandemente',  says  Rolle,  'es  forbodyn  to  gyffe  trouthe  till  socerye  or  tyll 
dyuynynge3  by  sternys,  or  by  dremys,  or  by  any  swylke  thynges'.  56  As  the  author 
of  Dives  and  Pauper  explains,  those  who  'welyn  been  of  Godys  preuy  counseyl' 
want  to 
puttyn  God  out  of  his  maieste,  out  of  his  kyngdom  and  his 
lordshepe  and  out  of  his  fredam  and  makyn  hym  more  bonde  to  Pe 45 
sterrys  an  euere  was  ony  kyng  or  ony  lord  or  ony  man  vpon  erthe. 
They  welyn  been  of  Godys  preuy  counseyl,  wyl  God  nyl  God,  and 
rewlyn  hese  domys.  57 
It  is  presumably  for  this  reason  that  the  fourteenth-century  Canons  of  Astesanus 
condemns  'the  use  of  the  astrolabe  for  purposes  of  prognostication'  and  a  later 
penitential  requires  two  years  of  atonement  for  'one  who  beholds  things  to  come  in 
an  astolabe'. 
58 
Astrological  studies  could  merit  the  punishment,  of  madness.  Over-curious 
philosophers  and  astrologers  who  persisted  in  their  folly  risked  divine  retribution, 
often  in  the  form  of  insanity.  In  the  eleventh  century  John  of  Salisbury  wrote 
ominously  that  he  had  'attended  the  lectures  of  a  very  large  number  of  astrologers, 
and  known  quite  a  few  personally;  yet  I  recall  none  who  persisted  long  in  this 
error,  but  that  in.  [sic]  the  Lord's  -  hand  brought  some  condign  punishment  on 
him'.  59  Fra  Giordano  of  Pisa,  meanwhile,  chastised  those  who  'want  to 
understand  by  reason  what  they  should  hold  by  faith,  and  attain  to  things  not 
granted  to  them'.  Such  people,  he  warns,  'break  their  necks,  and  go  blind  and 
mad'.  60  Such  is  the  fate  of  Nicholas  in  Chaucer's  Miller's  Tale. 
Of  all  the  heavenly  bodies,  the  moon  in  particular  was  often  credited  with 
causing  madness.  -The  close  connection  between  madness  and  the  lunar  cycle  is 
suggested  by  the  Old  English  adjective  monaß-seoc  which  Toller  translates  as 
'lunatic,  epileptic'. 
61  Bartholomeus  Anglicus  writes  that  the  moon  has  properties 
that  'ben  nou3t  ful  goode'.  Drawing  on  Ptolemy,  he  says  that  the  moon  causes 
men  to  become  'vnstable  and  changeable,  and  renninge  about  fro  place  to  place'. 
The  moon  also  has  the  power  to  bring  about  defects  of  the  eye,  discomfort,  sorrow 
and  also  epilepsy,  the  'fallinge  euel'.  62  Indeed,  the  epileptics  of  Trevisa's 
translation  are  Bartholomeus's  lunaticis  et  caducis. 
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Like  Bartholomeus,  William  Langland  draws  attention  to  the  physical 
instability  of  lunatics  and  their  socially  outcast  state.  But  his  famous  description  of 
the  'lunatyk  lollares'  is  admiring  rather  than  condemnatory: 
Ac  hem  wanteth  wyt,  men  and  women  bothe, 
The  whiche  aren  lunatyk  lollares  and  lepares  aboute, 
And  madden  as  be  mone  sit,  more  other  lasse.  y' 
Careth  they  for  no  colde  ne  counteth  of  non  hete 
And  aren  meuynge  aftur  be  mone;  moneyeles  pey  walke, 
With  a  good  will,  witteles,  mony  wyde  contreyes, 
Riht  as  Peter  dede  and  Poul.  64 
Langland  feels  that  these  harmless  madmen  have  a  special  dispensation  from  God 
for,  their  sins,  `For  vnder  godes  -  secret  seat,  here  synnes  ben  keuered'.  65  He 
therefore  advises  that  'We  sholde  haue  them  to  house  and  helpe  hem  when  they 
come'.  '  Langland's  attitude  lends  some  support  to  the  romantic  view  of  the 
medieval  madman  as  a  blessed  wanderer.  But  such  views  of  madness  are 
uncommon  in  the  late  Middle  Ages.  Moreover,  we  should  be  aware  that  'the 
necessity  to  catechize  the  common  people  on  charity  to  the  insane  suggests  that 
such  charity  was  not  the  rule'.  66 
Explanations  of  lunacy  were  complex.  In  the  third  century  Origen  analysed 
the  case  of  a  biblical  lunatic  who  was  possessed  by  a  demon  (Matthew  17:  14-18), 
explaining  that  the  devil  makes  use  of  the  phases  of  the  moon  in  order  to  possess 
individuals.  67  But  in  the  twelfth  century  Giraldus  of  Wales,  in  Daniel  Tuke's 
words, 
combats  the  interpretation  of'  an  expositor  of  Saint  Matthew- 
[Origen],  who  said  that  the  insane  are  spoken  of  by  him  as  lunatics, 
not  because  their  madness  comes  by  the  moon,  but  because  the 47 
devil,  who  causes  insanity,  avails  himself  of  the  phases  of  the  moon 
(lunara  tempora).  Giraldus,  on  the  contrary,  observes  [...  ]  that  the 
malady  was  in  consequence  of  the  humours  being  enormously 
increased  in  some  persons  when  the  moon  is  full.  68 
To  be  sure,  physiological  explanations  of  lunar  madness  are  not  the  rule:  the 
eminent  thirteenth-century  physician  Gilbertus  Anglicus,  in  his  Compendium 
Medicine,  refers  to  lunatics  as  'possessed'.  69  Nevertheless,  Giraldus's  argument 
typifies  the  late-medieval  tendency  to  keep  separate  the  natural  and  supernatural 
worlds. 
As  well  as  being  influenced  by  the  moon  and  the  stars,  the  incidence  of 
insanity  was  thought-  to  vary  according  to  the  seasons.  Each  season  disposed 
human  beings  to  a  certain  type  of  madness.  70  But  all  types  of  madness  were 
generally  considered  more  likely  to  strike  in  the  summer  months.  In  1270  Norwich 
jail  refused  to  release  a  homicidal  madman  named  Richard  of  Cheddestan.  'The 
same  Richard  is  well  enough',  says  an  advisory  letter  from  the  prison  to  the  court, 
'but  it  cannot  be  said  that  he  is  so  restored  to  soundness  of  mind  that  there  would 
not  be  danger  in  setting  him  free,  especially  when  the  heat  of  summer  is 
increasing,  lest  worse  befall'.  71  The  frenzy  of  Charles  VI  of  France  always 
returned  in  hot  weather.  In  Capgrave's  words,  'as  long  as  be  wedir  was  hote,  his 
sekenes  cesed  neuyr'.  72  Hoccleve's,  Complaint  also  contains  the  '  idea  that  the 
summer  heat  induces  insanity. 
Both  Hoccleve  and  Margery  Kempe  make  extensive  use  of  the  analogy 
between  madness  and  drunkenness.  The  association  between  drunkenness  and 
madness,  first  made  in  Aristotle's  Problems,  became  remarkably  common  inýthe 
Middle  Ages:  William  of  Conches,  for  example,  compared  the  frenzied  man  to  the 
drunkard,  for  whom  everything  is  shifting  and  unstable.  73  Chaucer's  Friar  John 
remarks  that  'Wyn  maketh  man  to  lesen  wrecchedly  /  His  mynde  and  eek  his 48 
lymes  everichon',  74  and  the  Pardoner  quotes  Seneca  to  the  effect  that  there  is  no 
difference 
Betwix  a  man  that  is  out  of  his  mynde 
And  a  man  which  that  is  dronkelewe, 
Save  that  woodnesse,  yfallen  in  a  shrewe, 
Persevereth  lenger  than  doth  dronkenesse.  75 
Drunkenness  was  the  perfect  analogy  for  madness,  since  both  were  manifested  by 
essentially  temporary  bouts  of  riotous  behaviour. 
Drunkenness  and  madness  were  also  connected  causally.  The  tenth-century 
Persian  physician  Haly  Abbas  notes  that  'ebriety,  if  frequent,  brings  many  evils  to 
the  body,  among  them  the  destruction  of  the  ruling  power'  and  'weakening  of  the 
mind'.  76  Later  in  the  Middle  Ages,  Bartholomeus  Anglicus  describes  how  one  of 
the  types  of  madness  he  classifies  --  stupor  --  can  result  from  excessive  drinking, 
which  quenches  the  body's  natural  heat.  77  Such  humoral  arguments  are  also  used 
by  Bartholomeus  to  explain  madness  induced  by  excessive  eating.  'If  mete  and 
drink  passeth  mesure',  he  warns, 
moisture  waxip  to  swithe  and  kynde  hete  feblip  [...  ]  pat  malicious 
smoke  [...  ]  disturbip  Pe  substaunce  and  Pe  vse  of  resoun,  and  ryuep 
and  apeirep  Pe  tongue  pat  tellith  what  resoun  menep,  and  makep  Pe 
tonge  stamere  and  faille,  as  it  is  iseye  in  dronken  men.  78 
From  a  purely  practical  viewpoint,  alcohol  unfitted  a  man  for  his  public 
duties.  In  his  The  Office  and  Dewtie  of  Kingis,  William  Lauder  advises  that  those 
responsible  for  the  selection  of  priests  'sulde  nocht  chuse  vnto  that  cure  /  Ane 
Vinolent  nor  wod  Pasture'.  79  In  religious  contexts  drunkenness  is  considered  a 
moral  atrocity.  It  is  in  itself  the  specific  sin  of  gluttony,  as  well  as  a  cause  of 49 
further  sins.  Bartholomeus,  for  example,  warns  of  the  deleterious  effects  of 
drinking  wine:  'wyn  makep  hem  pat  drinkep  perof  wood  and  out  of  here  witte  and 
rese  woodliche  in  obere  men'.  80  Drunkenness  was  also  a  voluntary  rejection  of 
God-given  reason,  rendering  it  all  the  more  heinous.  As  Chaucer's  Parson  baldly 
declares,  'whan  a  man  is  dronken,  he  hath  lost  his  resoun;  and  this  is  deedly 
synne'. 
81  Thus  the  drunken  man  is  often  likened  to  a  beast.  Indeed,  the  stages  of 
drunkenness  were  sometimes  classified  according  to  different  animals,  a 
convention  to  which  Chaucer's  Manciple  refers  when  he  chastises  the  Cook  with 
the  obscure  words,  'I  trowe  that  ye  dronken  han  wyn  ape'.  82  As  H.  W.  Janson 
notes,  'being  a  synonym  for  "fool",  the  ape  was  particularly  well  qualified  to 
suggest  the  irrational  antics  of  topers'.  83  But  since,  in  philosophical  contexts;  apes 
were  compared  to  men  in  all  but  the  faculty  of  reason,  'the  word  ape  became 
widely  used  to  signify  a  man  who  lacks  the  power  of  reason'.  84 
Excessive  study  was  considered  a  common  cause  of  madness  in  the  Middle 
Ages.  Unlike  the  eighteenth  century,  the  Middle  Ages  regarded  the  over-use  of 
human  reason  not  as  the  antithesis  of  madness,  but  its  apotheosis.  Michel 
Foucault's  comment  on  the  connection  between  learning  and  madness  in  the 
Renaissance  --  although  suggestive  of  the  satirical  spirit  of  that  era  --  also  holds 
good  for  the  Middle  Ages: 
madness  is  the  punishment  of  a  disorderly  and  useless  science.  If 
madness  is  the  truth  of  knowledge,  it  is  because  knowledge  is 
absurd,  and  instead  of  addressing  itself  to  the  great  book  of 
experience,  loses  its  way  in  the  dust  of  books  and  in  idle  debate; 
learning  becomes  madness  through  the  very  excess  of  false 
learning.  85 
This  idea,  of  course,  is  a  longstanding  one.  'He  that  increaseth  knowledge', 
according  to  Ecclesiastes,  'increaseth  sorrow'  (Ecclesiastes  1:  18).  In  Acts,  Paul's 50 
account  of  his  career  before  Agrippa  attracts  the  censure  from  Festus:  'Paul,  thou 
art  beside  thyself;  much  learning  doth  make  thee  mad'  (Acts  26:  24). 
The  late-medieval  emphasis  on  the  virtues  of  a  weak  intellect  combined 
with  a  distrust  of  the  learning  of  scholars  to  fortify  the  connection  between  study 
and  madness.  Many  medieval  illustrations  picture  the  fool  in  a  long  white  gown 
'that  has  associations  both  with  madmen  and  with  scholars'.  86  Study  is  posited  as 
a  cause  of  madness  in  many  of  the  literary  texts  examined  here,  and  is  a  cause  of 
madness  in  medical  textbooks.  Study-induced  madness  could  be  seen  as  a 
punishment  for  the  presumption  of  over-curiousity,  although  ý  medieval  physicians 
generally  note  study  as  a  cause  of  madness  with  no  tinge  of  moral  censure.  87 
In  certain  contexts,  anger  is  regarded  as  a  cause,  and  sometimes  a  form  of 
insanity;  according  to  Doob,  '  habitual  anger  is  madness;  it  is  not  simply  .  like 
madness'.  88  Religious  writers  eagerly  made  the  connection,  between  ira  -and 
madness.  According  to  Dan  Michel,  ire  makes  a  man  'al  oute  of  wytte'.  89  John 
Mirk,  meanwhile,  asks  the  reader  of  his  Instructions  for  Parish  Priests:  'Hast  pow 
any  tyme  be  wroth  so  /  pat  jay  wyv  hath  be  a-go?  '.  90  The  major  medical  texts 
seldom  mention  anger  as  a  cause  or  a  form  of  madness.  In  romances,  however,  the 
common  adage  ira  est  furor  brevis  is  often  exemplified  by  the  knights  who  fight, 
in  Malory's  words,  'woodly'  or  'as  men  outraged  of  resoun'.  The  courtly  fondness 
for  anger  madness  is  also  reflected  in'  Chaucer's  Knight's  Tale;  here  the,  Temple  of 
Mars  is  inhabited  by  the  disturbing  personification  of  'Woodnesse,  laughynge  in 
his  rage'  (2011). 
Anger  could  overlap  with  other  passions  to  produce  madness.  According  to 
Lydgate's  account  of  Herod's  life  in  the  Fall  of  Princes,  Herod  enters  a  jealous 
fury  following  his  slaughter  of  his  allegedly  adulterous  wife: 
Reste  hadde  he  non  novther  day  nor  niht, 
Troublid  with  furye  that  he  wex  frentik, 
With  dremys  vexid  &  many  an  vnkouth  siht; 51 
Of  cheer  nor  clour  to  no  man  he  was  lik, 
And  eueri  moneth  onys  lunatik.  91 
Herod's  subsequent  acts  of  random  violence,  embellished  by  Lydgate  from  the 
historical  accounts,  ensure  that  his  raging  madness  quickly  becomes  a  grotesque 
spectacle,  like  that  of  the  choleric  friar  in  Chaucer's  Summoner's  Tale. 
Grief,  sorrow  and  fear  constitute  a  further  category  of  causes  of  insanity. 
In  medieval  literature;  these  are  most  common  in  the  romances,  which  place 
particular  emphasis  upon  the  emotions  of  their  protagonists.  Bartholomeus 
Anglicus  reminds  us  that  melancolia  'comep  of  drede  and  sorwe'.  92  But  grief 
could  also  induce  manic  behaviour.  Thus  Jacob,  believing  his  son  to  be  dead,  'rent 
his  cloths,  and  put  sackcloth  upon  his  loins,  and  mourned  for  his  son  many  days' 
(Genesis  38:  34).  -Similarly,  Chaucer's  Melibee,  on  hearing  of  the  injury  done  to 
his  wife  and  daughter,  'lyk  a  mad  man,  rentynge  his  clothes,  gan  to  wepe  and 
crye'.  93 
Medieval  attitudes  towards  grief  depended  largely  upon  the  extent  and 
duration  of  mourning.  In  the  appropriate  circumstances,  a  certain  amount  of 
grieving  indicates  a  noble  sensitivity.  As  Gottfried  von  Strassburg  notes  in  his 
Tristan,  'when  a  man  grieves  for  his  friend  and  acts  loyally  towards  him  when  he 
has  died,  this  ranks  above  all  reward,  this  is  the  very  crown  of  loyalty'.  94  Thus 
Chaucer's  grieving  Man  in  Black  solicits  more  sympathy  than  condemnation,  and 
the  same  is  arguably  true  of  Melibee.  But  although  'clamorous  mourning'  can  be 
seen  'as  an  edifying  thing'  in  the  late  Middle  Ages,  prolonged  grief  is  treated  with 
suspicion,  especially  in  the  romances.  95  In  Chretien  de  Troyes'  Cliges, 
Soredamors'  grief  at  the  death  of  Alexander  is  so  great  that  she  dies  of  a  broken 
heart.  Alis  and  Cliges,  on  the  other  hand,  are  praised  for  ceasing  their  grief  in  due 
course:  'Alisand  Cliges  both  mourned  him  becomingly,  but  finally  ceased  their 
grief,  for  sorrow,  like  everything  else,  must  be  outlived.  To  continue  in  sorrow  is 
wrong,  for  no  good  can  come  of  it'.  96 52 
Medieval  theologians  stressed  the  immorality,  as  well  as  the  mentally 
deleterious  effects  of  excessive  mourning.  The  ninth-century  Penitential  of  Saint 
Hubert,  for  example,  proscribes  the  outward  display  of  grief:  'If  anyone  lacerates 
himself  over  his  dead  with  a  sword  or  his  nails,  or  pulls  his  hair,  or  rends  his 
garments,  he  shall  do  penance  for  forty  days'.  97  When  Malory's  Lancelot  faints 
for  grief  at  Guinevere's  funeral,  a  hermit  upbraids  him:  'Ye  be  to  blame,  for  ye 
dysplese  God  with  suche  maner  of  sorow-makyng'.  98  As  Doob  comments, 
'although  literary  judgments  are  seldom  so  harsh,  we  must  still  be  aware  of  the 
possibility  of  moral  fault  in  characters  temporarily  mad  through  grief  such  as 
Heurodis  in  Sir  Orfeo,  the  Dreamer  in  Pearl,  or  Melibee'.  99 
JA  rarer  but  nevertheless  significant  cause  of  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages  is 
fear,  particularly  in  the  context  of  battle.  The  convention  has  a  long  history.  , As 
H.  M.  Chadwick  notes,  'the  incident  of  a  warrior  going  mad  in  the  course  of  battle 
is  of  not  infrequent  occurrence  in  the  Irish  stories  relating  to  seventh  and  following 
centuries'.  100  In  the  Irish  poem  Buile  Suibhne  (The  Frenzy  of  Suibhne), 
battle-madness  is  an  instrumental  cause  of  the  hero's  madness,  which  is  a 
punishment  for  an  earlier  impiety: 
Now,  when  Suibhne  heard  these  great  cries  together  with  their 
sounds  and  reverberations  in  the  clouds  of  heaven  and  in  the  vault 
of  the  firmament,  he  looked  up,  whereupon  turbulence,  and 
darkness,  -and  fury,  and  giddiness,  and  frenzy,  and  flight, 
unsteadiness,  restlessness,  and  unquiet  filled  him,  likewise  disgust 
with  every  place  in  which  he  used  to  be  and  desire  for  every  place 
which  he  had  not  reached.  His  hands'were  palsied,  his  heartbeat 
quick,  his  senses  were  overcome,  his  sight  was  distorted,  his 
weapons  fell  naked  from  his  hands,  so  that  through  Ronan's  curse 
he  went,  like  any  bird  of  the  air,  in  madness'and  imbecility.  '101 53 
Likewise,  in  Geoffrey  of  Monmouth's  Vita  Merlini,  Merlin  becomes  mad  after  a 
battle.  These  two  poems  are  the  earliest  in  which  the  theme  of  madness  is  central. 
Although  neither  Suibhne  nor  Merlin  is  entirely  blameless  for  his  madness,  both 
are  portrayed  sympathetically.  As  J.  S.  P.  Tatlock  puts  it,  'it  is  highly  probable  that 
Geoffrey's  extremely  original  and  striking  poem  [...  ]  started  the  vogue  of  the  hero 
as  madman  sympathetically  regarded'.  102 
- 
Finally,  there  is  'love  madness'  or  erotomania,  which  is  widely  considered 
a  form  of  madness  in  medieval  literature.  This  belief  has  been  challenged  from  a 
number  of  perspectives.  Michel  Foucault  suggests  a  philosophical  reason  why  love 
was  not  a  prominent  cause  of  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages:  'As  long  as  there  was 
an  object',  he  writes,  'mad  love  was  more  love  than  madness'  " 
103  Nevertheless, 
the  insanity  of  earthly  love  is  emphasized  by  the  churchmen.  'Moral  Gower'  holds 
that 
Dum  carnalis  amor  animum  tenet  illaqueatum, 
Sensati  racio  fit  racionis  egens: 
Dum  iubar  humani  sensus  fascatur  in  umbra 
Carnis,  et  in  carnem  mens  racionis  abit, 
Stans  hominis  racio  calcata  per  omnia  carni 
Seruit,  et  ancille  vix  tenet  ipsa  locum. 
[When  carnal  love  holds  the  mind  ensnared,  an  intelligent  man's 
reason  becomes  irrational.  When  the  brightness  of  human 
intelligence  is  clouded  over  by  the  shadow  of  the  flesh,  and  the 
spirit  of  reason  withdraws  into  the  flesh,  man's  reason  stands  utterly 
scorned.  It  is  a  slave  to  the  flesh,  and  scarcely  retains  the  post  of 
handmaiden].  104 
Insanity  caused  directly  by  love,  however,  rarely  features,  in  medieval  literature. 
Chaucer's  Palamon  may  be  described  by  Arcite  as  'sik  and  wood  for  love'  (1600); 54 
but  in  the  romances,  as  Judith  Neaman  points  out,  'love  madness  [erotomania] 
does  not  exist'. 
105  The  heroes  of  romance  become  mad  not  for  love,  but  for  the 
loss  of  love,  that  is,  through  the  instrumental  causes  of  grief,  fear,  anger  or  some 
combination  of  these  passions. 
This  brief  survey  of  the  causes  of  madness  illustrates  the  difficulty  in 
generalizing  about  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages;  nevertheless,  it  also  provides  a 
definite  conclusion.  Although  madness  was  associated  with  sinfulness  in  religious 
writing,  medical  works  --  especially  the  major  textbooks  of  the  late  Middle  Ages  -- 
did  not  usually  include  moral  explanations.  Physiological  causes  of  madness  were 
not  always  seen  as  the  mere  instruments  of  higher  forces  and  it  is  hasty  to  assume 
that  they  presuppose  wickedness  as  the  root  cause  of  madness.  I 
This  point  is  clearly  illustrated  by  the  accounts  of  two  famous  late-medieval 
cases  of  madness.  Froissart's  Chronicles  relate  that  Charles  VI  of  France  was 
suddenly  struck  with  delusions  and  frenzy  when  on  a  campaign  against  the  Duke 
of  Brittany  in  August  1392.  As  Doob  writes, 
Charles's  case  is  highly  representative  of  medieval  attitudes  toward 
madness.  Almost  every  conceivable  cause  is  considered  except  for 
possession.  [...  ]  More  important,  the  story  illustrates  the  tendency 
of  every  man  to  interpret  the  disease  as  he  wishes:  to  Guillaume  [a 
physician]  it  is  physiological  only;  to  the  popes  it  is  moral;  to  the 
king's  brothers  it  suggests  no  weakness  on  the  king's  part,  coming 
instead  from  poison  or  from  spells  cast  by  political  enemies.  106 
Another  theory  was  that  Charles's  madness  was  due  to  his  extreme  anger  at  the 
Duke  of  Brittany,  which  overheated  his  black  bile.  107 
Attitudes  towards  the  madness  of  the  Flemish  painter  Hugo  van  der  Goes 
were  similarly  diverse.  Fortunately  for  the  fact-starved  student  of  the  history  of 
madness,  we  have  an  unusually  full  account  of  the  circumstances  surrounding 55 
Hugo's  madness.  The  onset  of  Hugo's  first  psychotic  attack  recalls  that  of  Charles 
VI's  breakdown.  While  on  a  journey  in  about  1480  the  painter  'was  struck  by  a 
strange  disorder  of  the  imagination.  He  cried  out  incessantly  that  he  was  doomed 
and  condemned  to  eternal  damnation.  He  would  even  have  injured  himself  had  he 
not  been  forcibly  prevented  by  his  companions'.  108  We  might  conjecture  that  the 
painter's  madness  was  in  some  way  related  to  his  'artistic  temperament'.  In  the 
post-medieval,  as  in  the  ancient  world,  an  artist's  divine  inspiration  has  often  been 
regarded  as  a  form  of  insanity:  Tasso  himself  associated  his  poetic  gifts  with  the 
violent  psychosis  for  which  he  was  institutionalized;  later,  the  romantics  made  a 
sentimental  connection  between  poetry  and  madness,  '  epitomized  by  the  sorry 
example  of  Hölderlin.  But  such  ideas  were  not  current  in  Northern  Europe  in 
Hugo's  time. 
After  Hugo's  death,  Gaspar  Ofhuys  --  Hugo's  biographer,  and  infirmarius 
of  his  monastery  after  1482  --  summarized  contemporary  opinion  about  the 
painter's  affliction.  Despite  his  feeling  that  'only  God  can  tell'  what  ailed  Hugo, 
Ofhuys  suggests  some  possibilities.  'We  may  thus  have  two  diverse  opinions  on 
the  disease  of  our  brother',  writes  Ofhuys; 
on  the  one  hand  we  might  say  that  his  was  a  case  of  a  natural 
disease.  [...  ]  There  are  of  course,  several  types  of  the  disease 
depending  on  its  original  cause:  sometimes  the  cause  is  melancholic 
food;  at  other  times  it  is  the  consumption  of.  strong  wines  which 
heat  the  body  juices  and  burn  them  to  ashes.  Furthermore,  frenzies 
may  occur  because  of  certain  sufferings  of  the  soul  like  restlessness, 
sadness,  excessive  study  and  anxiety.  Finally,  frenzy  may  be  caused 
by  the  virulence  of  noxious  juices,  if  such  abound  in  the  body  of  a 
man  who  inclines  to  that  malady.  109 JO 
Ofhuys's  list  of  the  causes  of  madness  recalls  that  of  Bartholomeus  Anglicus; 
indeed,  it  is  by  no  means  unlikely  that  Ofhuys  had  encountered  the  latter's  popular 
encyclopaedia  through  his  medical  training.  The  significant  point  here,  however,  is 
that  all  of  these  suggested  causes  are  rational. 
Othuys  was  writing,  however,  as  a  chronicler  as  well  as  a  physician. 
Unlike  Bartholomew,  he  records  contemporary  speculation  about  the  possible 
moral  causes  of  madness.  Some  of  Hugo's  acquaintances  believed  that  it  was 
God's  all-loving  providence  which  had  ordained  this  malady.  This 
brother  had  been  flattered  enough  in  our  Order  because  of  his  great 
art  --  in  fact,  his  name  became  more  famous  this  way  than  if  he  had 
remained  in  the  world.  But  since  he  was,  after  all,  just  as  human  as 
the  rest  of  us,  he  had  developed  a  rather  high  opinion  of  himself 
due  to  the  many  honours,  visits  and  compliments  which  were  paid 
to  him.  But  God,  `not  wanting  his  ruin,  in  his  great  mercy  sent  him 
this  chastening  affliction  which,  indeed,  humbled  him  mightily.  For 
brother  Hugo  repented  and,  as  soon  as  he  had  recovered  he 
exercised  the  greatest  humility.  110 
The  disagreement  about  the  explanation  of  Hugo's  illness-  suggests  that  by  the 
fifteenth  century  a  scepticism  about  supernatural  causes  of  insanity  existed 
alongside  less  rational  beliefs.  With  the  increase  in  the  circulation  of  medical  texts 
in  the  fifteenth  century  it  is  likely  that  this  scepticism  filtered  downwards  to  a 
wider  section  of,  society.  At  all  events,  the  works  of  writers  who  lived  in  quite 
different  circumstances,  such  as  Thomas  Hoccleve  -and  Margery  Kempe,  contain 
similarly  diverse  explanations  of  madness. 
In  theory,  at  least,  the  identification  of  madness  was  rather  easier  than  its 
explanation.  As  Judith  Neaman  points  out,  -mental  disorders  in  the  Middle  Ages 
were  'diagnosed  largely  by  behavioural  symptoms  which  are  conceived  of  as  clear ýl  / 
and  easily  recognisable'. 
III  Sometimes,  however,  an  individual's  speech  was 
made  the  basis  of  diagnosis.  This  was  certainly  the  case  with  idiocy.  In  1383 
Emma  de  Beston  of  Bishop's  Lynn  was  questioned  by  a  panel  in  order  to 
determine  whether  she  was  an  idiot.  The  importance  of  the  panel's  decision  has 
already  been  outlined:  the  property  of  idiots  or  'natural  fools'  was  alienated  to  the 
Crown.  Emma's  interrogation,  held  at  St  Benedict's  church  in  Lincoln,  proceeded 
as  follows: 
Being  asked  in  what  town  she  was,  she  said  that  she  was  at  Ely. 
Being  asked  what  day  that  Friday  was,  she  said  she  did  not  know. 
Being  asked  how  many  days  there  were  in  the  week,  she  said  seven, 
but  could  not  name  them. 
Although  she  had  been  married  three  times,  Emma  could  recall  the  name  of  only 
one  of  her  husbands.  Her  responses  to  questions  about  the  relative  values  of 
various  coins  -were  equally  unsatisfactory.  The  interrogating  panel  found  that 
Emma  'was  not  of  sound  mind,  having  neither  sense  nor  memory  nor  sufficient 
intelligence  to  manage  herself,  her  lands  or  her  goods'.  The  record  only  adds  as  an 
afterthought  the  comment  that,  'as  appeared  by  inspection,  she  had  the  face  and 
countenance  of  an  idiot'.  112  Clearly,  Emma's  mental  condition  was  ascertained 
principally  by  an  analysis  of  her  thought-processes  rather  than  her  appearance  or 
behaviour. 
Insanity,  however,  usually  gave  itself  away.  For  Bartholomeus  Anglicus 
the  'tokenes  and  signes'  of  madness  'is  diuers,  for  som  criep,  and  lepip,  and  hurtik 
and  woundil  hemself  and  opir  men,  and  lotiep  and  hidip  hemsilf  in  pri[uley  place 
and  hidelis'.  113  These  symptoms,  most  of  which  are  associated  with  mania,  are 
equally  commonplace  in  literature.  In  Piers  Plowman,  Langland's  'lunatik  lollares' 
leap  about  the  countryside  aimlessly.  The  manias  of  Margery  Kempe  and  Heurodis 58 
in  the  fourteenth-century  romance  Sir  Orfeo  are  manifested  by  self-mutilation  and 
screaming. 
114 
Indeed,  mania  was  characterized  by  violent  gestures  of  excess. 
Melancholia,  by  contrast,  entailed  the  absence  of  interest  and  energy,  macabre 
thoughts  and  a  tendency  to  solitary  grieving.  The  madman's  desire  for  solitude 
often  causes  him  to  flee  civilization  and  become  wild  or  bestial.  The  biblical 
prototype  for  this  behaviour  is  of  course  Nebuchadnezzar,  whose  pride  is  punished 
by  madness: 
The  same  hour  was  the  thing  fulfilled  upon  Nebuchadnezzar:  and  he 
was  driven  from  men,  and  did  eat  grass  as  oxen,  and  his  body  was 
wet  with  the  dew  of  heaven,  till  his  hairs  were  grown  like  eagles' 
feathers,  and  his  nails  like  bird's  claws.  (Daniel  4:  33) 
In  his  Anatomy  of  Melancholy,  the  Renaissance  physician  Robert  Burton  records  a 
number  of  cases  of  melancholy  madmen  who  believed  themselves  to  be,  and  in 
some  cases  were  seen  to  be,  bears  or  cattle.  "Another  form  of  insanity,  remarks 
Burton,  is  lyncanthropy  or  'Wolfe  madnesse,  when  men  runne  howling  about 
graves  and  fields  in  the  night,  and  will  not  be  perswaded  but  that  they  are  Wolves 
or  some  such  beasts'.  115  Bartholomeus  Anglicus  notes  that  some  men  in  the 
throes  of  what  he  calls  passio  melancolya  'if  they  here  the  kockes  crowe  they 
rereth  vp  here  armes  and  crowith,  and  trowith  that  hemsilf  be  kockes'.  Such 
fantasies,  he  continues,  are  based  ultimately  on  biblical  tradition,  as  in  the  case  of 
a  nobleman  pat  fel  into  suche  a  madnes  of  melancolye  pat  he  in  alle 
wise  trowed  pat  he  himself  was  a  catte,  -  and  kerfore  he  wolde 
nowher  reste  but  vndir  beddes  Pere  cattis  waitid  aftir  myse.  And  in 
cas  in  wreche  of  his  synnes  Nabugodonosor  was  ipunyshid  wip 59 
suche  a  peyne,  for  it  is  iwriten  in  stories  pat  seuen  3ere  hym  semed 
at  he  was  a  best  purou3  diuers  schappis:  Iyoun,  egle,  and  ox.  116 
Even  English  legal  discourse  reflects  this  association  between  madness  and 
animality.  The  thirteenth-century  legal  theorist  Bracton  saw  the  civil  status  of 
individuals  as  dependent  on  their  possession  or  lack  of  reason  and  he  compared 
not-responsible  individuals  to  animals. 
117  This  extremely  loose  criterion  attests  to 
the  medieval  West's  increasing  preoccupation  with  distinctions  between 
civilization  and  animality. 
Literary  madmen  such  as  Chretien  de  Troyes'  Yvain,  Merlin  and  the 
Middle  English  Orfeo  take  on  the  appearance  of  wild  men  and  wander  alone  in  the 
forests.  Particularly  moving  is  the  plight  of  the  Middle  Irish  Suibhne,  the 
battle-maddened  hero  who  wanders  emaciated  and  naked  through  desolate 
countryside  in  appalling  weather  conditions,  all  the  time  described  as  a  bird.  Like 
the  beasts,  ý  madmen  lost  the  power  of  speech.  'And  so  if  men  askep  of  suche  what 
pey  drede  and  wherefore  Pei  bep  sory',  says  Bartholomeus,  'pey  hauep  none 
answere'. 
118  Thus  Malory's  Dynadan  finds  the  deranged  Lamerok  in  the  forest, 
where  'he  lay  lyke  a  fole  grennynge  and  wolde  nat  speke'.  119  The  muteness  of  the 
madman  indicates  both  his  total  separation  from  social  conventions  and  his 
physical  and  moral  degradation  to  the  condition  of  a  beast.  Indeed,  the  behaviour 
of  the  medieval  madman  always  betokens  a  radical  loss  of  identity.  The  tearing  of 
garments,  a  symptom  of  grief-madness  in  many  medieval  texts  including  Sir  Orfeo 
and  Chaucer's  Tale  of  Melibee,  is  more  than  a  random  act  of  destruction;  in  an  age 
in  which  clothes  supposedly  indicated  social  station,  it  also  signifies  an  abdication 
of  rank. 
Real  lunatics  behaved  like  literary  madmen.  As  Jean-Marie  Fritz  points 
out,  the  forest  is  the  traditional  haunt  of  madmen  in  reality  as  well  as  in  the 
romances:  like  any  romance  hero,  Charles  VI  was  struck  with  madness  in  the 
forests  of  Northern  France.  120  It  is  therefore  extremely  difficult  to  separate 60 
conventional  and  actual  expressions  of  insanity  in  the  Middle  Ages.  In  real  life  and 
in  works  of  medicine,  literature  and  even  law,  the  symptoms  of  madness  are 
described  in  remarkably  similar  ways.  All  medieval  writers  were  deeply  influenced 
by  biblical  accounts  of  madness.  The  behaviour  of  the  possessed  man  in  the 
miracle  of  the  Gadarene  swine,  for  example,  resembles  both  Bartholomeus 
Anglicus's  description  of  mad  behaviour  and  the  conduct  of  the  insane  knights  of 
medieval  romance:  'Always,  day  and  night',  says  St  Mark,  'he  was  in  the 
mountains,  and  in  the  tombs,  -  crying,  and  cutting  himself  with  stones'  (Mark  5:  5). 
Such  precedents  do  not  account,  however,  for  the  ways  in  which  the  mad 
were  cared  for  in  the  Middle  Ages.  We  have  already  noted  that  the  medieval 
madman  did  not  lead  an  entirely  'easy  wandering  existence'.  While  it  may  be  true 
that,  'in  contrast  to  diehard  nineteenth-century  interpretations,  the  treatment  of  the 
insane  in  the  Middle  Ages  was  characterised  by  tolerance',  the  insane  were  often 
confined  or  restrained.  121 
Madmen  in  the  Middle  Ages  were  treated  well  under  the  law.  Measures 
were  taken  to  ensure  that  the  madman's  property  was  not  misappropriated  or 
misused.  In  fourteenth-century  Bristol  it  was  the  custom  that 
the  mayor  must  see  that  his  goods  and  chattels  are  taken  and  given' 
to  his  nearest  friends  to  look  after  until  he  recovers  his  sound  mind. 
And  his  friends  must  place  a  sufficient  guard  on  the  persons  of  such 
madmen  as  will  ensure  that  they  come,  to  no  harm  or  loss  and  that 
they  do  not  harm  to  others. 
122 
This  treatment  is  certainly  favorable  compared  with  that  of  natural  idiots,  whose 
goods  were  alienated  to  the  crown. 
If  the  preservation  of  the  madman's  property  was  a  public  matter,  the  care 
of  his  person  was  often  left  to  individuals.  In  the  Anglo-Saxon  period,  at  least, 
there  is  no  evidence  of  a  'regular  custom  of  confining  even  violent  mental  patients 61 
in  churches  and  prisons'.  123  In  fact,  throughout  the  Middle  Ages  madmen  were 
usually  looked  after  at  home  by  relatives  or  were  simply  allowed  to  wander  freely, 
especially  if  they  posed  no  threat  to  public  order.  The  madman's  life  was  often 
peripatetic:  madmen  held  in  town  jails  were  often  expelled  to  other  cities  at  public 
expense,  while  certain  almshouses  turned  away  insane  or  quarrelsome 
vagrants. 
124  Arrangements  were  flexible  and  ad  hoc.  In  fifteenth-century  Scotland 
a  deranged  or  idiot  girl  -was  sent  by  her  parents  to  be  looked  after  by  a  gentleman 
on  the  remote  Monarch  Isles  off  North  Uist  'lest  she  should  be  seen  of 
strangers'. 
125  This  expulsion  indicates  that  the  insane  were  popularly  thought  to 
constitute  an  embarrassing  spectacle. 
In  the  late  Middle  Ages  there  is  evidence  that  European  public  authorities 
assumed  limited  responsibility  for  the  control  of  the  insane.  Between  1377  and 
1397,  for  example,  the  city  of  Nürnberg  had  37  insane  people  in  its  charge.  The 
municipal  accounts  of  Hildesheim,  meanwhile,  show  expenditures  for  82  lunatics 
between  the  years  1384  and  1480.  Often  these  madmen  were  confined:  throughout 
Germany  in  the  fourteenth  century,  madhouses  or  mad  cells  were  built  for  this 
purpose.  126  There  is  also  evidence  of  institutional  confinement  in  medieval 
France.  In  Caen  and  St-Omer  at  least,  madmen  were  confined  in  towers,  as 
Michel  Fosseyeux  puts'  it,  'comme  des  prisonniers'.  127  The  insane  were  also  sent 
for  detention  at  Chätelet  of  Melun,  south  of  Paris.  128 
In  cases  of  violent  frenzy,  confinement  was  combined  with  physical 
restraint.  Here  again,  imaginative  ,  works  reflect  the  social  reality.  In  the 
fourteenth-century  poem  Sir  Orfeo  the  madmen  lying  in  the  Fairy  King's  castle  are 
casually  described  as  'ybounde'.  129  Indeed,  in  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth 
centuries  Bartholomeus  Anglicus's  injunction  that  madmen  'be  ibounde,  pat  pey 
hurte  not  hemsilf  and  opir  men'  was  put  into  practice  across  Europe.  130  When 
asked  if  he  would  join  the  Cistercian  order,  Walter  Map  wryly  instructed  his 
attendants:  'should  it  ever  so  happen  that  I  resolutely  insist  on  becoming  a  monk 
then  bind  me  with  chains  and  fetters  as  a  lunatic  who  has  lost  his  wits,  and  keep 62 
me  in  close  custody  until  I  repent  and  recover  my  senses'.  131  In  Mallorca  in 
1360,  the  guardian  of  a  certain  'den  Cassellas'  was  given  the  following  instruction 
by  the  governor  of  the  island:  'to  avoid  any  danger,  we  give  you  permission  [...  ] 
that  the  said  Casellas  be  locked  up  at  home  or  manacled,  or  whatever  you  think 
best,  and  do  it  in  such  a  way  that  no  harm  can  be  done  to  anyone  by  that 
person'. 
132  In  the  Hotel-Dieu  in  Paris,  some  of  the  mad  were  placed  in  enclosed 
beds  with  two  observation  windows;  those  in  ordinary  beds  were  tied  to  them  with 
strong  bonds.  133  Clearly,  violent  madmen,  at  least,  were  distinguished  from  other 
ill  people  in  late-medieval  hospitals. 
Indeed,  the  hospitalisation  of  the  mad  begins  not  in  the  Age  of  Reason,  but 
in  the  late  Middle  Ages.  In  1409  Juan  Gilabert  Joffre  established  the  West's  first 
hospital  for  the  insane.  at,  Valencia;  after  being  moved  at  the  sight  of  a  group  of 
boys  stoning  and  insulting  a  madman.  This  famous  story,  as  H.  C.  Erik  Midelfort 
points  out,  is  significant  for  two  reasons: 
first,  because  it  is  evidence  that  not  all  elements  of  medieval  society 
accepted  madness  as  part  of  life,  and  second,  because  it 
demonstrates  that  the  founding  of  mental  hospitals  did  not  wait  for 
the  "absolutist"  or  "bourgeois"  repression  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  134 
J.  H.  Baas  long  ago  showed  that  special  houses  for  the  insane  were  established  in 
various  Spanish  towns  throughout  the  fifteenth  century.  135 
At  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages  the  insane  in  England  were  occasionally 
confined  and  restrained  in  hospitals  or  prisons:  As  early  as  1216  there  was  a 
hospital  at  Chester  for  'poor-silly  people',  a  phrase  which  suggests  that  the  insane 
and  the  poor  were  not  then  clearly  distinguished  and  that  wealthier  lunatics  were 
cared  for  at  home  by  relatives.  136  But  it  is  only  in  the  later  part  of  the  fourteenth 
century  that  the  hospitalization  of  the  insane  becomes  a  major  concern.  In  1369  a 63 
chaplain,  Robert  Denton,  obtained  a  licence  to  found  a  hospital  at  All  Hallows, 
Barking,  for  'priests  and  others,  men  and  women  who  suddenly  fell  in  a  frenzy 
and  lost  their  memories  until  such  time  as  they  recover'.  137  Salisbury's  Holy 
Trinity  hospital  was  also  admitting  insane  patients  in  the  fourteenth  century. 
138 
Bethlem  hospital  in  1403  contained  six  men  described  as  menti  capti.  The 
hospital  inventory  records  'six  chains  of  iron,  with  six  locks;  four  pairs  of 
manacles  of  iron,  and  two  pairs  of  stocks'. 
139  The  Historical  Collections  of  the 
mayor  of  London  indicate  that  by  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century  Bethlem  was 
already  receiving  significant  numbers  of  insane  patients,  some  on  a  short-term 
basis,  others  pending  the  operation  of  divine  grace: 
And  yn  that  place  ben  founde  many  men  that  ben  fallyn  owte  of  hyr 
wytte.  And  fulle  honestly  they  ben  kepte  in  that  place;  and  sum  ben 
restoryd  unto  hyr  witte  and  helthe  a-gayne.  And  sum  ben,  a-bydyng 
there  yn  for  evyr,  for  they  ben  falle  soo  mucke  owte  of  hem  seife 
that  hyt  ys  uncurerabylle  unto  man. 
Hospital  records  note  donations  for  the  insane  throughout  the  fifteenth  century.  140 
A  lazar  house  -in  Holloway,  Bath,  was  'appropriated  to  the  use  of  lunatics' 
sometime  during  the  fifteenth  century. 
141 
Baas  attributes  the  belated  flourishing  of  lunatic  asylums  to  ecclesiastical 
prejudice  against  the  insane.  This  accords  only  too  well  with  the  dubious  liberal 
assumption  that  madhouses  were  essentially  benevolent  institutions  and  that 
sympathy  for  the  insane  was  impossible  until  the  dawn  of  the  Age  of  Reason.  In 
any  case,  we  have  already  seen  that  the  medieval  insane  were  not  always,  as  Baas 
claims,  'regarded  as  persons  "possessed"  by  the  devil  and  his  male  and  female 
assistants'.  142  `  The  only  clear  fact  that  emerges  from  a  discussion  of 
hospitalization  is  that  madmen  were  not  °  always  allowed  to  wander  '  freely, 
especially  towards  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages. 64 
The  mad  were  not  held  responsible  for  any  crimes  they  committed  while 
insane,  and  were  simply  imprisoned  in  the  interests  of  public  safety  until  they 
recovered  from  what  was  often  regarded  as  a  temporary  condition.  The  best 
example  is  that  of  the  homicidal  maniac  Richard  of  Cheddestan,  a  Norfolk  man 
who  in  1270  murdered  his  wife  and  two  children  before  attempting  suicide.  He 
was  confined  in  prison  indefinitely.  Some  time  later,  a  letter  from  Norwich  jail  to 
local  justices  reported  that  'the  same  Richard  is  well  enough;  but  it  cannot  be  said 
that  he  is  so  restored  to  soundness  of  mind  that  there  would  not  be  danger  in 
setting  him  free'.  143  The  prison  in  this  case  seemed  to  serve  as  a  sort  of  early 
mental  hospital.  There  is,  at  all  events,  no  suggestion  that  Richard's  prolonged 
detention  had  a  punitive  aspect:  if  madmen  were  regarded  by  moralists  as 
responsible  for  their  sufferings,  they  seem  nevertheless  to  have  enjoyed  sanctuary 
under  the  law. 
Confinement  and  restraint  were  useful  in  cases  of  short-term  insanity, 
especially  in  violent  cases;  but  they  were  not  considered  to  be  cures  for  madness. 
Yet  throughout  the  Middle  Ages  physicians  battled  against  madness  and  argued 
about  the  best  remedies  for  it.  Like  the  causes  of  madness,  the  treatments 
advocated  for  insanity  were  sometimes  religious  or  superstitious,  sometimes 
rational  in  character.  Moreover,  although  remedies  for  madness  focussed  primarily 
on  the  body,  there  is  also  evidence  that  what  are  now  termed  'psychotherapeutic' 
practices  were  applied  to  the  insane  in  the  Middle  Ages.  As  Basil  Clarke  writes, 
'One  conclusion  which  is  certain  is  that  at  no  point  in  the  Middle  Ages  will  one 
generalisation  serve  to  describe  all  the  formulations  and  treament  of  mental  illness 
which  were  being  employed'. 
144 
The  only  specifically  religious  remedy  for  insanity  was  exorcism.  It  is  still 
unclear  how  commonly  exorcisms  were  performed  and  it  would  be  easy  to 
overestimate  their  importance.  The  Church  itself  seems  to  have  been  unsure  of  the 
usefulness  of  exorcism:  a  decretal  of  the  synod  of  Reims,  for  example,  warns  that 
lunatics  are  more  in  need  of  medical  aid  than  exorcism.  145  At  all  events,  'insanity 65 
was  thought  to  be  curable  through  physical  and  mental  methods  without  recourse 
to  demonology,  especially  in  psychoses  which  had  been  caused  through  emotional 
upset'. 
146  Exorcisms  are  certainly  not  represented  in  medieval  English  literature. 
Throughout  the  medieval  period,  and  well  beyond,  popular  cures  for 
insanity  included  the  use.  of  herbs,  incantantions  or  holy  relics  and  the  visting  of 
holy  shrines  and  wells. 
147  Such  remedies  did  not,  of  course,  constitute  a  coherent 
system  of  treatment  and  tended  to  combine  rational  and  superstitious  elements. 
The  madman  in  the  thirteenth-century  French  play  Le  Jeu  de  la  Feuillee  is  advised 
to  go  home  and  take  rest  after  a  cure  by  holy  relics  proves  ineffective.  Popular 
remedies  often  involved  physical  cruelty:  a  thirteenth-century  window  at 
Canterbury  depicts  a  maniac  being  dragged  by  his  friends  to  the  shrine  of  St 
Thomas,  tied  with  ropes  and  thrashed  with  birch-rods.  148  Many  such  treatments 
for  insanity  continued  to  be  used  until  the  nineteenth  and  even  the  twentieth 
century. 
In  the  late  Middle  Ages,  rational  treatments  for  insanity  also  become 
important.  For  Michel  Foucault,  the  medieval  madman  had  not  yet  become  the 
subject  of  positivist  medicine.  It  is  certainly  true  that  the  ideas  of  the  medical 
schools  did  not  immediately  or  entirely  displace  popular  religious  beliefs  and 
practices.  Nevertheless,  as  Brian  Stock  writes,  'in  contradistinction  to  what  Weber 
proposed,  the  historical  evidence  suggests  that  the  Middle  Ages  were  the  period  in 
which  rationality  began  to  play  a  significant  role  in  Western  society  and 
culture'. 
149  From  the  twelfth  century  onwards,  methods  of  dealing  with  insanity 
were  transformed  as  the  increasingly  important  medical  schools  of  Salerno, 
Montpellier  and  Paris  trained  physicians  in  the  treatment  of  madness.  150  By  the 
end  of  the  Middle  Ages-the  growing  medical  scepticism  about  supernatural  cures 
of  madness  is  reflected  in  Guy  de  Chauliac's  contemptuous  dismissal  of  the 
'wommen  and  [...  ]  many  ydeotis  or  foles,  the  whiche  remitten  seke  men  for  all 
manere  of  sekenesse  onliche  to  seyntes',  151 66 
Some  of  the  remedies  for  insanity  in  the  textworks  are  bizarre  to  the 
modern  reader.  Bartholomeus  Anglicus,  for  example,  suggests  that  in  cases  of 
frenzy  the  patient  ought  not  to  be  shown  images,  his  head  should  be  shaved  and 
washed  in  vinegar  and  his  forehead  smeared  with  the  juice  of  lettuce  or  poppy.  152 
Nevertheless,  it  seems  that  many  peculiar  and  even  apparently  cruel  physical 
remedies  for  madness  were  motivated  by  compassion  rather  than  cruelty  and  were 
often  based  on  rational  principles. 
One  such  treatment  is  flogging.  Although  this  practice  is  not  mentioned  in 
late-medieval  medical  texts,  it  was  employed  in  the  Middle  Ages,  especially  in  the 
early  period.  A  tenth-century  leech  book  recommends:  'in  case  a  man  be  lunatic, 
take  the  skin  of  a  mere-swine,  work  it  into  a  whip.  Swinge  the  man  therewith, 
soon  he  will  be  well.  Amen'.  153  Basil  Clarke  asserts,  inexplicably,  that  this 
practice  implies  a  'simple  belief  in  demonism'.  154  But  this  is  not  the  only  possible 
explanation  of  flogging.  In  fact,  whipping  may  have  been  employed  only  to 
diminish  the  madman's  capacity  for  violence  in  accordance  with  Bartholomeus 
Anglicus's  observation  that  'harsh  treatment  of  the  body  removes  pain  from  the 
head  and  soothes  frenzy'.  155  This  rationale  presumably  underlies  Bartholomeus's 
suggestion  that  the  man  suffering  from  stupor  should  'be  drawe  and  ihalid 
strongliche  be  pe  here  of  his  berd  and  of  his  hed,  and  pat  his  face  be  often 
iwassche  with  coolde  watir  and  his  feet  ifrotid  often  vndir  Pe  soles'.  156  The 
physician  Bernard  de  Gordon  advocates  a  very  similar  treatment  for  lethargy: 
And  if  they  are  in  a  profound  torpor,  as  I  have  seen  many,  their 
hair  on  the  head,  beard  and  chest  should  be  pulled;  they  should  be 
seized  by  the  nose,  their  finger  squeezed  and  their  lower  members 
tightly  tied. 
But  Bernard  is  aware  of  the  thin  line  between  harsh  but  necessary  treatment  and 
abuse,  claiming  that  'many  die  because  the  medical  attendants  think  that  this 67 
treatment  is  cruel'.  157  Indeed,  medieval  medicine  took  what  might  be  called  an 
humane  approach  to  the  treatment  of  madness.  Even  haphazard  and  dangerous 
surgical  operations,  normally  only  undertaken  as  a  last  resort  in  cases  of  stubborn 
insanity,  were  well-intentioned.  158 
Psychiatric  historians  have  concerned  themselves  mainly  with  the  physical 
cures  for  insanity  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Nevertheless,  madness,  although  regarded 
principally  as  a  somatic  affliction,  was  often  treated  by  methods  which  worked  on 
the  mind  rather  than  the  body.  An  asylum  founded  by  King  Alonzo  at  Zaragoza  in 
1425  became  famous  for  giving  good  'moral  treatment'  for  madness-159  Usually 
such  treatment  consisted  of  down-to-earth  advice.  In  his  Castel  of  helth  (1539) 
Thomas  Elyot  writes  that 
Affectes  and  passions  of  the  mynde  [...  ]  yf  they  be  immoderate  [...  ] 
bringe  a  man  from  the  use  of  reason,  and  sometyme  in  the 
displeasure  of  almighty  god.  Wherefore  they  [men]  do  not  only 
require  the  helpe  of  phisyke  corporall,  but  also  the  counsell  of  a 
man  wyse  and  well  lerned  in  morall  philosophye.  160 
Elyot's  opinion  that  melancholics  should  'flee  darknes,  moche  watche,  and 
busynesse  of  mynde,  moche  companieng  with  women'  is  typically  medieval  and 
recalls  the  advice  given  by  the  beggar  to  the  melancholic  Hoccleve  in  the  Prologue 
to  his  Regement  of  Princes.  161 
The  textbooks  of  the  Middle  Ages  commonly  recommend  a  sort  of 
occupational  therapy.  Paul  of  Aegina  suggests  'suitable  exhilaration  of  the  mind', 
while  Bartholomeus  Anglicus  advises  that  the  madman  refrain  from  'busy  pou3tis' 
and  find  some  gentle  occupation.  162  Reading  and  rational  discourse  were 
considered  appropriate  diversions.  The  Roman  physician  Celsus  points  forward  to 
Hoccleve's  Dialogue  with  a  Friend  when  he  advises  that 68 
the  patient  is  to  be  agreed  with  rather  than  opposed,  and  his  mind 
slowly  and  imperceptibly  is  to  be  turned  from  irrational  talk  to 
something  better.  At  times  also  his  interest  should  be  awakened;  as 
may  be  done  in  the  case  of  men  fond  of  literature,  to  whom  a  book 
may  be  read.  163 
Music  was  also  considered  to  calm  the  mind.  Bartholomew  Anglicus  follows 
Celsus  in  recommending  that  the  madman  be  'gladed  wip  instrumentis  of  musik', 
and  in  cases  of  possession,  music  could  mollify  evil  spirits.  164  Music  therapy  was 
used  to  cure  Hugo  van  der  Goes,  whose  case  has  already  been  mentioned.  The 
account  of  Hugo's  mental  breakdown  by  the  painter's  biographer  Gaspar  Ofhuys 
indicates  how  both  the  perception  and  the  treatment  of  madness  were  influenced  by 
biblical  tradition.  When  Hugo  became  deranged,  Ofhuys  relates,  the  prior  of  his 
monastery  was  summoned  to  the  scene  of  his  collapse: 
Seeing  this  sick  man  and  learning  all  that  had  happened  he 
presumed  that  brother  Hugo  was  suffering  from  the  same  complaint 
that  had  once  afflicted  King  Saul,  and  reflecting  that  Saul's  disorder 
had  yielded  when  David  played  his  harp,  he  immediately  gave 
orders  to  play  music  frequently  in  Hugo's  presence.  165 
The  prior's  conduct  here  is  incredible  to  the  modern  reader:  despite  assimilating 
thoroughly  the  particular  details  concerning  the  onset  of  Hugo's  madness,  his 
instructions  are  finally  based  on  biblical  precedent.  To  the  medieval  mind,  both 
the  diagnosis  and  the  treatment  of  madness  were  inextricably  bound  up  with 
tradition. 
The  survey  of  medieval  attitudes  towards  madness  provides  a  number  of 
conclusions.  First,  it  is  clear  that  the  symptoms  of  madness  in  real  life  conform 
closely  to  literary,  especially  biblical,  precedents.  This  makes  any  firm  distinction 69 
between  fictional  and  real  cases  of  madness  extremely  difficult  --  a  point  to  which 
we  will  return  later. 
Other  conclusions  challenge  certain  assumptions  about  medieval  medical 
approaches  to  madness.  Although  madness  was  considered  principally  as  a  somatic 
affliction,  it  was  sometimes  recognized  and  treated  in  mentalistic  terms.  Thus  the 
medical  practices  of  late  Middle  Ages  point  forward  to  the  modern  concept  of 
madness  as  a  disease  of  the  mind  rather  than  the  body:  hence  Hoccleve's  view, 
discussed  in  Chapter  5,  that  a  man's  mental  condition  cannot  always  be  detected 
by  his  appearance. 
For  other  reasons,  generalized  views  of  the  Middle  Ages  or  its  approach  to 
insanity  are  untenable.  Madness,  it  has  been  seen,  was  habitually  interpreted  by 
the  churchmen  as  a  sign  of  moral  taint.  Yet  theological  interpretations  of  madness 
did  not  prevent  rational  investigation,  especially  as  the  prestigious  medical  schools 
developed  in  the  late  Middle  Ages.  Even  the  widespread  superstitious  belief  in 
demonic  possession  was  not  credited  by  all  sections  of  medieval  society.  In  fact, 
rational  and  spiritual  explanations  of  madness  co-existed  throughout  the  Middle 
Ages.  This  means  that  the  theme  of  madness  could  be  used  in  literary  texts  to 
produce  diverse  effects  ranging  from  moral  condemnation  to  sympathy.  The 
chapters  that  follow  attempt  to  describe  some  of  the  ways  in  which  these  effects 
are  manipulated  by  medieval  authors. 70 
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Chapter  2 
'Knightes  that  ar  so  wood':  The  Meanings  of  Madness 
in  Middle  English  Romance 
Cultural  historians  have  detected  an  increased  preoccupation  with,  and  sometimes 
incidence  of  madness  in  various  epochs.  Thus  Michael  MacDonald  holds  that 
'interest  in  insanity  quickened  about  1580',  while  Lynn  White  Jr  contends  that  a 
number  of  factors,  such  as  the  experience  of  famine  and  warfare,  made  the  period 
1300-1650  the  most  'psychically  disturbed'  era  of  European  history.,  Whatever 
the  merits  of  these  necessarily  vague  claims,  it  is  a  true  generalization  that  in  the 
twelfth  century  madness,  which  was  receiving  increasing  attention  as  a  subject  of 
study  in  the  medical  schools,  emerged  as  a  common  theme  in  Western  literature.  2 
The  renewed  interest  in  madness  is  most  evident  in  the  medieval  romances. 
These  works  tend  to  present  insanity  in  a  stereotypical  fashion,  illustrating  the 
paradigms  of  mad  behaviour  and  certain  conventional  interpretations  of  madness. 
These  traditional  ideas  about  madness  have  deep  historical  roots:  although  the  texts 
discussed  here  are  primarily  English  works  of  the  late  Middle  Ages,  their 
portrayals  of  madness  are  typical  of  the  continental  romances  on  which  they  are 
generally  based.  This  typicality  makes  the  romances  a  useful  starting  point  for  a 
discussion  of  madness  in  Middle  English  literature. 
There  are  contradictory  critical  opinions  about  the  general  attitude  towards 
madness  in  the  romances.  Many  years  ago  John  Revell  Reinhard,  in  his 
introduction  to  the  French  romance  Amadas  et  Ydoine,  stated  that  'the  Middle 
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by  miraculous,  unexplainable  means'.  3  Reinhard  is  correct  in  part:  although  they 
are  perfectly  explicable  within  a  Christian  framework  of  sin  and  punishment, 
supernatural  cures  of  madness  are  common  in  the  romances.  Nevertheless,  rational 82 
explanations  and  treatments  also  abound.  In  the  1930s,  Elizabeth  A.  Wright  found 
that  'medieval  French  romances  and  plays  reflect  a  worldly,  comparatively 
realistic  view  of  mental  illness,  little  influenced  by  the  doctrines  of  the 
churchmen'. 
4  The  romances  often  eschew  fantastical  and  supernatural  explanations 
of  madness.  To  take  one  example,  romance  heroes  do  not,  like  Nebuchadnezzar  or 
the  Irish  hero  Suibhne,  physically  metamorphosize  into  beasts  during  their  periods 
of  madness.  Despite  being  referred  to  as  a  'creature'  throughout  his  madness, 
Chretien  de  Troyes'  Yvain  remains  a  man.  5  Clearly,  the  romances  incorporate 
both  supernatural  elements  and  realistic  description.  Here,  as  in  other  genres  of 
medieval  literature,  madness  has  a  double  nature,  attesting  both  to  the  power  of 
God  to  chastise  sinners  and  to  more  secular  concerns. 
In  the  non-chivalric  romances,  the  moral  interpretation  of  madness  tends  to 
prevail.  The  hero's  madness  marks a  transition  from  sinful  to  holy  folly,  as  in  the 
remarkably  popular  metrical  romance  King  Robert  of  Sicily.  6  Like 
Nebuchadnezzar,  Robert  is  a  proud  and  powerful  king  who  oppresses  his  subjects 
and  whose  crimes  are  eventually  punished  by  madness.  In  all  the  versions  of  the 
story,  he  is  chastened  by  an  angel  after  boasting  of  his  great  might.  Robert's 
claims  to  kingship  are  taken  to  be  the  delusional  ravings  of  a  madman;  his  head  is 
shaved  and  he  becomes  a  fool.?  His  appearance  alters  so  much  that  he  is 
unrecognisable,  even  to  his  own  brothers,  and  he  is  forced  to  sleep  every  night 
with  dogs.  At  his  lowest  point,  he  becomes  a  maniac,  tearing  his  hair  and 
wringing  his  hands.  In  the  English  version  of  the  tale,  Robert  compares  his  plight 
to  that  of  Nebuchadnezzar.  Eventually,  like  his  biblical  predecessor,  he 
acknowledges  the  superior  might  of  God  and  is  immediately  restored  to  his  senses. 
A  similar  pattern  is  apparent  in  the  fourteenth-century  poem  Sir  Gowther, 
the  English  version  of  the  popular  Robert  the  Devil  legend.  8  Gowther,  the  duke  of 
Austria,  is  born  of  a  union  between  his  mother  and  the  devil.  Like  Robert,  he 
abuses  his  power  to  oppress  the  weak,  especially  those  in  religious  orders.  After 
learning  about  his  diabolical  origins,  however,  Gowther  goes  to  Rome  to  be 83 
absolved  of  his  sins  by  the  pope.  The  penance  he  receives  is  to  adopt  the  standard 
trappings  of  the  madman: 
'Pow  shalt  walk  norp  and  sowpe, 
And  gete  pi  mete  owt  of  houndis  moue; 
Pis  penaunce  shalt  thow  gynne. 
And  speke  no  word,  even  ne  odde, 
Til  pow  have  very  wetyng  of  Godde 
Foryevyn  be  all  by  sinne.  '  (283-288)9 
Gowther  faithfully  follows  these  directions.  First  he  wanders  into  a  'fer  contree' 
for  three  days,  where  he  is  fed  by  a  greyhound.  He  then  enters  a  castle,  where  he 
sits  in  silence  beneath  the  king's  banqueting  table  gnawing  a  bone  brought  to  him 
by  a  spaniel.  The  courtiers  regard  him  as  a  madman.  After  a  suitable  period  of 
abjection,  he  becomes  'Godes  child'  and  undergoes  a  spiritual  and  social 
regeneration.  By  the  end  of  the  tale,  Gowther  has  become  a  saint  with  the  power 
to  cure  the  insane. 
The  hero  of  the  fifteenth-century  English  romance  The  Tale  of  Beryn 
undergoes  a  comparable  transformation.  10  Beryn  is  the  spoiled  son  of  a  Roman 
Senator,  Faunus,  and  his  wife  Agea.  As  a  young  man  he  oppresses  and  attacks  the 
poor  and  innocent,  behaviour  that  recalls  that  of  Robert  the  Devil  and  which  has  a 
similar  outcome.  Beryn  also  plays  at  dice,  a  conventional  fool  activity;  in  short,  he 
is  caught  in  the  snare  of  folly.  Eventually  the  destitute  Beryn  is  forced  to  wear 
rags  (1295-1298).  In  this  wretched  and  distracted  state  he  shuns  the  town  and 
wanders  to  the  church.  Like  Gowther  during  his  exile,  he  begins  to  show  the 
symptoms  of  insanity,  such  as  an  inability  to  speak  (1321-1322). 
Naked  and  held  in  general  'disdeyn',  Beryn  begins  to  repent  his  youthful 
folly.  Visiting  his  mother's  tomb,  he  is  so  bitterly  afflicted  with  grief  and  remorse 
for  his  previous  neglect  that  he  loses  his  senses  and  collapses  (1336-1344).  That 84 
Beryn  becomes  mad  through  an  internal  passion  rather  than  some  external  agency 
suggests  that  he  has  more  in  common  with  the  knights  of  Arthurian  romance  than 
with  figures  like  Robert  of  Sicily.  When  he  regains  consciousness,  he  displays  the 
conventional  symptoms  of  mania: 
So  atte  last,  when  Beryn  a  litill  wakid  were, 
He  trampelid  fast  with  his  feet,  &  al  to-tare  his  ere 
And  his  visage  both,  ry3t  as  a  woodman, 
With  many  a  bittir  tere,  that  from  his  eyen  ran; 
And  sighid  many  a  sore  sigh,  &  had  much  hevynes;  (1349-1353) 
Only  now,  in  his  greatest  abjection,  does  Beryn  ask  mercy  of  God  for  his 
'mys-dede  &  foly'  (1362).  As  in  many  works  of  late-medieval  literature,  madness 
constitutes  a  spiritual  turning  point  in  the  life  of  the  sinner.  Like  Gowther,  Beryn 
is  made  to  recognize  his  sinfulness  through  a  period  of  penitential  madness;  also 
like  Gowther,  he  determines  to  atone  for  his  misdeeds.  Beryn  now  becomes  a  fool 
in  the  eyes  of  the  world  by  abandoning  his  worldly  privileges  and  journeying  to  a 
foreign  and  hostile  land.  Finally,  the  theme  of  'wise  folly'  is  introduced  through 
Beryn's  association  with  a  tonsured  fool  named  Geffrey,  who  helps  the  hero  to 
overcome  his  enemies. 
Clearly,  the  heroes  of  all  of  these  romances  progress  from  the  sinful  folly 
of  youth  to  Christian  foolishness,  via  a  brief  period  of  insanity.  This  pattern,  so 
common  in  didactic  contexts,  is  apparent  in  a  variety  of  medieval  literary  works, 
including  The  Book  of  Margery  Kempe.  11  Madness  was  clearly  an  attractive  theme 
to  medieval  religious  writers,  who  often  adapted  or  interpolated  non-Christian 
material  to  meet  the  didactic  requirements  of  their  texts.  From  the  viewpoint  of  the 
'religious'  romances,  madness  is  a  useful  metaphor  for  sinfulness. 
The  same  value  is  often  attached  to  madness  in  the  chivalric  or  Arthurian 
romances,  especially,  perhaps,  in  England.  In  her  comparison  of  the  English  and 85 
French  Yvain  poems,  for  example,  Penelope  Doob  has  argued  that  the  English 
romance  shows  a  greater  concern  with  the  moral  condition  of  its  hero  than  its 
continental  source.  12  Nevertheless,  the  briefest  comparison  of  these  works  with 
those  discussed  above  indicates  the  diversity  of  the  works  categorized  as  romances 
and  suggests  other,  secular  meanings  of  madness.  In  his  article  'The  Nature  of 
Romance',  W.  T.  H.  Jackson  warns  against  interpreting  all  medieval  romances 
according  to  a  Christian  framework.  A  secular  work,  he  points  out,  'may  have  its 
own  context  of  interpretation,  its  own  rules,  and  its  own  existence'.  13  Works  like 
Sir  Gowther  and  King  Robert  of  Sicily  present  madness  as  an  isolated  blow  of  fate 
involving  only  one  individual;  moreover,  the  attitudes  towards  madness  in  these 
romances  are  uniformly  negative.  The  Arthurian  romances,  by  contrast,  present  a 
broader  canvas  and  include  a  variety  of  responses  to  the  insanity  of  their  heroes, 
often  depending  on  the  observer's  social  class;  in  short,  they  encourage 
speculation  about  the  social  milieu  of  madness. 
The  circumstances  of  the  mad  knights  of  romance  are  certainly  quite 
different  to  those  of  Gowther  or  Robert  of  Sicily.  First,  the  madness  of  the 
romance  knights  always  takes  the  form  of  wildness,  the  chief  symptoms  of  which 
are  blackness  and  hairiness  and  a  great  capacity  for  physical  violence.  14  Not  all 
wild  men,  of  course,  are  insane.  Perhaps  the  best-known  medieval  English  Wild 
Man,  the  figure  of  the  Giant  Herdsman  in  the  fourteenth-century  romance  Ywain 
and  Gawain,  is  kindly  and  helpful.  15  Moreover,  the  sexual  aggressiveness  of  true 
wild  men  is  not  a  characteristic  of  the  wild  heroes  of  romance.  Finally,  genuine 
wild  men,  unlike  the  insane  knights,  are  permanently  wild.  Thus,  as  Judith 
Neaman  summarizes,  'the  wild  knight  was  a  madman  not  a  true  wild  man'.  16 
The  earliest  romance  featuring  a  wild  hero  is  Chretien  de  Troyes's 
astonishingly  influential  Yvain.  Realising  that  he  has  breached  his  promise  to  his 
lady,  Yvain  is  ashamed  and 86 
would  rather  be  banished  alone  in  some  wild  land,  where  no  one 
would  know  where  to  seek  for  him,  and  where  no  man  or  woman 
would  know  of  his  whereabouts  any  more  than  if  he  were  in  some 
deep  abyss.  '7 
This  melancholia  quickly  develops  into  mania:.  'Then  such  a  storm  broke  loose  in 
his  brain  that  he  loses  his  senses;  he  tears  his  flesh  and,  stripping  off  his  clothes, 
he  flees  across  meadows  and  fields';  grief-stricken,  he  runs  to  the  forest, 
'senseless  and  deprived  of  speech'.  18  Here  he  finds  sustenance  at  the  lodging  of  a 
old  hermit,  who  charitably  leaves  food  outside  his  door,  as  if  for  an  animal.  Yvain 
also  frightens  the  hermit,  who  will  not  venture  outside  his  hut  until  the  deranged 
knight  has  departed  from  the  area.  Throughout  Yvain's  period  of  madness 
Chretien,  like  the  author  of  the  Irish  Buile  Suibhne,  refers  to  his  hero  as  if  he  were 
describing  an  animal. 
In  the  English  version  of  Yvain,  the  fourteenth-century  metrical  romance 
Ywain  and  Gawain,  the  hero's  animality  is  exaggerated.  Like  Chretien's  knight, 
Ywain  wanders  in  the  forest  'Als  it  wore  a  wilde  beste';  but  the  English  author 
gives  the  story  a  grotesque  twist  by  having  his  hero  drink  the  'warm  blode'  of  a 
freshly  killed  deer.  19  Penelope  Doob  suggests  that  blood-drinking  is  a  traditional 
remedy  for  melancholy  madness  and  that  its  failure  to  cure  Ywain  suggests  the 
spiritual  nature  of  his  madness. 
20  Whatever  the  case,  the  poet  departs  significantly 
from  his  usual  practice  of  omitting  or  'toning  down  [...  ]  cruel  or  bloody 
passages'. 
21 
Given  this  emphasis  on  the  bestial  nature  of  the  mad  romance  hero,  it  is 
appropriate  to  examine  late-medieval  attitudes  towards  wildness.  The  mixture  of 
horror,  amusement  and  admiration  that  characterized  the  late-medieval  attitude 
towards  wildness  is  well  exemplified  in  the  late  romance  Valentine  and  Orson. 
Here  the  Wild  Man,  Orson,  so  terrifies  the  townsfolk  that  'also  sone  as  the  men  of 
the  vyllage  sawe  the  wylde  man,  they  ranne  into  their  houses,  and  for  great  fere 87 
shytte  their  dores  so  that  none  myght  entre',  an  action  which  recalls  the  response 
of  the  hermit  to  the  wild  Yvain;  similarly,  when  Orson's  civilized  brother 
Valentine  attempts  to  take  Orson  to  Orleans,  the  porters  shut  the  gates  in  fear.  22 
These  reactions  are  rational:  Orson  has  already  proved  his  capacity  for  a  variety  of 
criminal  activities,  including  theft  and  rape.  23  From  the  point  of  view  of  civilized 
society,  the  wild  man  is  a  dangerous  and  disruptive  figure  of  fantastic  carnal 
appetite.  Little  wonder  that  the  wildmen  or  'wodwos'  in  Sir  Gawain  and  the  Green 
Knight  rank  among  the  hero's  bestial  adversaries.  24 
In  Sir  Gawain  there  is  also,  however,  a  degree  of  thinly  disguised 
admiration  for  the  wildness  of  Bertilak,  who  represents  the  inexorable  laws  of 
nature.  By  the  late  fourteenth  century,  wild  men  had  become  figures  of  fascination 
to  civilized  people.  They  were  even  associated  with  the  royal  court:  thus  Charles 
VI  of  France  was  entertained  by  men  dressed  in  animal  skins;  in  Capgrave's 
words,  the  king  was  even  'arayed  lich  a  wodwous'  himself;  and  in  The  Receyt  of 
the  Ladie  Kateryne,  three  'woddosys'  pull  a  pageant  before  the  king.  25 
In  Valentine  and  Orson,  the  positive  aspects  of  wildness  are  even  clearer. 
When  defeated  in  combat  by  his  brother,  Orson  submits  to  his  conqueror  with 
good  will: 
And  whan  that  he  [Valentine]  had  bound  hym  fast  he  mounted  on 
horsebacke  and  ledde  him  with  hym  as  a  beast  tyed,  without  that 
euer  this  same  Orson  didde  hym  any  harme,  or  made  hym  an  euyl 
semblaunt,  that  was  a  thyng  myraculous.  26 
As  the  final  comment  here  indicates,  the  wild  man's  magnanimous  behaviour 
confounds  the  pessimistic  expectations  of  civilized  society. 
By  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages,  then,  the  Wild  Man  could  be  seen  as  a 
vehicle  for  social  criticism,  like  the  'noble  savage'  favoured  by  the  satirical  writers 
of  a  later  age.  The  prestige  of  the  Wild  Man  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  the 88 
recognition  of  his  nobility  is  the  preserve  of  the  upper  class:  thus  the  king  in 
Valentine  and  Orson  praises  the  Wild  Man's  innate  courtliness,  remarking  that 
'how  wel  that  he  is  roughe,  yf  he  were  clothed  as  we  be,  he  wolde  seme  a  right 
fayre  knyght'.  27  As  well  as  functioning  as  a  warning  of  what  may  happen  to  the 
unwary  civilized  man,  wildness  may also  disguise  true  nobility. 
The  Wild  Man  is  clearly  a  morally  ambiguous  figure.  Hayden  White 
observes  that 
by  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages,  the  Wild  Man  has  become  endowed 
with  two  distinct  personalities,  each  consonant  with  one  of  the 
possible  attitudes  men  might  assume  with  respect  to  society  and 
nature.  If  one  looked  upon  nature  as  a  horrible  world  of  struggle,  as 
animal  nature;  and  society  as  a  condition  which,  for  all  its 
shortcomings,  was  still  preferable  to  the  natural  state,  then  he  would 
continue  to  view  the  Wild  Man  as  the  antitype  of  the  desirable 
humanity,  as  a  warning  of  what  men  would  fall  into  if  they 
definitively  rejected  society  and  its  norms.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
one  took  his  vision  of  nature  from  the  cultivated  countryside,  from 
what  might  be  called  herbal  nature,  and  saw  society,  with  all  its 
struggle,  as  a  fall  away  from  the  natural  perfection,  then  he  might 
be  inclined  to  populate  that  nature  with  wild  men  whose  function 
was  to  serve  as  antitypes  of  social  existence.  28 
White  further  suggests  that  the  increasingly  positive  status  of  the  Wild  Man  in  the 
late  Middle  Ages  is  related  to  social  changes  'in  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth 
centuries,  when  the  social  bonds  of  medieval  culture  began  to  d  is  integrate'.  29  As 
Larry  Benson  puts  it,  the  positive  presentation  of  wildness  'seems  to  have  had  an 
especially  strong  appeal  to  the  later  period,  in  which  the  chivalric  ideals  of  the 
earlier  Middle  Ages  no  longer  held  unquestioned  dominance'.  30  It  is  easy  to  see 89 
the  imaginative  appeal  of  wildness  in  an  age  so  often  described  as  one  of  social 
unrest  and  spiritual  turmoil.  31 
To  the  medieval  mind,  wildness,  insofar  as  it  involved  exclusion  from 
society,  implied  a  loss  of  humanity.  Medieval  thought  about  the  relationship 
between  individuals  and  society  followed  Aristotle's  Politics,  whose  principles  are 
summarized  as  follows  by  Scott  Meikle: 
Society  is  a  natural  growth,  something  constituted  by  nature.  Man 
is  by  nature  a  social  animal,  and  society  is  not  an  artificial  construct 
imposed  on  natural  man  but  a  manifestation  of  human  nature  itself. 
Society  is  the  natural  form  of  existence  for  man,  and  the  capacity 
for  social  life  is  what  is  specific  to  humans  alone  among  gregarious 
animals.  [...  ]  One  who  can  exist  separately  from  society  and  be 
self-sufficient  is  either  a  lower  animal  or  a  god,  but  not  a  man.  32 
The  opposition  of  wildness  and  order  is  of  great  concern  to  twelfth-century 
theorists.  The  conservative  view  of  the  ideal  organization  of  society  is  elaborated 
in  John  of  Salisbury's  Policraticus,  a  work  of  seminal  importance  for  medieval 
political  philosophy  and  which  was  completed  as  the  wild  hero  was  becoming  a 
central  figure  in  literature.  'Civil  life  should  imitate  nature',  he  writes,  'otherwise, 
life  is  duly  called  not  merely  uncivil,  but  rather  bestial  and  brute'.  33  While  the 
natural  world  could  provide  a  model  for  human  social  organisation,  those  who 
exist  outside  society  align  themselves  with  anti-nature.  From  a  conservative  point 
of  view,  therefore,  the  asocial  Wild  Man  is  essentially  unnatural  and  irrational. 
Although  true  wild  men  and  madmen  must  be  distinguished,  the 
interpretation  of  the  Wild  Man's  popularity  as  a  symptom  of  increasing 
dissatisfaction  with  civilization  as  it  is  currently  constituted  may  account  for  the 
often  positive  portrayal  of  madness  in  the  medieval  romances.  In  the  Arthurian 
romances,  the  knights  are  affiliated  to  an  institution,  the  Round  Table,  which  does 90 
not  and  cannot  recognize  the  individual  desires  of  its  members.  Unlike  epic 
heroes,  the  heroes  of  romance,  as  well  as  fulfilling  the  demands  made  on  them  by 
society  and  its  institutions,  are  also  irresistibly  compelled  to  pursue  their  own 
apparently  self-defined  goals. 
The  tension  the  knights  feel  between  their  compulsion  to  pursue  their  own 
ends  and  the  necessity  of  knightly  service  often  leads  to  their  madness.  This  theory 
has  been  most  fully  articulated  by  the  Malory  critic  Robert  Merrill,  who  theorizes 
that 
the  general  condition  of  psychosis  implies  that  the  "me"  or  the 
culturally  determined  component  so  totally  dominates  the  "I" 
component  that  the  "I"  cannot  find  expression  except  in  violent  and 
destructive  acts  (i.  e.,  marginal  behavior),  whether  against  itself  or 
the  outside  world.  34 
This  highly  schematic  formulation  describes  the  nature  of  many  cases  of  madness 
in  medieval  literature,  such  as  the  maniacal  behaviour  described  at  the  beginning 
of  The  Book  of  Margery  Kempe.  The  romances,  in  particular,  repeatedly  illustrate 
its  truth.  If,  as  Merrill  argues,  'cultural  over-determination'  is  the  'essential 
character  of  the  late  Middle  Ages',  the  insanity  of  Thomas  Malory's  knights  may 
be  seen  as  the  inevitable  product  of  the  conflict  between  what  he  calls  institutional 
'indoctrination'  and  the  knights'  desire  for  self-creation.  The  result  is 
a  class  of  psychotics  from  which  a  rebel  will  emerge  who  will  not 
be  content  until  the  old  model  is  thoroughly  dismantled.  This  tragic 
pattern  underlies  the  careers  of  the  four  best  knights  whose 
repressed  individuality  leads  to  such  acts  as  loving  the  king's  wife, 
fighting  their  best  friends  (optimal  means  of  securing  worship)  or 91 
the  madness  in  which  they  alienate  themselves  from  the  society  that 
depends  on  them  for  its  security. 
35 
In  Merrill's  view,  the  madness  of  Malory's  knights  is  due  to  their  'repressed 
individuality'. 
In  the  light  of  much  previous  medieval  scholarship,  this  view  appears 
problematic  in  a  number  of  ways.  Quite  apart  from  the  controversial  question  of 
the  historical  purchase  of  the  Freudian  concept  of  repression,  Merrill's  theory 
presupposes  that  individuality  was  an  intelligible  concept  in  the  Middle  Ages. 
Many  medievalists  remain  cautious  about  this  possibility.  Karl  Weintraub,  for 
example,  suggests  that  the  notion  of  individuality  might  have  been  an 
'embarrassment'  for  medieval  writers  so  that  expressions  of  individuality  of  the 
sort  found  in  modern,  especially  autobiographical,  literature  were  rare.  36 
Nevertheless,  many  other  commentators  detect  an  increasing  interest  in  the 
individual  in  the  late  Middle  Ages. 
The  term  'individual'  must  be  used  carefully  in  an  historical  context.  In  the 
Middle  Ages  the  word  individuum  belonged  not  to  the  discourse  of  human 
relations,  but  to  that  of  logic;  the  semantic  shift  of  the  word  to  its  present  sense 
did  not  happen  until  the  Renaissance.  37  The  fact  that  the  Middle  Ages  had  no  term 
for  'individuality'  or  'individualism'  does  not  imply,  however,  that  what  we  call 
individuality  was  unintelligible  in  earlier  periods. 
Colin  Morris  argues  that  a  variety  of  factors,  including  the  Church's 
insistence  on  regular  confession  and  the  rise  of  portraiture  and  satirical  writing, 
contributed  to,  and  resulted  from,  an  increasing  awareness  of  individuality  in  the 
period  1050-1200.38  A  growing  concern  with  expressions  of  individuality  and 
self-consciousness  pervaded  late-medieval  culture.  As  one  authority  on  these  issues 
concludes,  it  is  'one  of  the  most  interesting  phenomena  of  the  period  from  the  late 
twelfth  century  on  that  we  find  in  entirely  different  and  quite  unrelated  fields,  if 
not  an  objection  to  the  conscious  norm,  at  any  rate  a  greater  inclination  to  pay 92 
attention  to  the  individual's  own  features'.  39  Stephen  Knight  notes  some  of  the 
manifestations  of  this  impulse  in  the  later  period,  including  the  increased  mobility 
created  by  the  development  of  the  market  economy  and  'the  cult  of  devotio 
moderna  which  focuses  on  the  private  Christian'.  'In  literature  and  art',  continues 
Knight,  'there  is  a  marked  development  of  concern  with  the  individual,  in  the 
'dance  of  death'  motif  especially,  but  also  in  the  development  of  realism,  a  mode 
which  bases  itself  on  the  validity  of  the  individual  sensual  response'.  40 
The  new  emphasis  on  the  individual  in  the  twelfth  century  is  accompanied 
by  an  increasing  interest  in  interiority  and  the  inner  lives  of  individuals.  A.  C. 
Spearing  notes  that  in  the  twelfth  century  there  emerged  a  'new  focus  on  the  inner 
landscape  or  subjectivity  of  the  human  being  --  new  at  least  since  Augustine's 
Confessions'.  41  This  shift  is  marked  by  a  range  of  developments  in 
twelfth-century  culture,  especially  in  the  area  of  religious  meditation.  It  was  no 
doubt  given  impetus  by  the  Lateran  Council  of  1215,  which  made  it  obligatory  for 
all  Christians  to  attend  confession  at  least  once  a  year.  If  confession,  by  its  nature, 
involves  'psychological  self-examination'  and  'increased  self-awareness'  it  must 
also  contribute  'to  more  refined  feelings,  to  a  divided  self,  to  the  possibility  of 
realising  the  self  as  against  the  crowd'.  42  These  new  confessional  practices 
produced  the  man  of  feeling,  whose  epitome  is  the  romance  hero. 
The  madness  of  the  romance  heroes  must  be  understood  against  this 
background  of  an  increasing  awareness  of  individuality  and  interiority.  In  many 
works  of  the  twelfth  century,  such  as  Buile  Suibhne,  madness  is  a  central  theme. 
Yet  Suibhne  is  hardly  a  fully  self-conscious  figure  like  Chretien's  Yvain  or 
Malory's  Tristram.  Suibhne  becomes  mad  through  an  external  cause,  the  curse  of 
St  Ronan.  But  while  the  heroes  of  romance  may  also  become  mad  because  of 
external  events  such  as  the  breaking  of  an  agreement  (Yvain's  situation),  they  also 
exhibit  a  high  degree  of  psychological  refinement  and  insight.  Judith  Neaman 
states  that 93 
with  the  develoment  of  the  romance  came  an  increased  exploration 
of  the  subtler  emotions  which  might  move  a  man  to  break  the  ties 
which  bound  him  to  civilisation.  [...  ]  Internal  compulsion,  not  an 
external  curse  or  spell,  drives  [Chretien's]  hero,  Yvain,  to  plunge 
from  the  heights  of  a  mannered  and  lavish  civilisation  to  the  depths 
of  a  shabby  and  disordered  primitivism. 
43 
Indeed,  Yvain  represents  a  radical  individualism  that  he  himself  recognizes  as  a 
sort  of  madness.  'My  foolish  heart  draws  me  there',  he  remarks  at  one  point;  'I 
will  do  as  my  heart  wills'.  44  From  the  Christian  perspective,  of  course,  exclusive 
orientation  towards  the  self  is  inherently  sinful;  it  is  included  in  Augustine's  notion 
of  cupiditas,  'a  motion  of  the  soul  toward  the  enjoyment  of  one's  self,  one's 
neighbor,  or  any  corporeal  thing  for  the  sake  of  something  other  than  God'.  45 
In  the  works  of  Thomas  Malory,  the  wilfulness  of  the  knights  is 
incomprehensible  to  the  representatives  of  the  court,  as  the  story  of  Balan  and 
Balin  shows.  After  pulling  the  sword  from  the  stone,  Balin  becomes  thoroughly 
socialized,  while  Balan,  who  virtually  disappears  from  the  tale,  comes  to 
represent,  as  Robert  Merrill  puts  it,  'the  absolutely  unique  individual'.  46 
Unsurprisingly,  the  two  brothers  are  unable  to  recognize  one  another  when  they 
meet  again  at  the  end  of  the  tale,  leading  to  the  combat  and  the  'dolerous  stroke' 
by  which  Balin  slays  his  own  brother.  Merlin's  response  to  this  tragedy  is 
revealing.  At  Balin  and  Balan's  tomb  he  acknowledges  only  the  civilized  Balin: 
In  the  morne  cam  Merlyn  and  lete  wryte  Balyns  name  on  the 
tombe  with  letters  of  gold  that  'here  lyeth  Balyn  le  Saveage  that  was 
the  knyght  with  two  swerdes  and  he  that  smote  the  dolorous  stroke.  ' 
Also  Merlyn  lete  make  there  a  bedde,  that  then  shold  never  man  lye 
therin  but  he  wente  oute  of  his  wytte.  (69-70)47 94 
For  Merlin,  Balan's  life  outside  of  society  has  no  value;  it  is  simply  dismissed  as  a 
sort  of  insanity. 
Lancelot  and  Tristram  are  judged  insane  by  their  peers  for  similar  reasons. 
In  a  remark  to  Tristram,  Dinadan  recognizes  the  self-destructive  nature  of 
Malory's  two  chief  knights  with  a  mixture  of  admiration  and  aversion: 
'But  ye  fare,  '  seyde  sir  Dynadan,  'as  a  man  that  were  oute  of  hys 
mynde  that  wold  caste  hymselff  away.  And  I  may  curse  the  tyme 
that  ever  I  sye  you,  for  in  all  the  worlde  ar  nat  such  two  knightes 
that  ar  so  wood  as  ys  sir  Lancelot  and  ye,  sir  Trystram!  For  onys  I 
felle  in  the  felyshyp  of  sir  Launcelot  as  I  have  now  with  you,  and 
he  sette  me  so  a  werke  that  a  quarter  of  a  yere  I  kepte  my  bedde. 
Jesus  deffende  me,  '  seyde  sir  Dynadan,  'frome  such  two  knyghtys, 
and  specially  frome  youre  felyshyp.  '  (379-380) 
Dinadan  perceives  the  anti-social  and  immoderate  aspects  of  Lancelot  and 
Tristram.  Like  Balin  and  Balan,  whose  mighty  feats  of  arms  are  attributed  to 
magical  or  diabolical  influence,  Tristram  and  Lancelot  appear  super-human.  As 
Judith  Neaman  says,  'the  hero  is  inordinate  in  relation  to  other  men  because  even 
his  superior  qualities  arise  from  a  lack  of  mesure'.  48  For  Dinadan,  who  represents 
prudence,  discretion  and  moderation,  Lancelot  and  Tristram  are  insane.  His 
reaction  illustrates  Neaman's  comment  that  'the  more  the  tradition  of  heroic 
exaggeration  pervaded  the  culture  or  style  of  the  writer,  the  more  trivial  was  the 
deviation  which  evoked  the  epithet  "mad".  49  Dinadan  not  only  testifies  to  the 
knights'  foolhardiness  in  battle,  but  also  hints  that  their  recklessness  and  wilfulness 
may  lead  eventually  to  outright  insanity. 
Tristram's  loyalties,  of  course,  are  divided  between  King  Mark  and  Isolde. 
The  dilemma  of  whether  Tristram  should  choose  his  own  or  the  common  good 
becomes  pressing  when  King  Helias  challenges  Mark.  Tristram  is  torn  between  his 95 
duty  to  champion  his  uncle  in  battle  and  his  instinct  for  self-preservation,  for  he  is 
aware  that  Mark  will  try  to  have  him  executed  later: 
'Sir,  '  seyde  sir  Trystram,  'now  I  undirstonde  ye  wolde  have  my 
succour,  and  reson  wolde  that  I  sholde  do  all  that  lyyth  in  me  to  do, 
savynge  my  worshyp  and  my  lyff,  howbehit  that  I  am  sore  brused 
and  hurte.  And  sytthyn  sir  Elyas  proferyth  so  largely,  I  shall  fyght 
with  hym'.  (469) 
Tristram's  will  here  is  governed  explicitly  by  'reson',  the  faculty  which  is  able  to 
discern  the  hierarchy  of  goods.  According  to  reason,  Tristram  must  defend  his 
king,  for,  as  Aquinas  asserts,  'right  reason  judges  that  the  common  good  is  better 
than  the  good  of  the  individual'.  50  But  as  Robert  Merrill  points  out,  Malory 
'constructs  the  situation  so  that  Tristram's  own  good  is  precisely  the  opposite  of 
the  good  which  is  rational'.  51  Of  course,  Tristram  is  not  insane  at  this  point;  but  it 
is  clear  that  he  can  only  escape  the  repressive  demands  of  his  fealty  by  rejecting 
the  imperatives  of  rationality.  Indeed,  madness  seems  to  have  had  a  radical  appeal 
in  the  late  Middle  Ages.  Margery  Kempe,  as  we  shall  see,  presents  madness  as  a 
token  of  individual  rebellion,  while  Malory  presents  Tristram's  dilemma  in  terms 
which  suggest  his  own  continual  struggles  for  freedom  from  authority.  Here,  as 
elsewhere  in  medieval  literature,  madness  is  associated  with  the  conflict  between 
private  desire  and  public  expectation. 
Vinaver  notes  that  Malory  does  not  dwell  on  the  causes  of  Tristram's 
madness. 
52  Suspecting  Isolde  of  an  affair  with  Kayhedins,  the  forlorn  Tristram 
rides  into  the  forest,  where  he  is  treated  harshly  by  the  rustics: 
And  than  was  he  naked,  and  waxed  leane  and  poore  of  fleyshe.  And 
so  he  felle  in  the  felyshyppe  of  herdmen  and  sheperdis,  and  dayly 
they  wolde  gyff  hym  som  of  their  mete  and  drynke,  and  whan  he 96 
ded  ony  shrewd  dede  they  wolde  beate  hym  with  roddis.  And  so 
they  clypped  hym  with  sherys  and  made  hym  tyke  a  foole.  (369) 
It  has  been  said  that  this  passage  'has  an  unusual  quality  which  one  would  look  for 
in  vain  in  the  Lay  Mortel  inserted  in  the  corresponding  place  in  the  Prose 
Romance'.  53  Clearly,  Tristram's  madness  has  a  special  resonance  for  Malory. 
Tristram  is  perceived  as  a  child  or  an  animal  that  can  only  be  disciplined  by  crude 
methods.  Despite  all  his  sufferings,  however,  he  nobly  defends  the  shepherds 
when  they  are  set  upon  by  Dagonet  and  his  squires  (371). 
Malory  emphasizes  the  pitiable  rather  than  the  sinful  aspect  of  Tristram's 
madness.  As  Judith  Neaman  points  out,  although  the  King  Mark  of  the  Folie 
Tristan  poems  mocks  the  madman,  both  Malory's  Mark  and  Lunette  in  Yvain, 
'explicitly  state  that  kind  treatment  of  a  madman  is  an  act  of  charity'.  54  King 
Mark's  court  sees  Tristram's  madness  as  an  unfortunate  affliction.  Even  although 
his  identity  is  at  first  unknown,  Tristram  is  treated  'with  fayrenes'  when  he  is 
found  by  Mark's  knights,  who  'keste  mantels  uppon  sir  Trystramys,  and  so  lad 
hym  unto  Tyntagyll.  And  there  they  bathed  hym  and  wayshed  hym,  and  gaff  hym 
hote  suppyngis,  tylle  they  had  brought  hym  well  to  hys  remembraunce'  (373). 
The  very  different  treatments  of  Tristram  by  the  upper  and  lower  classes 
recall  the  divided  attitudes  towards  the  mad  Lancelot.  Lancelot,  according  to  dame 
Brusen,  'cam  into  thys  contrey  lyke  a  madde  man,  wyth  doggys  and  boyes 
chasynge  hym  thorow  the  cyte  of  Corbyn'  (613).  He  is  treated  compassionately, 
however,  when  he  is  recognized  and  eventually  restored  to  his  wits  by  Elaine  and 
Brusen.  Similarly,  the  mad  French  hero  Amadas  is  mocked  by  'petit  et  grant': 
Mais  tuit  cil  qui  sevent  les  estres 
Saillent  as  huis  et  as  fenestres 
Pour  la  grant  mervelle  esgarder  [...  ] 
Grans  est  la  noise  et  grans  li  cris 97 
Des  garcons,  des  enfants  petis, 
Qui  1'empaignent  et  qui  le  batent, 
Qui  le  descirent,  qui  le  gratent.  (2705-2707,2741-2744)55 
As  the  Amadas  editor  John  Revell  Reinhard  comments,  'the  people  of  the  Middle 
Ages  regarded  the  madman  as  their  just  prey';  the  author  of  Amadas,  however, 
regards  his  insane  hero  with  the  pity  proper  to  a  sensitive  and  cultured  man.  56 
Despite  the  similarities  between  the  treatments  of  Malory's  Lancelot  and 
Tristram  at  the  hands  of  the  upper  and  lower  classes,  the  two  knights  undergo 
quite  different  sorts  of  cure.  Lancelot  is  healed  of  his  madness  by  the  Holy  Grail 
whereas  Tristram  is  cured  by  common  sense  methods  --  a  departure  from  the 
Prose  Tristan,  in  which  the  manner  of  Tristram's  cure  is  unclear.  57  This  suggests 
that  we  are  supposed  to  take  a  relatively  sympathetic  view  of  Tristram's  madness. 
From  our  point  of  view,  if  not  Tristram's,  wildness  appears  to  be  an  escape  from 
social  repression.  By  pursuing  the  king's  wife,  he  shows  that  he  is  'willing  to 
reject  the  dictates  of  social  order  and  to  assume  his  otherness  as  an  individual', 
even  if  such  a  course  leads  to  insanity.  58 
Lancelot's  insanity,  like  Tristan's,  grows  out  of  the  conflict  he  feels 
between  his  personal  desires  and  courtly  expectations.  In  the  early 
thirteenth-century  Prose  Lancelot  he  goes  mad  no  fewer  than  three  times.  The  first 
two  episodes  of  madness--  Lancelot's  madness  in  prison  and  later  when  he  fails  to 
find  Galehot  --  are  not  particularly  significant.  Lancelot's  final  madness,  the  only 
one  preserved  in  Malory,  is  treated  more  substantially.  59  Here  Lancelot  is  tricked 
by  the  enchantments  of  dame  Brusen  into  sleeping  with  Elaine  of  Corbenic  for  the 
second  time.  When  he  is  discovered  by  Guinevere,  the  mortified  hero  leaps  from 
the  window  and  runs  wild  in  the  forest  for  two  years  (604). 
Despite  being  cured  eventually  by  a  religious  relic,  those  who  witness 
Lancelot's  madness  take  a  commonsense  approach  to  his  cure.  When  Sir  Blyaunte 
encounters  Lancelot  during  his  madness  he  judges  that  the  knight  has  'more  nede 98 
of  a  slepe  and  of  warme  clothis  than  to  weide  that  swerde'  (604).  Such  reactions 
recall  the  commonsense  approaches  to  madness  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter 
and  contradict  Edelgard  DuBrock's  comment  that  'the  medieval  Christian  saw  in 
[the  madman]  the  workings  of  the  devil  and  had  no  reason  to  try  to  help  him'.  60 
Nor  is  madness,  at  this  point  at  least,  entirely  disgraceful.  Although  capable  of 
incredible  violence  and  despite  the  torments  of  the  townsfolk  of  Corbyn, 
Lancelot's  uncivilized  behaviour  is  often  commendable.  He  even  breaks  the  fetters 
in  which  he  has  been  placed  to  save  Blyaunte  from  his  attackers  (606).  Clearly, 
Lancelot,  like  Tristram,  has  much  in  common  with  the  increasingly  popular  figure 
of  the  Wild  Man. 
Robert  Merrill  quotes  Freud's  opinion  that  'a  person  becomes  neurotic 
because  he  cannot  tolerate  the  amount  of  frustration  which  society  imposes  on  him 
in  the  service  of  its  cultural  ideals'  as  a  way  of  explaining  Lancelot's  madness.  61 
In  Merrill's  terminology,  Lancelot's  madness  in  the  Prose  Lancelot 
appears  whenever  he  is  in  a  position  that  demonstrates  to  him  that 
as  the  flower  of  knighthood  he  embodies  the  explanatory  synthesis; 
it  appears  because  he  understands  that  in  submitting  himself  totally 
to  the  quest  for  the  explanatory  center  he  has  relinquished 
everything  that  might  be  uniquely  his.  62 
Inevitably,  then,  Lancelot  constantly  returns  to  his  self-destructive,  and  socially 
impermissible  passion  for  Guinevere.  As  Stephen  Knight  observes,  'the  dominant 
theme  of  "The  Tale  of  Launcelot  and  Guinevere"  is  how  the  private  love  between 
those  two  great  characters  increasingly  disturbs  the  public  life  of  the  Round 
Table'.  63  The  courtly  requirement  of  secrecy  in  love  affairs  demands  that 
Lancelot's  passion  must  remain  private:  Lancelot  is  'sette  inwardly'  on  the  queen 
'in  his  prevy  thoughtes  and  in  hys  myndis'  (744).  For  Lancelot  and  Tristram, 99 
therefore,  the  pursuit  of  the  ideal  of  knighthood  involves  a  painful  separation  of 
emotions  and  behaviour. 
This  point  is  nowhere  more  obvious  than  in  Malory's  account  of 
Palomides's  mental  breakdown.  Palomides  possesses  a  self-consciousness  and  a 
concern  with  appearances  typical  of  the  ostentatious  fifteenth  century.  Like 
Arthur's  other  knights,  he  seeks  to  win  his  lady  by  increasing  his  'worship',  the 
precious  commodity  that  underpins  the  social  identities  of  Arthur's  knights.  After 
his  humiliating  defeat  by  Tristram,  however,  he  becomes  'araged  out  of  his  witte' 
(400).  Following  a  suitable  period  of  absence  from  the  tale,  he  reappears  as  a 
suicidally  melancholic  wanderer  and  eventually  suffers  a  complete  crisis  of 
identity.  'Malory',  as  Knight  says,  'has  made  the  forces  of  private  desire  urgently 
pressing'  to  the  extent  that  they  drive  the  hero  to  distraction:  64 
So  uppon  a  day,  in  the  dawnynge,  sir  Palomydes  wente  into  the 
foreste  by  hymselff  alone;  and  there  he  founde  a  well,  and  anone  he 
loked  into  the  welle  and  in  the  watir  he  sawe  hys  owne  vysage,  how 
he  was  discolowred  and  defaded,  a  nothynge  lyke  as  he  was.  'Corde 
Jesu,  what  may  this  mean?  '  seyde  sir  Palomydes.  And  thus  he 
seyde  to  hymselff:  'A,  Palomydes,  Palomydes!  Why  arte  thou  thus 
defaded,  and  ever  was  wont  to  be  called  one  of  the  fayrest  knyghtes 
of  [the]  worlde?  Forsothe,  I  woll  no  more  lyve  this  lyff,  for  I  love 
that  I  may  never  gete  nor  recover.  '  (576-577) 
The  self-referential  language  of  the  passage  indicates  a  deep  sense  of  self-division. 
The  faded  knight  seen  in  the  well  is  the  public  man  who  is  perceived  by  the  'inner' 
Palomides  with  disgust.  This  recognition  prompts  Palomides's  determination  to 
commit  suicide  with  his  sword,  the  only  object  which  can  earn  him  vital 
'worship'.  Since  it  involves  treating  oneself  as  both  the  subject  and  the  object  of 100 
the  act,  suicide  is  the  ultimate  expression  of  self-division:  Palomides  is  unable  to 
live  with  himself. 
A  similar  scene  occurs  in  Chaucer's  Knight's  Tale.  During  his  exile  in 
Thebes,  Arcite  suffers  the  classic  symptoms  of  lovesickness,  the  'loveris  maladye  / 
Of  Hereos'.  65  He  is  also  afflicted  by  a  form  of  madness  which  Chaucer  describes, 
characteristically,  in  the  terminology  of  faculty  psychology: 
And  in  his  geere  for  al  the  world  he  ferde 
Nat  oonly  lik  the  loveris  maladye 
Of  Hereos,  but  rather  lyk  manye, 
Engendred  of  humour  malencolik 
Biforen,  in  his  celle  fantastik. 
And  shortly,  turned  was  al  up  so  doun 
Bothe  habit  and  eek  disposicioun 
Of  hym,  this  woful  lovere  daun  Arcite.  (1372-1379) 
Despite  the  equivalence  between  Arcite's  inner  condition  and  his  external 
appearance,  madness  here  brings  about  a  split  between  inner  and  outer,  between 
'habit'  and  'disposicioun'.  After  he  has  bemoaned  his  separation  from  his  lady, 
Arcite  himself  perceives  this  bifurcation  in  an  act  of  self-reflection  which  recalls 
Palomides's: 
[...  ]  he  caughte  a  greet  mirour, 
And  saugh  that  chaunged  was  al  his  colour, 
And  saugh  his  visage  al  in  another  kynde. 
And  right  anon  it  ran  hym  in  his  mynde 
That,  sith  his  face  was  so  disfigured 
Of  maladye  the  which  he  hadde  endured, 
He  myghte  wel,  if  that  he  bar  hym  Lowe, 101 
Lyve  in  Atthenes  everemoore  unknowe.  (1399-1406) 
In  both  style  and  content  this  looks  forward  to  the  scene  in  Thomas  Hoccleve's 
Complaint  in  which  the  melancholy  poet  scrutinizes  his  face  in  his  mirror.  As  the 
passage  switches  between  Arcite's  thoughts  and  his  appearance,  Arcite  is  aware  of 
himself  as  both  a  suffering  subject  and  a  shameful  object  in  the  eyes  of  others.  As 
in  the  works  of  Hoccleve  and  Margery  Kempe,  madness  in  the  romances  involves 
an  acute  sense  of  self-division. 
In  the  cases  of  Palomides  and  Arcite,  madness  is  spectacular.  As  the  critic 
Duncan  Salkeld  writes,  madmen,  until  at  least  the  time  of  Descartes,  'presented  a 
spectacular  physical  image,  and  bore  their  illness  in  the  flesh  and  matter  of  their 
bodies'.  66  When  Malory's  Lancelot  goes  mad  and  jumps  from  the  window,  for 
example,  Elaine  tells  Guinevere  that  she  has  lost  her  lover:  'for  I  saw  and  harde  by 
his  countenaunce  that  he  is  madde  for  ever'  (594).  However,  unlike  the  Hoccleve 
of  the  Complaint,  whose  mirror-searching  is  discussed  later,  neither  Palomides  nor 
Arcite  questions  whether  or  not  the  reflected  image  he  sees  is  trustworthy;  there  is 
no  room  for  doubt  about  his  true  mental  condition. 
Melancholy  in  medieval  romance,  then,  is  characterized  by  consciousness 
of  the  body,  a  body  that  instantly  betrays  inner  anguish  in  discolouration  and 
disfigurement.  In  Arthurian  romances,  as  Judith  Neaman  observes,  'every  internal 
change  is  set  forth  as  an  image  [...  ]  so  medieval  authors  externalized  states  of 
mind,  setting  them  in  loci,  investing  them  with  movements,  portraying  them  with 
features  immediately  recognisable  to  the  reader'.  67  The  difference  between  the 
chivalric  romances  and  other  literary  genres  such  as  epics,  however,  is  one  of 
perspective:  the  spectacle  of  madness  is  available  not  only  to  those  who  observe 
the  madman,  but  also  to  the  madman  himself. 
Palomides,  Arcite  and  the  other  distracted  knights,  then,  are  exquisitely 
self-conscious  during  their  identity  crises.  Chretien  de  Troyes's  description  of 
Yvain's  spectacular  madness  contains  a  sense  of  the  hero's  sinful  falling  away 102 
from  the  ideal  of  knighthood.  Thus  a  damsel  reports  her  discovery  of  Yvain  to  her 
mistress: 
My  lady,  I  have  found  Yvain,  who  has  proved  himself  to  be  the 
best  knight  in  the  world,  and  the  most  virtuous.  I  cannot  imagine 
what  sin  has  reduced  the  gentleman  to  such  a  plight.  I  think  he  must 
have  had  some  misfortune,  which  causes  him  thus  to  demean 
himself,  for  one  may  lose  his  wits  through  grief.  And  any  one  can 
see  that  he  is  not  in  his  right  mind.  Would  that  God  had  restored 
him  to  the  best  sense  that  he  ever  he  had,  and  would  that  he  might 
then  consent  to  render  assistance  in  your  cause. 
When  Yvain  regains  consciousness  after  his  insanity,  he  finds  himself  beneath  the 
tree  where  he  has  fallen  asleep  and 
sees  that  he  is  as  naked  as  ivory,  and  feels  much  ashamed;  but  he 
would  have  been  yet  more  ashamed  had  he  known  what  had 
happened.  As  it  is,  he  knows  nothing  but  that  he  is  naked.  [...  ]  But 
he  is  ashamed  and  concerned  because  of  his  nakedness,  and  says 
that  he  is  dead  and  utterly  undone  if  anyone  has  come  across  him 
there  and  recognised  him.  Meanwhile,  he  clothes  himself  and  looks 
out  into  the  forest  to  see  if  any  one  is  approaching.  68 
This  sensitivity  about  madness  is  shared  by  many  of  those  who  witness  madness. 
To  spare  Yvain  unnecessary  embarrassment,  the  lady  who  discovers  Yvain  at  first 
pretends  not  to  have  seen  the  hero,  allowing  him  first  to  catch  sight  of  her.  Here 
again,  madness  is  associated  with  an  exquisite  consciousness  of  the  body.  The 
shameful  spectacle  may  be  mocked  by  the  lower  classes;  but  as  the  experience  of 
Thomas  Hoccleve  attests,  it  is  a  sight  from  which  the  refined  avert  their  gaze. 103 
These  attitudes  towards  madness  are  retained  in  the  English  adaptation  of 
Chretien's  romance,  Ywain  and  Gawain.  69  The  association  between  madness  and 
the  sleep  beneath  the  tree  is,  of  course,  a  Celtic  motif  which  features  in  other 
English  romances  such  as  Sir  Orfeo.  More  importantly,  however,  this  detail, 
together  with  the  nakedness  and  shame  of  Yvain/Ywain  on  his  recovery,  strongly 
suggests  the  circumstances  of  Adam  and  Eve  after  the  Fall. 
Malory's  Lancelot,  on  his  recovery  from  madness,  is  particularly  anxious 
that  no-one  should  hear  of  his  disgrace: 
'Sir',  seyde  dame  Elayne,  'into  thys  contrey  ye  cam  lyke  a  mased 
man,  clene  oute  of  youre  wytte.  And  here  have  ye  ben  kepte  as  a 
foole,  and  no  cryature  here  knew  what  ye  were,  untyll  by  fortune  a 
mayden  of  myne  brought  me  unto  you  whereas  ye  lay  slepynge  by  a 
well.  And  anone  as  I  veryly  behylde  you  [I  knewe  you].  Than  I 
tolde  my  fadir,  and  so  were  ye  brought  afore  thys  holy  vessell,  and 
by  the  vertu  of  hit  thus  were  ye  heled.  ' 
'A,  Jesu,  mercy!  '  seyde  sir  Launcelot.  'Yf  this  be  sothe, 
how  many  be  there  that  knowyth  of  my  woodnes?  ' 
'So  God  me  helpe,  '  seyde  dame  Elayne,  'no  mo  but  my 
fadir,  and  I,  and  dame  Brusen.  ' 
'Now,  for  Crystes  love,  '  seyde  sir  Launcelot,  'kepe  hit 
counceyle  and  lat  no  man  knowe  hit  in  the  worlde!  For  I  am  sore 
ashamed  that  I  have  been  myssefortuned.  (610) 
Lancelot's  shame  proceeds  from  his  departure  from  the  codes  of  knighthood  and 
from  his  sense  of  sinfulness.  As  Beverly  Kennedy  notes,  Lancelot  now  takes  the 
name  'Le  Shyvalere  Ill  Mafeete,  that  ys  to  sey  "the  knyght  that  hath  trespassed"' 
(611)  and  later  refers  to  his  'foly'  'in  a  way  which  suggests  that  he  regards  his 
madness  as  a  punishment  for  his  sexual  sin'.  70 104 
Madness  and  the  Fall  are  explicitly  associated  in  the  little-read  Partonope 
of  Blois,  a  fifteenth-century  English  translation  of  a  twelfth-century  French 
romance.  71  Having  betrayed  his  mistress,  the  eponymous  hero  compares  his  plight 
to  that  of  Adam,  who  also  'loste  paradyse  thorowe  hys  folye'  (6471).  He  then 
leaves  civilization  for  the  forest  where,  like  other  melancholic  heroes,  he  wanders 
alone,  naked  and  emaciated  (6644-6672). 
The  story  of  the  Fall,  then,  clearly  underpins  the  presentation  of  madness 
in  the  romances,  connecting  the  melancholy  of  the  romance  heroes  with  their 
moral  trangressions.  Norbert  Elias  argues  that  the  Fall  involved  a  'step  on  the  way 
to  a  new  form  of  self-consciousness'.  'In  paradise',  he  explains, 
the  ancestors  of  mankind  were  unaware  of  their  nakedness;  then 
they  ate  the  forbidden  fruit  of  knowledge  and  became  aware  of  their 
nakedness.  We  find  here  a  vivid  expression  of  how  closely  the 
increase  in  self-consciousness  is  bound  up  with  an  increase  of 
conscience.  72 
Elias  also  notes  how  the  experience  of  shame  leads  to  the  individual's  sense  of 
himself  as  a  subject: 
It  is  [...  ]  this  conflict  within  the  individual,  this  "privatisation",  the 
exclusion  of  certain  spheres  of  life  from  social  intercourse  and  the 
association  with  them  of  socially  instilled  anxiety,  such  as  feelings 
of  shame  or  embarrassment,  which  arouses  within  the  individual  the 
feeling  that  he  is  "inwardly"  something  quite  separate,  that  he  exists 
without  relation  to  other  people.  73 
Madness,  of  course,  does  not  necessarily  'implicate  an  interiorised  condition  of 
subjectivity'.  74  Indeed,  certain  forms  of  insanity,  at  least  for  their  duration,  entail 105 
a  diminution  rather  than  an  increase  in  insight.  Nevertheless,  the  experience  of 
melancholy  madness  described  in  the  romances  and  many  other  medieval  works  of 
literature  is  characterized  by  guilt,  self-consciousness  and  a  sense  of  social 
alienation  of  the  kind  described  by  Elias. 
In  these  'secular'  romances,  the  significance  of  madness  is  quite  different 
from  that  in  didactic  works  such  as  Sir  Gowther  and  King  Robert  of  Sicily.  Those 
romances  concentrate  on  the  hero's  transition  from  unholy  to  holy  folly  and 
present  a  traditional  view  of  the  ideal  form  of  human  existence,  according  to 
which  madness  is  temporary  social  and  moral  exile.  The  chivalric  romances,  by 
contrast,  take  a  more  ambiguous  view  of  madness,  challenging  Doob's  thesis  that 
madness  always  implies  spiritual  turpitude.  In  these  works  madness  may  be  read  as 
a  form  of  rebellion  against  over-determined  or  repressive  society. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  chivalric  romances  regard  all  cases  of  madness 
alike.  In  Malory,  for  example,  the  madness  of  Arthur's  two  chief  knights  are 
treated  very  differently.  Although  he  is  abused  by  the  shepherds,  the  mad  Tristan 
is  treated  well  by  the  upper  class  and  is  cured  by  natural  means,  in  keeping  with 
Malory's  tendency  to  reduce  the  importance  of  the  supernatural  or  marvellous 
elements  he  found  in  his  sources.  Clearly,  madness  could  inspire  sympathy, 
perhaps  because  of  the  relatively  positive  late-medieval  attitude  towards  wildness. 
On  the  other  hand,  Lancelot's  madness,  like  that  of  Gowther  or  Beryn,  is  the 
shameful  token  of  his  sinful  'foly'  and  it  can  be  cured  only  by  a  supernatural 
means.  A  similar  double  attitude  towards  madness  is  used  in  a  quite  different  way 
in  The  Book  of  Margery  Kempe. 
What  is  common  to  all  of  the  romances  is  the  conception  of  madness  as  a 
spectacle.  Sometimes  this  spectacularity  takes  the  form  of  public  vilification,  as  in 
the  case  of  Amadas  or  Lancelot.  On  other  occasions,  however,  the  melancholic 
knights  perceive  for  themselves  their  inner  degradation  by  scrutinising  their 
appearance.  In  both  cases  madness  entails  self-consciousness  and  self-reflection 
and  an  awareness  of  difference  from  others.  This  is  particularly  apparent  in 106 
Malory,  whose  works  are  far  more  concerned  with  individual  psychology  than  are 
their  sources.  From  the  very  beginning,  the  romances  contain  the  sorts  of  tortured 
psychological  experiences  that  characterize  Thomas  Hoccleve's  autobiographical 
account  of  his  madness. 
Indeed,  the  central  position  of  madness  in  medieval  romance,  a  genre 
frequently  denounced  by  orthodox  spokesmen  as  frivolous  and  insignificant, 
suggests  a  general  cultural  movement  towards  individualism  in  a  collapsing  feudal 
order.  Malory's  work,  as  one  commentator  has  said,  may  be  'a  dream  of  a  world 
past,  recreated  in  imagination  amid  the  cruder  realities  of  a  changed  society';  by 
the  same  token,  however,  it  also  bears  witness  to  the  social  concerns  of  its  own 
unstable  times.  75  Malory's  treatment  of  madness,  like  that  of  his  contemporaries, 
attests  to  the  tension  between  individuals  and  society.  Unlike  Hoccleve's  Series  or 
even  Kempe's  Book,  the  romances  seldom  make  madness  a  central  concern; 
nevertheless,  insanity  bears  the  same  meaning  here  as  in  those  works.  Explicit 
moral  interpretations  of  madness  do  not  detract  from  the  significance  of  insanity  as 
a  manifestation  of  cultural  alienation,  whose  existence  official  culture 
simultaneously  denied  and  made  necessary. 107 
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Chapter  3 
'Reson  en  bestialite':  Madness,  Animality  and  Social  Class 
in  Book  I  of  Gower's  Vox  Clamantis 
Eric  Auerbach  long  ago  pointed  out  that  courtly  culture  'was  decidedly 
unfavorable  to  the  development  of  a  literary  art  which  should  apprehend  reality  in 
its  full  breadth  and  depth'.  I  To  turn  from  the  medieval  romances  to  John  Gower's 
Vox  Clamantis  is  to  turn  from  a  genre  in  which  social  realities  are  implicit  to  one 
which  directly  and  boldly  concerns  itself  with  the  condition  of  late 
fourteenth-century  England.  We  also  move  from  presentations  of  madness  as  an 
abstract  token  of  moral  disruption  or  cultural  dissatisfaction  to  the  specific 
deployment  of  the  language  of  madness  in  an  account  of  a  major  historical  event  -- 
the  Peasants'  Revolt  of  1381.  In  short,  the  Vox  shows  how  the  social  and  moral 
significances  of  madness  revealed  in  the  romances  could  function  at  the  level  of  an 
explicit  ideology. 
Reason  is  central  in  Gower's  moral  philosophy.  As  C.  S.  Lewis  points  out, 
'nearly  all  moralists  before  the  eighteenth  century  regarded  Reason  as  the  organ  of 
morality'. 
2  George  Coffman  even  argues  that  for  Gower,  man's  ethics  are  guided 
primarily  by  this  faculty.  3  Accordingly,  sin  involves  the  abandonment  of  reason. 
Especially  important  in  Gower's  major  works  --  in  particular  the  first  book  of  the 
Vox  Clamantis  --  is  the  longstanding  clerical  association  of  insanity,  sin  and 
animality.  In  its  graphic  presentation  of  the  1381  rebels  as  unreasoning  animals, 
the  Vox  constitutes  the  most  substantial  medieval  illustration  of  the  polemical  use 
of  the  language  of  madness. 
Stories  of  human  metamorphosis  abounded  in  the  Middle  Ages  and 
Renaissance,  functioning  as  moral  exempla  in  medical  as  well  as  literary  texts.  We 
have  already  noted  the  extraordinarily  influential  story  of  Nebuchadnezzar's 114 
transformation  into  an  ox  and  its  moral  significance  for  medieval  writers.  As 
Robert  Burton  explains,  the  transformation  of  human  beings  into  animals  implies 
vanity  and  madness: 
We,  as  long  as  we  are  ruled  by  reason,  correct  our  inordinate 
appetite,  and  conforme  our  selves  to  Gods  word,  are  as  so  many 
living  Saints:  but  if  wee  give  reines  to  Lust,  Anger,  Ambition, 
Pride,  and  follow  our  owne  wayes,  wee  degenerate  into  beasts, 
transforme  our  selves,  overthrowe  our  constitutions,  provoke  God 
to  Anger,  and  heap  upon  us  this  of  Melancholy,  and  all  kindes  of 
incurable  diseases,  as  a  just  and  deserved  punishment  for  our 
sinnes.  4 
The  man  who  loses  his  reason  through  sin,  then,  becomes  an  animal.  Like 
Aristotle,  late-medieval  churchmen  saw  man  as  a  compound  of  the  two  quite 
separate  qualities  of  animality  and  rationality.  As  Maria  Wickert  puts  it,  'man 
equals  animal  plus  ratio.  By  a  reversal  of  the  equation,  man,  if  his  ratio  loses 
control,  becomes  an  animal.  That  is  neither  allegory  nor  poetic  display,  but  a  kind 
of  theological  mathematics'. 
5  As  Burton  implies,  the  metamorphosis  of  a  man  into 
an  animal  was  a  heinous  degradation.  The  Aristotelian  definition  of  man  served 
not  to  link  humanity  and  the  beasts,  but  to  expel  animals  from  the  privileged  realm 
of  order  and  hence  from  human  fellowship.  As  Michel  Foucault  puts  it,  'why 
should  the  fact  that  Western  man  has  lived  for  two  thousand  years  on  his  definition 
as  a  rational  animal  necessarily  mean  that  he  has  recognised  the  possibility  of  an 
order  common  to  reason  and  to  animality?  '.  6 
The  wilful  adoption  of  the  appearance  of  animals  was  regarded  as  an 
especially  sinful  perversion  in  the  late  Middle  Ages.  Jacques  de  Vitry  relates  the 
following  cautionary  story: 115 
I  have  heard  of  one  man  who,  wishing  to  do  penance,  even  as  he 
had  likened  himself  to  the  beasts  in  sin,  so  he  would  make  himself 
like  to  a  beast  in  his  food;  wherefore  he  rose  up  at  dawn  and 
browsed  on  grass  without  touching  it  with  his  hands;  and  thus  he 
would  oftentimes  eat  daily.? 
When  this  'voluntary  Nebuchadnezzar'  wonders  what  order  of  angels  he  should  be 
allowed  to  join  after  such  abject  penance,  he  receives  a  humbling  rebuke  from  a 
heavenly  voice: 
'By  such  a  life  thou  hast  not  deserved  to  be  of  the  Order  of  Angels, 
but  rather  of  the  Order  of  Asses.  For,  as  saith  St.  Bernard:  "He 
who  hath  not  lived  as  a  man  shall  live  as  a  beast"';  so  this  man  fell 
8  from  discretion  into  presumption. 
The  story  exemplifies  the  intimate  connection  of  sin,  madness  and  brutishness  in 
clerical  writings. 
The  Nebuchadnezzar  story  was  clearly  a  favourite  among  didactic  authors 
in  the  Middle  Ages,  functioning  as  a  warning  to  the  powerful  to  shun  the  vice  of 
pride;  in  the  Confessio  Amantis,  Gower  himself  tells  the  story  of 
Nebuchadnezzar's  transformation  into  an  ox-9  The  relevance  of  such  stories  to  the 
lower  classes  is  not  immediately  obvious:  since  medieval  churls  did  not  wield 
political  power,  the  idea  of  a  mad  peasant  was  largely  redundant.  The  Vox 
Clamantis,  however,  like  many  other  contemporary  texts,  reflects  a  widespread 
official  fear  at  the  attempts  of  the  rebels  of  1381  to  challenge  and  even  seize 
power.  Unsurprisingly,  such  presumption  is  perceived  by  Gower  as  utter  madness. 
The  chroniclers  of  the  Revolt  attribute  the  mad  brutishness  of  the  rioters  to 
their  sinfulness.  If  sin  is  ubiquitous,  corrupting  even  those  of  high  degree,  its 
stigma  nevertheless  attaches  most  firmly  to  the  lower  class.  As  Chaucer's  Parson 116 
puts  it,  'Every  synful  man  is  a  cherl  to  synne'.  10  Despite  its  apparent 
even-handedness,  this  remark  cynically  reinforces  the  widespread  notion  of  the 
peasantry  as  a  degenerate  class.  The  man  of  high  degree  is  degraded  by  his  sin;  the 
peasant,  on  the  other  hand,  is  of  a  lower  moral  calibre  by  birth.  As  Lee  Patterson 
has  argued,  this  emphasis  on  the  medieval  peasant's  spiritual  inferiority  is  based 
on  a  peculiar  misrepresentation  of  Augustinian  ideas  which  resulted  in  his 
definition  as  'belonging  to  another  order  of  being,  as  a  member  of  a  different  race, 
a  nonhuman'. 
II 
It  is  unsurprising,  therefore,  that  the  language  of  madness,  possession  and 
brutishness  dominates  clerical  descriptions  of  social  disturbances  involving  the 
lower  classes.  This  is  particularly  evident  in  condemnations  of  popular  churchyard 
dances,  which  often  involved  transvestism  or  dressing  as  animals.  Such  behaviour 
incurs  severe  penalties  in  medieval  penitentials.  'If  anyone  [does]  what  many  do 
on  the  Kalends  of  January  as  was  done  hitherto  among  the  pagans',  says  the 
Burgundian  Penitential,  'seats  himself  on  a  stag,  as  it  is  called,  or  goes  about  in 
[the  guise  of]  a  calf,  he  shall  do  penance  for  three  years,  for  this  is  demoniacal'.  12 
The  Penitential  of  St  Hubert,  meanwhile,  recommends  three  years  of  penance  for 
'anyone  who  performs  dances  in  front  of  the  churches  of  saints  or  anyone  who 
disguises  his  appearance  in  the  guise  of  a  woman  or  of  beasts'.  13 
As  Judith  Neaman  writes,  'if  men,  by  indulging  in  pagan  rites,  mimic  the 
beasts  or  pervert  the  human  forms  which  God  gave  them,  they  bring  upon 
themselves  the  anathema  of  the  Church'.  14  Thus  St  Aurelius  'condemns  men  who 
cover  themselves  with  the  hides  of  animals  and  dance  in  the  heads  of  animals  so 
that  they  "do  not  seem  to  be  men"',  and  St  Peter  Chrysologus  calls  such  bestial 
rites  'vanitas,  qualis  dementia'  (a  foolishness  like  a  dementia).  15  The  following 
citation  from  Johannes  Crysostomus  in  the  pseudo-Bonaventura's  Pharetra  is 
particularly  germane  to  Gower's  vision  of  the  revolters: 117 
Comparatus  est,  ait  propheta,  homo  iumentis  insipientibus,  et 
similis  factus  est  eis.  Peius  est  comparari  quam  nasci.  Naturaliter 
non  habere  rationem  tolerabile  est,  verum  ratione  decoratum 
irrationabili  creature  comparari  voluntatis  est  crimen  non  nature. 
[Man  is  compared,  says  the  prophet,  to  the  foolish  beasts  of  burden, 
and  he  became  like  them.  It  is  worse  to  be  likened  to  one  than  to  be 
born  [one?  ].  To  lack  reason  by  nature  is  bearable,  but  to  liken  a 
creature  endowed  with  reason  to  a  brute  beast  is  to  level  an 
accusation  against  his  will  and  not  his  nature].  16 
Later  in  the  Middle  Ages  John  of  Salisbury  complains  that 
human  dignity  is  manifestly  thrown  away  if  man  devotes  himself  to 
being  on  the  same  level  with,  if  not  goats  and  pigs,  then  lions  and 
panthers,  leopards  and  satyrs,  peacocks,  nightingales  and  parrots,  or 
any  beasts  or  insensate  creatures  whatsoever.  17 
'Who  of  those  who  affect  the  endowments  of  beasts',  he  continues,  'deem  it 
proper  for  themselves  actually  to  be  beasts?  '.  18  St  Maximius  comments  that 
the  langour  of  those  is  more  serious  and  incurable  who  are  deceived 
by  the  sweetness  of  delusions  and  are  unhealthy  in  the  guise  of 
outward  health.  Are  not  all  of  those  false  and  mad  (falsa  et  insana) 
since  they  were  made  by  God,  when  they  change  into  sheep  or 
beasts  or  monsters  [of  depravity]?  19 
Maximius  is  referring  here  to  internal  rather  than  external  changes,  which  are  'all 
the  more  iniquitous  because  they  are  so  hard  to  detect'.  20  It  is  precisely  such  inner 
transformations  that  Gower  detects  in  the  hearts  of  the  rebels  of  1381.  Clearly, 118 
while  they  are  generally  characterized  as  outbursts  of  random,  demented  action, 
both  social  revolt  and  the  sorts  of  church  dances  described  above  imply  a  degree  of 
organization  that  is  deeply  disturbing  to  the  authorities. 
Book  I  of  the  Vox  Clamantis  constitutes  a  lengthy  and  vehement 
denunciation  of  the  sinful,  irrational  and  bestial  behaviour  of  the  peasants  during 
the  Revolt.  No  doubt  civil  disobedience  provoked  allegations  of  madness  in 
England  both  before  and  after  the  Revolt.  In  1194  the  leader  of  an  uprising  in 
London,  William  Fitzosbert,  is  called  mad  in  an  official  account  of  the  event. 
Three  hundred  years  later  Adam  of  Usk  refers  to  the  'savage  fury'  of  the  workmen  . 
who  beheaded  the  Lord  Despencer  at  Bristol.  21  But  as  Lee  Patterson  has  shown, 
during  the  1381  Revolt  the  language  of  insanity  and  demonic  possession  is 
ubiquitously  invoked  by  conservative  commentators.  Thus  the  leader  of  the  rebels, 
John  Ball,  is  described  by  Henry  Knighton  as  'a  most  famous  preacher  to  the 
laity',  who  for  many  years  'had  sowed  the  word  of  God  in  a  most  foolish 
manner'.  Thomas  Walsingham,  meanwhile,  blames  Ball  for  spreading  'the 
perverse  doctrines  of  the  perfidious  John  Wycliffe,  and  the  insane  opinions  that  he 
held'.  22  As  Patterson  says, 
for  Walsingham,  the  Revolt  as  a  whole  is  an  expression  of  the 
insania  nativorum  --  the  madness  of  bondmen  --  and  his  account  is 
[...  ]  saturated  with  terms  like  dementes,  irrationibile,  and  stulti  and 
invokes  throughout  the  language  of  satanic  possession:  the  rebels 
are  ganeones  daemoniaci  (children  of  the  devil),  perhaps  even 
pejores  daemonibus  (worse  than  devils).  23 
The  response  of  the  English  rebels  to  such  rhetoric  was  to  insist  on  their  dignity 
and  rationality.  According  to  John  Ball,  for  example,  the  disordered  state  of 
England  could  only  be  set  to  rights  by  'prudent  men'.  24 119 
The  association  between  madness  and  social  and  moral  revolt  is  already 
prominent  in  Gower's  first  long  work,  the  Anglo-French  Mirour  de  L'Omme.  Here 
Gower  identifies  the  sins  with  animal  nature.  The  source  of  all  sin  in  the  world,  he 
says,  is  man,  the  'Beste  [...  ]  A  qui  dieus  ad  reson  donne'  (MO,  26789-26790).  25 
Like  other  churchmen,  Gower  sees  the  man  lacking  reason  as  both  bestial  and 
immoral.  Sin  causes  man  to  lose  his  rationality,  turning  'reson  en  bestialite'  (MO, 
24). 
These  ideas  are  elaborated  in  Book  VII  of  the  Vox  Clamantis,  which  was 
written  before  Book  I: 
Et  sic  bruta  quasi  perdit  humanae  racionis 
Virtus,  dum  vicium  corporis  acta  regit. 
Est  homo  nunc  animal  dicam,  set  non  racionis, 
Dum  viuit  bruti  condicione  pari. 
Nescia  scripture  brutum  natura  gubernat, 
Iudicis  arbitrium  nec  rationis  habet: 
Est  igitur  brutis  homo  peior,  quando  voluntas 
Preter  naturam  sola  gubernat  eum.  (7.1171-1178) 
[And  so  the  power  of  human  reason  perishes  as  if  it  were  that  of  a 
beast,  so  long  as  vice  governs  the  actions  of  the  body.  Now,  I 
should  say  that  man  is  an  animal,  but  not  a  rational  animal,  as  long 
as  he  lives  in  a  condition  like  a  brute  beast's.  A  nature  ignorant  of 
learning  governs  a  beast,  and  it  has  no  power  of  judgement  or 
reason.  Man  is  therefore  worse  than  a  beast  when  his  will  alone 
governs  him  contrary  to  nature].  26 
Two  passages  from  the  Mirour  illustrate  the  social  application  of  Gower's 
theological  thinking  about  madness.  The  first  concludes  the  section  dealing  with 
the  peasantry  in  Gower's  discussion  of  the  estates: 120 
Mais  certes  c'est  un  grant  errour 
Veoir  Testat  superiour 
El  danger  d'un  vilein  estant. 
Me  semble  que  la  litargie 
Ad  endormi  la  seignourie, 
Si  qu'ils  de  la  commune  gent 
Ne  pernont  garde  a  la  folie  [...  ] 
Car  ja  ne  serront  arrestuz 
Par  resoun  ne  par  discipline.  (MO,  26482-26504) 
[But  certainly  it  is  a  great  error  to  see  the  higher  class  intimidated 
by  the  peasant  class.  It  seems  to  me  that  lethargy  has  so  put  the 
nobility  to  sleep  that  they  do  not  guard  against  the  folly  of  the 
common  people  [...  ]  for  they  will  not  be  stopped  by  reason  or  by 
disciplinel.  27 
Although  unique,  Gower's  prognostication  of  the  Revolt  is  far  from  uncanny, 
especially  if  one  regards  peasant  revolts  as  natural  to  seigneurial  regimes.  28  News 
of  the  French  Jacquerie  of  1358  no  doubt  made  an  impression  on  English 
imaginations,  especially  at  a  time  of  increasing  peasant  discontent.  29  Gower 
clearly  perceives  the  danger  of  a  peasant  insurrection  some  five  years  before  the 
event;  and  the  rhetoric  of  madness  which  pervades  Book  I  of  the  Vox  is  already  in 
evidence  here. 
The  second  passage,  in  which  Gower  introduces  the  image  of  the  peasants 
as  so  many  animals,  also  anticipates  the  events  of  1381: 
Qant  pie  se  lievre  contre  teste, 
Trop  est  la  guise  deshonneste; 
Et  ensi  qant  contre  seignour 121 
Les  gens  sicomme  salvage  beste 
En  multitude  et  en  tempeste 
Se  lievent,  c'est  un  grant  errour; 
Et  nopourquant  la  gent  menour 
Diont  que  leur  superiour 
Donnent  la  cause  du  moleste, 
C'est  de  commune  le  clamour: 
Mais  tout  cela  nest  que  folour, 
Q'au  siecle  nul  remede  preste.  (MO,  27229-27240) 
[When  the  foot  rebels  against  the  head  the  behavior  is  wholly 
illegitimate;  thus  when  the  people  rise  up  like  savage  beasts  in 
tempestuous  multitude  against  the  nobleman,  it  is  a  great  mistake. 
And  notwithstanding,  the  inferior  people  say  that  their  superiors 
give  the  cause  for  their  injury  --  this  is  the  common  cry.  But  all  this 
is  but  folly  for  which  there  is  no  immediate  remedy].  30 
The  first  lines  invoke  what  has  become  known  as  the  'organic  analogy'  of  society. 
Although  of  classical  pedigree,  this  social  model  was  first  applied  to  the  feudal 
Middle  Ages  by  John  of  Salisbury  in  the  Policraticus,  a  work  of  monumental 
significance  for  subsequent  political  philosophy. 
According  to  John's  model,  human  society  is  a  reflection  of  a  divine  ideal. 
A  properly  functioning  society  is  like  a  healthy  human  body;  the  disordered  human 
body,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  metaphor  for  social  disruption  and  revolt.  The  head 
of  the  feudal  body,  of  course,  is  the  sovereign.  'The  feet',  according  to  Salisbury, 
'are  the  name  of  those  who  exercize  the  humbler  duties,  by  whose  service  all  the 
members  of  the  republic  may  walk  along  the  earth.  In  this  accounting  may  be 
included  all  the  peasants  who  always  stick  to  the  land'.  31  The  organic  analogy 
remained  popular  in  the  late  Middle  Ages,  appearing  in  such  diverse  works  as  the 122 
writings  of  the  fourteenth-century  bishop  Thomas  Brinton  and  the  fifteenth-century 
political  poem  'The  Descryving  of  Mannes  Membres'.  32 
For  conservative  theorists  such  as  John  'the  human  body  becomes  a  useful 
image  [...  ]  because  it  stresses  the  subordination  of  the  parts  to  the  whole,  and  the 
inability  of  the  parts  to  function  as  independent  and  self-sufficient  units'. 
33  John's 
model  of  society  describes  not  the  teeming  aggregate  of  competing  individuals  of 
later  political  philosophy,  but  a  hierarchical  structure  held  together  by  natural  or 
pietal,  rather  than  contractual  bonds.  This  is  the  ideal  form  of  human  society 
whose  unattainability  is  lamented  in  the  Paradiso  and  the  Monarchia  and  it  no 
more  corresponds  to  reality  than  Dante's  vision;  indeed,  the  organic  society,  as 
radical  critics  so  frequently  remind  us,  seems  to  have  been  in  decay  since  its 
inception.  34 
The  view  that  medieval  society  was  homogenous  and  harmonious  has 
nevertheless  found  many  twentieth-century  defenders.  The  classic  and  much 
attacked  articulation  of  this  position  is  D.  W.  Robertson's  statement  that  'the 
medieval  world  was  innocent  of  our  profound  concern  for  tension.  [...  ]  We  project 
dynamic  polarities  on  history  as  class  struggles,  balances  of  power,  or  as  conflicts 
between  economic  realities  and  traditional  ideals.  [...  ]  But  the  medieval  world 
with  its  quiet  hierarchies  knew  nothing  of  these  things'.  35  Yet  Gower's 
community  was  not  as  unified  as  he  and  other  promoters  of  the  organic  analogy 
might  have  wished.  Although  there  is  no  space  to  rehearse  the  arguments  here, 
many  recent  studies  suggest  that  class  relations  were  far  from  harmonious  and  that 
market  competition  threatened  the  cohesion  of  late-medieval  English  society.  36 
Gower  did  not,  of  course,  perceive  the  disintegration  of  feudalism  and  the  rise  of 
capitalism;  on  the  contrary,  the  feudal  system  is  the  only  social  order  he  could 
have  understood.  Like  many  others,  however,  he  is  clearly  troubled  by  the 
increasing  autonomy  of  certain  social  groups.  The  author  of  the  early 
fifteenth-century  Dives  and  Pauper  shares  the  same  concern.  'Euery  man',  he 
complains, 123 
wil  ben  his  owyn  man  &  folwyn  his  owyn  fantasyys  &  despysyn  her 
souereynys,  her  doom  &  her  gouernance  ne  3euyn  no  tale  of  Goddis 
lawe  ne  of  londys  lawe  ne  of  holy  chiche  ne  han  men  of  vertue  ne 
of  dignete  in  worchepe  but  for  pride  han  hem  in  dispyt  and  ben  besy 
to  worchepyn  hemself  in  hyndryng  of  opere.  37 
Clearly,  by  the  late  fourteenth  century  an  embarrassing  disparity  is  apparent 
between  feudal  ideology  and  social  realities. 
For  Gower,  as  for  the  author  of  Dives  and  Pauper,  the  collapse  of  social 
hierarchy  is  attributable  to  individual  pride,  a  sin  punishable  by  madness.  But  this 
should  not  prevent  us  from  discussing  the  economic  reasons  for  social  change  in 
the  late  Middle  Ages.  At  the  bottom  end  of  society,  major  economic  changes  were 
affecting  the  relationships  between  peasants  and  their  masters.  Peasants  began  to 
enjoy  greater  mobility  in  the  labour  market,  so  that  laws  against  higher  wages  had 
to  be  introduced  to  prevent  them  from  leaving  their  natural  lords.  Moreover,  the 
historian  Rodney  Hilton  observes  that  during  the  period  from  1350  to  1450  a 
'relative  land  abundance  was  combined,  for  various  reasons,  with  a  relaxation  of 
seigneurial  domination  and  a  notable  lightening  of  the  burden  on  the  peasant 
economy'  so  that  'peasant  society,  in  spite  of  still  existing  within  (in  broad  terms) 
a  feudal  framework,  developed  according  to  laws  of  motion  internal  to  itself'.  38 
The  result  was  a  growing  economic  self-sufficiency  and  self-confidence  among  the 
peasantry. 
For  Gower,  as  for  many  of  his  contemporaries,  the  only  answer  to  these 
alarming  developments  was  to  restate  and  attempt  to  uphold  official  ideology.  As 
John  Fisher  succinctly  says  of  the  two  passages  from  the  Mirour  de  L'Omme 
quoted  above: 124 
both  passages  represent  the  practical  application  of  the  theories  of 
law  and  order  emerging  at  the  end  of  the  Mirour.  Reason  and 
human  law  supported  the  social  hierarchy  just  as  natural  law 
supported  the  natural  hierarchy.  Rebellion  against  the  social 
hierarchy  represented  rebellion  against  reason  and  law,  and 
ultimately  against  the  divinely  instituted  universal  order,  and  it 
reduced  the  rebels  to  the  level  of  unreasoning  beasts.  39 
The  Mirour  de  L'Omme,  then,  introduces  both  the  theological  framework  and  the 
social  vision  informing  the  first  book  of  Vox  Clamantis  and  reflects  the  uneasiness 
of  the  seigneurial  class  about  the  increasing  autonomy  of  the  peasantry. 
Book  I  of  the  Vox  was  added  by  Gower  as  an  afterthought  to  an  already 
extensive  work.  40  It  has  many  artistic  flaws,  chiefly  a  lachrymose  monotony. 
Even  so,  as  Eric  W.  Stockton  opines,  'Gower's  account  of  the  revolt  is  the  most 
interesting  and  original  part  of  the  Vox  Clamantis'.  41  It  is  also  Gower's  final 
damning  judgement  of  society.  Although  an  afterthought,  Book  I  graphically 
depicts  the  disintegration  of  a  community,  the  various  causes  of  which  are 
analysed  in  more  leisurely  fashion  in  the  remaining  books.  Even  disregarding  the 
first  book's  overwhelming  concern  with  madness,  then,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to 
restrict  our  interest  in  the  Vox  to  the  first  book. 
The  Book  begins  with  an  idyllic  description  of  England  shortly  before  the 
Revolt  in  June  1381.  The  narrator,  basking  in  sunshine  and  listening  to  birdsong, 
admires  the  plenitude  of  nature.  This  paradisiacal  experience  is,  of  course,  entirely 
ficticious  both  in  terms  of  the  state  of  English  society  before  the  Revolt  and  from 
the  point  of  view  of  Gower's  own  expectations:  in  the  Mirour  Gower  had  already 
acknowledged  peasant  discontent  and  had  anticipated  their  rising.  Book  I's  utopic 
vision,  then,  has  dramatic  rather  than  historical  validity.  A  hideous  transformation 
of  the  natural  order  is  about  to  take  place,  one  which  is  clearly  intended  to  mirror 
the  Fall  from  Paradise,  the  event  which  inaugurated  human  madness  and  man's 125 
descent  into  animality.  As  Robert  Burton  laments,  the  Fall  made  man  'inferiour  to 
a  beast'  and  'much  altered  from  that  he  was,  before  blessed  and  happy,  now 
miserable  and  accursed'.  42 
At  the  end  of  the  first  chapter  the  narrator  falls  asleep  and  his  dream-vision 
begins  --  even  although,  bewilderingly,  he  has  already  indicated  that  everything 
hitherto  has  been  a  dream.  There  follows  an  astonishing  version  of  the  Peasants' 
Revolt,  in  which  various  bands  of  peasants  metamorphosize  into  domestic  animals: 
Ecce  dei  subito  malediccio  fulsit  in  illos, 
Et  mutans  formas  feceret  esse  feras. 
Qui  fuerent  homines  prius  innate  rationis, 
Brutorum  species  irracionis  habent:  (175-178) 
[Behold,  the  curse  of  God  flashed  upon  them,  and  changing  their 
shapes,  it  had  made  them  into  wild  beasts.  They  who  had  been  men 
of  reason  before  had  the  look  of  unreasoning  brutes]. 
The  first  band  of  rioters  is  transformed  into  a  group  of  braying  asses,  the  second 
into  oxen,  and  so  on. 
Worse  still,  each  group  undergoes  a  second  transformation,  so  that  it 
forsakes  nature  and  becomes  wild: 
Sic  asini  fatui,  quos  fastus  concitat,  omni 
Postposita  lege  condita  iura  negant. 
Hos  intemperies  sic aeris  inficiebat, 
Quod  transformati  sunt  quasi  monstra  michi:  (221-224) 
[Thus  did  the  fatuous  asses,  whom  arrogance  aroused,  refuse  their 
appointed  duties  by  overthrowing  all  control.  The  madness  in  the  air  so 
ruined  them  that  they  seemed  to  be  tranformed  into  monsters]. 126 
In  their  pride  the  animals,  which  in  their  proper  place  partook  of  the  plenitude  of 
nature,  have  now  forsaken  nature.  According  to  Michel  Foucault,  animals  have 
always  been  associated  with  the  unnatural  and  with  madness.  'From  the  start',  he 
says, 
Western  culture  has  not  considered  it  evident  that  animals 
participate  in  the  plenitude  of  nature,  in  its  wisdom  and  its  order. 
[...  ]  In  fact,  on  close  examination,  it  becomes  evident  that  the 
animal  belongs  rather  to  anti-nature,  to  a  negativity  that  threatens 
order  and  by  its  frenzy  endangers  the  positive  wisdom  of  nature.  43 
For  Gower,  the  commoners,  like  the  animals,  are  useful  in  their  place;  but  once 
they  have  cast  off  their  burdens  and  refuse  to  work,  they  threaten  social  order.  The 
animals  have  become  monsters. 
Such  a  view  is  supported  by  a  weight  of  contemporary  rhetoric  which 
insisted  on  the  essentially  bestial  nature  of  the  lower  classes.  Adam  of  Usk,  for 
example,  describes  Richard  II's  Cheshire  archers  as  'by  nature  bestial,  not  drawn 
from  the  gentlemen  of  the  countryside  but  from  the  rustics  or  tailors  or  artisans. 
[...  ]  Men  who  at  home  were  hardly  worthy  to  take  off  the  shoes  of  their  masters 
have  behaved  like  equals  and  fellows  of  their  lords'.  44  Peasant  resentment  at  being 
considered  as  so  many  animals  to  be  contained  is  detectable  throughout  the  Middle 
Ages  and  may  very  well  have  contributed  to  the  rising.  'Euery  beste  that  leuyth 
now',  laments  a  popular  fifteenth-century  song,  'Is  of  more  fredam  than  thow'.  45 
In  the  opening  chapters  of  the  Vox  the  description  of  the  rebels  as  wild 
beasts  is  complemented  by  the  language  of  insanity  and  demonic  possession.  The 
third  rebel  band,  for  example,  is  transformed  into  possessed  swine: 
Hii  fuerant  porci,  maledictus  spiritus  in  quos 
Intravit,  sicut  leccio  sancta  refert.  (377-378) 127 
[They  were  swine  into  which  a  cursed  spirit  had  entered,  just  as 
holy  writ  tells  of]. 
In  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  writers  such  as  Carlisle  and  Swift  used 
the  parable  of  the  Gadarene  swine  as  a  political  allegory  for  the  gullibility  of  the 
masses.  Gower,  however,  subscribes  to  the  moral  interpretation  found  in  the 
Glossa  Ordinaria,  which  asserts  that  not  only  the  sinner  in  the  parable,  but  also 
the  possessed  swine,  were  figuratively  sinful, 
lacking  speech  and  reason,  given  to  filthy  deeds,  grazing  on  the 
mountain  of  pride.  And  unless  a  man  lives  thus  like  a  pig,  the  devil 
receives  no  power  over  him,  or  rather,  he  receives  power  only  to 
test  him,  not  to  destroy  him.  46 
The  same  ideas  are  present  in  the  later  passage: 
Demonis  ex  stirpe  furiens  fuit  illa  propago, 
Horrida  facta  viris  et  violenta  deo; 
Contemprix  superum,  seueque  auidissima  cedis, 
Vt  lupus  est,  ouium  dum  furit  ipse  fame.  (751-754) 
[This  was  the  mad  progeny  of  the  devil's  breed,  rendered  horrible 
in  the  eyes  of  men  and  rash  in  the  eyes  of  God,  contemptuous  of 
higher  powers  and  ferociously  eager  for  slaughter,  just  as  the  wolf 
is  when  it  goes  mad  with  hunger  for  sheep]. 
As  Maria  Wickert  remarks,  'the  bestial  rebel  becomes  the  demonic'.  4'  Even  after 
the  rebels  have  been  subdued,  the  diabolical  stigma  persists: 
Sic  ope  diuina  Sathane  iacet  obruta  virtus, 128 
Que  tarnen  indomita  rusticitate  latet;  (2097-2098) 
[Satan's  power  lay  prostrate,  overwhelmed  by  divine  might;  but 
nevertheless  it  lurked  in  hiding  among  the  ungovernable  peasantry]. 
Gower's  attitude  towards  madness  is  evidently  that  of  his  fellow  churchmen  and 
medieval  social  theorists  such  as  John  of  Salisbury. 
To  a  far  greater  degree  than  their  successors,  medieval  people  developed 
their  sense  of  purpose  and  identity  through  their  experiences  in  the  civic  sphere.  It 
is  therefore  unsurprising  that,  as  John  Fisher  says,  Gower  presents  London  as  'the 
symbol  of  order'. 
48  The  marauding  peasantry,  by  contrast,  are  presented  as  the 
bestial  and  satanic  forces  of  chaos  and  destruction.  But  the  symbolic  nature  of 
Book  I  of  the  Vox  entails  major  distortions  of  historical  fact.  Indeed,  Gower's 
version  of  the  events  of  the  Revolt  is  almost  as  fictitious  as  the  utopian  vision  of 
England  with  which  the  poem  begins:  the  rebels  did  not,  for  example,  sack  or 
defile  churches  as  the  narrator  claims.  Gower  includes  this  allegation  because  it 
makes  sense  that  the  devil's  servants  would  do  such  things. 
Book  I  of  the  Vox,  then,  is  one  of  the  most  sustained  and  vitriolic  pieces  of 
English  writing  to  use  the  language  of  madness.  What  makes  it  significantly 
different  from  other  literary  descriptions  of  madness  is  its  concern  with  the 
derangement  of  an  entire  social  class  rather  than  one  individual.  Moreover, 
madness  here  is  a  metaphor  for  insurrection  and  political  subversion.  We  must 
therefore  question  the  assumption  that  madness  was  not  yet  considered  a  'problem 
of  the  city'  and  that  it  had  not  yet  taken  on  a  'political,  social  and  ethical 
49  status'. 
Indeed,  the  association  of  madness,  demonic  possession  and  serious  civil 
disorder  is  found  in  many  medieval  accounts  of  urban  dancing  frenzies.  50  The 
third-century  Christian  writer  Minucius  Felix  attributes  to  the  pagan  gods 
responsibility  for 129 
the  madmen,  whom  you  see  running  out  into  the  streets,  themselves 
soothsayers  of  a  kind  but  without  a  temple,  raging,  ranting, 
whirling  round  in  the  dance;  there  is  the  same  demoniacal 
possession,  but  the  object  of  the  frenzy  is  different.  51 
In  the  fourteenth  century  Robert  Mannyng  denounces  as  insane  those  who  took 
part  in  the  semi-legendary  dance  at  Kölbigk  three  centuries  earlier.  52 
Of  more  immediate  relevance  to  the  Vox  Clamantis,  however,  are 
contemporary  descriptions  of  the  dancing  frenzies  which  swept  North-Western 
Europe  in  1374.  The  condition  of  the  participants  in  these  dances  is  described  in  a 
monk's  eyewitness  account: 
Both  men  and  women  were  abused  by  the  devil  to  such  a  degree 
that  they  danced  in  their  homes,  in  the  churches  and  in  the  streets, 
holding  each  other's  hands  and  leaping  in  the  air.  While  they 
danced  they  called  out  the  names  of  demons,  such  as  Friskes  and 
others,  but  they  were  unaware  of  this  nor  did  they  pay  attention  to 
modesty  even  though  people  watched  them.  At  the  end  of  the 
dance,  they  felt  such  pains  in  the  chest,  that  if  their  friends  did  not 
tie  linen  clothes  tightly  around  their  waists,  they  cried  out  like 
madmen  that  they  were  dying.  53 
The  monk  goes  on  to  note  that  the  dancers,  who  were  drawn  predominantly  from 
the  lower  classes,  considered  openly  revolting  against  the  clergy,  and  would  have 
done  so  if  the  priests's  exorcisms  had  not  proved  so  effective  in  quelling  the 
disturbances.  Indeed,  the  dancing  frenzy  of  1374  was  simply  a  repetition  on  a 
grand  scale  of  the  frequent  popular  dances  which  took  place  in  churchyards 
throughout  the  Middle  Ages.  As  we  have  seen,  the  participants  in  such  dances 
were  denounced  by  the  churchmen  in  the  language  of  madness  and  demonic 130 
possession.  It  is  unsurprising,  then,  that  the  English  rebels  of  1381  were  described 
in  precisely  these  terms  by  the  representatives  of  offical  culture.  54 
Given  the  ubiquity  of  peasant  disorder  in  the  Vox  Clamantis,  it  is  no 
surprise  that  the  equanimity  of  the  entire  society  is  jeopardized.  As  Gower  reminds 
us  in  Book  VII  of  the  Vox, 
Sic  minor  est  mundus  homo,  qui  fert  singula  solus, 
Soli  solus  homo  dat  sacra  vota  deo. 
Est  homo  qui  mundus  de  iure  suo  sibi  mundum 
Subdit,  et  in  melius  dirigit  inde  status: 
Si  tarnen  inmundus  est,  que  sunt  singula  mundi 
Ledit,  et  in  peius  omne  refundit  opus:  (7.645-650) 
[Thus  man,  who  alone  does  everything,  is  a  microcosm;  and  man 
alone  pays  sacred  devotion  to  God  alone.  The  man  who  is  pure  in 
his  own  right  subjects  the  world  to  himself,  and  accordingly  guides 
its  circumstances  for  the  better.  If  he  is  impure,  however,  he  is 
injurious  to  everything  which  pertains  to  the  world,  and  redirects  its 
whole  fabric  for  the  worse]. 
This  view  of  the  'little  world  of  man'  accords  both  with  John  of  Salisbury's 
organic  metaphor  of  society  and  with  the  essentially  somatic  approach  to  illness 
and  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Thus  the  actions  of  rebellious  or  simply 
autonomous  sections  of  society  were  seen  to  have  a  deleterious  effect  on  the  social 
body.  'Civil  life  should  imitate  nature',  writes  John  of  Salisbury,  'otherwise,  life 
is  duly  called  not  merely  uncivil,  but  rather  bestial  and  brute'.  55 
The  remainder  of  Book  I  deals  with  the  destruction  of  a  once  proud  city 
and  the  dreamer's  descent  into  brutishness.  In  Chapter  15  of  Book  I,  Gower 
depicts  the  solidarity  of  the  upper  class  in  its  physical  and  mental  anguish: 131 
Ora  rigant  fletus,  tremit  et  formidine  pectus, 
Gaudia  que  fuerant  deuorat  ipsa  dolor, 
Aspiceres  alios  flentes  terraque  iacentes, 
Quos  dolor  alterius  proprius  atque  dolet,  (1337-1340) 
[Tears  wetted  people's  faces,  and  breasts  trembled  with  fear,  and 
grief  consumed  the  joys  which  once  had  existed.  You  might  have 
seen  some  lying  on  the  ground  weeping  for  others,  and  one's  own 
sorrow  was  another's  grief]. 
For  many,  grief  leads  to  outright  madness: 
Sic  magis  orbatas  quam  sepe  maritis 
Femineas  vidi  corde  dolente  genas; 
Sepe  manus  stringi,  dirumpere  sepeque  crines, 
Vngues  et  propriam  dilaniare  cutem.  (1223-1226) 
[With  grieving  heart  I  saw  the  woman  bereaved  of  her  husband 
often  wet  her  delicate  cheeks,  often  wring  her  hands  and  tear  her 
hair,  and  her  nails  lacerate  her  own  skin]. 
As  in  many  medieval  romances,  grief-madness  here  is  principally  intended  to 
inspire  sympathy  rather  than  imply  moral  taint. 
The  dreamer  himself  is  now  afflicted  with  grief-madness.  Like  the  exiled 
Ovid  of  the  Tristia,  on  which  Gower  now  draws  frequently,  he  endures  an  abject 
exile  in  the  'wild  woodlands'  in  order  to  escape  the  angry  mobs  (1382).  He  even 
comes  to  resemble  the  hero  of  the  French  romance  Renaus  et  Montauban,  hiding 
from  his  enemies  and  living  'like  a  hunted  animal':  56 
Attamen  ad  tantam  rabiem  pedibus  timor  alas 
Addidit,  et  volucris  in  fugiendo  fui. 132 
Sic  vagus  hic  et  ibi,  quo  Bors  ducebat  euntem, 
Temptaui  varia  cum  grauitate  loca: 
Pes  vagat  osque  silet,  oculus  stupet  et  dolet  auris, 
Cor  timet  et  rigide  diriguere  come. 
Sicut  aper,  quem  turba  canum  cicumsona  terret, 
Territus  extrema  rebar  adire  loca.  (1389-1396) 
[Nevertheless,  fear  of  this  great  madness  added  wings  to  my  feet, 
and  I  was  like  a  bird  in  my  swift  flight.  So,  wandering  here  and 
there  as  chance  led  me  as  I  went,  I  made  a  serious  attempt  for 
several  places.  My  steps  wandered,  and  my  lips  were  silent;  my  eye 
was  struck  with  amazement  and  my  ear  was  in  pain;  my  heart 
trembled  and  my  hair  stood  stiffly  on  end.  Panicky  as  a  wild  boar 
which  a  pack  of  dogs  frightens  by  barking  around  it,  I  thought 
about  withdrawing  to  very  remote  places]. 
The  dreamer's  comparison  of  himself  to  a  bird  recalls  the  experience  of  the  Irish 
hero  Suibhne,  who  becomes  so  deranged  with  fear  at  the  battle  of  Magh  Rath  that, 
'through  Ronan's  curse  he  went,  like  any  bird  of  the  air,  in  madness  and 
imbecility'.  57  Indeed,  however  much  they  owe  to  classical  sources,  the  dreamer's 
desire  for  remoteness,  his  aimless  wandering,  his  muteness,  his  meagre  diet  of 
acorns  and  his  bed  of  grass  all  recall  the  physical  hardships  of  the  Irish  hero. 
Gower  also  clearly  draws  on  the  wild  man  tradition  of  medieval  romance  as 
he  'begins  to  resemble  the  beasts  who  attack'.  58  Nevertheless,  his  madness  is 
presented  sympathetically,  like  that  of  the  bestial  heroes  Yvain  and  Tristan. 
Moreover,  the  dreamer's  abject  condition  links  him  with  John  the  Baptist,  the 
figure  most  commonly  associated  with  the  phrase  to  which  Gower's  title  alludes  -- 
'the  voice  of  one  crying  in  the  wilderness'.  In  the  Cursor  Mundi,  for  example,  the 
prophet  appears  as  an  English  Wild  Man  subsisting  'wit  rotes  and  wit  gres'. 
59  In 133 
the  light  of  these  precedents,  the  dreamer's  madness  takes  on  a  quite  different 
moral  significance  from  the  frenzy  of  the  city  rebels. 
The  dreamer  later  refers  to  the  'insane  look  upon  my  anxious  face' 
(trepidoque  insania  vultu  [1479])  and  in  various  places  to  his  speechlessness, 
pallor,  sleeplessness,  leanness,  loss  of  appetite  and  thoughts  of  suicide.  All  of 
these,  of  course,  are  conventional  manifestations  of  melancholy  madness.  Like  the 
distracted  heroes  of  the  romances,  he  is  so  changed  that  he  loses  his  human 
appearance  and  becomes  quite  unrecognisable  even  to  himself  (1480).  The 
dreamer's  mental  state  is  throughout  connected  with  his  physical  degeneration: 
Sic  magis  a  longo  passum  quod  corpus  habebam, 
Vix  habuit  tenuem  qua  tegat  ossa  cutem; 
Sicque  diu  pauidas  pariter  cum  mente  colorem 
Perdideram,  que  fui  sic  nouus  alter  ego. 
Vix  fuerat  quod  ego  solida  me  mente  recepi.  (1487-1491) 
[I  underwent  long  suffering  because  of  the  fact  that  my  body 
scarcely  possessed  even  a  thin  skin  to  cover  my  bones.  And 
suffering  just  as  long  a  time  in  mind,  too,  I  lost  my  color,  and  so  I 
was  like  another  self.  It  was  with  difficulty  that  I  kept  myself  in 
sound  mind]. 
The  dreamer  suffers  --  from  the  inside,  as  it  were  --  a  crisis  of  identity  analogous 
to  that  of  the  romance  heroes.  Although  he  is  haunted  by  recollections  of  the 
violent  events  of  the  past,  his  memory  seems  constantly  to  be  in  jeopardy: 
Ha,  quociens  fuerat  mea  mens  oblita  quid  essem, 
Dum  status  anterior  posteriors  tenet!  (1421-1422) 
[Alas!  How  many  times  did  my  mind  forget  what  I  was,  as  [in]  its 
wonted  way  it  clung  to  the  past]. 134 
Elsewhere  he  tells  us  that  'Vt  lapis  a  mente  sepe  remotus  eram'  (1574)  11  was 
often  far  out  of  my  mind  [and]  like  a  stone]. 
Like  the  madness  of  the  grieving  woman  in  Chapter  15,  the  dreamer's 
madness  is  intended  to  inspire  sympathy  rather  than  condemnation,  and  it  too  is 
caused  by  grief.  'Grief',  he  tells  us,  'was  my  mind's  principal  concern'  (1449). 
Fear  and  sorrow,  of  course,  are  also  prominent  emotions  throughout  the  entire 
vision;  the  dreamer's  madness,  then,  is  caused  by  one  or  a  number  of  the 
'passions',  which  implied  far  less  moral  taint  in  the  Middle  Ages  than  demonic 
possession.  Also,  unlike  the  frenzy  of  the  rebels,  the  dreamer's  madness  has  a 
penitential  aspect:  the  dreamer  suggests  that  his  co-sufferers  must  take  some 
responsibility,  however  limited,  for  their  inability  to  maintain  social  order.  This 
sense  of  collective  responsibility  for  the  calamitous  Revolt  is  echoed  in 
contemporary  analyses  of  its  causes.  'Let  us  acknowledge  that  we  are  all  to 
blame',  writes  Thomas  Walsingham  after  the  Revolt,  'and  amend  as  best  we  can 
those  sins  which  we  have  knowingly  committed'.  60  Like  John  the  Baptist,  the 
dreamer  seeks  the  regeneration  of  the  faithful  through  a  renunciation  of  sin. 
Clearly,  'Gower's  tears  and  those  of  his  audience  are  intended,  as  rueful 
tears  of  the  sacrament  of  penance,  to  lead  to  a  reconciliation  with  God  and  to  a 
regeneration  of  the  individual  as  well  as  of  the  people'.  61  What  the  dreamer  fears 
most,  even  more  than  a  grisly  and  ignoble  death  at  the  hands  of  the  rebels,  is  that 
his  temporary  alienation  from  God  will  become  permanent: 
Plura  dolens  timui  tunc  temporis,  et  super  omne 
Ira  dei  magni  causa  timoris  erat:  (1455-1456) 
[Even  as  I  was  grieving  over  these  many  things,  I  was  very  much 
afraid  at  this  time;  and  above  all,  the  wrath  of  God  was  a 
considerable  cause  of  fear  on  my  part]. 135 
As  Penelope  Doob  has  argued,  the  exile  of  the  lone  madman  has  always  a 
penitential  aspect. 
62  The  outcast  dreamer,  however  pathetic,  is  therefore 
spiritually  as  well  as  socially  alienated. 
Indeed,  the  dreamer's  wildness  has  much  in  common  with  Gower's 
description,  in  Confessio  Amantis,  of  Nebuchadnezzar's  transformation  and 
pathetic  life  in  the  wilderness.  Gower  tells  this  story  in  great  detail  and  from  a 
subjective  point  of  view;  he  is  also  sympathetic  towards  the  fallen  king: 
Upon  himself  tho  gan  he  loke; 
In  stede  of  mete  gras  and  stres, 
In  stede  of  handes  longe  Iles, 
In  stede  of  man  a  bestes  Tyke 
He  syh;  and  thanne  he  gan  to  syke 
For  cloth  of  gold  and  for  perrie, 
Which  him  was  wont  to  magnefie. 
When  he  behield  his  Cote  of  heres, 
he  wept  and  with  fulwoful  teres 
Up  to  the  hevene  he  caste  his  chiere 
Wepende,  and  thoghte  in  this  manere; 
Thogh  he  no  wordes  myhte  winne, 
Thus  seide  his  herte  and  spak  withinne: 
'0  mihti  godd,  that  at  hast  wroght 
And  at  myht  bringe  ayein  to  noght, 
Now  knowe  I  wel,  bot  at  of  thee, 
This  world  hath  no  prosperite.  '  (I.  2992-3008) 
As  Doob  comments,  Nebuchadnezzar's  'madness  is  subordinated  to  his  bestiality'; 
in  this  way  it  invites  comparison  with  the  madness  of  the  dreamer  in  the  Vox.  63 
Nebuchadnezzar's  subsequent  confession  and  his  pledge  of  amendment  also  recall 136 
the  penitential  aspect  of  the  dreamer's  sylvan  existence.  It  is  even  possible  that 
Gower  had  Book  I  of  the  Vox  in  mind  when  he  turned  his  attention  to 
Nebuchadnezzar  in  the  later  work.  In  these  passages  Gower  draws  on  a  very 
different  sort  of  rhetoric  about  madness  to  that  which  prevails  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Vox. 
Huizinga  and  others  have  characterized  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth 
centuries  as  a  period  of  melancholy  pessimism  in  which  the  nobility  felt  'a 
sentimental  need  of  enrobing  their  souls  in  the  garb  of  woe'.  64  Gower's 
unrelentingly  apocalyptic  view  of  a  doomed  world  overrun  by  merciless  madmen 
is  in  this  sense  typical  of  his  age.  For  Gower,  the  frenzied  events  of  the  Revolt  are 
both  signs  and  causes  of  the  world's  end.  Thus  Gower  anticipates  the  destructive 
images  of  late  Gothic  art.  In  Michel  Foucault's  solemn  words,  'it  is  the  tide  of 
madness,  its  secret  invasion,  that  shows  that  the  world  is  near  its  final  catastrophe; 
it  is  man's  insanity  that  invokes  and  makes  necessary  the  world's  end'.  65  In 
fifteenth-century  literature,  certainly,  the  madness  of  men  ushered  in  the  world's 
end.  In  'The  Fiftene  Toknys  Aforn  the  Doom',  Gower's  follower  John  Lydgate 
gives  a  macabre  description  of  mute  madmen  in  the  last  days  which  recalls  the  Vox 
in  tone: 
The  tenth  day,  from  kavernys  &  ther  kavys 
Men  shal  come  out,  lyk  folk  that  kan  no  good, 
And  renne  abrood  lyk  drounke  men  that  Ravys 
Or  as  they  weren  frentyk,  outhir  wood, 
Dedly  pale,  and  devoyde  of  blood; 
Nat  speke  a  woord  Oon  vnto  anothir, 
As  witles  peple  of  resoun  and  of  mood  [mind], 
No  queyntaunce  maad,  brothir  vnto  brothir.  66 137 
The  jaundiced  sentiments  of  the  Vox  also  prefigure  Villon's  hopeless  vision 
of  humanity  in  his  Ballade  (de  bon  conseil): 
Hommes  faillis,  bersaudez  de  raison, 
Desnaturez  et  hors  de  congoissance, 
Desmis  du  sens,  comblez  de  desraison, 
Fols  abusez,  plains  de  descongoissance, 
[0  soul  sick  men,  barred  from  reason, 
perverted,  beyond  consciousness, 
deranged,  no  longer  rational, 
deluded  fools  filled  with  ignorance].  67 
Like  Villon,  the  Gower  of  the  Vox  believes  that  the  only  solution  to  this  general 
madness  is  repentance  before  the  Last  Judgement.  Although  the  peasants  are 
chiefly  to  blame  for  the  violence  of  1381,  the  insanity  of  the  Revolt  is  an 
abomination  for  which  all  men  must  take  some  responsibility  and  which  affects  all 
sections  of  society.  In  this  sense,  the  significance  of  madness  as  a  cosmic  drama 
intertwines  with  quite  specific  historical  and  political  concerns. 
A  concern  with  madness  and  sinfulness,  of  course,  is  not  uncommon  in  late 
fourteenth-century  literature.  In  the  poem  Pearl,  for  example,  the  maiden  calls  the 
worldly  dreamer  mad  on  several  occasions  and  the  dreamer  finally  comes  to  realise 
his  spiritual  turpitude  with  the  Gowerian  sentiment,  'Lorde,  mad  hit  am  that  agayn 
the  stryven'. 
68  The  Vox  Clamantis,  however,  couches  both  moral  and  civil 
disorder  in  terms  of  madness.  Gower  applies  the  traditional  warning  that  the 
-disordered  human  society  is  bestial  and  unnatural  to  the  more  immediate  social 
concerns  of  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries,  a  period  in  which,  as  John 
Bellamy  puts  it,  'the  preservation  of  public  order  was  very  often  the  biggest 
problem  the  king  had  to  face.  Neither  before  that  time  nor  since  has  the  issue  of 
public  order  bulked  so  large  in  English  history'.  69  Gower  also  illustrates  the 138 
theological  and  social  concepts  underlying  the  relationship  between  madness  and 
social  class  with  all  the  gloomy  pessimism  of  his  age.  Nevertheless,  that  epoch, 
like  every  other,  was  by  no  means  one  of  literary  homogeneity.  As  the  works  of 
Chaucer  demonstrate,  Gower's  is  not  the  only  possible  reaction  to  the  apparent 
madness  of  the  Peasants'  Revolt. 139 
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Chapter  4 
'Thou  mayst  nat  werken  after  thyn  owene  heed':  Madness  and 
Rationality  in  Chaucer's  Miller's  and  Summoner's  Tales 
The  enormous  stylistic  differences  between  the  works  of  Gower  and  Chaucer  can 
frustrate  comparative  literary  criticism.  As  John  Fisher  notes,  'to  modern  readers, 
Chaucer's  and  Gower's  treatments  of  the  same  material  are  so  different  that 
comparison  appears  fruitless,  if  not  downright  wrongheaded'.  I  Nevertheless,  since 
Chaucer  and  Gower  were  both  active  writers  during  the  Peasants'  Revolt,  it  should 
not  surprise  us  that  Chaucer's  Miller's  and  Summoner's  tales  explore,  albeit  in  a 
quite  different  tone,  the  same  powerful  connection  between  madness  and  social 
class  that  Gower  exploits  in  the  Vox  Clamantis. 
Neither  psychiatric  historians  nor  literary  critics  have  had  much  to  say 
about  the  theme  of  madness  in  Chaucer.  The  nineteenth-century  historian  Daniel 
Hack  Tuke  remarked  disappointedly  that  'there  is  not  much  to  be  found  in  Chaucer 
[...  ]  bearing  in  any  way  upon  the  insane'.  2  Tuke's  statement  is  fair  insofar  as  it 
refers  to  examples  or  discussions  of  actual  madness.  Melibee  is  afflicted  with 
grief-madness  when  he  learns  of  the  injury  done  by  his  enemies  to  his  wife  and 
daughter.  There  are  also  examples  of  anger-madness  scattered  throughout  the 
Canterbury  Tales;  and  Rose  Zimbardo  has  argued  for  the  insanity  of  the  narrator 
of  The  Book  of  the  Duchess.  3  Madness,  however,  is  rarely  a  prominent  theme. 
Not  even  Chaucer's  works  of  romance  contain  insane  protagonists.  Although  each 
becomes  lovesick  for  his  love  of  Emily,  Palamon  and  Arcite  cannot  properly  be 
described  as  mad;  not  even  Troilus's  love  languishment,  as  Judith  Neaman 
observes,  develops  into  a  full-blown  psychosis.  4  Nevertheless,  examples  of 
feigned  or  spurious  insanity  are  relatively  common  in  the  Canterbury  Tales.  The 147 
Miller's  and  Summoner's  tales,  in  particular,  show  a  sophisticated  awareness  of  the 
rhetorical  uses  of  the  language  of  madness. 
A  discussion  of  these  tales  is  conspicuously  absent  from  Penelope  Doob's 
study  of  the  conventions  of  madness  in  Middle  English  literature.  5  One  reason  for 
this  omission  is  that  any  discussion  of  madness  in  the  tales  involves  close  attention 
to  historical  detail,  whereas  Doob  is  concerned  principally  with  the  literary 
manifestations  of  the  trans-historical  Christian  association  between  madness  and 
sin.  The  value  and  persuasiveness  of  Doob's  thesis  has  already  been  noted;  but  the 
application  to  medieval  literature  of  conventional  ideas  about  madness  should  not 
preclude  investigation  into  social  context. 
The  current  ideas  about  madness  at  any  historical  point,  of  course,  are 
never  easily  separable  from  conventional  or  traditional  ones.  Throughout  the 
Middle  Ages  the  rhetorical  use  of  the  language  of  madness,  in  particular,  is  often 
remarkably  similar  from  one  genre  to  another.  This  becomes  clear  when  one 
compares  the  language  of  madness  in  religious  and  secular  texts.  The  cleric  Dan 
Michel  writes  that  heretics,  unbelievers  and  those  who  commit  sacrilege  are  'ase 
wode  hounder  /  bet  bitep  and  ne  knawep  na3t  hare  lhord'.  6  Clearly,  Michel  is 
talking  about  the  madness  of  sin.  But  substitute  a  secular  for  a  heavenly  'lhord' 
and  the  remark  could  be  drawn  from  any  of  the  official  invectives  on  the  Revolt  of 
1381:  Book  I  of  the  Vox,  it  has  been  seen,  presents  the  revolting  peasants  as  so 
many  insane  and  ungovernable  animals.  Similarities  between  clerical  and  other 
fields  of  discourse  about  madness  are  evident  even  in  writings  of  different 
historical  periods;  indeed,  Michel's  work  predates  the  Revolt  by  some  forty  years. 
Despite  such  overlaps  between  historical  and  conventional  detail,  Chaucer's 
concern  with  insanity  in  the  Miller's  and  Summoner's  tales  may  be  fully 
understood  in  relation  not  to  conventional  Christian  ideas  about  insanity,  but  to  the 
political  climate  of  England  in  the  early  1380s.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  fact 
that  the  Miller's  Tale  --  and  arguably  the  Summoner's  Tale  --  falls  into  the  fabliau 
genre  poses  a  particular  problem.  Literary  criticism  has  tended  to  focus  on  the 148 
continental  sources  of  the  fabliaux,  perhaps  hindering  attempts  to  set  the  tales  in 
their  historical  contexts.  Yet,  as  John  Hines  suggests  of  the  English  fabliaux,  'it  is 
often  more  productive  to  refer  [...  ]  to  their  immediate  historical  context  to  achieve 
a  critical  understanding  and  appreciation  of  this  literature  than  to  compare  them 
with  foreign-language  counterparts'.  7  Such  an  approach  seems  particularly  fruitful 
in  the  case  of  the  Miller's  Tale,  in  which  some  of  the  most  prominent  themes  -- 
such  as  madness,  astrology  and  the  scholarly  life  --  are  Chaucerian  additions  to  the 
basic  fabliau  story. 
8 
Hitherto,  the  only  critic  to  have  examined  the  theme  of  madness  in  Chaucer 
in  the  light  of  its  historical  context  is  Lee  Patterson.  9  Patterson  shows  that  the 
historically-charged  language  of  madness  at  the  end  of  the  Miller's  and 
Summoner's  tales  reflects  the  vocabulary  used  in  the  invectives  of  the  seigneurial 
class  against  the  peasantry  at  the  time  of  the  1381  Revolt.  Direct  political 
commentary  is  not,  of  course,  a  Chaucerian  trait:  the  Revolt  is  only  explicitly 
mentioned  by  Chaucer  in  the  Nun's  Priest's  Tale.  10  Nevertheless,  echoes  of  the 
Revolt  are  detectable  in  the  Miller's  and  Summoner's  tales.  This  chapter  shows 
how  the  conventions  of  insanity  which  permeate  these  texts  are  manipulated  so  as 
to  denaturalize  the  concept  of  madness  and  reveal  its  constructedness.  More 
particularly,  it  is  argued  that  in  these  tales  the  perceived  madness  of  the  peasantry 
is  contrasted  ironically  with  the  superior  rationality  of  clerks  and  scholarly 
discourse. 
The  interplay  between  madness  and  rationality  in  the  Miller's  narrative 
invites  comparison  with  the  preceding  tale.  Throughout  the  Knight's  Tale,  the 
Theban  cousins  act  irrationally:  Arcite  in  particular  is  referred  to  habitually  as 
'wood'.  Yet  their  deranged  behaviour  is  described  coolly.  Donald  W.  Rowe  says 
of  the  Knight's  Tale  that  'in  its  [...  ]  measured  pace,  its  distancing  of  the 
emotionally  disruptive,  its  highly  stylised  and  deliberate  order,  it  enacts 
rationality'. 
11  The  Miller's  Tale,  too,  is  a  tour-de-force  of  narrative 
craftsmanship.  By  telling  a  tale  even  more  polished  than  the  Knight's,  the  Miller 149 
provocatively  establishes  order  and  rationality  as  aesthetic  priorities  in  his  own 
tale,  despite  the  madness  of  the  action  he  narrates  and  his  own  intimidating 
animality. 
Indeed,  the  drunken  Miller  himself  offers  a  clue  to  the  understanding  of  the 
function  of  insanity  in  the  Miller's  Tale.  Lee  Patterson  observes  that  the  Miller  is  a 
deeply  'irrational'  figure.  12  Walter  Clyde  Curry  long  ago  discussed  how  the 
Miller's  physiognomy,  described  in  the  General  Prologue,  betrays  his  gross, 
foolish,  lawless  and  lecherous  nature.  13  It  is  also  possible,  however,  that  Chaucer 
modelled  the  Miller  after  an  historical  individual.  It  has  been  suggested,  for 
example,  that  the  Miller  recalls  'Robert  or  Robyn  the  knavish  apprentice  of  John 
de  Seinte  Fredeswide  of  Oxford  in  1355,  involved  in  that  year  in  the  riot  during 
which  townsmen  dislodged  or  broke  down  the  doors  of  gownsmen'.  14  This 
suggestion,  made  all  the  more  credible  by  the  Miller's  proven  way  with  doors, 
seems  significant  in  view  of  the  tale's  concern  with  town-gown  tensions  and 
allegations  of  peasant  irrationality. 
Whatever  the  case,  the  Miller's  description  emphasizes  his  bestial  and 
uncivilized  nature.  His  massive  size,  his  beard  as  red  'as  any  sowe  or  fox',  his 
huge  mouth  and  black,  hairy  nostrils  and  his  predilection  for  physical  violence  all 
authenticate  his  self-confessed  vilain  status.  More  particularly,  these  details  evoke 
the  descriptions  of  wild  men  which  fascinated  and  repelled  medieval  people. 
Indeed,  the  Miller  resembles  King  Claudas  in  the  vulgate  Lancelot.  A  handsome 
knight  from  the  neck  down,  Claudas  sports  the  grotesque  head  of  a  Wild  Man:  like 
the  Miller,  he  has  an  ugly  nose,  a  red  beard,  a  large  mouth  and  an  intimidating 
physique. 
15  The  Wild  Man,  the  traditional  antitype  of  the  chivalric  hero,  is  a 
fitting  identification  for  the  Miller,  who  seeks  to  undermine  the  courtly  world  of 
the  preceding  tale. 
The  suggestion  that  the  Miller  possesses  the  stock  characteristics  of  the 
Wild  Man  implies  his  irrationality.  Moreover,  drunkenness  was  regarded  as  a  form 
of  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages,  as  Harry  Baily  implies  when  he  calls  the  Miller  a 150 
'fool'  whose  'wit  is  overcome'  (3135).  16  The  sophistication  of  the  churl's 
narrative  therefore  comes  as  a  surprise.  This  reversal  of  expectation  again  links  the 
Miller  with  the  Wild  Man,  whose  rough  appearance  often  belies  a  superior 
rationality.  Chaucer's  principal  interest,  however,  is  in  the  subversive  political 
significance  of  such  undercutting  of  expectations.  By  presenting  his  peasant 
narrators  'with  intellects  far  higher  than  those  of  brute  beasts',  Chaucer  hints  at  'a 
potentially  egalitarian  levelling  of  differences  between  social  classes'.  17  Both  the 
Miller's  and  Summoner's  tales,  it  emerges,  are  concerned  with  the  relationship 
between  rationality  and  social  class. 
The  theme  of  madness  is  central  in  the  Miller's  Tale;  but  before 
considering  its  structural  and  political  importance,  we  may  say  something  about 
the  deranged  psychology  of  the  characters  who  inhabit  what  David  Williams  has 
aptly  called  the  'mad  world'  of  the  tale.  ig  Although  madness  is  directly  imputed 
only  to  Nicholas  and  John  in  this  tale,  Absolon's  addiction  to  fantasy  and  his 
ridiculous  behaviour  border  on  insanity.  At  the  root  of  Absolon's  distracted 
condition  is,  of  course,  the  sin  of  pride.  But  Chaucer  also  hints  at  the  instrumental 
physical  cause  of  his  detachment  from  reality.  In  terms  of  medieval  faculty 
psychology  --  a  branch  of  medicine  in  which  Chaucer  shows  interest  in  many  of 
his  works  --  Absolon's  'maladye'  until  his  shocking  cure  is  consistent  with  a 
derangement  of  the  faculty  of  imaginatio  or  phantasia.  This  faculty,  medieval 
physicians  and  philosophers  agreed,  was  responsible  for  apprehending  images; 
damage  to  the  imaginatio  could  therefore  make  things  seem  other  than  they  are.  19 
Thus  Patrick  Gallagher  echoes  medieval  psychological  terminology  when  he  notes 
that  'for  Absolon,  fantasy  begins  to  outrun  perception,  the  imaginary  to  usurp  the 
real'. 
20 
Absolon's  errors  spring  more  immediately  from  the  fact  that  his  faculty  of 
cogitatio  or  imaginativa  --  the  discriminatory  faculty  responsible  for  combining 
and  separating  impressions  received  by  the  brain  into  imaginatio  --  is  acting  on 
false  information.  Absolon  consequently  becomes  a  'veritable  zany  of 151 
indiscrimination',  whose  every  action  betrays  his  'extreme  inability  to  make 
proper  distinctions'.  21  His  physical  gaucheness  and  his  inappropriate  speech  are 
symptoms  of  the  perilous  diminution  of  proper  perspective  and  judgement  which 
culminates  in  the  misdirected  kiss. 
Chaucer  uses  the  language  of  madness  throughout  the  tale  to  satirize  the 
deluded  vanity  of  all  the  main  characters.  The  term  'fantasie',  for  example,  is 
applied  first  to  Nicholas,  and  it  comprehends  several  of  the  scholar's  dubious 
attributes.  Nicholas's  'fantasie'  indicates  his  lack  of  discrimination,  which  is 
shown  by  his  mixing  of  secular  and  religious  songs  and  his  later  ill-fated  decision 
to  'surpassen  al  the  jape'  on  Absolon.  'Fantasie'  also  has  the  meaning  of  'amorous 
fancy',  a  sense  which  applies  equally  well  to  the  tale's  other  male  characters.  22 
The  term  also  has  senses  more  specifically  relevant  to  Nicholas.  In  medieval 
psychology,  as  in  modern  usage,  'fantasie'  or  'imaginacioun'  is  the  faculty 
necessary  for  'speculating  about  the  future'  and  the  'devising  of  works  of  art', 
activities  for  which  Nicholas  shows  flair  later  in  the  tale.  23 
Most  pertinently,  'fantasie'  is  a  term  which  in  the  late  Middle  Ages  --  and 
especially  in  Chaucer  --  is  intimately  connected  with  the  self-delusion  that  springs 
from  social  isolation  and  self-absorption,  Chaucer's  'privetee'.  In  the  Merchant's 
Tale,  for  example,  January's  short-sighted  choice  of  a  young  wife  results  from  his 
'heigh  fantasye'  and  his  culpable  rejection  of  others'  counsel: 
For  whan  that  he  hymself  concluded  hadde, 
Hym  thoughte  ech  oother  mannes  wit  so  badde 
That  inpossible  it  were  to  repplye 
Agayn  his  choys;  this  was  his  fantasye.  (1607-1610) 
Such  abstracted  isolation  is  intolerable  in  the  quotidian  fabliau  world,  where  sanity 
means  conforming  to  the  common  laws  of  nature.  In  the  Miller's  Tale  'fantasie' 
suggests  Nicholas's  wilful  solitude:  as  far  as  John  is  concerned,  Nicholas  is 152 
dangerously  detatched  from  reality.  In  fact,  of  course,  it  is  John  who  is  finally, 
and  publicly,  seen  as  mad;  nevertheless,  John's  judgement  has  some  validity.  Like 
the  other  male  characters  in  the  tale,  Nicholas  is  eventually  brought  to  a 
humiliating  awareness  of  the  supremacy  of  reality  over  fantasy. 
The  rhyming  of  'fantasie'  with  'astrologye'  at  the  beginning  of  the  tale 
associates  Nicholas's  delusion  with  his  scholarly  learning  (3190-3191).  The  theme 
of  astrology  is  the  most  conspicuous  of  Chaucer's  narrative  additions  to  the  fabliau 
as  it  exists  in  continental  analogues.  In  fact,  the  detailed  description  of  Nicholas's 
astrological  equipment  and  other  scholarly  possessions  is  quite  unprecedented  in 
medieval  literature;  it  is  included  in  order  to  account  not  only  for  Nicholas's 
prediction  of  the  flood,  but  also  for  the  feigned  madness  which  precedes  it. 
Chaucer's  own  interest  in  the  subject  of  astrology  no  doubt  made  him 
sensitive  to  the  suspicion  in  which  it  was  often  held.  As  we  have  already  seen, 
those  who  attempted  to  restrict  the  majesty  of  God  through  the  insolent  art  of 
astrology  were  necessarily  mad.  In  John's  eyes,  the  apparently  deranged  Nicholas 
recalls  the  man  described  contemptuously  in  the  fourteenth-century  Northern 
Homily  as  'a  mased  man  al  out  of  minde,  pat  vses  for  fantasy  forto  stare  upward  at 
pe  scy'. 
24  In  a  passage  of  the  Troy  Book  which  recalls  the  language  of  the  Miller's 
Tale,  John  Lydgate  also  describes  astrologers  as  insane: 
Lat  be,  lat  be!  for  no  wi3t  is  so  wood, 
Pat  hak  his  witte,  to  3eue  ker-to  credence, 
pat  any  man  by  crafte  or  by  science, 
pat  mortel  is,  hab  konyng  to  devine 
Fortunys  cours,  or  fatys  to  termyne. 
Swyche  causis  hid,  conselid  in  secre, 
Reserued  ben  to  goddis  priuete.  25 153 
Moreover,  astrologers,  as  we  have  seen,  were  supposed  to  risk  dire  divine 
punishment,  including  blindness  and  madness.  Little  wonder,  then,  that  the 
carpenter  is  easily  duped  by  Nicholas's  pretended  madness,  immediately 
interpreting  it  as  the  inevitable  'punishment  of  knowledge  and  its  ignorant 
presumption'. 
26  But  although  clerical  proscriptions  against  astrology  explain 
John's  response  here,  the  tale  is  not  exclusively  or  even  primarily  concerned  with 
the  moral  implications  of  madness;  in  this  amoral  fabliau,  madness  assumes  its 
fullest  significance  on  the  social  and  political,  rather  than  the  theological  level. 
Nicholas's  feigned  insanity  alerts  the  reader  to  the  difficulty  of  identifying 
real  madness  in  any  circumstances.  This  difficulty  proceeds  not  only  from 
Nicholas's  skill  in  counterfeiting  the  symptoms  of  melancholia,  but  also  from  the 
miscellaneous  reactions  of  those  who  witness  his  pretence.  When  the  carpenter's 
servant  glimpses  Nicholas  'capyng  upright  /  As  he  had  kiked  on  the  newe  moone' 
(3444-3445),  the  implication  is  that  the  student's  'madness'  is  attributable  to  lunar 
influence.  The  idea  that  the  phases  of  the  moon  affected  human  health  negatively 
was  accepted  by  even  the  most  prestigious  medical  authorities;  the  superstitious 
belief  invoked  here,  however,  is  that  madness  can  be  induced  by  simply  looking  at 
a  full  moon.  The  carpenter  himself  ventures  some  other  causes  of  Nicholas's 
madness,  suggesting  that  it  results  not  from  the  malign  influence  of  the  stars,  but 
from  Nicholas's  over-curious  observation  of  them.  'This  man  is  falle',  he 
suggests,  'with  his  astomye,  /  In  some  woodness  or  in  some  agonye'  (3451-3452). 
By  explaining  Nicholas's  madness  as  the  result  of  his  scholarly  endeavour,  John 
displays  the  sort  of  cocky  class  antagonism  to  which  he  will  fall  victim  at  the  end 
of  the  tale.  John's  opinion  that  Nicholas's  madness  is  the  result  of  over-study  in 
intellectual  matters  is  perfectly  conventional;  but  it  has  a  particularly  powerful 
historical  significance  given  the  heightened  anti-intellectual  and,  by  extension, 
anti-clerical  sentiments  of  the  peasantry  at  the  time  of  the  Peasants'  Revolt,  when, 
according  to  the  contemporary  commentator  Thomas  Walsingham,  'it  was 
dangerous  to  be  seen  with  an  inkhorn  at  one's  side'.  27 154 
The  carpenter  now  determines  to  force  the  secluded  Nicholas  'out  of  his 
studiyng'  (3467).  John  is  arrogantly  confident  that  scholarly  activity  is  the  cause  of 
his  lodger's  distracted  state: 
I  thoghte  ay  wel  how  that  it  sholde  be! 
Men  sholde  nat  knowe  of  Goddes  pryvetee. 
Ye,  blessed  be  alwey  a  lewed  man 
That  noght  but  oonly  his  bileve  kan!  (3453-3456) 
Nevertheless,  he  unaccountably  revises  his  diagnosis  when  he  sees  Nicholas  for 
himself: 
This  carpenter  wende  he  were  in  despeir, 
And  hente  hym  by  the  sholdres  myghtily, 
And  shook  hym  Karde,  and  cride  spitously, 
'What!  Nicholay!  What,  how!  What,  looke  adoun! 
Awak,  and  thenk  on  Cristes  passioun! 
I  crouche  thee  from  elves  and  fro  wightes.  (3474-3479) 
Now  John  is  of  the  opinion  that  Nicholas  is  possessed.  It  has  already  been 
suggested  that  demonic  possession  was  more  often  credited  by  the  uneducated  than 
by  the  learned.  If  the  possibility  of  possession  by  demons  was  rejected  by  many 
educated  people  in  the  late  Middle  Ages,  the  near-obsolete  belief  in  possession  by 
elves  must  have  seemed  even  more  preposterous  to  Chaucer's  sophisticated 
audience.  By  indicating  a  relationship  between  ideas  about  madness  and  level  of 
education  and  social  status,  John's  superstitious  beliefs  anticipate  the  circumstances 
of  his  own  humiliation  at  the  end  of  the  tale. 
The  sheer  variety  of  explanations  of  madness  here  also  makes  John  appear 
ridiculous.  Although  multiple  explanations  of  insanity  were  common  in  the  Middle 155 
Ages,  John's  suggestion  of  one  conventional  cause  of  madness  after  another  is 
absurdly  rapid  and  arbitrary.  Nicholas's  pretence  of  insanity,  then,  is  more  than  a 
crude  narrative  device:  it  testifies  to  the  Miller's  self-consciousness  about  madness 
in  this  tale  and  solicits  a  critical  wariness  of  accepting  subsequent  allegations  of 
madness  at  face  value. 
Not  only  the  causes,  but  also  the  attitudes  towards  insanity  in  the  tale  are 
various:  John's  supposed  madness  results  in  public  mockery;  but  Nicholas's 
equally  spurious  insanity  evokes  the  sympathy  of  the  carpenter  and  his  servant. 
This  compassionate  response  to  madness  only  highlights  the  decidedly  insensitive 
attitude  of  the  townsfolk  towards  John  at  the  end  of  the  tale.  Madness,  the  Miller 
takes  pains  to  show,  is  not  a  simple  or  self-evident  phenomenon;  it  is  attributable 
to  no  single  cause  and  refuses  simple  explanations  and  responses.  In  short,  the 
Miller  draws  attention  to  the  constructedness  of  insanity. 
Once  he  has  been  brought  out  of  his  supposed  stupor,  Nicholas  proceeds  to 
spin  his  fantastic  yarn  about  the  second  flood  and  gives  the  carpenter  his 
instructions  for  saving  the  company.  He  then  threatens  John  with  madness  should 
he  disclose  his  advice  to  anyone: 
to  no  wight  thou  shalt  this  conseil  wreye, 
For  it  is  Cristes  conseil  that  I  seye, 
And  if  thou  teile  it  man,  thou  art  forlore; 
For  this  vengeaunce  thou  shalt  han  therfore, 
That  if  thou  wreye  me,  thou  shalt  be  wood.  (3503-3507) 
The  final  ominous  line  contains  multiple  ironies.  First,  by  disbelieving  God's 
promise  not  to  send  a  Second  Flood  the  carpenter  already  shows  his  lack  of 
reason.  Another  irony  becomes  clear  only  in  retrospect:  although  John  follows 
Nicholas's  directions  to  the  letter  he  is  nevertheless  finally  proclaimed  mad.  The 
implicit  theological  argument  of  the  scholar's  threat  follows  a  conventional 156 
pattern:  betrayal  of  'Cristes  conseil'  amounts  to  a  rejection  of  God-given  reason  -- 
a  sin  punishable  by  madness.  This  traditional  clerical  explanation  of  madness  as  a 
divine  chastisement  is  undermined  at  the  end  of  the  tale,  where  the  imputation  of 
insanity  appears  to  be  simply  a  crude  form  of  social  victimisation. 
In  lines  3559-3560  Nicholas  reasserts  that  John  should  not  question  him, 
again  on  pain  of  madness: 
Suffiseth  thee,  but  if  thy  wittes  madde, 
To  han  as  greet  a  grace  as  Noe  hadde. 
Nicholas  requires  John  to  be  obedient  to  authority;  to  think  for  oneself  --  to 
challenge  apparently  divine  instruction  --  is  to  court  insanity.  This  line  of 
argument  --  and  the  pessimistic  view  of  human  reason  it  implies  --  is  commonplace 
in  the  late  Middle  Ages.  But  its  introduction  here  is  a  shrewd  ploy  on  Nicholas's 
part:  by  stressing  the  virtues  of  a  passive  intellect,  Nicholas  appeals  to  the 
carpenter's  self-satisfied  bias  against  learning  and  his  naive  belief  that  a  man  who 
acts  out  of  simple  faith  cannot  fall  into  insanity.  Nicholas  tells  the  peasant  that  he 
can  only  save  the  threatened  company  by  renouncing  his  own  rationality:  'werken 
after  loore  and  reed',  he  advises  John;  'Thou  mayst  nat  werken  after  thyn  owene 
heed'  (3527-3528). 
Nicholas,  clearly,  is  directly  responsible  for  the  carpenter's  ridiculous 
delusion  or  'ymaginacioun'  of  the  flood  engulfing  his  cherished  wife.  Unlike 
Absolon,  who  willingly  abandons  all  reason  in  his  wooing  of  Alison,  John  is 
encouraged  in  his  delusion  by  Nicholas,  who  plays  on  the  carpenter's  fears  and 
presumably  hopes  to  make  easier  the  job  of  convincing  him  by  plying  him  with  ale 
(3498). 
But  the  Miller  himself  is  not  entirely  sympathetic  towards  the  carpenter.  If 
Nicholas  endeavours  to  suppress  John's  rationality  with  threats  and  alcohol,  the 
Miller  distances  us  from  the  carpenter's  consequent  hallucination  by  describing  it 157 
in  terms  which  parody  Arcite's  sorrow  in  the  Knight's  Tale  (1219-1222).  The  most 
obvious  stylistic  feature  of  this  passage,  however,  is  its  mocking  use  of  scholastic 
vocabulary: 
Lo,  which  a  greet  thyng  is  affeccioun! 
Men  may  dyen  of  ymaginacioun, 
So  depe  may  impressioun  be  take. 
This  sely  carpenter  bigynneth  quake; 
Hym  thynketh  verraily  that  he  may see 
Noees  flood  come  walwynge  as  the  see 
To  drenchen  Alisoun,  his  hony  deere. 
He  wepeth,  weyleth,  maketh  sory cheere; 
He  siketh  with  ful  many  a  sory  swogh;  (3611-3619) 
The  passage  recalls  contemporary  medical  descriptions  of  the  cataclysmic 
delusions  suffered  by  melancholy  madmen.  John's  hallucination  is  explained  as  a 
disorder  of  his  'ymaginacioun',  the  psychological  faculty  responsible  for  receiving 
impressions  from  the  senses.  The  immediate  cause  of  such  derangement  is  the 
passion  of  sorrow.  Indeed,  John's  reaction  illustrates  Avicenna's  observation  that 
in  the  melancholy  man,  the  strength  of  the  imagination  of  sorrowful 
things  makes  them  appear  to  him,  so  that  the  thing  whose  likeness  is 
represented  in  his  soul  seems  to  be  really  there,  and  therefore  he 
persists  in  his  continual  sorrow.  28 
Psychologically,  then,  John,  like  Absolon  and  Nicholas  at  other  points  in  the  tale, 
loses  contact  with  reality  and,  as  Patrick  Gallagher  puts  it,  'gives  in  to  fantasy'.  29 
The  Miller  ridicules  John's  experience  by  relating  it  in  the  conspicuously 
inappropriate  technical  language  of  philosophical  and  medical  discourse  -- 158 
'affeccioun',  'ymaginacioun',  'impressioun'  --  which  a  'lewed  man'  could  not 
understand.  The  passage  anticipates  John's  final  public  humiliation:  in  both  cases, 
the  carpenter's  fantastic  delusion  is  described  in  scholarly  language  and  the 
madman  becomes  an  object  of  ridicule. 
In  the  last  forty-one  lines  of  the  tale  the  word  'wood'  occurs  no  fewer  than 
five  times.  The  first  two  of  these  occurrences  are  apparently  commonplace  tags 
used  to  describe  Nicholas's  frantic  crying  for  water  after  the  branding  incident: 
As  he  were  wood,  for  wo  he  gan  to  crye, 
'Help!  Water!  Water!  Help,  for  Goddes  herte!  ' 
This  carpenter  out  of  his  slomber  sterte, 
And  herde  oon  Grien  'water!  '  as  he  were  wood,  (3814-3817) 
Along  with  a  preponderance  of  active  verbs,  the  repetition  ý  of  'wood'  here  gives 
the  scene  the  necessary  qualities  of  farce  and  exaggeration.  30  But  the  association 
of  the  word  'wood'  with  water  twice  within  four  lines  also  recalls  Nicholas's 
earlier  description  of  the  'wilde  and  wood'  rain  which  he  says  will  fall  to  create 
the  flood  (3517).  This  produces  a  subtle  irony:  at  the  very  point  when  the 
carpenter  supposes  the  flood  to  have  arrived,  the  term  'wood'  describes  not  the 
predicted  ferocity  of  the  imaginary  deluge  but  the  real  agony  of  its  too-clever 
inventor.  This  link  between  madness  and  flood  prepares  us  for  the  irony  of  the 
following  passage,  in  which  the  faithful  carpenter  --  prohibited  from  discussing  the 
flood  on  pain  of  madness  --  is  held  insane  by  the  townsfolk  despite  his  loyalty. 
Thus  the  comic  justice  meted  out  to  both  John  and  Nicholas  is  pointed  up  by  the 
ironic  use  of  the  language  of  madness. 
After  John's  humiliating  fall,  Nicholas  again  --  this  time  with  Alison's  help 
--  attempts  to  suppress  the  carpenter's  rationality.  Despite  John's  attempts  to 
explain  himself, 159 
he  was  anon  bore  doun 
With  hende  Nicholas  and  Alisoun. 
They  tolden  every  man  that  he  was  wood; 
He  was  agast  so  of  Nowelis  flood 
Thurgh  fantasie  that  of  his  vanytee 
He  hadde  yboght  hym  knedyng  tubbes  thre 
And  hadde  hem  hanged  in  the  roof  above; 
And  that  he  preyed  hem,  for  Goddes  love, 
To  litten  in  the  roof,  par  compaignye.  (3831-3839) 
John  Hines  suggests  that  'the  pun  on  "wood"  in  its  sole  surviving  modern  sense 
makes  the  imputed  insanity  of  the  carpenter  --  a  would-be  second  Noah,  the 
shipwright  --  adhere  to  John  the  more  firmly'.  31  The  word  '  wood',  then,  links 
John's  insanity  with  his  lowly  social  status,  preparing  us  for  the  class  antagonism 
which  ends  the  tale.  By  their  supercilious  attribution  of  the  phrase  par  compaignie 
to  a  humble  carpenter,  Nicholas  and  Alison  further  underline  John's  'lewednesse'. 
Nicholas  and  Alison  also  employ  technical  terms  to  explain  John's 
madness.  The  word  'fantasie',  applied  earlier  in  the  tale  to  Nicholas,  is  common  in 
medieval  medical  textbooks.  According  to  the  three-ventricle  theory  of  classical 
and  medieval  psychological  works,  the  foremost  ventricle  of  the  brain  (the  'celle 
fantastik'  of  the  Knight's  Tale)  runs  amok  if  ungoverned  by  reason.  By 
emphasising  John's  foolish  'fantasie',  Nicholas  and  Alison  follow  philosophical 
authority.  Avicenna,  for  example,  asserts  that  in  the  melancholy  man,  'the  intellect 
is  distracted  from  rational  actions  by  sense  and  phantasia'.  32  '  Vanytee' 
,  of 
course,  is  perhaps  the  most  traditional  and  morally  damning  cause  of  madness. 
Nicholas  and  Alison,  then,  invoke  conventional  psychological  and  theological 
explanations  of  insanity  to  account  for  the  carpenter's  supposed  madness.  These 
explanations,  of  course,  enjoyed  greater  prestige  and  credibility  among  the 
educated  than  John's  outmoded  and  superstitious  explanations  of  Nicholas's  earlier 160 
'madness'.  For  the  second  time  in  the  tale,  the  technical  terminology  of  medical 
and  theological  discourse  estranges  us  from  the  experience  of  the  'sely  carpenter'. 
The  language  of  the  passage,  then,  attests  to  the  power  of  clerical  reason  over 
peasant  credulity. 
The  constructed  nature  of  John's  madness  is  by  this  stage  obvious  to  the 
reader.  It  is  not,  of  course,  acknowledged  by  Alison  and  Nicholas,  nor  is  it 
recognized  by  the  crowd  which  assembles  to  enjoy  John's  misfortune.  Ironically, 
however,  the  scoffing  mob  unwittingly  attests  to  the  contingency  of  madness  by 
itself  behaving  unreasonably: 
The  folk  gan  laughen  at  his  fantasye; 
Into  the  roof  they  kiken  and  they  cape, 
And  turned  al  his  harm  unto  a  jape. 
For  what  so  that  this  carpenter  answerde, 
It  was  for  noght;  no  man  his  reson  herde. 
With  othes  grete  he  was  so  sworn  adoun 
That  he  was  holde  wood  in  al  the  toun.  (3840-3846) 
John  is  now  a  ridiculous  spectacle,  as  the  verbs  'kiken',  'cape'  and  the  earlier 
'gauren'  (3827)  imply.  His  humiliation,  unlike  that  of  the  equally  unfortunate 
miller  in  the  Reeve's  Tale,  is  public.  As  we  have  already  implied,  madness,  or 
'woodness',  is  the  concept  through  which  this  bourgeois  society  condemns  the 
shameful  excesses  of  individual  desire.  '  "Woodness"',  according  to  William 
Woods,  'is,  in  effect,  the  inevitable  inversion  of  "privetee":  the  deeply  motivated 
search  for  privacy  develops  as  an  ego-driven  fantasy,  extends  itself  above  or 
across  the  boundaries  of  the  private,  and  is  recognised  as  "woodness"  by  the 
unerring  judgment  of  the  small-town  public  gaze'.  33 
As  many  commentators  have  noted,  medieval  madmen  were  generally 
considered  spectacles.  In  his  Madness  and  Civilisation  Michel  Foucault  says  that 161 
It  was  doubtless  a  very  old  custom  of  the  Middle  Ages  to  display 
the  insane.  In  certain  of  the  Narrtürmer  in  Germany,  barred 
windows  had  been  installed  which  permitted  those  outside  to 
observe  those  chained  within.  They  thus  constituted  a  spectacle  at 
the  city  gates  [...  ].  Until  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century 
[...  ]  madmen  remained  monsters  --  that  is,  etymologically,  beings 
or  things  to  be  shown. 
34 
John  is  indeed  objectified  and  denied  a  voice.  The  spectacular  or  visible  nature  of 
his  madness  recalls  the  circumstances  of  Nicholas's  feigned  insanity.  The 
apparently  study-crazed  scholar  is  observed  first  by  the  carpenter's  servant,  who 
'looked  in  ful  depe'  through  the  cat-flap  in  the  lodger's  door  (3442).  Moreover, 
the  verbs  'kiken'  and  'cape'  --  used  here  to  describe  the  neighbours'  gleeful 
peering  into  the  carpenter's  roof  --  are  precisely  those  used  to  describe  Nicholas's 
astrological  vision.  Thus  'the  "folk"  here  align  themselves  with  Nicholas  --  and 
with  Nicholas  the  trickster  --  not  Nicholas  of  the  branded  bum'.  35  Once  again, 
through  his  careful  choice  of  words,  the  Miller  denaturalizes  the  concept  of 
madness,  inviting  us  to  compare  and  contrast  the  different  attitudes  towards 
madness  at  different  points  in  the  tale. 
In  this  final  section  of  the  poem  we  feel  some  sympathy  for  the  carpenter. 
Now  the  Miller,  who  had  previously  mocked  John's  delusion  of  the  flood,  grants 
John  what  Nicholas  has  persistently  and  effectively  denied  him  --  rationality  or 
'reson'.  The  primary  meaning  of  'reson'  here  is  'explanation'  or  'speech'  and  not, 
strictly  speaking,  'reason'.  But  the  two  senses  are  necessarily  connected  in  the  late 
Middle  Ages.  For  the  proto-rationalist  Reginald  Pecock,  'reson'  denotes 
principally  the  psychological  faculty  of  reason;  but  the  workings  of  reason  are 
obviously  dependent  on  this  faculty.  Pecock  draws  attention  to  the  close  relation  of 
the  two  meanings: 162 
In  anopir  maner  "reson"  is  oft  takun  for  Pe  worchingis  and  Pe 
doingis  of  Pe  resoun  now  bifore  in  Pe  first  manere  takun:  as  ben 
argumentis,  profis,  skilis  and  euidences,  which  resoun,  in  pe  first 
maner  takun,  fyndip,  conceiuep  and  formep,  and  in  pis  maner 
"resoun"  is  takun  in  commune  speche.  36 
The  two  senses  of  'reson'  as  speech  and  as  a  psychological  faculty  were  closely 
related  in  an  age  in  which  muteness  was  a  symptom  of  insanity.  More  importantly, 
the  emphasis  on  the  theme  of  madness  in  the  final  section  of  the  tale  invites  us  to 
consider  the  full  range  of  implications  of  the  word  'reson'.  In  the  context  of  John's 
humiliation  as  a  madman,  the  term  here  becomes  ambiguous,  denoting  the 
carpenter's  latent  intellectual  faculties  as  well  as  his  fruitless  attempts  to  explain 
himself.  The  carpenter,  in  short,  is  simultaneously  granted  rationality  and  denied 
self-expression. 
The  gaping  onlookers,  on  the  other  hand,  conduct  themselves  in  a  most 
unreasonable  manner.  The  logic  of  the  couplet:  'With  othes  grete  he  was  so 
sworne  adoun  /  That  he  was  holde  wood  in  al  the  toun',  points  up  their  lack  of 
reason  and  their  gullibility.  John  is  held  or  believed  to  be  mad  --  the  sense  of 
contingency  is  highlighted  here  --  because  he  is  sworn  down  with  oaths.  Thus  the 
leering  mob,  in  the  height  of  its  mockery  of  John's  madness,  itself  exhibits 
symptoms  of  irrationality. 
All  of  the  carpenter's  neighbours  --  'bothe  smale  and  grete'  --  emerge  from 
their  houses  to  deride  the  injured  carpenter.  Thus  John  receives  the  kind  of  casual 
opprobrium  customarily  heaped  upon  fools  and  madmen  by  mischievous  bourgeois 
throughout  the  Middle  Ages:  a  long  comparison  may  be  drawn  with  the  mad 
Lancelot  or  the  French  hero  Amadas,  who  are  mocked  by  entire  towns.  As  we 
have  seen,  such  abuse  could  inspire  the  compassion  of  some.  The  university 
students  who  mock  John,  however,  are  not  moved  to  pity  by  his  plight.  Rather, 163 
they  provide  a  final,  damning  diagnosis  of  the  carpenter  and  give  the  townsfolk's 
general  derision  a  socio-historical  twist: 
For  every  clerk  anonright  heeld  with  oother. 
They  seyde,  'The  man  is  wood,  my  leeve  brother'; 
And  every  wight  gan  laughen  at  this  stryf.  (3847-3849) 
This  assertion  of  John's  insanity  is  far  more  emphatic  than  the  allegations  of 
madness  with  which  the  tale  began.  Yet  the  Miller  takes  pains  to  show  that  the 
judgement  of  the  clerks  is  just  as  spurious  as  John's  earlier  diagnoses  of  Nicholas. 
The  immediacy  of  this  judgement  --  conveyed  by  'anonright'  --  and  the  phrase 
'heeld  with  oother'  imply  consensus  or  agreement  among  the  clerks  rather  than 
true  conviction.  Finally,  the  cosy  tag  'my  leeve  brother'  reinforces  the  sense  of 
class  solidarity,  making  the  attribution  of  madness  to  John  appear  all  the  more 
contingent  to  social  factors.  As  Lee  Patterson  observes,  the  carpenter's 
'punishment,  however  merited,  is  nonetheless  enacted  in  the  distasteful  form  of 
class  victimisation'.  37 
The  final  irony  of  the  mocking  scene  is  only  apparent  if  we  compare  John's 
'madness'  with  Nicholas's  earlier  predictions.  Nicholas  had  warned  the  carpenter 
that  any  disobedience  to  'Cristes  conseil'  would  bring  upon  him  the  divine 
punishment  of  madness.  But  by  emphasising  the  contingency  of  the  clerks' 
allegations  of  insanity  at  the  end  of  the  tale,  the  Miller  undermines  traditional 
theories  of  madness  as  a  divine  chastisement  for  sin.  The  scene  is  therefore  the 
culmination  of  the  Miller's  attempts  to  show  madness  as  a  social  construction 
rather  than  a  divine  chastisement. 
The  Miller's  radicalism  can  only  be  properly  understood  in  historical 
context.  Neither  the  antagonism  between  townsfolk  and  scholars  nor  the 
association  of  the  peasantry  with  the  demonic  and  the  insane  is,  as  Lee  Patterson's 
article  might  imply,  unique  to  late  fourteenth-century  England.  Throughout  the 164 
late  Middle  Ages  in  Europe,  town-gown  tension  of  the  sort  found  in  the  Miller's 
Tale  was  part  of  daily  life  in  university  towns;  but  it  became  especially  prominent 
at  times  of  civil  revolt.  In  his  Reason  and  Society  in  the  Middle  Ages,  Alexander 
Murray  writes, 
It  may  be  asked,  if  education  really  did  encourage  elitism  of  the  sort 
that  rained  abuse  on  rustics,  and  if  the  elite  really  did  get  into 
positions  where  rustics  might  feel  the  weight  of  this  contempt,  why 
the  rustics  should  rarely  be  heard  complaining.  The  answer  is  that 
medieval  rustics  are  rarely  heard  saying  anything.  They  generally 
had  to  revolt  in  order  to  be  heard  in  their  own  time.  It  is  only  the 
greater  of  their  revolts  that  can  be  heard  by  us  at  six  centuries' 
distance.  Nevertheless,  if  a  historian  listens  carefully  to  these  great 
medieval  peasant  revolts  he  will,  in  the  appropriate  milieux,  hear  an 
expressly  anti-academic  note.  38 
Scholars  were  granted  special  privileges,  the  most  significant  of  which  was 
'ecclesiastical  immunity,  or  exemption  from  normal  civil  judicial  processes'.  39 
That  whole  communities  were  fined  when  a  scholar  met  with  injury  or  death 
indicates  both  the  extensive  protection  enjoyed  by  clerks  and  the  possibility  of 
serious  attacks  on  them.  The  multiple  grievances  often  provoked  townsfolk  to  open 
violence.  As  Sheila  Delany  writes, 
The  so-called  "slaughters"  at  Oxford  (1228  and  1354),  Toulouse 
(1332)  and  Orleans  (1387)  are  only  a  few  of  the  best-known  in  a 
long  series  of  raids,  assaults  and  brawls.  Some  of  these  conflicts 
were  provoked  by  specific  trivial  incidents,  but  the  results  are  so 
disproportionately  violent  that  most  of  them  are  only  understandable 
as  manifestations  of  a  relation  that  was  strained  at  best.  40 165 
Murray  also  gives  examples  of  town-gown  conflicts  in  university  towns  in  both 
England  and  France,  ranging  in  seriousness  from  individual  practical  jokes  to 
organized  and  outrageous  acts  of  violence. 
41 
However  widespread  they  may  have  been,  such  tensions  were  felt  nowhere 
more  strongly  than  in  England  in  1381.  The  English  peasantry  had  their  own 
concerns  about  the  universities.  After  the  plague  in  mid-century,  labour  shortages 
were  a  frequent  problem,  and  'rural  unease  about  the  drain  of  farm-labour  through 
the  schools  is  in  evidence  in  the  years  before  and  after  the  revolt'. 
42  The  petty 
bourgeoisie,  such  as  Chaucer's  John,  also  had  their  grievances  against  the 
scholars.  Of  particular  relevance  to  the  Miller's  Tale  is  the  fact  that  'rents  and 
repairs  in  all  houses  letting  to  students  were  controlled  by  a  University 
commission'. 
43  In  fact,  the  universities  appear  to  have  regulated  many  aspects  of 
town  life,  and  were  even  allowed  to  investigate  the  morals  of  the  laity.  44  Little 
wonder,  then,  that 
in  the  revolt  of  1381  antipathy  to  the  scholar  was  occasionally 
explicit.  Some  of  the  rebels  in  the  eastern  counties  burned  the 
privileges  of  Cambridge  university.  Nor  was  that  entirely  a  matter 
of  tenant  fighting  landlord:  for  at  the  bonfire  an  old  woman  cried 
'Away  with  the  learning  of  the  clerks,  away  with  it!  '.  45 
According  to  one  historian,  by  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century,  Oxford  'had 
been  crushed,  and  was  almost  entirely  subjugated  to  the  authority  of  the 
University.  The  burghers  lived  henceforth  in  their  own  town  almost  as  the  helots 
or  subjects  of  a  conquering  people'.  46  The  comparison  is  provocative;  clearly, 
however,  the  actions  and  attitudes  of  the  characters  of  the  Miller's  Tale,  however 
traditional  in  the  fabliau  genre,  reflect  contemporary  antagonisms  between 
university  and  town. 166 
More  importantly,  the  language  of  insanity  was  ubiquitously  employed  in 
official  accounts  of  peasant  behaviour  during  the  1381  Revolt.  Book  I  of  Gower's 
Vox  Clamantis  is  only  the  most  dramatic  example  of  such  invective.  Through  his 
subtle  yet  constant  undermining  of  clerical  allegations  of  insanity,  the  Miller 
mounts  a  challenge  to  one  of  the  most  powerful  pieces  of  anti-peasant  ideology  of 
the  late  Middle  Ages. 
The  precariousness  and  contingency  of  allegations  of  madness  is  also 
apparent  in  another  fabliau,  or  near-fabliau,  by  Chaucer.  Like  the  Miller's  Tale, 
the  Summoner's  Tale  is  'permeated'  by  'the  image  of  sickness'.  47  The  first  part  of 
the  tale  concerns  a  friar's  attempts  to  wring  a  donation  from  a  reluctant,  bedridden 
peasant  named  Thomas.  Thomas  is  presumably  in  mourning  for  his  child,  who  has 
died  less  than  two  weeks  previously  (1852).  If  so,  it  is  unlikely  that  we  are 
intended  to  think  of  his  apparent  grief  as  excessive  and  therefore  morally  culpable. 
Rather,  Thomas's  illness  links  him  with  the  pathetic  old  woman  from  whom  the 
summoner  tries  to  extort  money  in  the  preceding  Friar's  Tale. 
Various  analogues  of  the  Summoner's  Tale  feature  conflicts  between 
avaricious  friars  and  ailing  peasants.  In  one  of  these,  Rutebeuf's  anti-fraternal 
poem  The  Peasant's  Fart,  the  narrator's  attitude  towards  peasants  is  couched  in 
language  similar  to  that  of  Chaucer's  Friar  John.  For  Rutebeuf's  narrator, 
People  who  are  charitable  have 
A  great  share  in  the  spiritual  paradise, 
But  those  who  don't  have  charity  in  them 
Or  sense  or  goodness  or  truth 
Fail  to  attain  that  joy.  48 
Similar  sentiments  are  evident  in  the  Summoner's  Tale,  in  which  Friar  John 
teaches  his  audiences  --  and  by  implication  Thomas  --  'to  be  charitable,  /  And 
spende  hir  good  ther  it  is  resonable'  (1795-1796);  thus  John  masks  his  selfish 167 
desire  for  a  donation  with  a  veneer  of  reasonableness.  Predictably,  however,  the 
language  of  reason  is  turned  against  the  friar  at  the  end  of  the  tale. 
In  the  opening  interchanges  among  Thomas,  his  wife  and  the  friar,  Thomas 
is  virtually  ignored.  Like  the  injured  carpenter  in  the  final  scene  of  the  Miller's 
Tale,  he  is  treated  as  an  object,  a  mere  topic  of  conversation.  The  wife's  use  of 
animal  similes  to  describe  her  husband  undermines  Thomas's  status  as  a  rational 
being:  Thomas,  she  tells  the  friar,  is  'as  angry  as  a  pissemyre'  (1825)  --  a  word 
which  anticipates  the  scatalogical  humour  of  the  end  of  the  tale  --  and  'groneth  lyk 
oure  boor'  (1829).  49  Friar  John  relishes  Thomas's  passive  state.  Since  Thomas 
has  been  unable  to  attend  church,  John  offers  to  summarize  the  day's  sermon  for 
him: 
I  have  to  day  been  at  youre  chirche  at  messe, 
And  seyd  a  sermon  after  my  symple  wit  -- 
Nat  at  after  the  text  of  hooly  writ; 
For  it  is  hard  to  yow,  as  I  suppose, 
And  therfore  wol  I  teche  yow  al  the  glose.  (1788-1792) 
The  passage  recalls  the  episode  in  the  Miller's  Tale  in  which  Nicholas  warns  the 
carpenter  not  to  think  for  himself;  it  also  prefigures  the  lord  and  lady's  rejection  of 
peasant  rationality  later  in  the  Summoner's  Tale. 
The  friar  tells  Thomas  that  anger  is  caused  by  the  devil  and  he  proceeds  to 
deliver  a  prolix  warning  to  Thomas  on  the  dangers  of  ire.  Within  the  frame  of  the 
Canterbury  Tales,  this  discourse  on  anger-madness  is  clearly  aimed  by  the 
Summoner  --  who  is  himself  presented  as  a  choleric  buffoon  --  at  his  bitter  enemy 
Friar  Huberd.  'Upon  this  Frere  his  herte  was  so  wood',  says  Chaucer  in  the 
Summoner's  Prologue,  'That  lyk  an  aspen  leef  he  quook  for  ire'  (1666-1667).  But 
the  theme  of  anger-madness  also  functions  ironically  within  the  tale  itself.  First, 
Friar  John  has  chosen  to  lecture  a  peasant  on  a  sin  that  pertains  to  himself,  as  the 168 
many  references  to  his  angry  demeanour  indicate.  Moreover,  anger-madness  is 
most  commonly  associated  with  the  upper  orders  of  society.  The  friar's  warning  to 
Thomas  --  'Withinne  thyn  hous  ne  be  thou  no  leon;  /  To  thy  subgitz  do  noon 
oppression'  (1989-1990)  --  is  a  classic  injunction  against  anger-madness;  but  it  is 
flagrantly  wrenched  from  its  proper  penitential  context.  As  Penelope  Doob  says,  it 
is  not  the  lowly  peasant,  but  'the  political  leader,  the  proud  king,  who  is  prey  to 
both  temporary  and  permanent  forms  of  anger-madness'.  50  Thus  the  friar's 
harangue  is  couched  in  terms  that  are  entirely  inappropriate  to  one  of  Thomas's 
social  rank.  Anger-madness  is  perhaps  the  most  class-specific  of  all  the  medieval 
categories  of  madness,  affecting  principally  men  of  'heigh  degree'.  It  is  therefore 
fitting  that  Friar  John  --  who  prides  himself  on  his  elevated  social  status  --  should 
himself  succumb  to  this  form  of  insanity.  As  in  the  Miller's  Tale,  madness  seems 
to  be  alleged  by  those  who  are  most  deluded. 
The  enraged  Thomas  now  plays  his  trick  on  his  tormentor.  He  agrees  to 
give  the  friar  'swich  thyng  as  is  in  [his]  possessioun'  on  the  condition  that  the  friar 
share  it  equally  among  his  fellows,  and  invites  him  to  search  his  buttocks  for  the 
donation  (2124).  The  predictable  'gift'  of  the  fart  can  be  seen  as  an  act  of 
madness.  As  Penelope  Doob  says,  'habitual  anger  is  madness;  it  is  not  simply  like 
madness'. 
51  The  angry  man,  according  to  Chaucer's  Parson,  is  'out  of  alle 
juggement  of  resoun'  (537).  Friar  John  himself  implies  this  connection  between 
anger  and  madness  when  he  ironically  warns  Thomas  to  'be  no  felawe  to  an  irous 
man,  /  Ne  with  no  wood  man  walke  by  the  weye'  (2086-2087).  As  provocative  as 
Thomas's  'probleme'  of  the  division  of  the  fart  proves  to  be,  then,  the  fart  itself  is 
an  act  of  anger-madness. 
Nevertheless,  Thomas's  madness  is  not  immoral.  In  certain  cases, 
anger-madness  could  be  sanctioned.  One  such  circumstance  was  sickness.  Aquinas 
notes  that  'if  anyone  through  sickness  or  some  such  cause  fall  into  such  a  passion 
as  deprives  him  of  the  use  of  his  reason,  his  act  is  rendered  wholly  involuntary, 
and  he  is  entirely  excused  from  sin'.  52  Thomas's  madness  certainly  seems  to 169 
proceed  from  his  illness,  as  the  Summoner  implies  by  his  remark:  'This  sike  man 
wax  wel  ny  wood  for  ire'  (2121).  But  Thomas's  explosive  retribution  may  be 
sanctioned  on  moral,  as  well  as  medical  grounds.  For  Chaucer's  Parson  there  are 
two  types  of  ire,  bad  and  good.  'The  good  Ire',  he  explains,  'is  by  jalousie  of 
goodnesse,  thurgh  which  a  man  is  wrooth  with  wikkednesse  and  agayns 
wikkednesse;  and  therfore  seith  a  wys  man  that  Ire  is  bet  than  pley  (538). 
Boccaccio  also  distinguishes  between  two  sorts  of  anger,  one  which  is 
'unreasonable',  another  which  'may  be  reasonable,  as  is  indignation  about  some 
injustice'.  53  Thomas's  anger-madness,  then,  is  entirely  justified. 
The  Summoner  emphasizes  the  ludicrousness  of  the  friar's  anger,  on  the 
other  hand,  by  his  use  of  comically  inappropriate  language.  If  Thomas  was  as 
'angry  as  a  pissemyre'  and  groaned  like  a  domestic  pig,  Friar  John  rises  up  'as 
dooth  a  wood  leoun'  (2152)  and  'looked  as  it  were  a  wilde  boor'  (2160).  These 
animals,  of  course,  have  a  courtly  pedigree  and  are  commonly  invoked  to  illustrate 
the  battle-rage  of  romance  heroes.  Thus  the  Summoner  mockingly  describes  the 
friar's  fury  in  terms  normally  reserved  for  the  knights  of  chivalric  romance. 
Yet  the  friar  seeks  redress  not  in  physical  conflict  but  in  an  impassioned 
appeal  to  the  lord  of  the  local  manor,  where  Thomas's  'probleme'  of  the  division 
of  the  fart  is  met  with  a  mixture  of  fascination  and  incomprehension.  At  first,  the 
lord  struggles  to  credit  the  peasant  with  intellectual  ability: 
'How  hadde  this  cherl  ymaginacioun 
To  shewe  such  a  probleme  to  the  frere?  (2218-2219) 
The  word  'ymaginacioun'  is  particularly  intriguing  to  the  historian  of  madness, 
since  it  has  associations  with  both  madness  and  reason. 
John  Hines  points  out  that  'it  was  a  current  supposition  of  some  medieval 
socio-religious  thought  that  churls  were  as  brute  beasts,  possessed  only  of 
imagination  rather  than  reason'.  Thus  he  maintains  that  'the  general  attitude'  of  the 170 
lord  and  lady  'seems  to  be  that  the  churl  has  stumbled  upon  this  riposte  to  the  friar 
blindly'  rather  than  through  any  rational  process.  54  The  idea  that  peasants  have 
only  imagination  can  be  explained  with  reference  to  medieval  faculty  psychology. 
According  to  the  physicians,  the  faculty  of  imaginatio,  situated  at  the  front  of  the 
brain,  receives  sensory  impressions.  But  the  term  'ymaginacioun'  in  the 
Summoner's  Tale  clearly  denotes  not  imaginatio,  as  Hines's  comment  might 
suggest,  but  the  higher  faculty  of  imaginativa  or  cogitativa.  This  faculty,  housed 
in  the  middle  ventricle  of  the  brain,  is  responsible  for  combining  sensory 
impressions  in  different  ways  to  create  new  and  sometimes  impossible  forms.  55 
From  the  time  of  Avicenna  onwards,  this  latter  faculty  is  referred  to  as  cogitativa 
in  human  beings  and  imaginativa  when  it  is  under  the  guidance  of  the  rational 
soul.  Thus  the  'power  which  relates  the  sensible  forms  in  imaginatio  to  each  other 
is  called  imaginative  in  beasts,  cogitative  when  controlled  by  the  rational  soul'.  56 
In  this  sense,  the  lord's  comment  echoes  Gower's  equation  of  peasants  and 
animals;  Chaucer  seems  to  be  sending  up  contemporary  anti-peasant  rhetoric. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  association  of  the  Middle  English  word 
'ymaginacioun'  with  the  middle  rather  than  the  anterior  ventricle  of  the  brain 
means  that  it  also  carries  positive  connotations.  Far  from  implying  a  diminution  of 
rationality,  'ymaginacioun'  can  also  denote  'power  of  reasoning'.  57  Thus  it  seems 
that  the  lord  is  impressed,  however  reluctantly,  by  the  peasant's  rationative 
powers.  Furthermore,  as  Timothy  O'Brien  notes,  the  word  'imagination'  had  a 
particular  scholarly  application,  appearing  'most  commonly  in  the  phrase 
secundum  imaginationem,  which  describes  the  process  of  proving  a  solution  via 
rationis,  that  is,  according  to  a  consistent  line  of  logic  without  regard  for  the 
observable  world'. 
58  In  this  sense,  the  lord's  comment  prepares  us  for  Jankyn's 
display  of  scholastic  reasoning  at  the  end  of  the  tale. 
'Ymaginacioun'  also  denotes  innovation  or  originality.  59  The  lord  is 
repeatedly  struck  not  only  by  the  reasonableness  of  Thomas's  problem,  but  also  by 
its  novelty: 171 
'Nevere  erst  er  now  herde  1  of  swich  mateere'  (2220) 
'In  ars-metrike  shal  ther  no  man  fynde, 
Biforn  this  day,  of  swich  a  question'  (2222-2223) 
'Who  evere  herde  of  swiche  a  thyng  er  now?  '  (2229) 
Thomas's  question  shocks  the  lord  because  it  shows  the  peasant's  disturbing 
capacity  to  think  independently  of  authority. 
This  display  of  inventiveness  is  simultaneously  dismissed  by  the  lord  and 
lady  as  the  product  of  a  deranged,  even  possessed  mind.  The  lady  of  the  manor, 
who  eventually  comes  to  praise  the  peasant's  powers  of  reasoning,  initially  regards 
Thomas  as  insane: 
His  sike  heed  is  ful  of  vanytee; 
I  holde  hym  in  a  manere  frenesye  (2208-2209) 
The  lord,  meanwhile,  recalls  the  friar's  sermon  on  the  diabolical  nature  of 
madness,  attributing  Thomas's  ingenuity  to  satanic  influence: 
I  trowe  the  devel  putte  it  in  his  mynde  (2221) 
I  holde  hym  certeyn  a  demonyak!  (2240) 
These  reactions  are  understandable  given  the  high  value  the  inhabitants  of  the 
manor  later  set  on  the  ability  to  reason.  As  Vieda  Skultans  observes  in  a  discussion 
of  eighteenth-century  attitudes  towards  imagination:  'excess  of  imagination  is 
thought  to  constitute  insanity  at  a  time  when  reasonableness  [is]  highly  valued'.  60 172 
Yet  the  lord  and  lady's  imputations  of  madness  are  undermined  by  the  very 
language  in  which  they  are  expressed:  as  in  the  Miller's  Tale,  their  tenuousness  is 
suggested  by  verbs  of  uncertainty  such  as  'trowe'  and  'holde'.  Even  the  lord's 
word  'certeyn'  implies  nothing  so  much  as  a  lack  of  conviction.  The  most 
vehement  allegations  of  madness  succeed  only  in  drawing  attention  to  the 
rhetorical  status  of  language  and  the  constructed  nature  of  madness. 
The  lord  and  lady's  allegations  of  insanity  and  demonic  possession  take  on 
their  full  significance  in  the  context  of  contemporary  anti-peasant  ideology.  Of 
course,  'demoniak'  is  used  as  a  general  term  of  abuse  throughout  the  Middle 
Ages;  61  but  such  language  must  be  understood  in  the  context  of  contemporary 
invectives  such  as  the  Vox  Clamantis.  Once  again,  it  seems  that  Chaucer  is 
satirizing  --  although  not  necessarily  criticizing  --  the  readiness  of  the  upper 
classes  to  dismiss  peasants  as  unreasoning  brutes. 
In  the  third  and  final  movement  of  the  poem  the  castigation  of  Thomas's 
supposed  insanity  gives  way  to  general  ridicule  of  the  friar.  The  lord's  squire, 
Jankyn,  now  offers  a  solution  to  Thomas's  problem  of  the  division  of  the  fart 
among  the  friars.  He  suggests  that  thirteen  friars,  including  Friar  John  himself,  be 
summoned  to  the  lord's  hall  and  assemble  around  a  cartwheel  to  take  part  in  an 
extraordinary  experiment: 
Thanne  shal  they  knele  doun,  by  oon  assent, 
And  to  every  spokes  ende,  in  this  manere, 
Ful  sadly  leye  his  nose  shal  a  frere. 
Youre  noble  confessour  --  there  God  hym  save!  -- 
Shal  holde  his  nose  upright  under  the  nave. 
Thanne  shal  this  cherl,  with  bely  stif  and  toght 
As  any  tabour,  hyder  been  ybroght; 
And  sette  hym  on  the  wheel  right  of  this  cart, 
Upon  the  nave,  and  make  hym  lete  a  fart. 173 
And  ye  shul  seen,  up  peril  of  my  lyf, 
By  preeve  which  that  is  demonstratif, 
That  equally  the  soun  of  it  wol  wende, 
And  eke  the  stynk,  unto  the  spokes  ende, 
Save  that  this  worthy  man,  youre  confessour, 
By  cause  he  is  a  man  of  greet  honour, 
Shul  have  the  firste  fruyt,  as  resoun  is.  (2262-2277) 
Jankyn's  absurd  solution  is  met  with  unqualified  approval  by  the  lord  and  lady,  if 
not  the  friar.  It  is  a  triumph  of  imagination  --  the  faculty  associated  with  both 
madness  and  reason.  Jankyn's  mockingly  precious  insistence  on  the  language  of 
scholastic  reason  --  'By  preeve  which  is  demonstratif',  'By  cause',  'as  resoun  is'  -- 
parodies  the  friar's  verbosity  as  well  as  his  earlier  instruction  to  Thomas  to  spend 
his  money  'ther  it  is  resonable'  (1796). 
The  squire's  shrewd  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  fart's  division  shows 
how  reason  can  be  manipulated  for  selfish  ends:  if  the  Friar's  'reson'  consisted  in 
telling  people  where  to  'spend  hir  good',  Jankyn's  casuistry  is  motivated  by  the 
lord's  promise  of  a  new  'gowne-clooth'.  But  the  latter  detail  suggests  a  less 
obvious  point.  Jankyn's  role  is  remarkably  like  that  of  a  court  fool,  whose  'major 
office',  as  Rose  Zimbardo  puts  it,  'was  to  engage  in  wit  combat  or  dispute  with 
his  lord'.  62  Like  the  court  wits  described  in  Enid  Welsford's  important  study 
Fool,  Jankyn  is  licensed  to  contradict  his  lord's  judgement,  to  solve  riddles  and  to 
flatter  or  ridicule  freely  with  the  promise  of  material  remuneration;  in  this  case  the 
reward  is  a  gown,  the  garment  traditionally  provided  by  a  court  for  its  fools.  63 
Jankyn's  satirical  friar-baiting,  in  particular,  aligns  him  with  those 
'artificial'  fools  who  were  permitted  to  denounce  with  impunity  the  hidden  vices 
of  the  powerful. 
64  Moreover,  by  punning  on  the  words  'ars-metrik'  and  'resoun' 
--  the  latter  of  which  suggests  the  'resonance'  of  a  fart  --  Jankyn  not  only  alludes 
to  the  scatological  behaviour  for  which  buffoons  were  renowned,  but  also  draws 174 
upon  the  fool's  traditional  rhetorical  resources.  His  sophistry  has  the  effect  of 
defusing  a  highly-charged  situation  by  substituting  the  manor's  class-conscious 
imputations  of  madness  with  absurd  and  politically  impotent  fool-play. 
Ostensibly  at  least,  the  Summoner  has  evaded  the  radical  implications  of 
Thomas's  problem.  Indeed,  medieval  fools  characteristically  satirize  the  abuses  of 
individual  figures,  imaginary  or  real,  but  never  the  social  structures  or  institutions 
to  which  they  belong.  If  Heather  Arden  is  right,  for  example,  the  popular  sotties 
or  'fool  plays'  of  the  late  Middle  Ages  are  properly  seen  not  as  radical  subversions 
of  official  culture,  but  rather  as  non-egalitarian  and  conservative  works. 
65  In  the 
Summoner's  Tale  folly  has  an  equally  stabilizing  rationale.  The  introduction  of  the 
fool  is  an  attempt  to  dissolve,  rather  than  point  up  the  unpalatable  political 
implications  of  Thomas's  conundrum. 
The  tale  has  now  moved  into  a  traditional  form  of  satire.  In  a  sense,  the 
historically  specific  allegations  of  peasant  insanity  have  been  'translated',  as  Lee 
Patterson  laments,  'back  into  the  dehistoricizing  language  of  antifraternal 
discourse'  so  that  'we  retreat  into  a  world  of  aesthetic  appreciation,  in  which 
peasant  energy,  however  potentially  threatening,  is  reduced  to  a  playful 
manipulation  of  the  images  of  official  culture  that  leaves  the  realities  firmly  in 
place'. 
66  Nevertheless,  to  see  the  end  of  the  Summoner's  Tale  as  an  escape  from 
history  is  to  overlook  the  extent  to  which  the  desire  for  such  an  escape  is  itself  a 
feature  of  official  commentaries  on  the  Revolt.  The  most  conservative  of  these, 
Walsingham's  Historia  Anglicana,  also  moves  from  the  disturbing  invective  of 
peasant  defamation  to  antifraternalism.  Walsingham,  whose  vitriolic  description  of 
the  rebels  has  already  been  mentioned,  ends  his  analysis  of  the  rising  with  a 
conventional  tract  against  the  mendicant  friars,  whom  he  implausibly  blames  for 
neglecting  their  office  and  causing  the  commons  to  rebel.  67  The  end  of  the 
Summoner's  Tale  therefore  mirrors,  rather  than  abandons  contemporary 
anti-peasant  discourse. 175 
Other  elements  at  the  end  of  the  tale  preclude  a  comfortable  closure  or  a 
total  abdication  of  historically  specific  elements.  The  most  obvious  of  these  is  the 
tale's  fashionable  concern  with  scholarly  reason.  If  the  end  of  the  tale  represents 
the  victory  of  folly  over  madness,  it  also  sees  the  triumph  of  science  over 
demonology,  a  point  neatly  underscored  by  Jankyn's  pun  on  'demonstratif'.  The 
household's  excessive  praise  of  Jankyn's  cogitative  powers  recalls  the  bitter  ending 
of  the  Miller's  Tale:  by  comparing  Jankyn's  reasoning  to  that  of  Euclid  and 
Ptolemy,  the  inhabitants  of  the  manor  salute  the  reasoning  of  clerks  (2287-2289). 
But  despite  its  supposed  classical  grandeur,  Jankyn's  reasoning  is  not  far  removed 
from  the  concerns  of  contemporary  England.  In  fact,  the  solution  to  the  problem 
of  the  fart's  division  recalls  the  scholarly  controversies  of  the  late 
fourteenth-century.  As  Timothy  O'Brien  points  out,  the  debate  over  indivisibility 
was  a  central  issue  of  debate  among  scholars  during  the  fourteenth 
century.  According  to  John  Murdoch,  the  debate  was  between,  on 
the  one  hand,  those  such  as  Henry  of  Harclay,  Walter  Chatton  and 
Nicholas  Bonet,  who  argued  that  continua  are  composed  of 
indivisibles,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  those  Mertonians  such  as 
Thomas  Bradwardine  and  William  Heytesbury,  who,  with  Aristotle 
in  the  Physics,  argued  that  continua  were  composed  only  of 
divisibles.  It  is  likely  that  the  problem  of  division  at  the  end  of  the 
Summoner's  Tale  refers  to  this  debate  over  indivisibility.  68 
The  suggestion  is  plausible.  Chaucer  was,  after  all,  a  friend  of  the  Oxford  fellow 
and  mathematician  Ralph  Strode,  who  tutored  the  poet's  son  Lewis;  and  elsewhere 
in  his  work  Chaucer  exhibits  'a  clear  understanding  of  the  scholastic  terminology 
used  at  Merton  College'.  69 
The  end  of  the  Summoner's  Tale  also  reflects  a  more  specific  and  directly 
relevant  concern  with  division.  In  a  recent  article  Phillip  Pulsiano  has  convincingly 176 
discussed  Jankyn's  thought-experiment  in  relation  to  another  contemporary 
problem  of  natural  science,  that  of  the  division  of  the  winds  according  to  their 
directions.  7°  This  suggestion,  along  with  O'Brien's,  indicates  that  Jankyn's  satire 
has  contemporary  as  well  as  traditional  targets,  sending  up  not  only  the  friars,  but 
also  the  concerns  of  university  scholars. 
Indeed,  O'Brien  shows  how  Jankyn's  reasoning  relates  to 
fourteenth-century  philosophical  debates  between  the  champions  of  a  traditional 
sort  of  science  which  relied  on  authority  and  the  advocates  of  the  increasingly 
popular  phenomenological  science,  which,  following  the  example  of  Grosseteste 
and  Roger  Bacon  in  the  previous  century,  depended  for  its  conclusions  on 
experience  and  demonstration.  71  By  relying  on  'preeve  which  that  is 
demonstratif',  Jankyn's  clearly  endorses  the  latter  scientific  method  which,  as 
O'Brien  notes,  was  particularly  fashionable  in  the  English  universities  in  the 
fourteenth  century.  Finally,  O'Brien  shows  that  both  the  vocabulary  and  the 
structure  of  the  argument  in  the  final  part  of  the  tale  conform  to  the  conventions  of 
contemporary  scholastic  discourse.  72  Jankyn's  solution  therefore  subtly  re-invokes 
the  antagonism  between  scholars  and  peasants  that  erupts  so  unpleasantly  in  the 
final  scene  of  the  Miller's  Tale.  At  the  end  of  the  Summoner's  Tale,  then,  the 
allegations  of  peasant  madness  are  not  entirely  dissolved  into  traditional 
anti-fraternal  satire,  nor  does  the  tale  end  with  'the  reestablishment  of  a  happy, 
stable  society'. 
73  On  the  contrary,  Jankyn's  mock  pedagogy  constitutes  an  ironic 
but  insidious  reassertion  of  class  difference. 
As  far  as  Thomas  himself  is  concerned,  the  endorsement  of  his  reasoning 
by  the  lord  and  squire  is  a  mixed  blessing.  Explicitly  at  least,  Thomas  is  conceded 
rationality  and  relieved  of  the  stigma  of  diabolism: 
Touchynge  the  cherl,  they  seyde,  subtiltee 
And  heigh  wit  made  hym  speken  as  he  spak; 
He  nys  no  fool,  ne  no  demonyak.  (2290-2292) 177 
Having  dismissed  the  dangerous  ideas  of  a  mad  peasant,  the  inhabitants  of  the 
manor  jestingly  recast  Thomas  as  a  champion  of  reason;  if  the  Miller's  Tale  ended 
with  the  mockery  of  peasant  madness,  the  Summoner's  Tale  ends  with  a  tribute  to 
the  rationality  of  a  churl. 
This  tribute,  of  course,  is  entirely  spurious  and  ironic.  In  the  Summoner's 
Tale,  the  peasant  becomes  an  object  of  scientific  study.  Just  as  the  squire  places 
the  rustic  cartwheel  at  the  centre  of  his  thought-experiment,  so  the  peasant  Thomas 
is  reduced,  in  O'Brien's  austere  words,  to  the  status  of  a  'mechanical  device'  or 
the  'narrating  Summoner's  cooking  pot'.  74  Thomas's  predictable  behaviour  means 
that  he  may  be  regarded  as  an  experimental  constant,  or  even  as  a  beast,  according 
to  Aquinas's  observation  that  'animals  show  regular  and  orderly  behaviour  and 
must  therefore  be  regarded  as  machines,  distinct  from  man  who  acts  according  to 
his  rational  soul'.  75  This  latter  idea  recalls  the  lord's  earlier  reference  to  Thomas's 
'ymaginacioun',  insofar  as  that  term  calls  into  question  Thomas's  rationality. 
Chaucer's  parody  of  scholastic  reasoning  here  implies  a  traditional  scepticism 
about  a  scientific  methodology  which,  applied  mechanically,  acts  as  a  distraction 
from  moral  values  and  reduces  human  beings  to  the  level  of  objects  or  beasts. 
Abstract  scholastic  language,  like  the  language  of  folly,  also  causes  the  new 
scientists  of  the  manor  to  lose  sight  of  the  radical  political  implications  of 
Thomas's  assertion  of  the  possibility  of  dividing  his  donation  equally  among  the 
friars.  In  the  portentous  words  of  Ernesto  Grassi  and  Maristella  Lorch: 
Scientific,  intellectual  thought  can  only  have  a  formal  character,  can 
take  place  only  within  the  boundaries  of  a  system.  Any  humanism 
that  attempts  to  transcend  formal  thinking  by  taking  into  account  the 
problems  of  life,  of  man  in  his  real  context,  is  excluded.  [...  ] 
Scientific,  rational  language  must  of  inner  necessity  be  an  inhuman, 178 
mathematical  calculation  [...  ].  Rationality  becomes  the  terror  of  the 
human.  76 
Unlike  Thomas's  problem,  Jankyn's  sophistry  disregards  the  possibility  of  social 
change.  In  fact,  Thomas  is  repeatedly  referred  to  as  a  'churl'  in  the  final  section  of 
the  tale,  even  after  his  riposte  has  been  vindicated. 
The  Miller's  and  Summoner's  tales,  we  have  seen,  reflect  the  widespread 
and  often  violent  antipathy  between  peasants  and  scholars  which  was  conspicuous 
during  the  Peasants'  Revolt.  This  antipathy  --  frequently  expressed  in  terms  of 
insanity  --  erupts  spectacularly  in  the  Miller's  Tale  and  is  presented  more 
ambiguously  in  the  Summoner's  Tale.  Chaucer  does  not  simply  record  the 
prevalent  attitudes  of  his  day,  but  manipulates  them  impressively.  In  a  statement 
typical  of  early  Chaucer  criticism,  Thomas  Warton  long  ago  stated  that  'we  are 
surprised  to  find,  in  so  gross  and  ignorant  an  age,  such  talents  for  satire,  and  for 
observation  of  life'.  7'  This  pronouncement,  however  patronizing  and  naive  to 
twentieth-century  ears,  is  not  wholly  untrue.  The  ludic  nature  of  Chaucer's 
concern  with  madness  is  part  of  his  more  general  reluctance  to  subjugate  his 
writing  to  ideology.  Moreover,  by  comparing  one  allegation  of  madness  with 
another  for  ironic  effect  or  by  satirizing  these  allegations  in  various  ways,  Chaucer 
emphasizes  the  socially-constructed,  rather  than  the  natural  or  divine  character  of 
insanity.  Thus  he  shows  a  self-consciousness  about  madness  that  is  impossible  for 
'moral  Gower',  whose  literary  objective  is  vilification  rather  than  exploration. 
However  much  Chaucer  might  have  shared  his  friend's  horror  at  the  Peasants' 
Revolt,  he  nevertheless  perceives  the  irony  of  a  situation  in  which  the  English 
peasantry,  whose  radical  rhetoric  insisted  on  common  human  dignity  and  the 
necessity  of  'prudent'  rule  based  on  egalitarian  principles,  were  summarily 
dismissed  as  unreasoning  beasts. 179 
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Chapter  5 
'By  cowntynaunce  it  is  not  wist'  :  Thomas  Hoccleve  and  the 
Subject  of  Madnessl 
No  sicknesse  suche,  as  is  the  griefe  of  miede  -  Nicholas  Breton 
In  many  of  the  literary  works  discussed  so  far,  madness  is  both  a  moral 
abomination  and  a  threat  to  social  and  political  order.  Moreover,  these  works  often 
present  the  observation  of  madness  from  a  third-person  perspective.  By  contrast, 
the  major,  apparently  autobiographical  poems  of  the  fifteenth-century  civil  servant 
Thomas  Hoccleve  present  the  experience  of  madness  from  the  viewpoint  of  the 
sufferer.  As  Michael  MacDonald  observes,  madness,  although  'the  most  social  of 
maladies  to  those  who  observe  its  effects'  is  also  'the  most  solitary  of  afflictions  to 
the  people  who  experience  it'.  2  In  Hoccleve's  works  insanity  is  not  merely  a 
spectacular  moral  emblem,  but  a  distressing  personal  experience. 
That  Hoccleve  both  suffered  and  wrote  about  madness  should  not  surprise 
us.  Hoccleve  seems  not  to  have  had  any  knowledge  of  his  madness  while  he 
suffered  from  it;  rather,  he  gleans  the  details  of  his  madness  from  his  friends  after 
the  event. 
3  Nevertheless,  his  description  of  his  madness,  especially  in  the 
Complaint,  attests  to  the  medieval  madman's  awareness  of  the  stigma  of  madness 
and  to  his  acute  sense  of  social  alienation.  The  last  few  of  Hoccleve's  major 
works,  however,  have  a  different  tone,  as  Hoccleve  abandons  his  autobiographical 
exploration  of  his  insanity  in  favour  of  a  more  public-spirited  poetry  in  which  he 
denounces  the  unruliness  of  others. 
Early  critics  tended  to  value  the  autobiographical  content  of  the  poems 
above  all  else.  This  is  the  element  of  Hoccleve's  work  that  most  excited  the  poet's 
first  editor  Frederick  Furnivall,  whose  long  introduction  to  the  Minor  Poems  is  rife 186 
with  groundless  speculations  about  the  poet's  life.  4  Some  years  later,  H.  S.  Bennett 
observed  that  'we  are  always  in  touch  with  the  poet:  we  do  not  feel  that  his  poems 
are  mechanical  exercises,  but  the  reflection  of  the  poet's  own  ideas  and 
personality',  referring  to  Hoccleve's  egotism  and  what  he  rather  disparagingly 
terms  his  'crude  immediacy'.  5  Eleanor  Prescott  Hammond  also  calls  Hoccleve  a 
'natural  egoist'  who  'turns  more  naturally  toward  himself  than  toward  literature'.  6 
Hammond  implies  that  in  writing  about  himself  Hoccleve  managed  to  escape  the 
influences  of  literary  convention,  freeing  himself  to  express  a  natural 
autobiographical  impulse.  All  of  these  critics  see  Hoccleve  as  a  proto-humanist,  an 
often  dull  yet  historically  precocious  champion  of  an  individualism  completely 
undetermined  by  social  conditions.  Indeed,  Hammond  implies  that  Hoccleve  was 
isolated  from  his  society,  that  there  was  'a  poet  here  and  a  public  world  there'.  7 
Absolute  distinctions  between  individual  and  society  or  between  the 
'immediate'  and  the  conventional  cannot,  of  course,  be  made.  We  can  agree  with 
Bennett  that  Hoccleve's  poetry  is  'immediate',  so  long  as  we  remember  that  for 
the  artist,  directness  is  a  literary  affectation.  8  We  can  also  agree  with  Hammond 
that  Hoccleve  'turned  towards  himself',  so  long  as  we  do  not  suppose  that  in  doing 
so  he  was  able  either  to  escape  the  public  sphere  or  to  express  himself  without  the 
aid  of  literary  conventions. 
Almost  all  of  the  rapidly  growing  scholarship  on  Hoccleve's  major  works 
has  been  concerned  to  some  extent  with  the  question  of  autobiography. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  still  impossible  to  say  precisely  how  much  of  what  the  narrator 
tells  us  in  the  poems  corresponds  with  actual  events  in  the  life  of  Hoccleve. 
Furnivall  took  for  granted  the  historical  veracity  of  the  longer  poems.  The  'chief 
authorities'  for  Hoccleve's  life,  he  remarks,  are  not  only  historical  documents,  but 
also  his  'Male  Regle  [...  ]  his  Dialog  with  the  old  Beggar  in  his  Regement  of 
Princes,  his  Complaint  and  Dialogue  with  a  friend'.  9  Furnivall  naturally 
concluded  that  the  details  Hoccleve  describes,  including  a  period  of  madness,  are 
autobiographical. 187 
More  recently,  New  Critical  and  Deconstructive  movements  in  literary 
theory  have  encouraged  a  general  distrust  of  autobiographical  interpretations  of 
texts.  Since  the  1960s  a  number  of  critics  have  undermined  Furnivall's  confident 
identification  of  Hoccleve  with  his  mad  narrator.  The  most  influential  of  these, 
Penelope  Doob,  is  willing  to  concede  that  Hoccleve  may  have  been  insane.  10  She 
is  quick,  however,  to  point  out  that  Hoccleve's  descriptions  of  madness  are 
steeped  in  literary  and  medical  conventions.  As  Albert  Friedman  notes,  Doob 
implies  that  those  who  have  taken  Hoccleve  at  his  word  when  he  says  that  he  is 
mad  have  simply  been  'taken  in'.  11  Thus  Doob  effectively  reverses  Hammond's 
observation  that  Hoccleve  turned  'more  naturally  toward  himself  than  toward 
literature'.  One  eminent  critic  has  gone  even  further,  claiming  confidently  that 
'no-one  could  mistake'  Hoccleve's  work  'for  anything  other  than  a  fiction'.  12 
It  is  clearly  fallacious,  however,  to  suppose  that  the  conventionality  of  an 
experience  precludes  its  veracity.  As  John  Burrow  points  out,  'it  is  not  safe  to 
assume  that  a  real  experience  will  not  be  described  (or  indeed  experienced)  in 
conventional  terms'.  13  The  psychosis  which  afflicts  the  narrator  at  the  start  of  The 
Book  of  Margery  Kempe,  for  example,  is  described  in  conventional  fashion;  yet  no 
reader  can  rule  out  the  possibility  that  Kempe  really  was  insane.  The  same  might 
be  said  of  the  Elizabethan  Nicholas  Breton,  who  is  in  many  ways  Hoccleve's 
literary  successor.  Breton  lived  near  Bethlem  hospital  and  seems  to  have  been 
familiar  with  its  insane  inmates.  His  poems  are  saturated  with  references  to 
madness  and  madmen,  leading  Basil  Clarke  to  speculate  that  the  poet  'had  chronic 
depressive  troubles  of  his  own'.  14  Whatever  the  truth  of  these  cases,  literary 
convention  is  not  the  opposite  of  real  life;  on  the  contrary,  it  can  determine  not 
only  how,  but  also  which  experiences  are  described  in  an  autobiography.  In  an 
autobiography  of  the  twelfth  century,  the  French  abbot  Guibert  de  Nogent  tells  of 
the  beatings  he  received  as  a  child  from  his  tutor,  a  detail  which  recalls  the  early 
experiences  of  Augustine.  15  Despite  this  awesome  precedent,  the  possibility  that 
Guibert  was  indeed  thrashed  cannot  be  discounted. 188 
Clearly,  a  strong  distinction  between  conventional  and  real  textual  details 
cannot  be  upheld.  It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  the  two  categories  should  be 
regarded  either  as  co-extensive  or  as  indistinguishable;  rather,  we  should  posit  a 
weak  distinction  between  them.  As  we  have  already  seen,  during  the  Middle  Ages 
details  of  real  and  fictional  descriptions  of  madness  often  overlapped.  The 
experience  of  madness  --  like  any  other  experience  which  may  be  related  in  an 
autobiography  --  is  closely,  but  not  inextricably,  bound  up  with  convention. 
The  poetic  and  documentary  evidence  for  Hoccleve's  madness  cannot 
simply  be  ignored.  The  major  poems  are  so  strewn  with  verifiable  details  from 
Hoccleve's  life  that  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  they  have  any  less 
truth-value  than  the  autobiographies  of,  say,  Tolstoy  or  Woolf,  even  if  Hoccleve's 
motivations  for  self-revelation  are  typically  medieval.  Gordon  Claridge,  Ruth 
Pryor  and  Gwen  Watkins  advance  another  reason  for  believing  that  'Hoccleve  is 
describing  his  own  experience',  pointing  out  that 
it  would  have  been  professional  suicide  for  a  civil  servant  to 
describe  the  indignities  of  derangement  and  to  represent  himself  as 
having  been  mad,  unless  the  facts  were  as  well  known  to  his 
colleagues  and  masters  as  he  says  they  were;  while  to  try,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  put  his  known  condition  in  a  better  light,  as  Hoccleve 
does,  is  sensible  only  if  the  fact  of  his  illness  was  well  known  but 
his  recovery  less  well  recognised,  which  is  what  he  claims.  16 
Whether  or  not  Hoccleve  would  indeed  have  undermined  his  position  as  a  civil 
servant  by  identifying  himself  with  an  insane  narrator,  he  would  hardly  have 
jeopardized  his  considerable  opportunities  for  professional  advancement  by  doing 
so. 
Given  the  likelihood  of  Hoccleve's  insanity  and  the  fact  that  his  poetry 
'was  as  autobiographical  as  any  writing  can  be,  given  that  we  are  always 189 
controlled  by  the  conventions  of  our  age',  the  narrator  of  these  poems  is  referred 
to  in  this  chapter  as  Hoccleve  rather  than  Thomas,  as  some  critics  prefer. 
17  Not 
everyone  will  agree  that  Hoccleve's  major  works  are  as  autobiographical  as  is 
claimed  here;  but  this  need  not  invalidate  the  arguments  of  this  chapter.  Few  of 
the  points  made  here  are  dependent  on  an  acceptance  of  Hoccleve  as  an 
autobiographer.  Stephen  Medcalf's  forthright  caveat  to  his  readers  must  suffice  to 
allay  any  remaining  doubts: 
I  shall  proceed  on  the  assumption  that  the  proportion  of  genuine 
experience  to  the  conventions  which  articulate  and  enable  Hoccleve 
to  explore  it  is  very  large.  You  must  make  your  own  adjustment  to 
what  I  have  to  say  if  you  are  less  convinced  than  I  am  of  the 
veridicalness  of  Hoccleve's  story.  I8 
While  the  issue  of  authenticity  has  a  significance  for  literary  history,  it  has  been 
said  that  it  does  not  matter  'from  a  literary  point  of  view'  whether  or  not  we  can 
establish  Hoccleve's  apparent  autobiographies  as  historical  facts.  19  The  most 
important  point  to  take  from  the  discussion  about  autobiography  in  Hoccleve  is 
that  the  poet  wishes  us  to  understand  the  madness  of  his  narrator  as  his  own 
personal  experience. 
Hoccleve  has  not  escaped  the  attentions  of  twentieth-century  physicians. 
From  the  evidence  of  the  poems,  Dr  Anthony  Ryle  diagnoses  him  as  suffering 
from  a  bi-polar  manic-depressive  illness,  having  experienced  a 
minor  depressive  episode  in  1406  (Male  Regle)  and  a  worse  and 
more  prolonged  one  starting  in  1411  (Regement)  terminating  in  an 
attack  of  mania  or  hypomania  which  cleared  in  1416  (Complaint 
and  Dialogue  with  a  Friend),  after  which  time  he  was  but  mildly 
depressed.  20 190 
There  is documentary  evidence  that  Hoccleve,  who  worked  as  a  scribe  at  the  Privy 
Seal  office  in  Westminster,  was  incapacitated  for  some  reason  in  the  period 
preceding  his  first  poetic  reference  to  his  madness.  The  Pells  Issue  Roll  for  18  July 
1416  shows  that  Hoccleve's  half-yearly  annuity  was  paid  not  to  Hoccleve  but  to 
his  three  colleagues. 
21  In  fact,  as  the  historian  A.  L.  Brown  states,  Hoccleve  'did 
not  come  to  the  Exchequer  personally  between  May  1414  and  March  1417  to 
collect  payments  due  to  him'.  22  The  poet's  first  reference  to  his  madness  occurs, 
significantly,  in  the  Complaint  of  1422,  in  which  he  claims  to  have  recovered  his 
memory  some  five  years  previously  (50-56).  23  Indeed,  what  little  we  know  about 
Hoccleve's  career  is  consistent  with  what  he  tells  us  in  his  poems.  'What  he 
wrote',  says  Brown  of  Hoccleve,  'was  apparently  in  essence  true.  His  service  in 
the  Privy  Seal,  his  annuity,  his  hostel,  even  to  some  extent  his  breakdown,  can  be 
substantiated  from  the  records'.  24 
The  best  source  of  information  about  conditions  at  the  Privy  Seal  office 
during  the  early  fifteenth  century  is  still  the  fifth  volume  of  Thomas  F.  Tout's 
colossal  Chapters  in  Medieval  Administrative  History.  25  A  consideration  of 
Hoccleve's  poems  alongside  Tout's  evidence  yields  a  consistent,  albeit  sketchy, 
picture  of  the  life  of  the  Privy  Seal  clerk  and  of  the  professional  and  economic 
stresses  and  grievances  which  may  have  contributed  to  his  breakdown. 
Tout  notes  that  the  Privy  Seal  office  was  understaffed,  and  this  situation 
seems  to  have  worsened  during  Hoccleve's  term  of  employment.  26  The  clerks 
were  paid  irregularly  to  put  it  mildly:  one  of  Hoccleve's  predecessors  at  the  office, 
Dighton,  received  no  wages  for  an  astonishing  six  years  and  forty-three  days; 
Tirrington's  arrears  were  comparable.  Their  supposedly  fixed  income  was  very 
little.  And  yet,  as  Tout  notes,  'low  as  were  their  wages  and  irregular  as  was  their 
payment,  as  time  went  on  the  privy  seal  clerks  tended  to  be  treated  with  less  rather 
than  more  liberality'.  27  Hoccleve  complains  in  considerable  detail  about  all  of 
these  pressures  throughout  the  major  poetry. 191 
Other  hazards  tested  the  poet's  sanity.  In  the  prologue  to  his  Regement  of 
Princes  Hoccleve  describes  the  financial  chicanery  practised  by  some  of  those  with 
whom  the  Seal  office  had  dealings.  Many  of  the  wealthier  clients  employed 
servants  as  go-betweens  in  their  transactions  with  the  office.  These  servants  often 
refused  to  pay  the  clerks.  If  the  clerks  demurred,  the  servants  would  simply  return 
to  their  lords  complaining  of  the  extortions  of  the  clerks.  28  Thus  the  clerks,  like 
the  customs  controllers  in  Chaucer's  day,  were  regularly  humiliated. 
Not  all  critics  have  been  moved  to  pity  by  Hoccleve's  plight.  In  a  severe 
attack  on  Hoccleve's  professional  career  and  personality,  Malcolm  Richardson 
describes  the  Privy  Seal  clerk  as  'a  conspicuous  under-achiever,  a  man  who  did 
not  or  could  not  avail  himself  of  the  opportunities  available  to  him'.  29  Richardson 
argues  that  the  blockish  Hoccleve  had  only  himself  to  blame  for  the  hardship  he 
complains  of  and  upbraids  the  poet  for  his  lack  of  self-provision  and  initiative. 
Hoccleve,  it  is  true,  effectively  debarred  himself  from  ecclesiastical  preferment  by 
marrying  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  showed  much  ambition  in  his  business 
affairs.  Compared  with  the  shrewd  and  confident  Chaucer  and  his  own  more 
professionally  vigorous  colleagues,  Hoccleve  certainly  appears  inept.  In  what 
DuBoulay  has  called  'an  age  of  ambition',  it  is  little  wonder  that  the  hapless  poet 
became  depressed;  as  Thomas  Elyot  writes  in  his  discussion  of  melancholy 
madness,  'oftentymes  the  repulse  frome  promotion  is  cause  of  discomforte'.  30 
As  well  as  professional  worries,  Hoccleve  and  his  fellow  clerks  endured 
considerable  physical  stresses.  Writing,  Hoccleve  reminds  us  in  the  Regement,  is 
hard  work.  Twenty-three  years  of  tedious  scribal  work  has  given  the  clerk  pains  in 
his  stomach  and  back  and  ruined  his  eyesight  (1016-1029).  Moreover,  whereas 
workmen  can  'make  game  and  play'  as  they  work,  a  scribe  must  keep  his  words  to 
himself,  devoting  'al  his  wittes'  to  his  work  (1002-1015).  Here  Hoccleve  comes 
close  to  attributing  his  melancholy  to  the  conventional  cause  of  over-study,  a 
theme  to  which  he  returns  in  his  later  poetry. 192 
Penelope  Doob  has  argued  that  Hoccleve  writes  about  madness  because  it 
accords  with  a  penitential  impulse  running  throughout  his  work.  Madness,  she 
says,  is  simply  'the  best  metaphor'  for  the  narrator's  sinfulness,  a  view  reinforced 
by  Eva  Thornley's  comparison  of  Hoccleve's  works  with  medieval  penitential 
lyrics.  31  Interesting  as  this  argument  is,  it  is  not  the  only  way  of  accounting  for 
Hoccleve's  concern  with  madness.  It  has  already  been  argued  that  a  number  of 
specific  social,  economic  and  physical  factors  play  their  part  in  the  onset  of 
Hoccleve's  insanity.  Such  a  claim  is  hardly  far-fetched:  after  all,  most  critics 
would  acknowledge  that  Margery  Kempe's  madness  can  be  seen  not  only  as  part 
of  a  theological  pattern  of  sin,  punishment  and  regeneration,  but  also  as  the  result 
of  the  oppressive  conditions  of  her  life.  Similarly,  in  stressing  the  implicit  moral 
significance  of  Hoccleve's  madness,  there  is  a  danger  of  overlooking  Hoccleve's 
explicit  attribution  of  his  insanity  to  his  working  conditions  and  his  thwarted  desire 
for  social  advancement. 
The  theme  of  madness  runs  through  the  major  poetry,  which  includes  the 
Male  Regle  (1406),  The  Regement  of  Princes  (1411)  and  the  sequence  of  poems 
now  known  as  the  Series  (1422).  Hoccleve's  interest  in  the  connection  between  sin 
and  disease  has  already  been  well  explored  by  Doob,  who  argues  that  madness  is 
seen  primarily  as  a  token  of  spiritual  sickness  in  all  of  Hoccleve's  works.  32  Many 
of  the  minor  poems,  such  as  'Ad  Spiritum  Sanctum'  and  'The  epistle  of  grace  sent 
to  the  seek  man',  present  illness  as  a  result  of  spiritual  negligence;  confession  and 
repentance  are  the  only  effective  curative  measures.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  an 
awareness  of  medical  practices  in  these  poems.  'The  epistle  of  grace',  for 
example,  refers  to  a  humoral  imbalance  which  'wil  aske  sothly  a  fleobotomye' 
(28).  Nevertheless,  the  causes  and  cures  of  disease  here  are  always  framed 
ultimately  in  religious  terms. 
This  common  religious  interpretation  of  disease  helps  give  the  minor  poems 
the  appearance  of  a  unified  body  of  work.  Nevertheless,  we  should  not,  as  Doob 
does,  assume  that  madness  is  interpreted  identically  in  Hoccleve's  other  works.  If 193 
other  medieval  authors  can  express  several  views  about  a  single  subject,  there  is  no 
reason  to  think  any  differently  of  Hoccleve.  In  the  Male  Regle,  the  Regement  and 
the  Series,  various  perspectives  on  madness  are  explored  in  diverse  styles  and 
genres.  Hoccleve  in  places  regards  his  madness  as  a  punishment  for  his  sins;  but 
madness  is  elsewhere  seen,  more  prosaically,  as  the  product  of  unfortunate  but 
unavoidable  professional  and  economic  circumstances.  Clearly,  Hoccleve's 
treatment  of  madness  is  not  unchanging.  In  the  major  poems  --  especially  in  the 
Series  --  the  emphasis  is  as  much  on  the  social  and  psychological,  as  the  moral 
dynamics  of  the  poet's  'sycknesse'. 
The  ironic  begging  poem  known  as  the  Male  Regle  --  the  earliest  work 
referring  to  Hoccleve's  ill-health  --  illustrates  this  point  well.  Here  Hoccleve  is  a 
melancholic  'only  because  working  conditions  have  worn  him  out  and  his  salary  is 
inadequate'.  33  The  poet  begins  with  a  lament  for  his  poor  state  of  health.  This 
'seekly  heuynesse'  (15),  he  implies,  is  a  divine  punishment  for  the  dissolute  living 
of  his  youth,  and  he  goes  on  to  confess  the  riotous  behaviour  that  led  to  his  illness. 
Some  of  the  detail  here  is  conventional  and  familiar:  Hoccleve's  drinking 
activities,  for  example,  would  not  seem  out  of  place  among  the  confessions  of 
Langland's  Deadly  Sins.  There  are  also  similarities  between  Hoccleve's 
description  of  his  youthful  revels  and  the  penitential  lyric  'In  my  youth  fulle  wylde 
I  was'. 
34 
Other  details  are  too  specific  to  be  conventional.  Hoccleve  tells  us,  for 
example,  precisely  where  he  drank:  at  the  'Poules  heed'  tavern  (143).  The 
intrusion  of  everyday  detail  into  conventional  works  is  typically  late-medieval:  we 
see  it  in  the  mystery  plays,  in  medieval  art,  and  in  many  devotional  books  of  the 
period.  In  the  Male  Regle,  however,  the  apparently  unmotivated  detail  is  derived 
from  personal  experience.  Just  as  the  Langland  of  the  C-Text  Piers  Plowman 
presents  'a  world  of  specific  places,  Cornhulle  and  London',  Hoccleve  describes 
his  debauched  London  life  in  merciless  detail.  35  He  even  describes  his  shyness 
regarding  sexual  matters: 194 
Had  Ia  kus  I  was  content  ful  weel, 
Bettre  than  I  wolde  han  be  with  the  deede: 
Ther-on  can  I  but  smal;  it  is  no  dreede: 
Whan  at  man  speke  of  it  in  my  presence, 
For  shame  I  wexe  as  reed  as  is  the  gleede.  (155-159) 
We  are  reminded  here  of  Chaucer's  seemingly  autobiographical  passages  in  the 
House  of  Fame.  Hoccleve  repeatedly  adopts  a  personal  tone  in  the  major  works  so 
that  'a  real  human  personality  emerges  from  the  pages  of  La  Male  Regle  --  a 
personality  which  we  can  watch  develop  and  observe  in  different  circumstances  in 
the  Prologue  to  the  Regement,  the  Complaint,  and  the  Dialogue'.  36 
Clearly,  while  he  does  not  present  anything  like  a  modern  autobiography, 
Hoccleve  studs  his  conventional  passages  of  poetry  with  autobiographical  details. 
This  point  is  noted  by  Stephan  Kohl,  who  implies  that  Hoccleve's  apparently 
candid  confession  of  his  bashfulness  in  the  company  of  women  may  not  be  entirely 
serious: 
By  referring  to  his  continence  in  unlikely  circumstances,  [Hoccleve] 
exempts  himself  from  having  to  give  a  moralizing  account  of  his 
behaviour  and,  as  if  shocked  by  this  deviation  from  the  moral 
framework  of  his  La  Male  Regle,  he  concludes  this  episode  with  the 
line: 
Now  wol  I  turne  ageyn  to  my  sentence.  (1.160).  37 
The  sudden  shift  from  autobiography  to  traditional  'sentence'  prefigures  the 
stylistic  fluctuations  of  the  other  major  poems.  As  Burrow  puts  it,  'Hoccleve's 
various  confessions  of  personal  inadequacy  cast  fitful  shadows  across  the  adjacent 195 
passages  of  moral  and  prudential  counsel'.  38  Ethan  Knapp  has  recently  argued  that 
Hoccleve's  'poetics  of  selfhood'  is  parallelled  in  his  professional  output  as  a  civil 
servant.  Knapp  convincingly  compares  Hoccleve's  petitionary  verse  with  the  early 
sections  of  his  formulary,  suggesting  that  all  of  these  works  present  a  generic 
bifurcation,  for  'the  lowly  clerk  must  simultaneously  assert  the  particularities  of 
desire,  and  yet,  for  the  sake  of  propriety,  take  shelter  in  the  bureaucratic  nature  of 
the  document'.  39  From  our  point  of  view,  Hoccleve's  candour  in  his  poems  shifts 
our  attention  from  the  moral  to  the  personal  significance  of  madness.  In  this  way, 
Hoccleve  creates  an  interpretative  context  for  the  theme  of  sickness  that  is  quite 
distinct  from  that  of  the  shorter  religious  poems. 
Hoccleve  continues  with  his  queasy  confession  of  his  youthful  follies  after 
the  fashion  of  medieval  penitential  handbooks.  He  describes  his  physical 
cowardice  (170),  refers  to  his  work  at  the  Privy  Seal  office  (188)  and  his  vanity 
and  pretentiousness  in  his  dealings  with  the  London  boatmen  (201-208).  The  most 
telling  of  these  autobiographical  vignettes  concerns  Hoccleve's  fellow  clerks 
'Prentys  and  Arondel'  (321),  who,  like  the  poet,  led  riotous  lives,  drinking  all 
night  and  lying  in  bed  until  mid-morning  instead  of  working.  Neither  of  these 
men,  complains  Hoccleve,  has  been  punished  with  ill-health  as  he  has  been  for  his 
bohemian  lifestyle.  Prentys  and  Arondel's  freedom  from  physical  suffering  despite 
their  sloth  does  not  constitute  a  reprieve  from  punishment:  Penelope  Doob  points 
out  that  'the  absence  of  disease  does  not  [...  ]  indicate  absence  of  sin',  which  could 
be  punished  either  on  earth  or  in  the  afterlife.  40  Nevertheless,  the  absence  of  a 
visible  divine  justice  is  a  cause  of  frustration  for  Hoccleve. 
Hoccleve's  recognition  that  divine  chastisement  is  visited  unequally  upon 
the  living  signals  a  departure  from  the  depictions  of  immediate  moral  justice  in  the 
minor  poems.  In  'The  epistle  of  grace  sent  to  the  seek  man',  Grace  tells  the 
eponymous  invalid  that  his  malady  has  been  caused  directly  by  that  favourite  sin  of 
the  late  Middle  Ages,  sloth:  41 196 
Also  I  see,  at  ful  art  thu  withinne 
of  corrupte  humour  al  a-bowt[e]  spred, 
That  rennyth  ay  betwyn  [pi]  flesch  and  skynne, 
That  causith  pat  thu  kepist  now  thi  bedde: 
Than  ydilnesse  and  slouthe  hath  this  bred.  (29-33) 
In  the  Male  Regle,  however,  such  divine  justice  is  postponed.  Hoccleve  is  thus 
forced  to  recognize  the  complexity  of  the  relationship  between  sin  and  its 
punishment.  His  annoyance  that  men  who  are  as  dissolute  as  he  is  enjoy  perfect 
health  adumbrates  his  insistence  in  the  later  Complaint  on  the  discrepancy  between 
inward  states  and  outward  appearances. 
The  uncomplicated  moral  interpretation  of  disease  in  the  shorter  religious 
poems  now  gives  way  to  a  more  personal  response  to  affliction.  One  indication  of 
this  is  Hoccleve's  implication  of  his  colleagues  Prentys  and  Arondel  in  his 
confession.  As  a  medieval  audience  would  immediately  recognize,  this  is 
strikingly  at  odds  with  the  explicit  injunctions  in  penitential  manuals  against  the 
revelation  of  names  in  confession. 
42  Once  again,  Hoccleve  cannot  resist 
introducing  personal  details  into  the  conventional  framework  of  his  poem, 
however  inappropriate  they  may  seem.  Similar  autobiographical  intrusions  occur 
later  in  the  poem  when  Hoccleve  includes,  among  his  conventional  requests  for 
money,  two  specific  references  to  his  financial  condition:  his  rents  (fixed  incomes) 
are  low  (361-362)  and  he  is  owed  ten  pounds  for  the  year,  waiving  his  arrears 
(417-424).  One  is  inclined  to  agree  with  Stephen  Medcalf's  observation  that  'for 
Chaucer,  as  for  Langland,  the  needs  of  the  poem  are  the  cause  of  the  person  in  the 
poem:  for  Hoccleve  it  seems  [...  ]  that  the  poem  is  being  led  off  to  manifest  the 
character'. 
43  In  the  Male  Regle,  then,  Hoccleve's  troubles,  whatever  their  literary 
precedents,  are  presented  in  the  context  of  the  poet's  daily  life. 
Hoccleve's  next  major  poem,  the  Regement  of  Princes,  has  been  described 
as  'a  strangely  schizophrenic  work'. 
44  At  over  2000  lines,  the  massive, 197 
autobiographical  prologue  rivals  the  Regement  in  length.  Here,  as  in  the  Male 
Regle,  Hoccleve  spends  much  of  his  time  discussing  the  causes  and  nature  of  his 
bodily  decrepitude;  indeed,  recent  criticism  has  emphasized  Hoccleve's  concern 
with  the  sick  body  in  both  the  prologue  and  the  Regement  proper.  45 
The  prologue  begins  with  Hoccleve  unable  to  sleep  and  oppressed  by 
'thought': 
Mvsyng  vpon  the  restles  bisynesse 
Which  that  this  troubly  world  hath  ay  on  honde, 
That  othir  thyng  than  fruyt  of  byttirnesse 
Ne  yeldeth  nought,  as  I  can  vndirstonde, 
At  Chestre  ynne,  right  fast  be  the  stronde, 
As  I  lay  in  my  bed  vp-on  a  nyght, 
Thought  me  bereft  of  sleep  with  force  and  myght. 
And  many  a  day  and  nyght  that  wykked  hyne 
Hadde  beforn  vexid  my  poore  goost 
So  grevously,  that  of  anguysh  and  pyne 
No  richere  man  was  nougher  in  no  coost; 
This  dar  I  seyn,  may  no  wight  make  his  boost 
That  he  with  thought  was  bettir  than  I  aqveynted, 
For  to  the  deth  it  wel  nigh  hath  me  feynted.  (1-14) 
This  melancholic  brooding  recalls  the  opening  of  the  Male  Regle  and  the  distracted 
lamentation  which  begins  the  Book  of  the  Duchess,  although  it  has  a  greater 
metaphorical  richness  and  contains  fewer  redundant  phrases  than  Chaucer's  poem. 
Hoccleve  now  encounters  an  old  beggar,  who  attempts  to  restore  the  poet 
to  his  right  wits.  The  beggar  instructs  Hoccleve  to  make  a  full  confession  and  to 
avoid  solitariness  and  thought.  Drawing  on  Ecclesiastes,  he  warns  that  the  man 198 
who  is  alone  is  likely  'to  bere  a  dotyd  heed'  (200).  Here  the  beggar  is  uttering  the 
wisdom  that  will  be  urged  again  in  the  Series:  too  much  brooding  leads  to 
madness.  'Besy  ýoght'  may  also  lead  to  error,  he  warns,  ominously  invoking  the 
case  of  John  Badby,  a  Lollard  burnt  at  the  stake  for  heresy  in  March  1410.46  This 
leads  the  beggar  to  denounce  human  reason  as  'surquidrie'  (331).  Those  who 
meddle  in  scripture,  in  particular,  are  madly  presumptuous: 
Pat  oure  lord  god  seip  in  holy  scripture 
May  not  be  fals;  pis  knawit  euery  whi3t, 
But  he  be  mad.  (337-339) 
Presumpcioun,  a!  benedicite! 
Why  vexist  you  folk  with  pi  franesie?  (358-359) 
These  splenetic  outbursts  against  the  potentially  heretical  exercise  of  human  reason 
anticipate  Hoccleve's  diatribe  against  heresy  in  one  of  his  more  directly  political 
poems,  To  Sir  John  Oldcastle  (1414).  For  the  beggar,  as  for  the  Hoccleve  of 
Oldcastle,  insanity  is  associated  with  the  presumption  and  error  of  heresy.  This 
vitriolic  use  of  the  language  of  insanity  is  strikingly  different  from  Hoccleve's  own 
pathetic  first-person  account  of  his  madness  at  the  beginning  of  the  poem.  The 
Regement  prologue  reminds  us,  then,  of  the  diverse  significances  of  madness. 
Hoccleve  goes  on  to  discuss  the  causes  of  his  melancholia  in 
autobiographical  terms.  He  describes  in  detail  the  nature  and  duration  of  his 
arduous  work  at  the  the  Privy  Seal  office  (801-805)  and  gives  particulars,  as  in  the 
Male  Regle,  of  his  dire  financial  circumstances  (820-840).  Thus  he  illustrates  his 
statement  in  the  Male  Regle  that  'poore  purs  and  peynes  stronge'  have  caused  him 
to  'raue'  (395-396).  Hoccleve  characteristically  turns  from  these  personal  musings 
to  reflect  on  the  proper  behaviour  for  nobles  and  knights  (862-924).  But  he  cannot 
desist  from  talking  about  his  own  circumstances  for  long.  The  impoverished  state 199 
of  England's  soldiery  reminds  him  that  he  himself  may  soon  suffer  want;  and  he 
gives  futher  details  of  his  personal  finances  (932-935).  He  tells  of  the  physical 
hardships  and  mental  stresses  of  life  as  a  clerk  (988-1029).  His  complaint  that 
writing  spoils  the  eyes  carries  special  autobiographical  weight  since  Hoccleve 
complains  of  impaired  vision  in  To  the  Duke  of  Bedford  and  admits  in  the  Balade 
to  the  Duke  of  York  that  he  is  too  proud  to  wear  spectacles.  The  impression  created 
by  this  accumulation  of  details  is  of  an  anguished  and  self-conscious  man,  a 
characterization  which  Hoccleve  develops  considerably  in  his  later  works. 
The  poet  and  the  beggar  represent  two  distinct  attitudes  towards  madness, 
the  first  positive,  the  second  condemnatory.  At  one  level,  these  attitudes 
correspond  to  Hoccleve's  moral  dilemma:  the  tension  which  remains  at  the  end  of 
the  prologue  is,  as  Penelope  Doob  says,  between  'the  Christian  injunction  to  be 
mad  to  the  world  and  the  secular  desire  for  prosperity  which  entails  the  madness  of 
sin.  [...  ]  It  is  this  tension  which  may  indeed  have  driven  Hoccleve  mad  a  few 
years  after  writing  the  Regement'.  47  This  is  no  doubt  true;  yet  in  reducing 
Hoccleve's  dilemma  to  Christian  terms  we  should  not  forget  the  secular  pathos  of 
Hoccleve's  description  of  his  madness  or  the  specific  economic  and  physical 
pressures  which  underlie  it. 
Hoccleve's  final  work  is  the  string  of  poems  now  known  collectively  as  the 
Series  (1422),  which  comprises  a  prologue  to  the  Complaint,  the  Complaint  itself, 
the  Dialogue  with  a  Friend,  Lerne  to  Die,  The  Tale  of  Jereslaus's  Wife  and  The 
Tale  of  Jonathas.  The  first  three  parts  of  this  sequence,  in  particular,  are 
concerned  with  what  A.  G.  Rigg  has  called  the  'social  consequences  of 
madness'.  48  Four  centuries  after  Hoccleve's  death,  Lord  Shaftesbury  remarked: 
What  an  awful  condition  that  of  a  lunatic!  His  words  are  generally 
disbelieved,  and  his  most  innocent  particularities  perverted;  it  is 
natural  that  it  should  be  so;  and  we  place  ourselves  on  guard  --  that 
is,  give  to  every  word,  look,  gesture  a  value  and  meaning  which 200 
oftentimes  it  cannot  bear,  and  which  it  would  not  bear  in  ordinary 
life.  49 
Such  public  hypersensitivity  to  madness  and  its  effect  on  the  madman  were  quite 
familiar  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Indeed,  these  are  the  subjects  of  Hoccleve's 
Complaint. 
The  Complaint  prologue  is  remarkably  similar  to  that  of  the  Regement. 
Again,  Hoccleve  laments  his  melancholic  state: 
and  in  the  ende  of  novembar,  vpon  a  nyght, 
syghenge  sore  as  I  in  my  bed  lay, 
for  this  and  othar  thowghts  whiche  many  a  day 
before  I  toke,  sleape  cam  none  in  myne  eye, 
so  vexyd  me  the  thowghtfull  maladye. 
I  see  well,  sythen  I  with  sycknes  last 
was  scourged,  clowdy  hath  bene  the  favoure 
that  shone  [on]  me  full  bright  in  tymes  past; 
the  sonne  abatid  and  the  derke  showre 
hildyd  downe  right  on  me  and  in  langour 
he  made  [me]  swyme,  so  that  my  wite 
to  lyve  no  lust  hadd,  ne  [no]  delyte. 
The  grefe  abowte  my  harte  so  [sore]  swal 
and  bolned  evar  to  and  to  so  sore, 
that  nedes  out  I  must[e]  there-with-all; 
I  thowght  I  nolde  it  kepe  cloos  no  more, 
ne  lett  it  in  me  for  to  olde  and  hore; 
and  for  to  preve  I  cam  of  a  woman, 201 
I  brast  oute  on  the  morowe  and  thus  began.  (17-34) 
The  final  stanza  indicates  that  Hoccleve's  immediate  purpose  in  writing  his 
Complaint  is  to  exorcize  his  madness.  Madness,  we  have  already  said,  was  a 
source  of  poetic  inspiration  for  classical  and  Renaissance  poets.  Although  this 
particular  relationship  between  madness  and  authorship  was  unknown  in  the 
Middle  Ages,  Hoccleve  nevertheless  presents  his  insanity  as  his  reason  for  writing. 
Indeed,  as  Julia  Kristeva  writes,  'for  those  who  are  racked  with  melancholia, 
writing  about  it  would  have  meaning  only  if  writing  sprang  out  of  that  very 
melancholia'.  50 
Hoccleve  begins  the  Complaint  itself  by  relating  an  apparently  genuine 
experience  of  madness: 
Allmyghty  god  as  lykethe  his  goodnes, 
visytethe  folks  alday  as  men  may se, 
with  lose  of  good  and  bodily  sikenese, 
and  amonge  othar  he  forgat  not  me; 
witnes  vppon  the  wyld  infirmytie 
which  that  I  had,  as  many  a  man  well  knewe, 
and  whiche  me  out  of  my  seife  cast  and  threw.  (36-42) 
Hoccleve  clearly  states  that  his  madness  was  divinely  ordained.  But  it  could  be 
argued  that  the  focus  of  the  Complaint  is  on  the  social  and  psychological,  rather 
than  the  moral  dynamics  of  Hoccleve's  madness.  Certainly,  the  phrases  'as  men 
may  se'  and  'as  many  a  man  well  knewe'  foreshadow  Hoccleve's  almost  paranoid 
concern  throughout  the  Complaint  with  other  people's  responses  to  his  madness. 
The  following  stanza,  moreover,  describes  the  reactions  of  Hoccleve's  friends  to 
his  insanity.  His  affliction  was  well-known  and  became  the  talk  of  the  town  -- 
'how  it  with  me  stode  was  in  every  mans  mowthe'  --  and  his  friends  undertook 202 
pilgrimages  for  his  cure  (46-49).  Thankfully,  continues  Hoccleve,  God  restored 
his  memory  five  years  ago,  a  detail  that  is  consistent  with  the  documentary 
evidence  for  the  poet's  incapacity  and  recovery. 
Despite  Hoccleve's  assurances,  the  poet's  friends  are  not  convinced  that 
Hoccleve  is fully  recovered  from  his  insanity: 
for  thowgh  that  my  wit  were  hoom  come  again, 
men  wolde  it  not  so  vnderstond  or  take; 
with  me  to  deale  hadden  they  dysdayne; 
a  ryotows  person  I  was  and  forsake; 
myn  olde  ffrindshipe  was  all  ovarshake; 
no  wyte  withe  me  lyst  make  daliance; 
the  worlde  me  made  a  straunge  continance.  (64-70) 
Hoccleve's  obsessive  repetition  of  the  word  'continance',  which  occurs  no  fewer 
than  six  times  in  the  Complaint,  indicates  a  heightened  self-consciousness.  The 
poet's  Westminster  colleagues  react  to  him  with  suspicion,  shying  away  from  him, 
'as  they  not  me  sye'  (77)  or  simply  fleeing  from  him:  'they  that  me  sye  fledden 
a-wey  fro  me'  (79).  51  Feelings  of  shame  and  embarrassment,  of  course,  figure 
prominently  in  many  medieval  cases  of  madness.  For  Hoccleve,  the  taint  of 
insanity  is  a  private  torment  as  well  as  a  public  disgrace. 
Hoccleve  now  relates  his  friends'  reports  of  his  behaviour  during  his 
insanity.  These  testimonies  are  extremely  conventional,  in  both  literary  and 
medical  terms.  Hoccleve's  observers  compared  him  to  an  ox,  a  buck  and  a  deer, 
images  which,  as  John  Burrow  points  out,  'suggest  Hoccleve's  degradation  (like 
Nebuchadnezzar)  to  a  bestial  state'.  52  Hoccleve's  eyes,  these  friends  observed, 
'sowghten  every  halke'  (133),  a  phrase  which  recalls  Bartholomeus  Anglicus's 
description  of  the  madman's  'meuynge  and  castinge  about  the  y3en'.  53  During  his 
insanity  Hoccleve  also  ran  about  'here  and  there',  another  traditional  indication  of 203 
insanity.  Such  symptoms  were,  of  course,  handed  down  from  classical  writers  and 
codified  in  medieval  medical  works.  It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  Hoccleve 
was  not  really  insane  or  that  his  friends'  reports  were  not  based  on  observation. 
During  the  fifteenth  century  'works  in  the  vernacular  on  medicine  and  surgery  of 
every  description  were  in  circulation  in  some  numbers';  the  ideas  contained  within 
them  may  well  have  influenced  Hoccleve's  contemporaries.  54  As  Bennett  Simon 
remarks  in  his  study  of  madness  in  ancient  Greece,  'there  is  a  good  deal  of 
evidence,  both  cross  cultural  and  historical,  that  culturally  defined  categories  shape 
both  the  patient's  vision  of  his  inner  experience  and  others'  reports  of  his 
behavior'  , 
55 
As  well  as  describing  the  poet's  conduct  while  insane,  Hoccleve's  friends 
offer  their  prognoses  of  his  condition.  They  say  that  madness  endures  and  that 
even  if  Hoccleve  is  temporarily  recovered,  a  relapse  is  inevitable  given  his  age.  As 
Penelope  Doob  notes,  these  are  both  medical  conventions.  56  The  latter  prediction, 
however,  also  has  a  ring  of  plausibility:  Hoccleve  was  fifty-three  years  old  when 
he  wrote  the  Complaint,  a  ripe  age  by  medieval  standards.  Finally,  the  friends 
opine,  again  conventionally,  that  the  arrival  of  the  hot  weather  will  precipitate 
another  bout  of  madness  (92-93).  It  may  be  that  Hoccleve  added  or  embellished 
some  of  these  details  in  order  to  inspire  sympathy.  Whatever  the  case,  Hoccleve 
presents  the  interpretation  of  his  madness  as  the  central  problem  in  his  struggle  for 
identity.  A  principal  question  raised  by  the  Complaint  is  one  which  has  been,  and 
continues  to  be,  vigorously  disputed  in  the  twentieth  century:  who  has  the 
authority  to  identify  madness? 
Whatever  the  status  of  his  friends'  gloomy  clinical  forecasts,  Hoccleve 
points  out  that  they  were  proved  wrong:  'thanked  be  god',  says  the  relieved  poet, 
'it  shoop  nought  as  they  seide'  (98).  As  if  to  discredit  further  his  friends'  medical 
speculations,  he  spends  the  next  three  stanzas  explaining  the  cause  of  his  quondam 
madness  as  he  understands  it,  in  Christian  terms.  'It  is  a  lew[e]dnesse',  he  warns, 
to  pretend  to  know  what  will  happen  in  the  future  (101-105).  Sickness,  he  reminds 204 
us,  is  sent  by  God;  therefore  only  He  can  predict  the  onset  of  disease.  But  this 
reflection  ends  with  characteristic  abruptness  --  'To  my  mater  streit  wol  I  me 
dresse'  (119)  --  and  we  are  returned  in  the  next  stanza  to  the  things  'men  seyden' 
about  Hoccleve's  illness  (120).  Through  such  shifts  of  perspective  our  attention  is 
directed  to  the  controversial  nature  of  explanations  of  madness.  Hoccleve  counters 
his  friends'  purely  physiological  theories  about  his  insanity  with  his  own 
supernatural  explanation.  We  are  reminded  here  of  the  diverse  theories  about  the 
probable  causes  and  outcomes  of  madness  in  the  cases  of  Charles  VI  of  France  and 
the  painter  Hugo  van  der  Goes,  whose  temporary  madness  was  considered  a 
natural  disease  by  some  and  a  divine  chastisement  by  others. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  despite  all  the  speculation  about  Hoccleve's 
madness,  demonic  possession  is  not  once  suggested  as  a  cause  of  it,  a  fact  that 
must  confound  the  many  psychiatric  historians  who  continue  to  regard  possession 
as  the  cornerstone  of  medieval  approaches  to  madness.  Moreover,  despite  their 
avoidance  of  him,  Hoccleve's  friends  are  sympathetic  towards  the  man  they 
believe  to  be  mad.  Their  responses  parallel  courtly  responses  to  the  insane  knights 
of  the  romances,  showing  that  a  compassionate  attitude  towards  insanity  was 
possible  long  before  the  sentimental  fiction  of  the  post-romantic  period: 
but  some  dele  had  I  reioysynge  amonge, 
and  gladnese  also  in  my  spirit, 
that  thowghe  the  people  toke  hem  mis  &  wronge, 
me  demynge  of  my  syck[e]nesse  not  quite, 
yet  for  they  compleyned  the  hevy  plit 
that  they  had  sene  me  in  with  tendernesse 
of  hertes  cherte,  my  grefe  was  the  lesse.  (281-287) 
This  lessens  Hoccleve's  discomfort  and  goes  some  way  towards  dispelling  the 
widespread  view  that  the  medieval  insane  were  regarded  only  with  disgust.  But 205 
however  well-intentioned  Hoccleve's  friends  may  be,  their  gossip  has  profoundly 
humiliating  effects  of  the  self-conscious  man.  In  fact,  Hoccleve's  public  behaviour 
is  consistent  with  what  might  now  be  called  a  phobic  disorder  or  agoraphobia  with 
distinct  features  of  paranoia: 
My  sprites  laboryd  [euere]  bysyly 
to  peinte  countinaunce  chere  and  loke, 
for  that  men  spake  of  me  so  wonderingly, 
and  for  the  very  shame  and  fere  I  qwoke; 
thowghe  myne  herte  had  be  dypped  in  the  broke, 
It  wete  and  moyste  I-now  was  of  my  swot, 
whiche  was  nowe  frostye  colde,  now  firy  hoot.  (148-154) 
Hoccleve's  fluctuating  physical  sensations  recall  the  tortured  Boethian  meditation 
on  instability  with  which  the  Complaint  began.  The  poet's  shame, 
self-consciousness  and  anxiety  at  this  point  are  far  greater  than  Michel  Foucault's 
history  of  madness  might  lead  us  to  expect  in  a  medieval  text. 
Indeed,  Hoccleve's  is  not,  to  recall  Foucault's  phrase,  an  'easy  wandering 
existence'.  The  poet  begins  to  eschew  company  for  fear  of  uttering  some  solecism 
which  might  convict  him  of  insanity  (134-140).  His  madness  is  not  simply  a 
spectacular  or  visible  phenomenon,  but  a  lurking  menace  which  is  at  any  moment 
liable  to  betray  its  presence.  To  avoid  this  danger,  Hoccleve  retreats  from  public 
view  altogether  into  the  privacy  of  his  home.  It  has  already  been  seen  that  the 
insane  in  the  late  Middle  Ages  were  generally  cared  for  by  friends  or  relatives; 
Furnivall's  conjecture  that  Hoccleve  was  tended  during  his  illness  by  his  wife  is 
therefore  plausible,  albeit  unsubstantiated.  57  But  Hoccleve's  isolation  from  daily 
life  has  deleterious  effects  on  his  state  of  mind.  His  self-imposed  exile  ominously 
recalls  the  beggar's  warning  to  Hoccleve  in  the  prologue  to  the  Regement: 206 
O  ping  seye  I,  if  you  go  feerlees 
Al  solytarie,  &  counsel  lakke,  &  rede, 
As  me  pinkep,  pi  gyse  is  doutelees, 
Pou  likly  art  to  bere  a  dotyd  heed. 
Whil  you  art  soule,  poght  is  wastyng  seed, 
Swich  in  be,  &  bat  in  grete  foysoun, 
And  you  redeles,  nat  cant  voyde  his  poysoun.  (197-203) 
Indeed,  Hoccleve  is  once  again  assailed  by  'besy  J  oght'.  Moreover,  as  James 
Simpson  writes  of  Hoccleve's  home,  'paradoxically,  this  place  of  privacy  is 
registered  as  being  no  defence  against  public  scrutiny'.  58  In  fact,  Hoccleve's 
self-consciousness  is  felt  most  acutely  at  exactly  this  point  in  the  poem,  in  the 
extraordinary  'mirror  scene'. 
The  melancholic  heroes  of  romance  are  given  to  self-reflection  in  mirrors 
and  wells,  gaining  insight  into  their  identities  from  their  external  appearances.  In 
the  Complaint,  Hoccleve  describes  a  rather  different  sort  of  mirror  gazing.  Here 
the  poet  practices  looking  sane  before  his  'glas'  and  once  again  determines  to 
correct  any  irregularities  he  might  detect: 
And  in  my  chamber  at  home  when  I  was 
my  seife  alone  I  in  this  wyse  wrowght: 
I  streite  vnto  my  myrrowr  and  my  glas, 
to  loke  how  that  me  of  my  chere  thowght[e], 
yf  any  [other]  were  it  than  it  owght[e]; 
for  fayne  wolde  I  yf  it  had  not  be  right, 
amendyd  it  to  my  kunynge  and  myght. 
Many  a  sawte  made  I  to  this  myrrowre, 
thinkynge,  'yf  that  I  loke  in  this  manere 207 
amonge  folke  as  I  now  do,  none  errowr 
of  suspecte  loke  may  in  my  face  appere, 
this  countinance,  I  am svre,  and  this  chere, 
If  I  forth  vse,  is  no  thinge  reprevable 
to  them  that  have  conseytes  resonable.  '  (155-168) 
Initially,  then,  Hoccleve  is  satisfied  that  his  face  betrays  no  marks  of  insanity,  at 
least  to  those  who  have  'conseytes  resonable',  or  'reliable  perceptions'. 
But  of  course,  this  comfortable  conclusion  presupposes  the  reliability  of  his 
own  perceptions,  a  fact  which  Hoccleve  suddenly  realizes  with  a  characteristic 
volte-face.  He  now  perceives  the  folly  of  regarding  himself  as  entirely  other,  of 
failing  to  take  into  account  his  subjectivity.  What  if,  he  begins  to  wonder,  he  is 
unable  to  perceive  his  real  state  after  all? 
And  there-with-all  I  thowght[e]  thus  anon: 
'men  in  theyr  owne  case  bene  blynd  alday, 
as  I  haue  hard  say  many  a  day  agon, 
and  in  that  [same]  plyght  I  stonde  may; 
how  shall  I  doo  which  is  the  best[e]  way, 
my  trowbled  spirit  for  to  bringe  at  rest[e]? 
yf  I  wist  howe,  fayne  wolde  I  do  the  best[e].  '  (169-175) 
The  implication  of  this  is  that  Hoccleve's  own  senses  may  be  untrustworthy.  In  the 
Middle  Ages  and  Renaissance,  of  course,  sight  was  often  considered  to  be  the 
sense  most  prone  to  error.  59  But  given  the  context  of  Hoccleve's  doubt,  we  may 
infer  that  Hoccleve  attributes  the  unreliability  of  his  perceptions  to  the  possibility 
of  his  enduring  madness.  Perhaps  his  apparent  sanity,  he  thinks,  is  merely  an 
insane  delusion.  Once  this  suspicion  has  entered  his  mind,  his  attempt  to  see 
himself  as  others  see  him  is  doomed.  Hoccleve  had  begun  his  self-scrutiny  in  the 208 
hope  that  his  mirror  image  would  return  to  him  an  unmediated  reflection  of  his 
true  condition  and  therefore  vouchsafe  his  sanity.  The  awful  realisation  of  the 
fallibility  of  his  perceptions,  however,  undermines  any  such  confidence. 
The  mirror  scene  has  important  implications  for  anyone  interested  in  the 
histories  of  madness  and  subjectivities.  In  particular,  it  shows  that  madness,  far 
from  being  spectacular  or  visible,  could  be  seen  in  the  Middle  Ages  as  a  hidden 
and  subjective  affliction.  Hoccleve's  presentation  of  madness  in  the  Complaint  is 
certainly  difficult  to  reconcile  with  certain  widespread  ideas  about  the  medieval 
view  of  insanity  and  the  psychology  of  medieval  people.  Chief  among  these, 
perhaps,  is  the  view  that  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages  was  always  conceived  as  a 
spectacle.  Michel  Foucault,  for  example,  says  that  madmen  were  then  regarded  as 
'monsters  --  that  is,  etymologically,  beings  or  things  to  be  shown'.  60  Roy  Porter 
takes  this  point  much  further.  In  the  Middle  Ages  and  Renaissance,  he  argues,  'it 
was  the  essence  of  madness  to  be  visible,  and  known  by  its  appearance'.  61  Before 
the  nineteenth  century,  men  'trusted  to  Nature's  legibility';  'outward  signs', 
continues  Porter,  'encoded  inner  realities.  Hence  madness  gave  itself  away'.  62 
According  to  the  literary  critic  Duncan  Salkeld,  madmen,  until  at  least  the  time  of 
Descartes,  'presented  a  spectacular  physical  image,  and  bore  their  illness  in  the 
flesh  and  matter  of  their  bodies'.  63 
It  has  already  be  shown  that  in  medical  texts  madness  was  regarded 
principally,  although  not  exclusively,  as  a  somatic  affliction,  the  result  of  a 
malfunctioning  of  one  of  the  ventricles  of  the  brain  or  an  imbalance  of  the 
humours.  The  symptoms  of  madness  were  easily  detectable.  The  maniac  screamed 
and  tore  both  his  flesh  and  his  clothes;  the  melancholic  had  a  surplus  of  black  bile 
and  was  therefore  recognisable  by  his  swarthy  complexion.  In  short,  a  man's 
mental  and  physical  condition  were  discernible  at  a  single  glance.  As  Roy  Porter 
says,  it  was  only  in  the  wake  of  Cartesian  dualism  that  physicians  started  to  think 
seriously  about  madness  as  a  disorder  of  the  mind  rather  than  the  body.  In 
England,  he  argues,  it  was  not  until  the  publication  of  Locke's  Essay.  on  Human 209 
Understanding  (1690)  that  the  concept  of  madness  as  a  purely  mental  affliction 
began  to  gain  anything  like  widespread  academic  respectability. 
64  In  the  early 
nineteenth  century,  mentalistic  explanations  of  madness  --  although  highly 
contentious  --  gained  increasing  popularity.  65  By  the  time  of  Freud,  of  course, 
madness  had  become  the  'enemy  within',  whose  secret  workings  could  be  brought 
to  light  and  analyzed  only  through  the  specialized  skill  of  the  psychiatrist. 
Historians  of  psychiatry,  then,  have  charted  a  gradual  shift  from  the 
medieval  understanding  of  madness  as  a  spectacular  disease  to  the  modern 
interiorization  of  madness.  Michel  Foucault,  for  example,  talks  of  the 
'psychologization'  of  madness  in  the  nineteenth  century,  when  madness  became 
'inscribed  within  the  dimension  of  interiority'.  66  Art  historians  have  noted  the 
same  historical  trend.  In  an  article  on  the  early  nineteenth-century  painter 
Gericault,  for  example,  Margaret  Miller  discusses  how  shifting  paradigms  of 
mental  illness  affected  artistic  representations  of  the  insane.  Before  the  nineteenth 
century,  says  Miller,  the  madman  in  art  was  often  represented  in  terms  of  demonic 
possession  or  witchcraft  and  was  identified  by  his  spectacular  appearance  or 
behaviour.  In  his  portraits  of  the  mentally  ill,  however,  Gericault 
interprets  insanity  not  in  terms  of  behaviour,  but  as  a  state  of  mind. 
[...  ]  Hidden  in  the  "likeness,  "  in  the  colour  of  the  skin,  the  eyes, 
the  veins,  are  the  pathological  "emblems"  of  their  malady  which  are 
only  there  for  the  psychiatrist  to  read.  67 
For  Miller,  the  demonic  representation  of  the  mad  in  medieval  art  obliterated  their 
individual  features;  Gericault's  paintings  of  madmen,  however,  established  the 
insane  as  'understandable  individuals',  an  achievement  which  was  dependent  less 
on  the  painter's  individual  insight  than  on  what  Miller  calls  'the  conceptions  of  his 
time'.  68  Miller's  comments  about  the  artistic  representation  of  madness  in  history 
are  consistent  with  many  historian's  and  critic's  pronouncements  on  medieval 210 
madness.  The  Complaint  shows  that  these  ideas  constitute  a  caricature  of  medieval 
depictions  of  madness  which  cannot  be  applied  to  all  works  of  medieval  literature. 
As  the  treatment  of  the  carpenter  in  the  Miller's  Tale  suggests,  madness  in 
literature  is  often  spectacular.  In  the  romances,  for  example,  madness  is  instantly 
identifiable  by  appearance.  Medieval  drama  offers  an  even  more  blatant  example 
of  the  spectacular  medieval  madman  in  the  figure  of  Herod,  whose  raving  madness 
and  eventual  death  constitute  a  spectacular  warning  to  shun  the  sin  of  pride.  The 
stage  directions  for  the  Coventry  Pageant  of  Shearmen  and  Taylors  even  require 
Herod  to  rant  in  the  streets  as  well  as  on  stage.  69 
In  the  Complaint,  however,  the  identification  of  madness  is  more 
problematic,  as  Hoccleve  continually  draws  attention  to  the  discrepancy  between 
inner,  subjective  impressions  and  outer  appearances.  As  Hoccleve's  Letter  of 
Cupid  (1402),  a  translation  of  Christine  de  Pisan's  Epistre  Au  Dieu  D'Amours,  has 
it: 
fful  herd  yt  is  to  know  a  manys  hert; 
for  outwarde  may no  man  the  trouthe  deme;  (36-37) 
In  fact,  the  madman's  interiority  is  stressed  in  all  of  the  major  poems.  Throughout 
the  Male  Regle,  the  Regement  of  Princes  and  the  Complaint,  the  madman  is 
presented  not  so  much  as  a  stock  figure  or  a  featureless  demoniac  as  a  unique 
human  subject.  In  this  way  these  poems  highlight  the  discrepancy  between  artistic 
stereotypes  and  everyday  experiences  of  madness. 
Hoccleve's  sense  of  a  disjunction  between  inner  and  outer  is  made  explicit 
in  a  sententious  admonition  later  in  the  Complaint: 
Vpon  a  looke  is  harde,  men  them  to  grownde 
what  a  man  is  there-by  the  sothe  is  hid; 
whither  his  wittes  seke  bene  or  sounde, 211 
by  cowntynaunce  it  is  not  wist  ne  kyd.  (211-214) 
The  only  reliable  method  of  discovering  the  truth  about  a  man's  mental  condition, 
says  Hoccleve,  is  by  conversing  or  'comunynge'  with  him  (217),  a  conclusion  that 
might  be  endorsed  by  a  modern  psychiatrist.  Far  from  being  spectacular,  madness 
is  seen  by  Hoccleve  as  a  secret,  hidden  affliction. 
The  point  is  reinforced  a  little  later  in  the  Complaint  when  Hoccleve  writes 
angrily: 
Now  let  this  passe  god  wott,  many  a  man 
semythe  full  wise  by  cowntenaunce  and  chere, 
whiche,  and  he  tastyd  were  what  he  can, 
men  myghten  licken  hym  to  a  fooles  pere; 
and  some  man  lokethe  in  foltyshe  maner[e] 
as  to  the  outward  dome  and  ludgement, 
that  at  the  prese  descrete  is  and  prudent.  (239-245) 
The  wordplay  on  'taste'  here  indicates  that  'pere'  is  also  to  be  understood  as  a 
pun.  Since  pears,  as  Burrow  says,  'often  seem  good  when  they  are  rotten',  the 
image  cleverly  suggests  the  discrepancy  between  appearances  and  reality.  70  'God 
wott',  meanwhile,  is  not  merely  a  simple  expression  of  exasperation  or  a  metrical 
filler:  it  reinforces  Hoccleve's  insistence  throughout  the  Complaint  that  only  God 
can  tell  the  mad  from  the  sane.  For  man,  on  the  other  hand,  madness  is  inherently 
subjective  and  undetectable.  71 
This  conclusion  has  implications  for  cultural,  as  well  as  psychiatric  history. 
Many  historians  are  still  reluctant  to  accept  the  existence  of  expressions  and 
experiences  of  subjectivity  in  medieval  literature.  In  his  controversial  book  The 
Tremulous  Private  Body,  Francis  Barker  argues  that  experiences  of  inwardness  or 
interiority  were  simply  not  possible  in  the  Middle  Ages.  'Pre-bourgeois 212 
subjection',  writes  Barker,  'does  not  properly  involve  subjectivity  at  all,  but  a 
condition  of  dependent  membership  in  which  place  and  articulation  are  defined  not 
by  an  interiorised  self-recognition  [...  ]  but  by  incorporation  in  the  body  politic'. 
72 
For  Barker,  any  talk  about  the  inwardness  of  medieval  people  would  be 
inappropriate.  As  David  Aers  exasperatedly  notes,  interest  in  medieval 
subjectivities  has  often  been  dismissed  as  a  sign  of  'one's  benighted  "humanism", 
one's  incorrigible  "anachronism"'.  Yet  this  position  has  no  historical  foundation. 
'There  is  no  reason',  continues  Aers,  'to  think  that  languages  and  experiences  of 
inwardness,  of  interiority,  of  divided  selves,  of  splits  between  outer  realities  and 
inner  forms  of  being,  were  unknown  before  the  seventeenth  century,  before 
capitalism,  before  the  "bourgeoisie",  before  Descartes'.  73 
Many  medievalists  nevertheless  remain  unwilling  to  acknowledge 
expressions  of  subjectivity  in  literature.  In  his  study  of  the  psychology  of 
late-medieval  writers,  Stephen  Medcalf  argues  that  medieval  people  perceived  no 
significant  difference  between  reality  and  their  interpretations  of  it.  In  his 
discussion  of  Hoccleve's  poetry,  Medcalf  notes  that  'body  is  close  to  spirit:  this 
world  to  the  supernatural:  appearance  is  straightforwardly  related,  in  truth  and 
falsehood,  to  reality'.  The  medieval  world,  as  he  memorably  puts  it,  'was  more 
single'.  74  Medieval  philosophers,  he  explains  elsewhere,  were  'less  bothered  than 
later  philosophers  by  any  gap  between  subjectivity  and  the  external  world'; 
consequently,  for  literary  authors,  'the  division  between  inner  and  outer  does  not 
run  deep'.  75  Pre-modern  perception,  Medcalf  argues,  was  based  on  Aristotelian 
principles  which  permitted  no  distinction  between  the  knower  and  the  known.  'In 
Aristotelian  theory',  he  writes, 
what  men  perceive  is  an  actual  aspect  of  the  thing  perceived,  not 
any  interpretation  or  decoding  of  impressions  received  from  it.  [...  ] 
It  was  not  until  toward  Descartes'  time  that  ancient  sceptical  doubts 213 
were  raised  again  about  whether  our  perceptions  correspond  to 
external  reality.  76 
While  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  such  doubts  became  keener  in  the  seventeenth 
century,  they  are  already  apparent  in  Hoccleve's  Complaint;  in  fact,  the  mirror 
scene  foreshadows  Descartes's  philosophical  concern  with  madness  in  the 
Meditations  in  a  number  of  ways. 
First,  Hoccleve  anticipates  Descartes's  double  awareness  of  himself  as  both 
subject  and  object,  observer  and  observed.  Also  like  Descartes,  although  for  very 
different  reasons,  Hoccleve  entertains  the  idea  that  his  perception  of  reality  might 
be  distorted  by  madness.  77  In  the  latter  respect  Hoccleve  goes  even  further  than 
the  philosopher.  For  Descartes  madness  strikes  first  of  all  the  foundation  of 
knowledge,  the  senses;  but  rather  than  pursue  the  possibility  of  his  insanity, 
Descartes  simply  excludes  it  by  fiat.  'These  are  madmen',  he  writes  of  the 
melancholics  who  believe  their  bodies  to  be  made  of  glass,  'and  I  would  hardly  be 
less  extravagant  if  I  were  to  follow  their  example'.  78  As  Harry  Frankfurt 
comments,  Descartes 
simply  dismisses  the  possibility  of  his  madness  with  the  remark  that 
it  would  not  be  reasonable  to  entertain  it.  [...  ]  The  fact  that  error 
may  arise  out  of  madness  suggests  that  he  should  be  suspicious  of 
all  his  opinions  until  he  can  establish  that  he  is  not  insane.  He  does 
not,  however,  attempt  to  establish  his  sanity,  or  even  to  establish  a 
procedure  for  doing  so.  79 
Hoccleve's  apparently  objective  procedure  for  establishing  his  sanity  --  and 
its  predictably  subjective  result  --  points  forward  to  Renaissance  imagery.  In  his 
discussion  of  the  iconography  of  madness  at  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages,  Michel 
Foucault  writes: 214 
The  symbol  of  madness  will  henceforth  be  the  mirror  which, 
without  reflecting  anything  real,  will  secretly  offer  the  man  who 
observes  himself  in  it  the  dream  of  his  own  presumption.  Madness 
deals  not  so  much  with  truth  and  the  world,  as  with  man  and 
whatever  truth  about  himself  he  is  able  to  perceive.  80 
This  experience  of  madness  is  encapsulated  in  one  of  Holbein's  illustrations  for 
Erasmus's  Praise  of  Folly,  in  which  a  man  observes  his  mirror-image  sticking  out 
its  tongue  at  him,  ridiculing  his  vanity.  81  Hoccleve's  search  for  truth  in  the  mirror 
results  in  a  similar  sort  of  self-mockery,  as  the  poet  loses  all  grounds  for  certainty. 
Hoccleve's  text  illustrates  perfectly  Max  Pensky's  perceptive  statement  that 
'melancholia  is  a  discourse  about  the  necessity  and  impossibility  of  the  discovery 
and  possession  of  "objective"  meaning  by  the  subjective  investigator'.  82 
Like  Descartes  after  him,  Hoccleve  takes  refuge  in  dogma  rather  than 
pursue  his  insights  so  far  as  to  threaten  a  relapse  of  madness  or  to  achieve  a  truly 
modern  existential  awareness  of  self.  The  only  bearable  option  open  to  him  now  is 
to  abandon  his  'busy'  investigation  into  his  mental  condition  and  return  to  the 
security  of  faith.  Stephan  Kohl  remarks  of  the  mirror  experiment  that  'if  ever  there 
was  a  program  of  self-education  not  rooted  in  ethical  maxims,  then  this  is  one'.  83 
As  the  Series  progresses  it  becomes  clear  that  only  an  act  of  faith  --  a  commitment 
to  'ethical  maxims'  --  can  deliver  Hoccleve  from  solipsism  into  truth. 
Hoccleve's  alternating  thoughts  as  he  gazes  into  his  mirror  suggest  the  sorts 
of  pathological  self-consciousness  described  in  R.  D.  Laing's  seminal  book  The 
Divided  Self.  'The  schizoid  individual',  writes  Laing,  'is  frequently  tormented  by 
the  compulsive  nature  of  his  own  processes,  and  also  by  the  equally  compulsive 
nature  of  his  sense  of  his  body  as  an  object  in  the  world  of  others'.  84  For 
Hoccleve,  such  fears  are  renewed  in  a  public  setting  when  he  returns  one  day  from 
Westminster,  'vexid  full  grevously  withe  thowghtfull  hete'  (184).  This  association 215 
between  mental  torment  and  body  temperature  recalls  the  disturbing  alternations  in 
Hoccleve's  physical  state  between  'frostye  colde'  and  'firy  hoot'  in  the  earlier 
street  scene. 
There  are  also  echoes  of  the  poet's  mental  vacillation  before  his  mirror. 
Hoccleve  now  reflects  dejectedly  that  he  is  a  'great  fole'  to  show  himself  in  public 
when  he  stands  'out  of  all  favour  and  grace'  (189).  But  this  thought  is  immediately 
followed  another  consideration,  namely,  that  to  remain  indoors  would  only  fuel 
gossip: 
And  then  thowght  I  on  that  othar  syde: 
'If  that  I  not  be  sene  amonge  the  prees, 
men  deme  wele  that  I  myne  heade  hyde, 
and  am  werse  than  I  am  it  is  no  lees.  '  (190-193) 
Concern  about  the  opinions  of  others  now  gives  way  to  stubbornness  and 
frustration.  Hoccleve  cannot,  he  says,  prevent  people  from  speculating  about  his 
condition  - 
I  may  not  lette  a  man  to  ymagine 
ferre  above  the  mone,  yf  that  hym  lyst  (197-198) 
-  but  the  poet  will  not  heed  their  talk.  'Of  suche  ymaginynge  I  not  ne  reche',  he 
says  emphatically,  'for  evar  sythen  set  haue  I  the  lesse  /  by  the  peoples 
ymagination'  (307;  379-380).  In  the  dispute  over  his  sanity,  Hoccleve's  reiteration 
of  the  word  'ymagination'  is  a  significant  counter-tactic.  As  the  lord  in  Chaucer's 
Summoner's  Tale  asserts,  excess  of  imagination  implies  detachment  from  reality 
and  even  madness.  Thus  Hoccleve  not  only  attempts  to  escape  the  stigma  of 
insanity  but  turns  the  tables  on  the  rumour-mongers,  implying  that  the  truly 
deluded  are  those  who  think  him  still  mad. 216 
In  order  to  stress  the  temporary  nature  of  his  madness,  Hoccleve  invokes 
the  conventional  analogy  between  madness  and  drunkenness: 
If  a  man  ones  fall  in  dronkenesse, 
shall  he  contynewe  there-in  evar  mo? 
nay,  thowghe  a  man  doo  in  drinkynge  excesse 
so  ferforthe  that  not  speake  he  ne  can,  ne  go, 
and  his  wittes  welny  ben  reft  him  froo, 
and  buryed  in  the  Cuppe  he  aftarward 
Comythe  to  hym  seife  agayne,  ellis  were  it  hard. 
Right  so  thowghe  my  witt  were  a  pilgrime, 
and  went[e]  fer  fro  home  he  cam  agayne.  (225-233) 
Indeed,  by  the  end  of  the  Complaint  Hoccleve  apparently  sounds  a  new  note  of 
self-confidence: 
This  troubly  lyfe  hathe  all  to  longe  enduryd, 
not  have  I  wyst  how  in  my  skynne  to  turne; 
but  now  my  seife  to  my  seife  have  ensured, 
for  no  suche  wondrynge  aftar  this  to  morne.  (302-305) 
Moreover,  Hoccleve  now  appeals  to  the  conventional  figure  of  Reason  for 
consolation: 
This  othar  day  a  lamentacion 
of  a  wofull  man  in  a  boke  I  sye, 
to  whome  word[e]s  of  consolation 
Reason  gave  spekynge  effectually; 217 
and  well  easyd  myn  herte  was  ther-by; 
for  when  I  had  a  while  in  the  boke  red, 
with  the  speche  of  Reason  was  I  well  fed.  (309-315) 
As  Stephen  Medcalf  writes,  Hoccleve  'takes  refuge,  after  such  painful  and  surely 
personally  reminiscent  details  such  as  the  mirror,  in  a  convention  like  the  'wofull 
man'  consoled  by  Reason  whom  he  took  from  Isidore  of  Seville'.  85  By  the  end  of 
the  Complaint,  then,  Hoccleve  is  beginning  to  reject  autobiography  in  favour  of 
more  conventional  modes  of  expression.  Rather  than  relying  on  his  own  resources 
to  guarantee  his  sanity  as  he  does  in  the  mirror  episode,  Hoccleve  finally  seeks  the 
support  of  moral  authority. 
In  the  Dialogue  with  a  Friend,  however,  Hoccleve  is  still  ghoulishly 
self-conscious  about  public  opinion.  Here  he  returns,  'as  if  compelled'  to  the 
subject  of  his  supposed  insanity.  86  He  wishes  to  publish  his  Complaint,  against  his 
friend's  advice,  to  prove  that  he  is  not  ashamed  of  his  previous  'wildhede'  (52) 
and  to  give  praise  to  God  for  restoring  his  sanity  (80-84).  The  cathartic  value  of 
the  act  of  writing  in  the  prologue  to  the  Complaint  has  already  been  noted.  Now 
Hoccleve  determines  to  use  his  writing  to  prove  his  sanity  to  others.  In  his  study 
of  autobiographies  by  the  insane,  Roy  Porter  remarks  that  'for  people  judged 
insane  but  trying  to  prove  their  sanity,  the  very  act  of  putting  pen  to  paper, 
"composing"  a  testament,  was  clearly  significant  in  itself  --  evidence,  surely,  of 
"composure".  87  In  this  sense,  Hoccleve  stands  at  the  beginning  of  an  English 
tradition  of  unstable  writers  including  Carkesse,  Smart  and  Cowper,  who  'clearly 
resorted  to  authorship  to  maintain  their  sanity'.  88 
The  excessive  length  and  repetitiveness  of  the  Dialogue  suggest  the  poet's 
exasperation  at  having  to  prove  his  mental  stability.  Clearly,  Hoccleve's  aim  in  the 
Dialogue  is  to  reconcile  himself  with  his  friend  and  to  conform  to  his  expectations. 
But  the  Dialogue  may  also  be  read  as  a  sort  of  inner  drama.  Stephan  Kohl  regards 
the  friend  as  Hoccleve's  unconscious  mind.  89  Similarly,  Lillian  Feder  has 218 
suggested  that  the  friend  is  the  externalisation  of  a  'threat  within',  suggesting  that 
madness  is  a  'perennial  determinant  of  human  nature'.  90  But  the  extent  to  which 
Hoccleve's  dialogue  is  oriented  towards  social  reintegration  should  not  be 
underestimated:  Hoccleve's  lengthy  and  apparently  spurious  invective  against  the 
abominable  practice  of  coin-clipping  may  be  accounted  for  as  an  attempt  to  find 
more  respectable  poetic  material.  91 
In  the  following  section  of  the  Dialogue  the  friend  alleges  that  Hoccleve 
has  become  insane  again  due  to  overstudy  in  literary  matters  and  recommends  that 
Hoccleve  postpone  his  plans  to  write: 
Thy  bisy  Studie  aboute  swich  mateere 
Hath  causid  thee  to  stirte  in-to  the  plyt 
That  thow  were  in  as  fer  as  I  can  heere; 
And  thogh  thow  deeme  thow  be  there-of  qwyt 
Abyde  and  thy  purpos  putte  in  respyt 
Til  pat  right  wel  stablisshid  be  thy  brayn; 
And  ther-to  thanne  I  wole  assente  fayn.  (302-308) 
The  friend  represents  conspicuously  conventional  beliefs:  'thyng  of  thoghtful 
studie  kaght,  /  Perillous  is,  as  Pat  hath  me  been  taght'  (398-399,  my  italics).  This 
is  the  view  of  Ecclesiastes  --  'of  making  many  books  there  is  no  end;  and  much 
study  is  weariness  of  the  flesh'  (Ecclesiastes  12:  12)  --  and  of  Hoccleve's  master 
Chaucer  in  the  House  of  Fame  (29-30).  Indeed,  we  have  already  seen  that  negative 
attitudes  towards  scholarly  work  were  widespread  in  the  late  Middle  Ages;  the 
friend's  comments  therefore  have  behind  them  a  weight  of  tradition. 
Nevertheless,  Hoccleve  bravely  meets  the  repeated  charges  of  overstudy 
with  equally  solid  protestations  of  sanity.  As  if  to  emphasize  his  philosophical 
wisdom  he  quotes  Solomon  and  Cicero.  He  also  repeatedly  uses  the  words  'reson' 
and  'resonable'  to  describe  both  his  mental  state  and  his  literary  aspirations.  As 219 
Lillian  Feder  says,  'the  Reason  that  led  to  acceptance  of  the  very  experience  of 
madness  in  the  Complaint  is  now  the  inner  faculty  that  provides  confidence  in  his 
own  judgement'.  92 
Hoccleve's  recovery  from  madness,  then,  is  presented  as  an  inner 
transformation.  His  'fear  of  madness',  Feder  claims,  has  'yielded  to  his  individual 
observation  and  his  effort  to  rediscover  restorative  powers  within  his  being'.  93 
This  comment  is  consistent  with  the  trend  in  liberal  literary  criticism  which  sees 
Hoccleve  as  a  bold  pioneer  of  individualism.  It  also  brings  Hoccleve's  cure  into 
line  with  certain  contemporary  liberal  ideas  about  psychiatric  healing,  according  to 
which,  as  Roger  Scruton  sceptically  observes,  'not  only  the  process  of  recovery, 
but  its  end  result,  are  described  in  terms  that  are  internal  to  the  individual.  He 
must  simply  "actualize"  his  "possibilities"'.  94  Obviously,  such  a  desocializing 
explanation  of  the  cure  of  madness  is  not  entirely  appropriate  here.  The  mirror 
experiment  has  already  shown  Hoccleve  the  dangers  of  self-reliance;  in  the 
Dialogue,  by  contrast,  Hoccleve  assimilates  the  advice  of  Reason  and  the  wisdom 
of  authority.  Nevertheless,  Hoccleve  does  present  his  madness  and  his  recovery 
from  it  in  individual  and  psychological  terms,  even  if,  as  Feder  grudgingly  notes, 
his  self-examination  is  'blocked  by  a  prescribed  moral  conclusion'.  95 
As  James  Simpson  has  argued,  Hoccleve's  successful  defence  of  his  sanity 
derives  from  his  confidence  in  his  uniqueness  as  an  individual.  'The  turning  point 
in  the  Dialogue',  says  Simpson,  'when  the  friend  is  persuaded  of  Thomas's 
stability,  comes  when  Thomas  puts  it  to  his  friend  that  the  friend  should  not 
presume  to  judge  another  completely':  96 
'ffreend,  as  to  pat,  he  lyueth  nat  pat  can 
Knowe  how  it  standith  with  an  othir  wight 
So  wel  as  him  self;  al-thogh  many  a  man 
Take  on  him  more  than  lyth  in  his  might 
To  knowe  pat  man  is  nat  ruled  right 220 
Pat  so  presumeth  in  his  iugement: 
Beforn  the  doom  good  were  auisament.  '  (477-483) 
This  passage  recalls  and  reinforces  Hoccleve's  insistence  in  the  Complaint  that  a 
man's  mental  condition  is  hidden  and  unknowable  to  any  mortal  other  than 
himself.  As  Simpson  observes,  'here  Thomas  is  not  seeing  himself  simply  as 
'other',  through  the  eyes  of  other  people.  Instead,  he  is  defending  his  intimacy  and 
integrity'.  97 
Now  that  Hoccleve  has  relinquished  the  sickly  self-consciousness  of  the 
mirror  scene,  the  friend  reveals  that  he  has  been  merely  testing  Hoccleve's  sanity 
(484-490)  and  at  last  endorses  the  frustrated  poet's  plans  to  write,  so  long  as 
Hoccleve  promises  not  to  work  too  hard: 
'I  preye  thee  in  al  maneere  way 
Thy  wittes  to  conserue  in  hir  fresshnesse; 
Whan  thow  ther-to  goost  take  of  hem  the  lesse; 
To  muse  longe  in  an  harde  mateere, 
The  wit  of  man  abieth  it  ful  deere.  '  (493-497) 
With  this  conditional  endorsement,  Hoccleve  can  begin  a  process  of  social 
reintegration. 
In  order  to  prove  his  public  spiritedness,  Hoccleve  now  praises  the  Duke  of 
Gloucester  in  a  fitting  display  of  piety.  Next  he  tells  the  friend  that  since  he  has 
often  chided  women  in  the  past  --  an  allusion  to  his  adaptation  of  Christine  de 
Pisan's  Letter  of  Cupid  --  he  will  write  a  piece  in  praise  of  women.  This  turns  out 
to  be  a  translation  of  the  Gesta  Romanorum  story  of  Jereslaus's  Wife.  The 
conventionality  of  this  choice  indicates  that  Hoccleve  has  now  abandoned  the 
autobiographical  mode;  the  public  poet  now  takes  over  from  the  poet  of  private 
complaint. 221 
The  view  of  physical  suffering  in  Jereslaus's  Wife  is  similar  to  that  in  the 
shorter  religious  poems.  Sickness  is  once  again  seen  'from  the  outside',  as  it  were, 
as  spectacular  phenomena;  moreover,  it  is  presented  as  the  consequence  of  sin,  not 
of  poverty  or  poor  working  conditions,  as  both  the  Male  Regle  and  the  prologue  to 
the  Regement  implied.  The  Shipman  in  Jereslaus's  Wife,  for  example,  is  punished 
for  his  lechery  with  madness: 
The  Shipman  had  also  the  franesie, 
That  with  this  Emperice  hadde  ment 
ffulfillid  his  foul  lust  of  aduoutrie, 
Which  was  in  him  ful  hoot  and  ful  feruent: 
See  how  all  hem  that  to  this  Innocent, 
This  noble  lady  had  y-doon  greuance, 
Our  lord  god  qwitte  with  strooke  of  vengeance.  (715-721) 
As  this  didactic  conclusion  shows,  Hoccleve  is  now  the  moralistic  observer  of 
madness  rather  than  its  pathetic  victim. 
Hoccleve  also  now  deflects  attention  from  the  irregularities  of  his  own  life 
which  he  described  in  the  earlier  long  poems  by  focussing  on  the  theme  of  female 
unruliness.  In  a  recent  article  on  Jereslaus's  Wife  and  Tale  of  Jonathas,  Karen 
Winstead  argues  that  'taken  together'  the  two  poems  'form  an  artfully  constructed 
anti-feminist  joke,  which  mocks  disorderly  women'.  98  Jereslaus's  Wife  concerns 
the  wife  of  an  emperor  who  is  left  to  manage  her  husband's  realm  in  his  absence. 
The  emperor's  brother,  the  steward  of  the  land,  takes  advantage  of  the  emperor's 
absence  by  oppressing  the  poor,  robbing  the  rich  and  attempting  to  rape  the 
emperor's  wife.  For  these  crimes  the  empress  has  him  jailed.  Pitying  the  steward's 
appeals  for  mercy  and  believing  his  promises  to  reform,  she  eventually  releases 
him.  Inevitably,  the  steward  repays  her  kindness  by  renewing  his  advances 
towards  her  and,  when  she  refuses,  hanging  her  by  the  hair  in  an  oak  tree.  By 222 
ridiculing  the  empress's  passivity  and  general  incompetence  Hoccleve,  argues 
Winstead,  disparages  women's  capacity  to  keep  order.  The  arguably 
autobiographical  nature  of  the  earlier  parts  of  the  Series  suggests  that  this  'baiting 
of  fractious  women'  also  has  a  personal  significance  for  Hoccleve.  Whatever  the 
case,  by  upholding  the  claim  of  the  friend  in  the  Dialogue  that  women  are  unfitted 
for  'rule  and  governance'  (718),  Hoccleve  diverts  attention  from  the  unruliness  of 
his  own  early  life. 
The  Series  ends,  at  the  friend's  instigation,  with  the  grim  Tale  of  Jonathas. 
Like  Jereslaus's  Wife,  this  tale  is  a  translation  of  the  Anglo-Latin  version  of  the 
tale  in  the  Gesta  Rontanorum.  It  too  emphasizes  the  importance  of  order  and 
reason,  transgression  of  which  leads  to  appalling  and  graphically  described 
physical  punishment.  John  Burrow  comments  on  Hoccleve's  choice  of  tale: 
To  produce  a  moral  tale  for  the  benefit  of  his  friend's  erring  son  is 
a  comfortable  sort  of  commission.  The  poet,  at  last,  has  the 
advantage  of  his  worried  friend,  and  it  is  now  Hoccleve  who  speaks 
for  society,  uttering  the  common  wisdom  of  the  elders  of  the  tribe. 
It  is  a  very  different  sort  of  utterance  from  the  solitary  grieving  with 
which  the  Series  began;  and  it  seems  intended  to  mark  the  poet's 
struggle  to  rehabilitate  himself.  99 
However  comfortable  this  process  of  rehabilitation  is  for  the  poet,  it  nevertheless 
involves  the  unpleasant  anti-feminism  which  was  built  into  the  'common  wisdom' 
of  Hoccleve's  age. 
The  Tale  of  Jereslaus's  Wife  and  the  Tale  of  Jonathas  are  not,  of  course, 
the  only  anti-feminist  pieces  in  Hoccleve's  works.  Hoccleve  reproaches  unruly 
women  in  his  poem  To  Sir  John  Oldcastle  of  1414: 
Some  wommen  eeke,  thogh  hir  wit  be  thynne, 223 
Wele  argumentes  make  in  holy  writ! 
Lewde  calates!  sitteth  down  and  spynne, 
And  kakele  of  sumwhat  elles,  for  your  wit 
Is  al  to  feeble  to  despute  of  it!  (145-149) 
This,  of  course,  is  a  standard  anti-feminist  and  anti-Lollard  piece.  It  is  possible, 
however,  that  it  is  written  with  a  particular  target  in  mind  --  the  unruly  and 
potentially  heretical  Margery  Kempe. 
It  is.  possible  that  Hoccleve  is  again  thinking  of  Kempe  when  he  presents 
the  duplicitous  Fellicula  in  the  Tale  of  Jonathas:  the  patron  to  whom  Jonathas  is 
dedicated  --  Lady  Westmoreland  --  was  a  known  acquaintance  of  Kempe. 
Fellicula,  pretending  to  have  lost  the  magical  brooch  which  Jonathas  has  given 
her,  feigns  insanity: 
Shee  mente  it  nat,  but  as  shee  had  be  mad, 
hir  clothes  hath  shee  at  to-rent  &  tore, 
And  cryde,  'alias,  the  brooch  away  is  bore! 
For  which  I  wole  anoon  right,  with  my  knyf 
My  self  slee,  I  am  weery  of  my  lyfe.  (332-336) 
Fellicula's  madness  is  a  devious  ploy  which,  like  the  boisterous  behaviour  for 
which  Margery  Kempe  became  notorious,  is  treated  with  suspicion  by  others.  The 
advice  of  Jonathas's  mother  to  her  son  --  'The  compaignie  of  wommen  riotous  I 
Thow  flee'  (353-354)  --  is  possibly  intended  by  Hoccleve  as  a  veiled  warning  to 
Lady  Westmoreland  to  avoid  the  disruptive  influence  of  Kempe.  As  Chaucer's 
Melibee  understands  from  Solomon,  '"it  were  bettre  to  dwelle  in  desert  than  with 
a  womman  that  is  riotous"'.  100 
Whether  or  not  Kempe  is  the  intended  target  here,  Hoccleve's 
condemnation  of  female  'riot'  --  the  term  Hoccleve  uses  in  the  Complaint  for  his 224 
own  youthful  dissolution  --  establishes  him  as  a  sober  and  responsible  member  of 
society  who,  by  condemning  female  wiles,  is  finally  'uttering  the  common  wisdom 
of  the  elders  of  the  tribe'.  Hoccleve  has  rehabilitated  himself  not  by  carrying  out 
his  avowed  purpose  of  pleasing  women,  but  by  denouncing  their  unruliness. 
It  is  unsurprising  that  the  Complaint,  which  is  so  different  from  the  minor 
poems  in  other  respects,  also  registers  a  very  different  attitude  towards  sickness. 
We  may  regard  Hoccleve,  as  Eva  Thornley  does,  primarily  as  a  didactic  poet;  and 
we  may,  like  Penelope  Doob,  regard  the  principal  function  of  madness  in  medieval 
literature  as  didactic.  We  may  also  feel  that  'the  immediate  interest  of  medieval 
poetry  for  us  [...  ]  is  as  poetry,  products  of  literary  art,  not  as  documents  of 
individual  psychology'. 
101  But  Hoccleve's  poetry  shows  the  danger  of 
generalizing  about  either  literary  or  psychiatric  history.  As  we  have  seen,  the 
major  works  are  stylistically  diverse;  always  alongside  the  conventional  moralizing 
there  is  the  relation  of  personal  experience;  and  Hoccleve  describes  his  madness  in 
a  personal  and  exploratory,  rather  than  a  didactic  manner.  One  of  the  dominant 
features  of  Hoccleve's  major  poetry  is  a  frequent  insistence  on  a  personal 
experience  inaccessible  to  public  scrutiny  and  therefore  beyond  the  purview  of 
conventional  explanations. 
Although  Hoccleve's  friends  describe  the  poet's  madness  in  terms  of 
medical  and  literary  conventions,  Hoccleve  presents  his  madness  in  individual 
rather  than  diabolical  or  stereotypical  terms;  moreover,  he  insists  that  madness  is 
an  essentially  private  experience.  This  is  consistent  with  other  aspects  of  the 
Complaint,  such  as  its  anachronistic  insistence  on  its  textuality,  a  feature  usually 
associated  with  private  rather  than  public  poetry.  102  At  all  events,  Hoccleve's 
personal  description  of  madness  brings  into  question  many  entrenched  assumptions 
of  psychiatric  and  cultural  history;  as  Hoccleve  says  regarding  his  friends'  clinical 
speculations:  'it  shoop  nat  as  thei  seide'. 
Hoccleve  not  only  conceives  of  madness  in  subjective  terms,  but  also 
reestablishes  himself  as  a  man  of  reason  by  stressing  his  uniqueness  and 225 
unknowability  as  a  man.  Having  regained  his  self-confidence,  however,  he 
reintegrates  himself  into  his  society  by  very  different  means.  If  Hoccleve's 
public-spiritedness  extends  to  a  willingness  'to  make  amends  for  his  own  faults  by 
burning  Oldcastle  and  heretics,  and  uttering  moral  precepts',  we  should  not  be 
surprised  that  his  autobiographical  account  of  insanity  eventually  gives  way  to 
more  didactic  uses  of  the  theme  of  madness.  103  By  the  end  of  the  Series,  insanity 
is  no  longer  the  pitiable  affliction  of  the  overworked  and  underpaid,  but  the 
spectacular  punishment  and  token  of  sin. 226 
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Chapter  6 
'So  euyl  to  rewlyn':  Madness  and  Authority  in  The  Book  of 
Margery  Kempes 
The  Book  of  Margery  Kempe  is  the  work  of  an  illiterate  housewife  born  in  the  year 
1373  in  the  Norfolk  town  of  King's  Lynn  (then  known  as  Bishop's  Lynn  or  simply 
Lynn).  It  was  transcribed  by  an  unknown  amanuensis  after  Kempe's  dictation  and 
was  later  rewritten  and  expanded  by  a  second  scribe,  a  priest  of  Kempe's 
acquaintance.  The  only  surviving  manuscript,  the  Butler-Bowden  manuscript,  was 
copied  around  1450  and  was  for  many  years  in  the  possession  of  the  Carthusians 
of  Mount  Grace  Priory  in  Yorkshire.  The  Book  is  remarkable  not  least  for  its 
sophisticated  presentation  of  the  significance  of  madness  in  the  life  of  an 
uneducated  late-medieval  laywoman. 
The  extent  to  which  the  Book  is  Kempe's  personal  testimony  is  unclear. 
Certain  passages  appear  to  have  been  authored  or  rewritten  by  the  priest-scribe;  it 
is  even  conceivable  that  although  Kempe  wrote  the  Book  she  invented  the  scribe. 
In  either  case,  however,  it  is  likely  that  she  had  complete  control  over  and 
knowledge  of  the  Book's  contents.  2  There  is  still  no  scholarly  consensus,  either, 
on  the  Book's  generic  status.  Some  commentators,  including  many  of  those 
interested  in  the  theme  of  madness,  regard  the  Book  as  an  autobiography.  Other 
scholars  have  been  more  cautious,  pointing  out  the  lack  of  documentary  evidence 
for  some  of  the  most  significant  events  in  Margery's  life.  3  It  seems  likely  that  the 
Book  is,  amongst  other  things,  an  early  attempt  at  self-presentation;  Kempe  would 
hardly  have  undermined  her  narrator's  spiritual  credibility  by  noting  that  she  is 
considered  an  epileptic  if  this  were  not  indeed  the  case.  It  is  unnecessary, 
however,  to  decide  finally  whether  the  Book  is  autobiographical  or  fictional.  As  in 237 
the  case  of  Hoccleve's  Series,  what  is  important  is  that  the  Book  gives  the 
impression  or  illusion  of  autobiography. 
'Madness',  says  Douglas  Gray  simply,  'is  an  important  strand  in  the 
Book'.  4  As  well  as  suffering  from  a  lengthy  psychosis  at  the  age  of  twenty-one, 
Kempe  endures  allegations  of  insanity  throughout  her  life.  Her  early  madness,  like 
that  of  the  romance  heroes  Gowther  and  Beryn,  is  presented  as  a  moral  turning 
point;  indeed,  madness  has  a  spiritual  significance  throughout  the  Book.  We  need 
not,  however,  consider  Kempe's  madness  solely  in  relation  to  theological  ideas.  5 
On  the  contrary,  madness  in  the  Book  must  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  social  and 
psychological  pressures  which  bear  on  Kempe  as  she  pursues  her  controversial 
career  as  a  housewife-saint,  torn  between  the  active  and  the  contemplative  lives. 
This  chapter  attempts  to  explain  Kempe's  psychosis,  her  spectacular  religious 
ecstasies,  and  the  allegations  of  madness  levelled  at  her  in  relation  to  her  lifelong 
search  for  a  degree  of  autonomy  and  spiritual  respectability  in  the  face  of  domestic 
stress,  public  obloquy  and  ferocious  clerical  opposition. 
In  his  anthology  of  autobiographies  by  madmen,  Roy  Porter  concludes  that 
'if  the  copious  writings  of  the  mad  are  about  one  thing,  it  is  above  all  the  desire  to 
cease  to  be  misunderstood'.  6  Like  Hoccleve,  Kempe  is  defensive  about  her 
boisterous  behaviour  and  continually  solicits  the  understanding  and  respect  of 
others.  She  wishes  to  be  seen  as  a  Fool  for  Christ,  suffering  patiently  the  reproofs 
of  a  sinful  world  for  the  greater  glory  of  God.  Nevertheless,  her  own  frank 
analysis  of  her  early  worldly  ambitions  --  'Alle  hir  desyr  was  for  to  be  worshepd 
of  the  pepul'  (9)  --  aptly  summarizes  her  motivation  for  writing.?  As  various 
critics  have  noted,  Kempe  is  'almost  obsessively  concerned  with  the  reactions  of 
others'  and  is  'tirelessly  absorbed  in  what  she  conceives  as  setting  the  record 
straight  about  herself'.  8  This  is  hardly  surprising,  as  Kempe's  'cryings'  or 
'roarings'  are  interpreted  as  evidence  of  insanity  by  many  in  her  community.  In 
this  climate  of  opposition  and  controversy  Kempe  uses  the  theme  of  madness  both 
to  vindicate  her  own  actions  and  to  criticize  the  behaviour  of  others. 238 
The  Book  begins  with  a  dramatic  event.  Soon  after  the  birth  of  her  first 
child,  Kempe  becomes  seriously  ill.  Until  this  sickness,  she  had  gone  to 
confession,  but  had  avoided  confessing  one  particular  sin  which  is  left  intriguingly 
unspecified.  'Sche  had  a  thyng  in  conscyens',  we  are  told,  'whech  sche  had  neuyr 
schewyd  be-forn  kat  tyme  in  alle  hyr  lyfe'  (6-7).  For  this  sin  Kempe  had  hitherto 
done  penance  'be  hir-self  a-Toone'  on  the  grounds  that  'God  is  mercyful  j-now' 
(7).  Illness,  however,  sharpens  her  sense  of  duty.  Fearing  for  her  life  and  taunted 
by  the  devil  with  threats  of  damnation,  she  eventually  calls  for  a  priest;  yet  she  is 
deterred  from  revealing  her  sin  by  the  severity  of  her  confessor  and  becomes  mad: 
whan  sche  cam  to  be  poynt  for  to  seyn  at  ping  whech  sche  had  so 
long  conselyd,  hir  confessowr  was  a  lytyl  to  hastye  &  gan  scharply 
to  vndyrnemyn  hir  er  an  sche  had  fully  seyd  hir  entent,  &  so  sche 
wold  no  mor  seyn  for  nowt  he  mygth  do.  And  a-noon,  for  dreed 
sche  had  of  dampnacyon  on  be  to  syde  &  hys  scharp  repreuyng  on 
pat  oiler  syde,  is  creatur  went  owt  of  hir  tuende  &  was  wondyrlye 
vexid  &  labowryd  wyth  spyritys  half  3er  viij  wekys  &  odde  days. 
(7) 
The  mania  which  ensues  has  attracted  the  attentions  of  numerous  professional  and 
amateur  psychiatrists,  who  have  variously  labelled  it  a  case  of  'postpartum 
psychosis,  postpartum  hysteria,  postpartum  depression  at  its  manic  phase,  hysteria, 
and  postpartum  depressive  psychosis  with  features  of  agitation'.  9  Postpartum  or 
puerperal  psychosis  is  a  severe  but  usually  self-limiting  alienation  which  sets  in 
shortly  after  childbirth  and  can  last  from  between  a  day  and  several  months.  10  Its 
onset  is  sudden,  and  its  symptoms  include  'confusion,  disorientation, 
hallucinations,  delusional  elements,  and  profound  changes  in  mood'.  11  It  occurs 
most  commonly  after  first  deliveries.  These  features  are  consistent  with  the  timing, 
circumstances  and  symptoms  of  Kempe's  illness. 239 
The  cause  of  Kempe's  condition  is  harder  to  determine.  As  the  psychiatric 
historians  Hunter  and  Macalpine  note,  our  knowledge  of  the  precipitating  event  of 
postpartum  pyschosis  brings  into  focus  the  question  of  whether  the  condition  'is 
due  to  the  physical  or  to  the  psychological  circumstances  associated  with 
childbearing'. 
12  Unfortunately,  the  answer  to  this  question  remains  a  matter  of 
debate  among  physicians.  The  lack  of  consensus  about  the  etiology  of  postpartum 
psychosis  raises  the  further  question  of  whether  or  not  the  condition  is  a  proper 
subject  for  sociological  analysis.  Indeed,  one  historian  who  usually  insists  on 
setting  madness  in  its  social  context  excludes  postpartum  psychosis  from  such 
consideration  because  of  its  apparently  'physiological  basis'.  13  It  is  fruitless, 
however,  to  proceed  with  such  caution  in  the  interpretation  of  Kempe's  psychosis. 
As  Sarah  Beckwith  says,  to  regard  Kempe's  madness  as  entirely  organic  in  origin 
is  to  isolate  her  'in  the  society  of  her  own  madness'.  14  In  any  case,  such  an 
approach  is  invalid  on  literary,  if  not  medical  grounds.  Kempe  does  not  allow  us 
to  foreclose  speculation  about  her  madness  by  sidestepping  its  social  dimensions; 
on  the  contrary,  she  encourages  us  to  consider  her  mania  in  the  light  of  her  own 
testimony  and  to  regard  madness  as  a  social  construction. 
The  immediate  causes  of  Kempe's  insanity  are  her  fear  of  damnation  and 
her  humiliation  after  her  tactless  confessor's  'scharp  repreuyng'  --  terms  which 
Kempe  uses  in  connection  with  her  detractors  at  several  points  in  the  Book.  15  In 
this  sense,  religious  convention  and  experience  go  hand  in  hand.  Like  the  pious 
but  peevish  Hoccleve,  Kempe  combines  a  deep  understanding  of  the  supernatural 
significance  of  madness  with  bitter  expressions  of  personal  grievance  against  the 
world. 
Guilt  obviously  plays  a  major  part  in  the  onset  of  the  psychosis.  Kempe 
evidently  bears  the  guilty  memory  of  her  unspoken  sin.  16  Less  obviously, 
perhaps,  her  confession  to  a  priest  after  a  long  period  of  solitary  penance  is  also  a 
source  of  guilt  and  confusion.  Late-medieval  handbooks  frequently  stressed  the 
necessity  of  full  confession.  The  Book  of  the  Knight  of  La  Tour-Landry  contains  a 240 
cautionary  tale  about  a  woman  who  is  damned  for  failing  to  confess  a  sexual  sin. 
The  grim  moral  is  delivered  in  the  woman's  own  words: 
beware  by  me,  for  whanne  y  was  yonge,  for  the  lust  of  my  flesshe, 
y  laye  with  a  monke;  &y  durste  neuer  tell  it  to  my  confessour,  for 
drede  of  encursinge,  dredinge  shame  and  the  bobaunce  of  the 
worlde,  more  thanne  spirituel  uengeaunce  of  myn  synne.  And  yet  y 
sende  and  gaue  my  good  for  Goddes  sake,  herde  masses,  and  saide 
my  seruice  diligently,  wenyng  that  the  good  and  the  abstinence  that 
y  dede  shulde  haue  clensed  the  synne  that  y  durste  not  tell  the 
preest,  and  therein  y  am  deseiued,  and  lost;  for  y  saie  you  all,  who 
that  dothe  a  dedly  synne  and  confessith  hym  not  therof,  and  deith 
so,  he  is  dampned  perpetuelly. 
17 
The  woman's  circumstances  are  uncannily  reminiscent  of  Kempe's.  Her  story 
illustrates  the  unconfessed  sinner's  real  fear  of  damnation  and  suggests  the  severity 
of  the  orthodox  condemnation  of  headstrong  women. 
Confessional  negligence  could  also  earn  dire  punishment  on  earth.  The  first 
autobiographer  of  the  Western  Middle  Ages,  the  German  monk  Otloh  of  Saint 
Emmeram,  became  mad  after  failing  to  confess  fully  his  sins.  'Although  I  had 
done  penance  in  the  abbots's  presence',  says  Otloh,  'yet,  because  I  had  failed  to 
do  it  before  God,  against  whom  alone  I  had  sinned,  after  a  few  days  I  fell  into  a 
sickness'. 
18  Such  precedent  lends  credibility  to  Denise  Despres's  assertion  that 
it  is  Margery's  lack  of  faith  in  the  cleansing  power  of  confession, 
her  fear  that  her  sin  is  too  great  a  burden  even  for  the  cross  to  bear, 
that  leads  her  to  the  despair  and  madness  that  signify  both  spiritual 
and  physical  sickness.  19 241 
Kempe's  anxiety  about  these  issues  is  understandable  given  the  peculiar  conditions 
of  the  late-medieval  laywoman's  confession.  A  late  twelfth-century  penitential 
gives  the  following  advice  to  confessors: 
The  priest  shall  have  a  lowly  countenance  in  confession,  and  he 
shall  not  look  at  the  face  of  the  confessant,  especially  of  a  woman, 
on  account  of  the  obligation  of  honour;  and  he  shall  patiently  hear 
what  she  says  in  a  spirit  of  mildness  and  to  the  best  of  his  ability 
persuade  her  by  various  methods  to  make  an  integral  confession,  for 
otherwise  he  shall  say  that  it  is  of  no  value  to  her.  20 
The  need  for  advice  of  this  sort  suggests  that  priests  were  not  renowned  for  their 
sensitivity  during  confession,  particularly  towards  female  penitents. 
Later  in  the  Middle  Ages  the  possibilities  for  the  abuse  of  penitents 
increased.  By  this  time  'repentance  and  the  call  to  penance  were  among  the  most 
popular  sermon  topics  of  the  day'  and  penitents  were  subject  to  increasingly  close 
scrutiny. 
21  From  the  second  half  of  the  thirteenth-century  onwards, 
the  sacrament  of  penance  consisted,  for  every  member  of  medieval 
English  society,  of  enforced  regular  confession  to  the  parish  priest. 
This  was  one  of  the  several  ways  in  which  thirteenth-century  church 
reforms,  designed  initially  to  improve  pastoral  care,  exercised 
increasing  control  over  people's  daily  lives.  The  rule  which  obliged 
every  layman  to  confess  his  intimate  misdeeds  regularly  and  in 
minute  detail  to  his  parish  priest  was  a  considerable  intrusion  of  the 
institutional  church  into  a  relationship  which  had  hitherto  been  a 
private  matter  between  God  and  the  individual.  22 242 
This  new  intrusive  spirit  is  reflected  in  confessional  manuals  which  'elaborated  a 
rhetoric  of  sin  and  censure;  intended  to  instruct,  the  rhetoric  could  also  be 
deployed  by  individual  confessors  to  constrict  the  spirits  in  their  care'.  23  That 
confessors  were  under  considerable  pressure  to  extract  complete  confessions  from 
their  parishioners  is  clear  from  the  frequent  warnings  against  confessional  laxity  in 
the  late  Middle  Ages. 
The  discrepancy  between  Kempe's  confessional  practices  and  clerical 
expectations  is  clearly  another  source  of  anguish  for  Kempe.  Kempe's  emphasis  on 
her  personal  relationship  with  God  is  not  necessarily  heretical:  it  can  be  seen  as 
part  of  an  orthodox  movement,  encouraged  by  such  works  as  The  Imitation  of 
Christ,  towards  more  personal  forms  of  religious  devotion.  Nevertheless,  as  David 
Aers  remarks,  'unlike  Lollards,  Margery  had  not  rejected  the  sacrament  of 
confession,  but  she  had  sought  a  potentially  Lollard-like  autonomy  of  her 
"souereynes"  and  the  institution'.  24  Moreover,  Kempe's  unmentioned  sin  has  been 
interpreted  biographically  as  her  known  association  with  William  Sawtre,  a  priest 
of  Lynn  until  1399  and  the  first  Lollard  to  be  burnt  for  his  beliefs  under  the  De 
heretico  comburendo  statute  of  1401.25  That  Sawtre  is  not  mentioned  in  Kempe's 
account  of  the  confession  episode  may  be  due  to  the  prohibition  against  the 
disclosure  of  names  during  confession.  26  Whatever  the  case,  Sawtre's  name  is 
conspicuously  absent  from  the  Book:  perhaps  Kempe,  who  was  acquitted  of  the 
charge  of  heresy  on  several  occasions,  did  not  wish  to  provoke  the  church 
authorities  too  far.  In  this  connection,  it  is  significant  that  the  late-medieval 
Church  insisted  on  regular  confession  partly  so  that  a  pastor  'could  know  his  sheep 
and  thus  not  fail  to  detect  heresy'.  27 
Whether  or  not  Kempe  is  under  suspicion  of  heresy  at  this  point,  her  tart 
comments  about  her  confessor's  attitude  suggest  a  barely  muffled  animosity.  The 
confessor  is  'a  lytyl  to  hastye'  in  rebuking  her:  an  ironically  understated  phrase 
considering  that  he  is  partly  responsible  for  the  onset  of  a  terrifying  psychosis. 
Whatever  other  factors  played  their  part,  Kempe's  madness  is  related  to  her 243 
confusion  about  the  validity  of  her  pursuit  of  religious  autonomy  and  to  her 
resentment  towards  an  unsympathetic  clerical  authority. 
Kempe's  famous  description  of  her  eight-month  madness  is  one  of  the 
fullest  accounts  in  English  literature  of  a  psychotic  experience.  Unlike  Hoccleve, 
who  reconstructs  his  psychosis  from  the  reports  of  his  friends,  Kempe  appears  to 
recall  the  details  of  her  madness.  Internalising  her  conflict  with  those  around  her, 
she  substitutes  the  rebukes  of  her  aggressive  confessor  with  the  tormenting 
promptings  of  devils.  These  encourage  her  to  speak  'repreuows'  words  to  her 
family  and  friends,  just  as  her  confessor  had  done  to  her: 
And  in  pis  tyme  sche  sey,  as  hir  thowt,  deuelys  opyn  her  mowthys 
al  inflaumed  wyth  brennyng  lowys  of  fyr  as  bei  schuld  a  swalwyd 
hyr  in,  sum-tyme  rampyng  at  hyr,  sum-tyme  thretyng  her,  sum-tym 
pullyng  hyr  &  halyng  hir  boge  nyghth  &  day  duryng  pe  forseyd 
tyme.  And  also  pe  deuelys  cryed  up-on  hir  wyth  greet  thretyngys  & 
bodyn  hir  sche  schuld  forsake  hir  Crystendam  hir  feyth,  and  denyin 
hir  God,  hys  Modyr,  &  alle  pe  seyntys  in  Heuyn,  hyr  goode  werkys 
&  alle  good  vertues,  hir  fadyr,  hyr  modyr,  &  alle  hire  frendys.  And 
so  sche  dede.  Sche  slawndred  hir  husbond,  hir  frendys,  and  her 
owyn  self;  sche  spak  many  a  repreuows  worde  and  many  a 
schrewyd  worde;  sche  knew  no  vertu  ne  goodnesse;  sche  desyryd 
all  wykkydnesse;  lych  as  be  spyrytys  temptyd  hir  to  sey  &  do  so 
sche  seyd  &  dede.  Sche  wold  a  for-done  hir-self  many  a  tym  at  her 
steryngys  &a  ben  damnyd  wyth  hem  in  Helle,  &  in-to  wytnesse 
perof  sche  bot  hir  owen  hand  so  vyolently  pat  it  was  seen  al  hir  lyfe 
aftyr.  And  also  sche  roof  hir  skyn  on  hir  body  a-3en  hir  hert  wyth 
hir  nayles  spetowsly,  for  sche  had  noon  Ober  instrumentys,  &  wers 
sche  wold  a  don  saf  sche  was  bowndyn  &  kept  wyth  strength  boge 
day  &  nygth  pat  sche  mygth  not  haue  hir  wylle.  (7-8) 244 
Compared  to  Hoccleve's  account  of  mania,  this  passage  is  striking  for  its  violence; 
Kempe's  madness,  unlike  Hoccleve's,  takes  the  form  of  a  explicit  confrontation 
with  those  around  her. 
The  supernatural  colouring  of  Kempe's  experience  of  madness  is  also 
remarkable.  Discussing  Kempe's  account  of  her  insanity,  Charlotte  Garrett 
remarks  that 
we  who  read  Margery's  Book  are  separated  from  her  account  and 
the  depths  of  her  experience  through  time  and  an  acculturation  that 
may  appear  to  raise  insurmountable  barriers.  The  paradigmatic  shift 
from  medieval  theology  to  modern  scientificism  leaves  a  gap  in 
credibility,  especially  if  one  looks  through  a  Cartesian  or  Freudian 
lens.  28 
Nevertheless,  Kempe's  experience  of  madness  recalls  much  later  cases  of  religious 
mania.  A  number  of  eighteenth-century  women  confined  in  a  Montelimar  hospital 
became  affected  by  similar  thoughts  of  despair  and  punishment  after  a  mission 
held  in  the  city.  One  of  these  women  'absolutely  refused  to  undergo  any  cure, 
convinced  that  she  was  in  Hell  and  that  nothing  could  extinguish  the  fire  she 
believed  was  devouring  her'.  29  The  nineteenth-century  French  physician  Esquirol 
describes  the  case  of  another  madwoman  who  exhibits  behaviour  like  Kempe's, 
including  sexual  anxiety  and  'extreme  ardor  in  religious  devotion';  also,  like 
Kempe  throughout  her  life,  she  makes  vows  of  chastity,  has  visions  of  Christ,  and 
suffers  delirium  and  diabolical  torments.  30  These  examples,  like  Kempe's 
experience  with  her  confessor,  show  the  potentially  ruinous  effects  of  over-zealous 
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Kempe's  psychotic  behaviour  also  follows  the  conventions  surrounding 
literary  madwomen.  In  particular,  her  self-mutilation  recalls  the  psychotic  outburst 
of  the  grief-stricken  Heurodis  in  the  romance  Sir  Orfeo: 
Sche  crid,  &  lopli  bere  gan  make: 
Sche  froted  hir  honden  &  hir  fet, 
&  crached  hir  visage  --  it  bled  wete; 
Hir  riche  robe  hye  al  to-rett, 
&  was  reueyd  out  of  hir  witt. 
31 
Such  self-destructive  forms  of  maniacal  behaviour  are  associated  chiefly  with 
women.  Ladies  in  medieval  romances,  of  course,  are  idealized  in  terms  of  their 
physical  appearances;  in  the  patriarchal  society  of  medieval  England,  female 
beauty  is  perhaps  a  woman's  only  widely  acknowledged  asset  of  value.  By 
disfiguring  themselves,  therefore,  women  implicitly  reject  the  value-system  that 
reduces  them  to  the  condition  of  passive  objects  of  admiration. 
With  the  exception  of  its  demonic  elements,  Kempe's  behaviour  also 
resembles  that  of  Clerimond  in  the  romance  Valentine  and  Orson,  who  pretends  to 
be  'mad  and  out  of  her  wytte'  in  order  to  escape  a  forced  marriage  to  an  Indian 
king: 
In  thys  wyse  dyd  the  lady  abyde  longe  tyme,  and  she  made  it  so 
well  that  wythin  fyftene  dayes  she  semed  more  lykely  a  [bleest  than 
a  resonable  woman.  She  was  of  so  cruell  and  folysshe  maners  that 
all  the  seruauntes  lytle  and  greate,  ladyes  and  damoyselles 
habandoned  her,  and  abode  wythout  companye.  Wyth  her  teth  and 
nayles  she  bote  and  scratched  all  them  that  wolde  approche  nere 
her.  And  by  her  greate  crudelyte  she  was  locked  all  alone  in  her 
chambre,  and  by  a  wyndowe  they  gaue  her  meat  and  drynke  as  to  a 246 
beest.  On  the  daye  she  made  the  semblaunt  that  her  maladye 
encreased,  and  al  to  rente  her  clothes.  32 
Clerimond's  madness,  albeit  feigned,  resembles  Kempe's  in  its  causes  as  well  as 
its  symptoms:  in  both  cases  madness  is  a  desperate  response  to  unwelcome  male 
demands.  On  a  sociological  level,  Kempe's  madness  constitutes  an  individual's 
struggle  for  autonomy  and  her  rejection  of  her  social  role.  But  insanity  is  never 
simply  a  matter  of  the  individual  casting  off  the  burdens  of  social  expectation; 
rather,  it  involves  the  internalisation  of  social  pressures.  Thus  Kempe's  torments 
are  presented  not  simply  as  external  impositions  on  an  integrated, 
homogenous  self  but  the  guilty  product  of  her  own  struggles  for  an 
identity  which  would  enable  a  relative  autonomy  in  relation  to 
priest,  husband,  and  others.  The  cost  of  this  individual  struggle  is  a 
terrifying  isolation  combined  with  immense  aggression  against  her 
husband,  her  community,  and  the  self  formed  by  conflicting 
tendencies  within  it.  33 
The  anti-social  aggression  which  Kempe  shows  during  her  madness  is  typical  of 
medieval  madpeople  in  very  different  social  circumstances.  Nevertheless,  Kempe's 
psychosis  may  reasonably  be  seen  as  a  rejection  of  her  role.  Her  anxiety  about  her 
unspoken  sin  and  her  resentment  of  her  confessor's  hastiness  is  compounded  by 
her  confusion  about  her  new  obligations  as  a  new  wife  and  mother.  34 
Kempe,  unlike  Clerimond,  is  not  empowered  by  her  experience.  Indeed, 
real  madness  may  be  more  a  'manifestation  of  cultural  impotence  and  of  political 
castration'  than  an  effective  strategy  of  opposition  to  authority.  35  Nor  is  Kempe 
'liberated'  by  her  insanity.  As  Julia  Long  says,  'if  her  madness  is  a  sign  of  her 
rebellion  against  her  role  (as  indicated  by  its  nature  --  revealing  violent  feelings 
towards  herself,  her  beliefs,  her  family),  it  leads  her  to  being  even  more 247 
constrained  --  forcefully  and  literally'.  36  Kempe's  experience  of  mania  is  clearly 
very  different  from  Thomas  Hoccleve's,  taking  the  form  of  aggressive 
confrontation  with  those  around  her  and  being  dealt  with  by  the  sternest  measures. 
This  is  unsurprising  given  the  sensational  nature  of  postpartum  psychosis 
which,  more  than  any  other  form  of  insanity,  constitutes  a  total  rejection  of  all 
socially  acceptable  ways  of  behaving.  The  condition  has  always  been  treated  by 
physicians  with  barely  concealed  astonishment  and  deep  suspicion.  Writing  three 
centuries  after  Kempe,  the  physician  John  Woodward  describes  a  puerperal  maniac 
in  the  following  terms: 
Amongst  others,  she  had  Thoughts  of  the  Devil,  as  tempting  and 
vehemently  urging  her  to  ill;  particularly  to  fling  her  Child  into  the 
fire,  beat  its  Brains  out,  and  the  like;  to  which  she  had  the  utmost 
Horror  and  Aversion;  being  naturally  mild,  good  natured,  and  very 
virtuous.  But  she  found  herself  so  much  out  of  her  own  Power  and 
Guidance  [...  ]  that  she  was  in  perpetual  fear  of  doing  something 
very  ill.  [...  ]  She  had  frequently  Temptations  to  lay  violent  Hands 
on  herself.  37 
This  language,  minus  its  demonic  components,  is  echoed  by  later  physicians.  For 
the  Victorian  alienists  Bucknill  and  Tuke,  the  puerpally  insane  woman  evinces 
a  total  negligence  of,  and  often  very  strong  aversion  to,  her  child 
and  husband  [...  ]  explosions  of  anger  occur,  with  vociferations  and 
violent  gesticulations;  and,  although  the  patient  may  have  been 
remarkable  previously  for  her  correct,  modest  demeanor,  and 
attention  to  her  religious  duties,  most  awful  oaths  and  imprecations 
are  uttered,  and  language  used  which  astonishes  her  friends.  38 248 
There  are  obvious  similarities  between  Kempe's  description  of  her  insanity  and 
these  much  later  descriptions  of  postpartum  psychoses  in  terms  of  both  style  and 
content.  39  In  each  case  the  madwoman  is  exempted  from  blame  for  her  behaviour; 
but  there  is  also  a  common  sense  of  the  madwoman's  profound  degeneration  from 
a  virtuous  life  to  one  of  complete  degradation. 
Given  the  stigma  of  postpartum  psychosis,  we  may  wonder  why  Kempe 
confesses  to  her  insanity,  especially  since  it  apparently  involves  possession  by 
demons  --  the  most  wretched  and  morally  degraded  form  of  madness.  And  once 
Kempe  had  decided  to  include  the  account  of  her  psychosis  in  her  Book,  why  did 
she  choose  to  characterize  it  so  bleakly?  If  she  had  wished  to  elicit  sympathy  she 
might  have  described  her  suffering  as  a  pitiable  affliction,  as  Hoccleve  does  in  his 
roughly  contemporary  Complaint.  Alternatively,  she  might  have  presented  her 
madness  as  a  superior  sort  of  wisdom,  like  the  insanity  of  a  woman  cured  by 
Kempe's  visits  and  conversation  later  in  the  Book.  Instead,  her  madness  is  a  moral 
and  social  catastrophe.  Part  of  Kempe's  purpose  in  describing  her  madness  is  in 
shaming  her  confessor,  as  has  already  been  suggested.  Kempe  also,  however, 
presents  her  insanity  negatively,  as  a  temporary  aberration  from  the  way  of  Christ. 
This  impulse  is  elucidated  by  an  observation  of  Jean  Starobinski  --  a 
fomidable  commentator  on  both  the  history  of  psychiatry  and  the  history  of 
consciousness  --  on  the  enabling  conditions  of  autobiography: 
one  would  hardly  have  sufficient  motive  to  write  an  autobiography 
had  not  some  radical  change  occurred  in  his  life  --  conversion,  entry 
into  a  new  life,  the  operation  of  Grace.  If  such  a  change  had  not 
affected  the  life  of  the  narrator,  he  could  merely  depict  himself  once 
and  for  all,  and  new  developments  would  be  treated  as  external 
(historical)  events:  we  would  then  be  in  the  presence  of  the 
conditions  of  what  Benveniste  has  named  history,  and  a  narrator  in 
the  first  person  would  hardly  continue  to  be  necessary.  It  is  the 249 
internal  transformation  of  the  individual  --  and  the  exemplary 
character  of  this  transformation  --  which  furnishes  a  subject  for  a 
narrative  discourse  in  which  "I"  is  both  subject  and  object. 
Thus  we  discover  an  important  fact:  it  is because  the  past  "I" 
is  different  from  the  present  "I"  that  the  latter  may  really  be 
confirmed  in  all  his  prerogatives.  The  narrator  describes  not  only 
what  happened  to  him  at  a  different  time  in  his  life,  but  above  all 
how  he  became  --  out  of  what  he  was  --  what  he  presently  is.  40 
According  to  Starobinski,  then,  the  search  for  identity  through  autobiography  is 
only  necessary  after  some  radical  crisis  of  identity.  Kempe  --  like  her 
contemporary  Thomas  Hoccleve  --  experiences  just  such  a  crisis  in  the  form  of  a 
spectacular  mania.  Her  frankly  admitted  psychosis,  coming  at  the  beginning  of  her 
Book,  marks  both  her  greatest  alienation  from  friends  and  family  and  her  deepest 
moral  abjection,  since  her  madness  is  clearly  bound  up  with  the  sins  of  her  early 
life  --  in  particular  the  'fleshly  lusts'  with  which  she  continually  battles. 
In  the  latter  regard  Kempe  resembles  other  medieval  autobiographers  from 
the  French  abbot  Guibert  de  Nogent  to  Francois  Villon  and  Thomas  Hoccleve,  all 
of  whom  describe  the  lechery  and  unruliness  of  their  younger  years.  Kempe's 
subsequent  behaviour,  however,  is  carefully  distinguished  from  the  youthful  follies 
that  preceded  and  contributed  to  her  madness.  Like  the  period  of  insanity 
described  by  Augustine  in  Book  VII  of  the  Confessions,  Kempe's  diabolical  mania 
is  the  cardinal  point  in  both  her  life  and  her  work;  it  functions  as  a  moral 
touchstone  against  which  the  divinely-inspired  cryings  and  roarings  of  the  rest  of 
the  Book  may  be  tested  and  vindicated  and  by  which  the  author,  in  Starobinski's 
words,  may  be  'confirmed  in  all  [her]  prerogatives'.  41 
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whan  sche  had  long  ben  labowred  in  pes  &  many  oper  temptacyons 
at  men  wend  sche  schuld  neuyr  a  skapyd  ne  levyd,  an  on  a  tym, 
as  sche  lay  a-loon  and  hir  kepars  wer  fro  hir,  owyr  mercyful  Lord 
Crist  Ihesu,  euyr  to  be  trostyd,  worshypd  be  hys  name,  neuyr 
forsakyng  hys  seruawnt  in  tyme  of  nede,  aperyd  to  hys  creatur 
whych  had  forsakyn  hym  in  lyknesse  of  a  man,  most  semly,  most 
bewtyuows,  &  most  amyable  pat  euyr  mygth  be  seen  wyth  mannys 
eye,  clad  in  a  mantyl  of  purpyl  sylke,  syttyng  up-on  hir  beddys 
syde,  lokyng  vp-on  hir  wyth  so  blyssyd  a  chere  at  sche  was 
strengthyd  in  alle  hir  spyritys,  seyd  to  hir  pes  wordys:  'Dowtyr, 
why  hast  pow  forsakyn  me,  and  I  forsoke  neuyr  peT  [...  ]  And 
a-noon  be  creature  was  stabelyd  in  hir  wyttys  &  in  hir  reson  as  wel 
as  euyr  sche  was  be-forn.  (8) 
Kempe  is  now  restored  to  her  previous  domestic  role,  a  rehabilitation  marked  with 
mundane  ceremony  when  the  keys  to  the  buttery  are  returned  to  her.  But  Kempe's 
madness  is  now  recognized  as  a  moral,  as  well  as  a  social  aberration.  Christ's 
gently  admonishing  words  in  the  passage  above  confirm  that  her  madness  is  a 
punishment  for  sin,  presumably  the  unspoken  sin  which  she  felt  unable  to  reveal  to 
her  insensitive  confessor. 
In  the  following  chapter,  Kempe  presents  herself  in  a  social  setting. 
Despite  her  husband's  reproofs  and  the  obloquies  of  other  townsfolk,  she  is  unable 
to  leave  her  sinful  pride  in  her  'pompows  aray',  insisting  on  wearing  extravagant 
clothing  on  the  pretext  that  she  is  born  of  'worthy  kenred'  (9).  This  concern  with 
clothes  is,  of  course,  extremely  conventional.  42  Kempe  also  succumbs  to  avarice, 
trying  her  hand  first  at  brewing  and  then  at  milling  'for  pure  coveytyse  &  for  to 
maynten  hir  pride'  (9).  Both  of  these  improvident  business  enterprises  end  in 
humiliating  failure.  It  is  at  this  point  that  she  finally  recognizes  her  worldly  losses 
as 251 
be  skowrges  of  owyr  Lord  pat  wold  chastyse  hir  for  hir  synne.  Iran 
sche  askyd  God  mercy  &  forsoke  hir  pride,  hir  coueytyse,  &  desyr 
pat  sche  had  of  be  worshepys  of  be  world,  &  dede  grett  bodyly 
penawnce,  &  gan  to  entyr  be  wey  of  euyr-lestyng  lyfe,  as  schal  be 
seyd  aftyr.  (11) 
The  vision  of  Christ  is  the  first  of  Kempe's  many  spiritual  revelations.  After  the 
year  1413  these  revelations  are  usually  accompanied  by  the  crying,  shouting  and 
wild  gestures  which  modern  readers  have  variously  interpreted  as  signs  of 
psychosis,  epilepsy  or  hysteria.  The  reactions  of  Kempe's  contemporaries  to  this 
disruptive  behaviour  indicate  that  many  of  them  also  believe  her  to  be  mad. 
While  on  a  visit  to  Calvary  in  1413  Kempe  has  a  vision  of  Christ's 
Passion.  Her  epileptiform  behaviour  during  this  vision  sets  the  pattern  for  future 
ecstasies.  Writhing  on  the  ground  with  outstretched  arms,  Kempe 
cryed  wyth  a  lowde  voys  as  bow  hir  herte  xulde  a  brostyn  a-sundyr, 
for  in  be  cite  of  hir  sowie  sche  saw  veryly  &  freschly  how  owyr 
Lord  was  crucifyed.  Beforn  hir  face  sche  herd  and  saw  in  hir  gostly 
sygth  be  mornyng  of  owyr  Lady,  of  Ser  lohn  &  Mary  Mawdelyn, 
and  of  many  oiler  bat  louyd  owyr  Lord.  &  sche  had  so  gret 
compassyon  and  so  gret  peyn  to  se  owyr  Lordys  peyn  at  sche  myt 
not  kepe  hir-self  fro  krying  &  roryng  bow  sche  xuld  a  be  ded 
therfor.  (68) 
Kempe  adopts  the  conventional  behaviour  of  the  sorrowing  mother  or  mater 
dolorosa,  typified  by  Our  Lady's  display  of  sorrow  in  the  increasingly  emotional 
crucifixion  scenes  of  the  late  Middle  Ages.  43  Thus  Kempe  identifies  throughout 
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This  behaviour,  if  not  properly  controlled,  could  come  dangerously  close  to 
madness.  Highly-charged  emotional  scenes,  of  course,  were  common  at 
pilgrimage  sites  in  the  late  Middle  Ages;  but  they  were  nevertheless  regarded  with 
grave  suspicion  by  some  contemporaries.  Fabri,  a  fifteenth-century  German 
pilgrim,  disparagingly  describes  the  behaviour  of  some  of  his  companions  at  the 
church  of  the  Holy  Sepulchre  in  Jerusalem: 
I  saw  there  some  pilgrims  lying  powerless  on  the  ground,  forsaken 
by  their  strength,  and  as  it  were  forgetful  of  their  own  being  by 
reason  of  their  excessive  feeling  of  devotion.  Others  I  saw  who 
wandered  hither  and  thither,  from  one  corner  to  another,  beating 
their  breasts,  as  though  they  were  driven  by  an  evil  spirit.  Some 
knelt  on  the  earth  with  their  bare  knees,  and  prayed  with  tears, 
holding  their  arms  out  in  the  form  of  a  cross.  Others  were  shaken 
with  such  violent  sobs  that  they  could  not  hold  themselves  up,  and 
were  forced  to  sit  down  and  hold  their  heads  with  their  hands,  that 
they  might  endure  their  thick-coming  sobs.  Some  lay  prostrate  so 
long  without  motion,  that  they  seemed  as  though  they  were  dead. 
Above  all  our  companions  and  sisters  the  women  pilgrims  shrieked 
as  though  in  labour,  cried  aloud  and  wept.  Some  pilgrims,  out  of 
excess  of  devotion,  lost  all  command  of  themselves,  forgot  how 
they  should  behave,  and  out  of  excessive  zeal  to  please  God,  made 
strange  and  childish  gestures. 
44 
This  description  recalls  the  clerical  condemnations  of  dancing  frenzies  mentioned 
in  Chapter  3.  But  this  passage  is  concerned  in  particular  with  the  unacceptability  of 
certain  forms  of  female  behaviour.  Fabri's  observation  that  women  are  particularly 
susceptible  to  'excessive  feeling  of  devotion'  is  consistent  with  the  widespread 
medieval  idea  that  women  are  governed  by  their  emotions  rather  than  reason.  45  It 253 
is hardly  surprising  that  women  were  held  to  be  more  liable  than  men  to  diabolical 
seduction  or  that,  as  we  shall  see  later,  holy  laywomen  who  became  too 
enthusiastic  were  often  chastised  in  the  same  terms  as  madwomen. 
46 
The  variability  of  the  public  perception  of  religious  ecstasy  is  a  major 
concern  of  the  Book.  Those  who  witness  Kempe's  cryings  at  Calvary  and  many 
other  less  sanctified  places  are  astonished,  and  each  advances  his  own  explanation 
of  her  conduct: 
For  summe  seyd  it  was  a  wikkyd  spiryt  vexid  hir;  sum  seyd  it  was  a 
sekenes;  sum  seyd  sche  had  dronkyn  to  mech  wyn;  sum  bannyd  hir; 
sum  wisshed  sche  had  ben  in  pe  hauyn;  sum  wolde  sche  had  ben  in 
Pe  se  in  a  bottumles  boyt;  and  so  ich  man  as  hym  thowte.  (69) 
This  ragbag  of  explanations  for  Kempe's  behaviour  illustrates  the  diversity  of 
interpretations  of  irrational  behaviour  in  the  late  Middle  Ages.  Like  Hoccleve, 
however,  Kempe  gives  short  shrift  to  public  opinion,  firmly  rejecting  the  welter  of 
speculation  about  her  behaviour  and  asserting  her  identity  in  personal  and  spiritual 
terms. 
Kempe  finds  supporters  among  all  sorts  of  people,  especially  the  'gostly 
men'  who  realize  that  Kempe  is  not  mad,  but  blessed.  The  opinions  of  these 
churchmen  are  frequently  registered  by  Kempe,  who  is,  as  Sarah  Beckwith  says, 
constantly  'incorporating  the  voice  of  others'  into  her  texts.  47  A  particularly 
striking  example  of  this  occurs  in  Chapter  28.  Here  the  passage  describing  the 
public  reaction  to  Kempe's  behaviour  at  Calvary  is  followed  by  a  defence  of  her 
conduct.  Kempe  makes  explicit  the  negative  significance  of  madness,  comparing 
her  ecstatic  behaviour  favourably  with  the  sinful  excesses  of  madmen  and  -women: 
It  is  nowt  to  be  merueyled  3yf  pis  creatur  cryed  and  made  wondirful 
cher  &  cuntenawns,  whan  we  may  se  eche  day  at  eye  boge  men  and 254 
women,  summe  for  los  of  werdly  good,  sum  for  affecyon  of  her 
kynred  er  for  werdly  frenshypys  thorw  ouyr  fele  stody  &  erdly 
affecyon,  &  most  of  alle  for  inordinat  lofe  &  fleschly  affecyon  3yf 
her  frendys  er  partyn  fro  hem,  bei  wyl  cryen  &  roryn  and  wryngyn 
her  handys  as  3yf  bei  had  no  wytte  ne  non  mende,  &  yet  wetyn  bei 
wel  j-now  bat  bei  displesyn  God.  &,  3yf  a  man  cownsel  hem  to 
leevyn  er  seesyn  of  her  wepyng  er  crying,  bei  wyl  seyn  that  bei  may 
not;  bei  louyd  her  frend  so  meche  &  he  was  so  gentyl  &  so  kende  to 
hem  bat  Pei  may  be  no  wey  for3etyn  hym.  How  meche  mor  myth 
bei  wepyn,  cryen,  &  roryn  3yf  her  most  belouyd  frendys  wer  wyth 
vyolens  takyn  in  her  sygth  &  wyth  at  maner  of  reprefe  browt  be-for 
be  juge,  wrongfully  condemnyd  to  be  deth,  &  namely  so  spyteful  a 
deth  as  owr  mercyful  Lord  suffyrd  for  owyr  sake.  How  schuld  bei 
suf[fyr  y]t?  No  dowt  but  bei  xulde  boge  cry  &  rore  &  wrekyn  hem 
3yf  bei  myth,  &  ellys  men  wold  sey  bei  wer  no  frendys.  Alas,  alas, 
for  sorwe,  bat  be  deth  of  a  creatur  whech  hat  oftyn  synned  & 
trespasyd  a-geyn  her  Maker  xal  be  so  vnmesurabely  mornyd  & 
sorwyd.  &  it  is  offen  to  God  &  hyndryng  to  be  sowlys  on  eche 
syde.  (70-71) 
We  have  already  seen  that  grief-madness  was  held  in  moral  suspicion  by  the 
churchmen.  John  Hirsch's  observation  that  this  passage  'reads  like'  the 
priest-scribe's  interpolation  rather  than  Kempe's  own  explanation  is  therefore 
plausible. 
48  There  are  also  stylistic  reasons  for  thinking  that  this  passage  was  not 
written  by  Kempe.  First,  the  orderly  catalogue  of  causes  and  the  questioning  style 
are  quite  untypical  of  the  Book.  More  significantly,  the  passage  is  unique  in  the 
Book  in  that  it  does  not  refer  explicitly  to  Kempe  or  her  actions;  as  the  large 
number  of  conditional  subordinating  conjunctions  indicates,  it  is  a  lengthy  and 255 
theoretical  narrative  digression.  We  may  tentatively  conclude  that  this  justificatory 
passage  was  either  written  or  significantly  reinterpreted  by  the  priest-scribe. 
This  was  not  done,  of  course,  without  Kempe's  knowledge.  Indeed,  it  is 
possible  that  Kempe  invented  the  priest-scribe  and  that  in  this  passage  she  is 
merely  ventriloquising  a  clerical  voice.  Whatever  the  case,  Kempe  had  complete 
control  over  the  contents  of  her  Book.  We  must  therefore  see  her  as  prudently 
defending  her  suspiciously  female  form  of  devotion  by  invoking  an  ecclesiastical 
condemnation  of  madness.  Kempe's  allegiances  have  temporarily  shifted:  if  her 
madness  was  precipitated  by  a  Church  representative,  it  is  precisely  by  means  of 
such  authority  that  she  now  establishes  her  sanity. 
Kempe's  remark  that  those  who  suffer  from  grief-  or  study-induced 
madness  'displesyn  God'  recalls  Fabri's  condemnation  of  the  behaviour  of 
Jerusalem  pilgrims,  as  does  her  reference  to  the  madmen's  'inordinat  lofe  & 
fleschly  affeccyon'.  The  latter  phrase  also  echoes  the  expression  Kempe  uses  to 
describe  the  sinful  pleasures  of  her  early  married  life,  the  guilty  memory  of  which 
may  have  contributed  to  her  madness.  We  are  therefore  encouraged  to  make  a 
qualitative  distinction  between  Kempe's  divinely-inspired  cryings  --  and  by 
extension  her  other  religious  gifts  such  as  the  power  of  prophecy  --  and  the  sort  of 
sinful  madness  from  which  she  suffers  at  the  beginning  of  the  Book. 
Kempe's  need  to  emphasize  the  separateness  of  her  devotional  tears  and  her 
earlier  psychosis  is  best  understood  in  the  context  of  the  medieval  Church's  ideas' 
about  religious  ecstasy.  The  difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  experiences  of 
madness  and  true  religious  ecstasy  has  bedevilled  the  Christian  tradition.  Both 
conditions  involve  a  loss  of  identity:  the  madman  loses  his  memory;  the  ecstatic, 
etymologically,  is  'displaced'  or  'beside  himself'.  Furthermore,  both  madness  and 
mystical  experience  are  more  or  less  inaccessible  to  rational  investigation:  students 
of  mysticism  frequently  comment  on  what  William  James  called  the  'ineffability' 
or  incommunicability  of  the  experience  of  religious  ecstasy,  just  as  philosophers 
point  to  the  paradox  involved  in  reasoning  about  madness.  Such  considerations  did 256 
not,  however,  deter  medieval  writers  from  discussing  madness  or  divine  ecstasy, 
or  from  distinguishing  carefully  between  them. 
Despite  their  occasional  toleration  of  ecstatic  behaviour,  the  Church 
Fathers  agreed  that  divine  inspiration  and  insanity  were  incompatible.  The 
psychiatric  historian  Gregory  Zilboorg  recounts  the  famous  story  of  Tertullian's 
association  with  two  female  ecstatics.  Although  the  episode  predates  the  Book  by 
some  twelve  centuries,  the  conduct  of  these  women  resembles  not  only  Kempe's, 
but  also  that  of  the  'holy  madwoman'  who  appears  later  in  the  Book: 
He  [Tertullian]  wrote  of  a  certain  Montanus,  who,  although  a 
heretic,  claimed  to  bring  a  new  light  to  the  Christian  world. 
Montanus  knew  two  women,  Prisca  and  Maximilla,  and  all  three 
were  apparently  somnambulistic  and  suffered  from  attacks  of  grande 
hysterie.  Two  bishops  in  succession,  St.  Zephyrinus  and  St.  Victor, 
were  convinced  of  the  prophetic  powers  of  these  three  sick  people, 
and  they  were  accorded  'letters  of  peace.  Tertullian  at  first  thought 
that  Montanus  and  his  two  friends  were  'in  error,  '  but  he  soon  felt 
convinced  that  when  in  ecstasy  they  really  possessed  prophetic 
powers.  'There  is  now  among  us,  '  he  relates,  'a  sister  who  is 
favored  with  the  gift  of  revelations.  These  come  to  her  in  church  in 
the  midst  of  the  consecration  of  sacraments,  when  she  enters  the 
state  of  ecstasy.  While  in  this  state,  she  converses  with  angels  and  at 
times  even  with  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ.  In  her  rapture  she  sees  and 
hears  the  celestial  secrets,  she  knows  what  is  concealed  in  the  hearts 
of  some  people  and  she  gives  information  about  salutary  remedies'. 
Zilboorg  concludes  from  this  passage  that  Tertullian  considered  'mental  diseases 
with  religious  ecstatic  trends  as  coming  from  the  Lord  and  his  angels'.  49  Of 
course,  the  claim  that  these  three  supposed  mystics  were  in  any  sense  sick  or 257 
hysterical  is  Zilboorg's,  not  Tertullian's.  For  the  Church  Fathers,  true  insanity 
could  not  be  divine  in  origin.  In  fact,  as  David  Knowles  says,  the  reduction  of  all 
mystical  phenomena  to  the  category  of  hysteria  is  'against  all  the  traditional 
teaching  of  the  Church  on  the  development  of  the  spiritual  life'.  50  A  man  or 
woman  claiming  to  be  a  mystic  might  therefore  be  either  insane  or  touched  by 
God,  but  surely  not  both.  'The  patristic  tradition',  says  William  Ober,  'held  that  a 
prophet  must  be  conscious  and  in  full  command  of  his  faculties'.  51  This  point  is 
made  clear  in  Ronald  Knox's  study  Enthusiasm.  'The  spokesmen  of  orthodoxy', 
writes  Knox,  'were  inclined  to  view  with  suspicion  any  kind  of  enthusiasm  which 
was  accompanied  by  alienation  of  the  senses'.  52 
The  same  view  is  ubiquitous  in  the  writings  of  late-medieval  mystics. 
Walter  Hilton  emphasizes  that  true  mystical  experiences  cannot  occur  without  the 
exercise  of  the  faculty  of  reason: 
For  wyte  you  wele  Pat  a  nakyd  mynde  or  a  nakyd  ymaginacion  of 
Ihesu  or  of  any  gastly  thynge,  with-outyn  swetenes  of  We  in 
affeccyon,  or  with-outyn  ly3te  of  knowynge  in  resone,  it  is  bot  a 
blyndenes,  &a  way  to  disceyte,  if  a  man  halde  it  in  hys  awen  sy3te 
mare  Pan  it  is.  Perfor  I  halde  it  sekyr  pat  he  be  meke  in  his  awen 
felynge,  and  hald  pis  mynde  in  regarde  nou3t  til  he  may  by  custome 
&  vsynge  of  pis  mynde  fele  be  fyre  of  We  in  hys  affeccion,  &  be 
li3t  of  knawynge  in  hys  resone.  53 
The  abandonment  of  reason  leaves  the  aspiring  mystic  open  to  satanic  suggestion 
or  madness.  'No  writers',  says  Ronald  Knox,  'have  insisted  more  strongly  than  the 
mystics  themselves  on  the  fact  that  ecstasy  can  be  counterfeited  by  diabolic 
influence,  or  even  by  hysteria.  One  of  the  privileges  of  sanctity,  it  is  not 
necessarily  a  mark  of  sanctity'.  54  Thus  the  English  mystic  Richard  Rolle,  with 
whose  Incendium  Amoris  Kempe  elsewhere  claims  familiarity,  describes  how  the 258 
over-eager  mystic  can  fall  into  error  through  physical  infirmity  or  the  workings  of 
the  devil: 
are  he  be  callede  of  Godd,  he  gedyrs  his  wittys  by  violence  to  seke 
and  to  be-halde  heuenly  thynges,  are  his  eghe  be  made  gastely  by 
grace,  and  ouertrauells  by  ymaginaciouns  his  wittes,  and  by 
undiscrete  trauellynge  turnes  be  braynes  in  his  heuede,  and 
for-brekes  be  myghtes  and  Pe  wittes  of  be  soule  and  of  be  body;  and 
ban,  for  febilnes  of  be  brayne,  hym  thynkes  pat  he  heres 
woundirfull  sownes  and  sanges,  and  pat  is  no  thynge  ells  bot  a 
fantasie  caused  of  trubblyng  of  be  brayne,  as  a  man  pat  es  in  a 
fransye,  hym  thynkes  Pat  he  herys  or  sese  bat  na  notier  man  duse, 
and  all  es  bot  vanyte  and  fantasie  of  be  heued;  or  elles  by  wyrkyng 
of  be  enemy  bat  fenys  swylke  sowune  in  his  herynge.  55 
Rolle's  terms  constitute  a  familiar  rhetoric  of  moral  censure:  'fantasie',  'vanyte' 
and  'fransye'  are  precisely  those  words  used  to  ridicule  the  'madmen'  in  Chaucer's 
Miller's  and  Summoner's  tales. 
In  the  light  of  such  disapproving  invectives,  Kempe's  fear  of  being 
regarded  as  insane  is  understandable.  When  she  meets  Julian  of  Norwich  in 
Chapter  18,  she  is  advised  to  obey  the  will  of  God  in  whatever  way  she  pleases,  so 
long  as  'it  wer  not  a-geyn  be  worshep  of  God  &  profyte  of  hir  euyn-cristen,  for, 
yf  it  wer,  pan  it  wer  nowt  be  mevyng  of  a  good  spyryte  but  rapar  of  an  euyl 
spyrit'  (42).  Julian  does  not  doubt  the  pedigree  of  Kempe's  ecstasies;  she  simply 
recognizes  that  madness  and  the  devil  lie  always  in  wait  for  the  unwary  mystic. 
There  are  indeed  many  who  believe  Kempe  to  be  possessed.  As  a  young 
monk  of  Lincoln  says  to  her,  'Eypyr  pow  hast  be  Holy  Gost  or  ellys  pow  hast  a 
devyl  wyth-in  be,  for  pat  pu  spekyst  her  to  vs  it  is  Holy  Wrytte,  and  bat  hast  bu 
not  of  piself'  (28).  Similarly,  a  steward  of  Leicester  who  sexually  molests  her 259 
demands  to  know,  on  pain  of  imprisonment,  whether  her  'speche'  comes  'of  God 
er of  De  Devyl'  (113).  Kempe  is  sensitive  to  these  doubts  and  frequently  expresses 
her  'drede  for  illusyons  &  deceytys  of  hyr  gostly  enmys'  (3).  That  the  first  book 
should  end  with  a  warning  about  the  proper  interpretation  of  divine  revelations 
also  shows  that  authenticity  is  a  major  concern. 
The  real  issue  here,  of  course,  is  not  whether  Kempe's  religious 
experiences  were  real,  but  to  what  extent  others  believed  their  veracity.  In  the  late 
Middle  Ages  prophecy  was  always  a  dangerous  business  associated  with  deception: 
that  other  fifteenth-century  resident  of  Lynn,  John  Capgrave,  records  the 
attempted  assasination  of  Henry  III  at  Woodstock  by  'a  clerk,  whech  feyned  him  a 
prophete,  and  sumtyme  feyned  him  frentik'.  56  Kempe  was  not  exempt  from 
suspicion.  In  fact,  'concerning  Margery  Kempe's  status  as  saintly  or  mad, 
authentic  or  hypocritical,  public  opinion,  as  reported  in  her  Book,  is  more  divided 
and  fragile  than  it  is  of  any  other  English  or  continental  mystic'.  57 
Unfortunately,  many  critics  have  tended  to  blur  Kempe's  careful 
distinctions  between  insanity  and  religious  ecstasy  by  seeing  her  as  both  saintly 
and  mad.  This  view,  we  have  already  suggested,  is  based  on  twentieth-century 
scientific  assumptions  which  had  little  currency  in  the  Middle  Ages.  As  Carolly 
Erikson  remarks,  'our  lexicon  associates  visions  with  mysticism,  irrationality, 
occultism,  impracticality,  and  madness.  From  our  point  of  view  the  visionary  is  a 
person  who  sees  what  isn't  there'.  58  In  our  culture,  then,  mystical  experience  is 
continuous  with  delusion  and  insanity.  This  may  explain  the  tendency  of  literary 
critics  and  psychiatric  historians  to  regard  madness  and  religious  ecstasy  as 
compatible  in  the  medieval  mind.  Donald  R.  Howard  avers  that  Kempe  is  'quite 
mad,  an  incurable  hysteric  with  a  large  paranoid  trend';  but,  he  continues,  'to  the 
medieval  way  of  thinking  this  was  not  incompatible  with  real  visions'.  This  leads 
Howard  to  speculate  that  Kempe  'may  after  all  have  been  the  real  thing,  a  holy 
madwoman'. 
59  Derek  Pearsall  even  regards  the  idea  that  '"real"  fools  and 
madmen  have  a  special  access  to  God  and  God's  truth'  as  'a  common  belief  in  the 260 
Middle  Ages'.  60  The  psychiatric  historian  Roy  Porter  also  asserts  that  madness 
was  often  divine.  Basing  his  argument  on  Michael  Screech's  provocative 
contention  that  'madness  and  Christianity  go  hand  in  hand',  Porter  states  that 
madness,  as  well  as  being  seen  as  a  sign  of  moral  turpitude,  'can  also  be  holy, 
either  as  the  innocent  otherwordliness  of  the  Pauline  fool  or  as  the  ecstasy  of  the 
Old  Testament  prophet'. 
61  But  these  assertions  of  what  constituted  madness  in  the 
Middle  Ages  are  oversimplified,  if  not  entirely  misleading. 
The  theme  of  Pauline  folly  or  the  'Folly  of  the  Cross'  is  important  in  the 
Book.  Roland  Maisonneuve  has  convincingly  demonstrated  that  Kempe  presents 
herself  as  a  'Fool  for  Christ'.  62  Throughout  her  life  she  suffers  with  humility  the 
scorn  of  her  friends  and  companions.  Indeed,  she  was  'mery  whan  sche  was 
repreuyd,  skornyd,  or  japyd  for  ower  Lordys  lofe,  &  mych  mor  mery  kan  sche 
was  be-for-tyme  in  ke  worshepys  of  Pe  world'  (13).  Moreover,  Christ  tells  her 
that  by  enduring  worldly  humiliation  she  is  assured  of  his  grace:  '  "Dowtyr,  is 
plesith  me rith  wel,  for  je  mor  schame  &  mor  despite  pat  Pu  hast  for  my  lofe,  be 
mor  joy  schalt  you  haue  wyth  me  in  Heuyn,  and  it  is  rithful  pat  it  be  so"'  (185). 
On  one  occasion  during  Kempe's  visit  to  the  Holy  Land,  the  theme  of  holy 
folly  becomes  explicit.  Kempe's  fellow  pilgrims  become  so  exasperated  by  her 
weeping  that  they  humiliate  her  by  forcing  her  to  wear  the  white  gown  of  a  fool,  a 
form  of  clothing  that  Kempe  elsewhere  adopts  by  choice  despite  its  associations 
with  the  suspect  Flagellant  sect: 
They  cuttyd  hir  gown  so  schort  pat  it  come  but  lytil  be-nethyn  hir 
kne  &  dedyn  hir  don  on  a  whyte  canwas  in  maner  of  a  sekkyn  gelle, 
for  sche  xuld  ben  holdyn  a  fool  &  be  pepyl  xuld  noy  makyn  of  hiy 
ne  han  hir  in  reputacyon.  Pei  madyn  hir  to  syttyn  at  be  tabelys  ende 
be-nethyn  alle  obey  pat  sche  durst  ful  euyl  spekyn  a  word.  (62) 261 
It  has  been  suggested  that  'gelle'  is  'an  extension  of  gill  or  jill,  a  familiar  or 
contemptuous  term  applied  to  a  woman'.  63  At  all  events,  this  episode  fulfills 
Christ's  graphic  warning  to  Kempe  that  she  would  be  'etyn  &  knawyn  of  the  pepul 
of  the  world  as  any  raton  knawyth  the  stokfysch'  (17).  'Holy  folly',  as  Karma 
Lochrie  observes,  'clearly  carries  none  of  the  protection  or  allowances  made  for 
the  court  fool' 
. 
64 
Kempe's  humiliation  here  recalls  her  earlier  encounter  with  the  'hastye' 
confessor:  in  both  instances  she  is  forced  into  the  role  of  madwoman  and  is 
reduced  to  silence  --  a  conventional  token  of  insanity  --  by  unsympathetic  members 
of  her  community.  Clearly,  however,  the  imputations  of  madness  here  are 
spurious.  Michael  Screech  argues  that,  for  Erasmus,  St  Paul  himself  was  seen  -- 
and  even  regarded  himself  --  as  truly  insane.  But  Screech's  retention  of  inverted 
commas  when  referring  to  St  Paul,  Christ  and  other  men  and  women  as  'mad' 
suggests  a  degree  of  circumspection.  65  In  fact,  as  Screech's  quotations  from  the 
Praise  of  Folly  make  clear,  Erasmus  noted  only  the  similarity,  not  the  identity,  of 
madness  and  religious  rapture.  Christian  ecstasy,  he  writes  in  the  Praise  of  Folly, 
is  'a  kind  of  madness'  (insaniam  quandam)  'very  like  dementedness'  (dementiae 
simillimum). 
66  Kempe's  white  gown  resembles  that  of  Christ  as  he  is 
representated  in  late-medieval  portrayals  of  the  Mocking  of  Christ,  an 
identification  which  implies  both  her  sanctity  and  her  sanity.  67  The  Fool  for 
Christ  is  not  truly  insane;  he  is  merely  held  mad  by  others. 
Nor  were  the  Old  Testament  prophets  considered  mad  according  to 
conventional  theology.  On  the  contrary,  the  Bible  'made  it  virtually  impossible  for 
a  theologian  to  admit  of  any  connection  between  true  prophecy  and  insanity.  68  As 
Ronald  Knox  concludes  in  his  discussion  of  Tertullian's  involvement  in  the 
so-called  Montanist  heresy,  'it  seems  quite  clear  that  the  orthodox  of  the  second 
century  [...  ]  distinguished  sharply  between  prophecy  and  alienation  of  the  senses'. 
Later,  St  Jerome  expends  much  energy  'assuring  us  that  the  Old  Testament 
prophets  had  all  their  wits  about  them'  and  Albert  the  Great  insists  that  true 262 
prophets,  unlike  the  insane,  have  control  over  the  onsets  of  their  trances.  69  It  is 
therefore  all  the  more  significant  that  it  is  Jerome  who  endorses  Kempe's  tears 
when  he  appears  to  her  at  his  tomb  in  the  church  of  St  Maria  Maggiore  in  Rome 
(99).  70  For  the  Church  Fathers,  neither  the  Pauline  fool  nor  the  Old  Testament 
prophet  could  be  described,  from  a  Christian  perspective,  as  truly  mad. 
Medieval  medical  authorities  bolstered  the  Church's  views  by  stressing  that 
madness  could  produce  only  the  delusion  of  true  prophecy.  The  seventh-century 
Byzantine  author  Paul  of  Aegina,  for  example,  notes  that  some  melancholics 
appear  to  'fortell  what  is  to  come,  as  if  under  divine  influence;  and  these  are, 
therefore,  properly  called  demoniacs,  or  possessed  persons'.  Paul's  'demoniacs' 
probably  refers  to  the  Greek  tradition  of  divine  inspiration;  nevertheless,  Paul 
clearly  disbelieves  that  prophecies  in  such  circumstances  are  true.  In  this  he 
follows  his  sixth-century  predecessor  Alexander  of  Tralles.  71 
Roy  Porter  stresses  the  very  different  origins  of  madness  and  mystical 
ecstasy  in  Christian  theology.  'Satan's  voice',  he  writes,  'mimicked  God's,  and 
when  such  diabolical  ventriloquism  happened,  "divine  ecstasy"  imploded  into 
raving  madness'.  72  Hence  the  Church's  requirement  that  visionaries,  for  example, 
undergo  rigorous  testing  (probatio)  to  determine  the  truth  of  their  experiences  and 
to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  delusion  through  mental  infirmity.  73  However 
difficult  they  may  have  been  to  disentangle  in  practice,  'raving  madness'  and 
'divine  ecstasy'  were  carefully  distinguished  in  medieval  theology  and  medicine; 
orthodoxy  permitted  no  overlap  between  them.  It  is  true  that  'at  no  time  since  the 
first  century  has  it  been  possible  to  draw  a  sharp  line  between  several  kinds  of 
Christian  other-worldliness  and  diabolical  or  organic  madness'.  74  The 
fifteenth-century  Alphabet  of  Tales,  for  example,  relates  Jacques  de  Vitry's 
description  of  'devote  wommen,  pat  was  so  hugelie  ravissid  with  thoght  of  holy 
liffyng,  pat  of  all  Pe  day  per  was  no  Witt  in  paim  vnto  none  oute-ward  thyng'.  75 
Nevertheless,  Christian  writers  attempted  to  draw  a  line  between  madness  and 
religious  ecstasy  and  were  extremely  anxious  that  it  should  not  be  crossed. 263 
The  point  is  neatly  illustrated  in  the  autobiography  of  the  thirteenth-century 
Flemish  mystic  Beatrice  of  Nazareth,  who,  like  Kempe,  longed  so  ardently  for 
Christ  that  'very  often,  destitute  of  the  obedience  of  her  corporeal  senses,  she  was 
not  able  to  discern  by  their  services  what  was  outside  her'.  76  Despite  this 
apparently  insane  behaviour,  Beatrice  was  regarded  by  her  biographer  as  saintly; 
but  when  she  consulted  her  confessor  about  the  possibility  of  'molding  herself  to 
the  way  of  [...  ]  madness  or  foolishness'  she  was  advised  against  it.  77  The 
confessor's  reluctance  to  endorse  her  project  implies  that  Beatrice  had  not  yet,  in 
his  estimation,  become  insane,  and  that  such  a  development  would  be  undesirable. 
Clearly,  then,  madness  did  not  intersect  with  mystical  rapture.  'In  Christian 
theology,  as  in  Christian  medicine',  says  Judith  Neaman  simply,  'true  madness 
was  never  divine' 
"78 
Nevertheless,  to  be  mistakenly  held  mad  by  others  is  the  lot 
of  the  mystic.  In  the  thirteenth-century  prose  legend  of  St  Christina,  for  example, 
the  saint's  family  and  friends  suppose  her  to  be  possessed  on  account  of  her 
bizarre  behaviour: 
Therfore  after  bis  whan  Cristyn  fledde  be  presens  of  folke  wib  a 
wonder  loping  into  wildernesse  and  in  to  trees,  into  be  coppys  of 
tourys  or  chirches  or  of  obere  hye  thinges:  hir  frendys,  supposynge 
hir  wode  and  ful  of  fendes,  atte  laste  with  grete  laboure  toke  hir  and 
bonde  hir  with  chaynes  of  yren.  And  whan  sche  so  bounden  hadde 
soffred  many  pennuryes  and  peynes,  but  moost  in  sauour  of  men: 
vpon  a  nighte  sche  was  holpen  of  oure  lorde,  and  hir  bondys  and 
fettirs  vndone  she  skaped  aweye  and  fledde  ferre  into  deserte  to 
wodes,  and  Pere  she  Iyued  as  bryddes  don,  in  trees.  [...  ]  be 
mene-tyme  she  was  soghte,  founden  and  taken  of  hir  freendys,  and 
tyed  with  yren  chaynes,  as  she  was  byfore.  79 264 
Christina's  friends  and  family  are  ashamed  of  the  saint's  behaviour.  They  bind  her 
and  feed  her  like  a  dog  with  bread  and  water,  a  detail  which  recalls  the  treatment 
of  those  heroes  and  heroines  of  romance  who  either  become  or  pretend  to  be  mad. 
Both  Robert  of  Sicily  and  Clerimond  in  Valentine  and  Orson,  for  example,  are 
forced  to  live  as  hounds.  Most  significantly,  Christina's  treatment  allies  her  with 
Christ,  whose  family  try  to  restrain  him  as  a  madman.  80 
Other  female  ascetics  exhibit  mad  behaviour.  The  self-mutilation  of  St 
Elizabeth  of  Spalbeck,  so  reminiscent  of  Kempe's  behaviour  during  her  psychosis, 
appears  maniacal  to  others:  'sche  takip  her  owne  cheekys,  be  whiche  byfore  sche 
hadde  smyten  wip  many  strokes,  now  with  be  platte  hande  now  wip  be  fiste,  and 
obere-while  wit,  her  fingers,  drawen  to-gedir,  as  sche  wolde  pulle  oute  her 
chaules'. 
81  The  Alphabet  of  Tales  relates  the  story  of  a  holy  nun  whose  asceticism 
causes  her  to  be  considered  mad  by  the  other  sisters  of  her  order.  Only  the  visiting 
St  Patrick,  himself  a  wilderness-dwelling  ascetic,  recognizes  her  sanctity:  'sho  is 
wise,  &  ye  er  bod  fules;  ffor  sho  is  bettyr  pan  owder  ye  or  I' 
. 
82 
Like  these  holy  women,  Kempe  is  held  mad  by  many  in  her  society. 
Moreover,  she  appears  to  encourage  allegations  of  insanity  by  likening  her  cryings 
to  the  ravings  of  madmen  and  drunkards.  Alcoholic  intoxication,  we  have  seen, 
was  inextricably  linked  with  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages;  but  it  was  also  widely 
used  as  a  metaphor  for  mystical  experience.  'The  drunken  consciousness',  as 
William  James  recognized,  'is  one  part  of  the  mystic  consciousness'.  83  In  Chapter 
41  Kempe  becomes 
so  delectabely  fed  wyth  be  swet  dalyawns  of  owr  Lorde  &  so 
fulfilled  of  hys  lofe  bat  as  a  drunkyn  man  sche  turnyd  hir  fyrst  on 
be  o  syde  &  sithyn  on  be  oiler  wyth  gret  wepyng  &  gret  sobbyng, 
vn-mythy  to  kepyn  hir-seife  in  stabilnes  for  be  vnqwenchabyl  fyer 
of  lofe  whech  brent  ful  sor  in  hir  sowie.  Pan  meche  pepyl  wonderyd 
up-on  hir,  askyng  hir  what  sche  eyled,  to  whom  sche  as  a  creatur  at 265 
wowndyd  wyth  lofe  &  as  reson  had  fayled,  cryed  wyth  lowde  voys, 
'ke  Passyon  of  Crist  sleth  me'.  (98) 
Similarly,  when  her  mind  is  'raueschyd'  in  church  at  Candlemas,  Kempe  is  unable 
to  bear  her  candle  to  the  priest  with  the  rest  of  the  congregation  and  instead  'went 
waueryng  on  eche  syde  as  it  had  ben  a  dronkyn  woman'  (198).  Unlike  Hoccleve  in 
his  Complaint,  then,  Kempe  uses  drunkenness  as  an  analogy  not  for  madness,  but 
for  religious  ecstasy.  This  is  risky,  for  Kempe  must  beware  undermining  her  status 
as  a  holy  woman  by  allowing  her  metaphors  to  be  taken  literally.  As  the  ever-wary 
marginal  annotator  of  the  Butler-Bowden  manuscript  insists,  Kempe's 
'drunkenness'  should  be  interpreted  as  a  case  of  ebrietas  sancta  (98). 
Kempe  is  well  aware  of  the  dangerous  potential  of  her  metaphors.  A 
passage  she  quotes  from  the  fourteenth-century  compilation  Stimulus  Amoris 
recognizes  the  similarity  between  mystical  devotion  and  insanity  or  drunkenness  at 
the  same  time  as  it  distinguishes  between  them: 
'A,  Lord,  what  xal  I  mor  noysen  er  cryen?  Pu  lettyst  &  Pu  comyst 
not,  &  I,  wery  &  ouyrcome  thorw  desyr,  begynne  for  to  maddyn, 
for  lofe  gouernyth  me  &  not  reson.  I  renne  wyth  hasty  cowrs 
wher-pat-euyr  thu  wylte.  I  bowe,  Lord,  Pei  pat  se  me  irkyn  and 
rewyn,  not  knowyng  me  drunkyn  wyth  pi  lofe.  Lord,  Pei  seyn  "Lo, 
Sen  wood  man  cryeth  in  be  stretys,  "  but  how  meche  is  be  desyr  of 
myn  hert  Pei  parceyue  not.  '  (154) 
As  in  the  passage  justifying  Kempe's  tears  at  Calvary,  Kempe  stresses  that  the 
difference  between  drunkenness  or  madness  and  divine  ecstasy  is  not  simply  one  of 
degree.  Madness  here  is  spectacular  and  public;  mystical  rapture,  although 
apparently  similar,  is  in  truth  the  'desire'  of  the  'heart',  inherently  private, 
incommunicable  and  invisible.  In  Sarah  Beckwith's  phrase,  mysticism  involves  a 266 
'drive  towards  interiority'.  84  As  in  Hoccleve's  Complaint,  Kempe's  unease  about 
the  public  perception  of  her  unusual  behaviour  entails  a  deep  sense  of  division 
between  inner  and  outer. 
So  far  we  have  seen  that  Kempe,  after  her  initial  psychosis,  takes  pains  to 
emphasize  her  sanity  and  to  show  madness  as  a  token  of  sinfulness.  Towards  the 
end  of  the  Book,  however,  Kempe  presents  madness  in  a  very  different  light; 
moreover,  she  herself  shows  symptoms  of  a  variety  of  mental  and  physical 
illnesses.  As  has  already  been  suggested,  retrospective  clinical  diagnoses  are  of 
limited  value  and  are  in  any  case  often  bedevilled  by  a  lack  of  reliable  data;  what 
is  important  here  is  Kempe's  description  of  her  behaviour  and  the  contemporary 
response  to  it. 
Kempe's  freakish  behaviour  is  often  attributed  to  organic  diseases  other 
than  madness.  It  certainly  occurs  to  both  lay  and  clerical  observers  that  she  is 
suffering  from  a  'sekenes'.  One  suggested  cause  is  epilepsy,  a  condition  often 
identified  with  insanity  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Many  people  think  that  Kempe  has  the 
'fallyng  euyl'  and  spit  at  her  in  abhorrence  of  the  disease  (105).  That  Kempe's 
face  turns  blue  during  her  ecstasies  certainly  suggests  epilepsy,  although  Trudi 
Drucker  prefers  a  diagnosis  of  'convulsive  hysteria'.  85  And  although  it  is 
dangerous  to  apply  clinical  descriptions  to  historical  cases,  Kempe  also  arguably 
demonstates  the  chief  personality  changes  associated  with  epilepsy.  86  The  hostile 
reactions  of  others  towards  Kempe's  'sekenes'  may  therefore  be  attributable  to  the 
fact  that  of  all  illnesses  in  the  Middle  Ages,  epilepsy  was  the  'slowest  to  find  a 
plausible  pathology  of  a  rational  kind'.  87 
Not  all  diseases,  however,  were  treated  with  such  revulsion.  A  friar  who 
disbelieves  that  Kempe's  crying  is  a  gift  from  God  courteously  asks  her  to 
acknowledge  that  her  behaviour  is  caused  by  a  physical  illness,  a  'cardiakyl  er  sum 
oiler  sekenesse'  (151).  In  return  he  promises  to  tolerate  her  cryings  and  to 
encourage  the  people  to  pray  for  her.  Kempe,  of  course,  refuses  the  bargain.  Thus 
she  rejects  not  only  the  morally  stigmatising  allegations  of  possession  and 267 
drunkenness,  but  also  any  suggestion  that  her  behaviour  is  attributable  to  organic 
causes.  Eluned  Bremner  speculates  that  Kempe's  acceptance  of  a  natural  cause  of 
her  tears  would  have  aroused  suspicions  of  demonic  possession. 
88  This  is 
possible,  since  Kempe's  contemporaries  tend  to  see  her  either  as  a  holy  woman  or 
as  possessed  by  the  devil.  But  as  we  have  seen,  illness  could  be  regarded  as 
entirely  organic  in  origin.  More  plausible,  therefore,  is  Drucker's  suggestion  that 
if  Kempe  had  attributed  her  cryings  to  a  'kendly  seknes',  'she  would  have  had  to 
forfeit  the  unique  attention  she  attracted  and  become  only  another  uninteresting 
sick  woman'. 
89 
Nevertheless,  Kempe  does  present  herself  as  sick  and  even  insane.  She  is 
frequently  afraid  that  mental  illness  will  follow  from  her  many  physical 
infirmities.  90  Moreover,  she  displays  the  symptoms  of  mania  and  melancholia 
long  after  her  psychosis  of  1394.  Indeed,  in  assessing  Kempe's  mental  condition, 
we  must  be  careful  to  distinguish  her  early  postpartum  psychosis  --  usually  a 
self-limiting  condition  --  from  her  behaviour  in  the  rest  of  the  Book.  As  Freeman 
et  al.  rightly  complain,  too  many  critics  have  'extended  their  pronouncements'  on 
the  initial  psychotic  episode  'to  the  whole  of  The  Book'.  91 
Despite  the  fact  that  Kempe  suffers  a  'puerperal  breakdown  following  her 
first  child,  which  seems  to  have  been  psychotic  in  nature',  Dr  Anthony  Ryle  finds 
in  the  rest  of  the  Book  no  evidence  of  a  'continuing  psychotic  process'.  92  Most 
commentators,  however,  have  regarded  Kempe's  behaviour  after  her  first  bout  of 
madness  as  hysterical.  Freeman,  Bogorad  and  Sholomskas  summarize  some  of 
their  opinions: 
Howard  calls  Margery  Kempe  'an  incurable  hysteric  with  a  large 
paranoid  trend.  '  McCann  labels  her  as  manifesting  'violent 
hysteria.  '  Ryle  writes  of  'hysterical  personality  organisation.  '  Tuma 
calls  her  'hysterical  and  undoubtedly  mentally  unbalanced,  '  and 268 
Ober  applies  Carter's  1853  classification  to  Kempe  of  'tertiary 
93  hysteria'. 
Despite  the  popularity  of  such  speculation,  there  are  good  reasons  for  eschewing  it 
here.  First,  the  term  hysteria  has  accumulated  such  a  stigma  that  the  responsible 
critic  must  seriously  consider  the  wisdom  of  using  it  as  a  diagnostic  category.  94 
More  importantly,  the  diagnosis  of  hysteria,  however  interesting  to  modern 
physicians,  is  ultimately  anachronistic;  it  does  nothing  to  further  our  understanding 
of  the  Book,  Kempe's  condition,  or  medieval  reactions  to  it.  Indeed,  it  seems  most 
unlikely  that  either  psychiatry  or  modern  medicine,  as  Marion  Glasscoe  claims, 
provides  the  'most  helpful  perspective'  in  understanding  Kempe's  symptoms.  95 
A  far  more  promising  and  relevant  approach  is  taken  in  Freeman,  Bogorad 
and  Sholomskas's  recent  attempt  to  diagnose  Kempe's  pathology  in  terms  of 
medieval  medical  nosology.  Freeman  et  al.  argue  that  Kempe,  after  her  initial 
postpartum  psychosis,  suffered  'cyclical  episodes  of  mania  and  melancholia'.  96 
With  the  exception  of  her  initial  psychosis,  it  is  open  to  question  whether  a 
medieval  physician  would  have  found  much  in  Kempe's  behaviour  that  accorded 
with  the  traditional  definition  of  mania.  As  we  have  seen,  the  maniac  --  according 
to  the  textbooks  --  made  insulting  or  nonsensical  remarks  and  attempted  to  harm 
himself  and  others  so  that  he  had  to  be  restrained.  These  are  the  core  behavioural 
symptoms  of  mania,  and  they  apply  only  imperfectly  to  Kempe. 
Nevertheless,  Kempe  does  display  some  distinctly  manic-depressive  traits. 
Freeman,  Bogorad  and  Sholomskas  point  to  the  pride  that  she  takes  in  her  'showy 
manner  of  dressing'  as  evidence  of  her  mania,  quoting  Aretaeus  of  Cappadocias,  a 
second-century  physician  who  believed  the  classic  form  of  mania  to  be  the  bipolar 
form.  'The  patient  who  previously  was  gay,  euphoric,  inspired  and  hyperactive', 
says  Aretaeus,  'suddenly  has  a  tendency  to  melancholy;  he  becomes  at  the  end  of 
the  attack  languid,  sad,  taciturn,  he  complains  that  he  is  worried  about  his  future, 
he  feels  ashamed'.  After  the  depressive  phase  is  over,  the  madmen  'show  off  in 269 
public  with  crowned  heads  as  if  they  were  returning  victorious  from  the  games'.  97 
Freeman  compares  this  latter  observation  with  Kempe's  behaviour  shortly  after  her 
postpartum  psychosis: 
sche  wold  not  leeuyn  hir  pride  ne  hir  pompows  aray  Oat  sche  had 
vsyd  be-for-tym,  neipyr  for  hyr  husbond  ne  for  noon  ober  mannys 
cownsel.  And  3et  sche  wyst  ful  wel  pat  men  seyden  hir  ful  mech 
velany,  for  sche  weryd  gold  pypys  on  hir  hevyd  &  hir  hodys  wyth 
be  typettys  were  daggyd.  Hir  clokys  also  wer  daggyd  &  leyd  wyth 
dyuers  colowrs  be-twen  be  daggys  pat  it  schuld  be  pe  mor  staryng 
to  mennys  sygth  and  hir-self  be  mor  ben  worshepyd.  (9) 
This  detail  may  be  interpreted  in  at  least  two,  not  necessarily  incompatible  ways. 
On  the  one  hand,  Kempe's  'pompows  aray'  can  be  seen,  like  the  Wife  of  Bath's 
similar  gaudy  apparel,  as  a  near-statutory  assertion  of  wealth  and  status  in  an 
aggressively  competitive  capitalist  society.  98  But  the  suggestion  that  Kempe's 
display  is  a  symptom  of  mania  remains  a  possibility;  sartorial  ostentation  was 
interpreted  as  a  symptom  of  mania  in  women  until  at  least  the  early  twentieth 
century. 
99 
Freeman  also  points  out  that  Kempe  suffers  from  regular  bouts  of 
melancholia.  Kempe  never  exhibits  the  morbid  desire  for  death,  the  intense 
fearfulness,  the  sense  of  bodily  fragility  or  the  delusions  of  catastrophe  which 
attend  melancholics  in  medical  works  like  Bartholomeus  Anglicus's  De 
Proprietatibus  Rerum.  Nevertheless,  she  does  return  compulsively  to  her  feelings 
of  depression  and  despair  throughout  the  Book,  rather  as  Hoccleve  does  in  his 
Complaint. 
Perhaps  her  profoundest  and  most  prolonged  melancholic  episode  occurs 
near  the  beginning  of  the  Book,  in  Chapter  4.  Here  she  describes  her  guilt  for 270 
consenting  to  sexual  intercourse  with  a  man  who,  it  transpires,  is  merely  toying 
with  her: 
Pan  fel  sche  half  in  dyspeyr.  Sche  thowt  sche  wold  a  ben  in  Helle 
for  be  sorw  that  sche  had.  Sche  thowt  sche  was  worthy  no  mercy 
for  hir  consentyng  was  so  wylfully  do  ne  neuyr  worthy  to  don  hym 
seruyse  for  sche  was  so  fals  vn-to  hym.  [...  ]  but  he  wythdrowe  not 
hir  temptacyon  but  rapar  incresyd  it  as  hir  thowt.  And  perfore  wend 
sche  bat  he  had  forsakyn  hir  &  durst  not  trostyn  to  hys  mercy,  but 
was  labowrd  wyth  horrybyl  temptacyons  of  lettherye  &  of  dyspeyr 
ny  al  be  next  3er  folwyng,  saue  owyr  Lord  of  hys  mercy,  as  sche 
seyd  hir-self,  3af  hir  ech  day  for  the  most  party  too  owerys  of 
compunccyon  for  hir  synnys  wyth  many  byttyr  terrys.  &  sythen 
sche  was  labowryd  wyth  temptacyons  of  dyspeyr  as  sche  was  befor 
and  was  as  for  fro  felyng  of  grace  as  bei  that  neuyr  felt  noon.  & 
that  mygth  sche  not  beryn,  &  kerfor  al-wey  sche  dyspeyred.  Safe 
for  be  tyme  bat  sche  felt  grace,  hir  labowrs  wer  so  wondyrful  bat 
sche  cowd  euel  far  wyth  hem  but  euyr  mornyn  &  sorwyn  as  bow 
God  had  forsakyn  hir.  (16) 
We  may  compare  Kempe's  melancholia  here  with  Hoccleve's.  Whatever  religious 
significance  Hoccleve's  madness  may  have,  its  immediate  cause  is  to  be  found  in 
the  poet's  dire  financial  situation  and  his  stressful  working  conditions  in  the 
understaffed  Privy  Seal  Office.  Kempe's  melancholia  is  related  to  her  guilty  sexual 
feelings  and  is  much  more  closely  bound  up  with  her  religiosity;  it  springs  from 
her  theological  concern  that  she  is  beyond  redemption. 
Despite  her  careful  differentiations  between  insanity  and  mystical  union  at 
certain  points  of  the  Book,  then,  Kempe  shows  symptoms  of  madness.  This  is 
initially  perplexing.  If  madness  and  holiness  were  regarded  as  incompatible  in 271 
orthodox  thought,  it  may  seem  strange  that  a  medieval  woman  with  aspirations  to 
sainthood  would  risk  appearing  to  be  insane.  By  presenting  herself  as  insane  in  the 
eyes  of  others,  of  course,  she  places  herself  in  the  hallowed  company  of  the 
misunderstood  female  ecstatics  whom  she  admires  so  much.  But  Kempe  goes 
further  than  this,  by  admitting  to  symptoms  of  genuine  madness.  She  must 
therefore  find  some  way  of  vindicating,  or  at  least  softening  the  stigma  of 
madness. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  first  book,  Kempe  is  increasingly  accused  of  being 
mad  or  possessed  by  demons.  It  is  therefore  fitting  that  in  Chapter  74  she  visits 
and  helps  a  number  of  sick  people,  including  a  woman  assailed  by  demons.  Like 
Kempe  during  her  psychosis  and  her  depressive  bouts  later  in  the  Book,  this 
woman  is  tormented  by  the  devil  with  threats  of  damnation  and  lecherous 
thoughts.  Kempe,  understandably,  feels  sympathy  for  the  woman  and  is  able  to 
comfort  her  with  kind  words  and  prayers. 
Chapter  75  describes  Kempe's  cure  of  a  woman  suffering  from  postpartum 
psychosis.  This  is  a  thematically  and  structurally  important  event  whose  similarity 
to  the  description  of  Kempe's  postpartum  psychosis  has  not  escaped  critical 
notice. 
100  Its  inclusion  suggests  that  Kempe  is  a  cannier  artist  that  is  often 
allowed.  Nevertheless,  Kempe,  with  typically  ironic  ingenuousness,  does  not 
acknowledge  the  similarity  between  what  are  arguably  the  two  most  memorable 
events  in  the  Book.  Despite  Lynn  Staley's  observation  that  there  is  no  comfortable 
closure  or  circularity  in  the  Book,  this  episode,  like  the  preceding  one,  seems 
intended  to  mark  the  end  of  Kempe's  spiritual  journey  from  madness  to 
saintliness-101  The  circumstances  of  this  episode  indicate  that  the  onetime 
madwoman  has  become  a  locally  revered  holywoman  with  both  the  power  and  the 
authority  to  restore  the  deranged  to  their  senses. 
As  Kempe  is  praying  in  the  Church  of  St  Margaret  --  the  site  of  earlier 
miracles  --  a  distracted  man  approaches  her  and  implores  her  to  visit  his  wife  who, 
like  Kempe  at  the  beginning  of  the  Book,  has  gone  insane  shortly  after  childbirth. 272 
The  madwoman's  symptoms,  as  described  by  her  husband,  are  similar  to  those 
suffered  by  Kempe: 
As  Pe  sayd  creatur  was  in  a  chirch  of  Seynt  Margaret  to  sey  hir 
deuocyons,  Per  cam  a  man  knelyng  at  hir  bak,  wryngyng  hys 
handys  &  schewyng  tokenys  of  gret  heuynes.  Sche,  parceyuyng  hys 
heuynes,  askyd  what  hym  eylyd.  He  seyd  it  stod  ryth  hard  wyth 
hym,  for  hys  wyfe  was  newly  delyueryd  of  a  childe  &  sche  was  owt 
of  hir  tuende.  '&,  dame,  '  he  seyth,  'sche  knowyth  not  me  ne  non  of 
hir  neyborwys.  Sche  roryth  &  cryith  so  pat  sche  makith  folk  euyl 
a-feerd.  Sche  wyl  boge  smytyn  &  bityn,  &  perfor  is  sche  manykyld 
on  hir  wristys.  (177-178) 
The  passage  suggests  that  the  medieval  insane  led  a  far  from  carefree  life  and  that 
madness,  far  from  being  a  liberating  experience,  involved  extreme  suffering.  In 
David  Aers's  provocative  words,  'perhaps  there  is  an  anxiety  in  this  isolating 
confinement  of  the  female  victim  which  Foucault's  "history"  of  madness  might  not 
lead  one  to  expect  in  this  period'.  102 
Eventually  the  woman's  incessant  crying  so  exasperates  her  neighbours  that 
she  is  confined  in  a  room  at  the  outskirts  of  the  town.  Kempe,  who  converses  with 
her  easily  and  pleasantly,  helps  restore  her  to  her  right  mind;  the  madwoman 
regards  everyone  else  as  possessed  by  demons  and  tries  to  attack  them: 
So  sche  went  forth  wyth  hym  to  se  Pe  woman.  &,  whan  sche  cam 
in-to  Pe  hows,  as  sone  as  Pe  seke  woman  at  was  alienyd  of  hir 
witte  saw  hir,  sehe  spak  to  hir  sadly  &  goodly  &  seyd  sehe  was  ryth 
wolcome  to  hir.  &  sehe  was  ryth  glad  of  hir  comyng  and  gretly 
comfortyd  be  hir  presens,  'For  3e  arn,  '  sehe  seyd,  'a  ryth  good 
woman,  &I  behelde  many  fayr  awngelys  a-bowte  3ow,  &  kerfor,  I 273 
pray  3ow,  goth  not  fro  me,  for  I  am  gretly  comfortyd  be  3ow.  ' 
And,  whan  oiler  folke  cam  to  hir,  sche  cryid  &  gapyd  as  sche  wolde 
an  etyn  hem  &  seyd  bat  sche  saw  many  deuelys  a-bowtyn  hem. 
Sche  wolde  not  suffyrn  hem  to  towchyn  hir  be  hyr  good  wyl.  Sche 
roryd  and  cryid  so  boge  nyth  &  day  for  be  most  part  bat  men  wolde 
not  suffyr  hir  to  dwellyn  a-mongys  hem,  sche  was  so  tediows  to 
hem.  Pan  was  sche  had  to  be  forthest  ende  of  be  town  in-to  a 
chambyr  bat  be  pepil  xulde  not  heryn  hir  cryin.  &  per  was  sche 
bowndyn  handys  and  feet  wyth  chenys  of  yron  bat  sche  xulde 
smytyn  no-body.  (178) 
The  madwoman's  aversion  to  being  touched  obviously  indicates  a  deep  fear  of 
defilement  by  human  contact.  Indeed,  Kempe  asks  us  to  respect  this  madwoman  as 
an  irrational  sage  who  perceives  in  her  delirium  the  sinfulness  of  normal 
humanity.  Thus  the  madwoman  is  clearly  identified  as  Kempe's  spiritual  ally. 
Indeed,  the  language  in  which  she  is  described  recalls  the  terms  applied  to  Kempe 
elsewhere  in  the  Book:  Kempe's  behaviour  in  the  churches  of  London,  for 
example,  is  described  as  'tediows'  to  the  'curatys  &  preistys'  (245).  Moreover, 
unlike  the  possessed  woman  in  Chapter  74,  the  madwoman  is  not  a  virgin, 
corroborating  Christ's  early  message  to  Kempe  that  he  loves  'wyfes  also'  (49).  In 
other  ways,  the  episode  is  problematic:  the  sympathetic  attitude  towards  this 
woman's  mania  is  inconsistent  with  Kempe's  previous  insistence  on  the 
separateness  of  madness  and  blessedness.  In  fact,  Kempe  now  eschews  her  earlier 
moral  distinction  between  madness  and  divine  inspiration,  emphasising  the 
holiness,  rather  than  the  sinfulness  and  abjection  of  madness. 
Despite  its  rationale  in  terms  of  social  harmony,  the  madwoman's  removal 
to  the  fringes  of  the  town  has  a  positive  spiritual  significance.  Michel  Foucault 
stresses  the  symbolic  significance  of  the  madman's  liminal  position  in 274 
late-medieval  society.  If  he  was  not  cast  adrift  on  one  of  Foucault's  imaginary 
ships  of  fools,  the  madman  was  assigned  a 
liminal  position  on  the  horizon  of  medieval  concern  --  a  position 
symbolised  and  made  real  at  the  same  time  by  the  madman's 
privilege  of  being  confined  within  the  city  gates:  his  exclusion  must 
enclose  him;  if  he  cannot  and  must  not  have  another  prison  than  the 
threshold  itself,  he  is  kept  at  the  point  of  passage.  He  is  put  in  the 
interior  of  the  exterior,  and  inversely.  103 
The  madman's  simultaneous  inclusion  within  and  exclusion  from  society  suggests 
that  he  was  regarded  as  only  partly  belonging  to  the  world. 
The  insane  were  not  the  only  elements  of  medieval  society  to  occupy  such  a 
position.  One  is  struck  particularly  by  the  similarity  between  the  medieval 
madman's  marginal  location  and  that  of  the  medieval  anchorite,  who  was  typically 
walled  up  in  a  tiny  cell  adjacent  to  a  church,  with  only  a  small  window  to  the 
outside  world,  or  a  narrow  squint  into  the  church  itself.  The  anchorite's  cell  was 
fashioned  like  a  tomb,  so  that  her  confinement  signified  death  to  the  world.  104 
Thus  the  anchorite,  like  the  madwoman  in  the  Book,  occupies  what  the  sociologist 
Victor  Turner  calls  a  'betwixt  and  between'  position  in  society,  on  the  threshold 
(Latin  limen)  between  this  world  and  the  next.  105 
Whatever  the  associations  between  the  mad  and  religious  recluses,  the 
madwoman  visited  by  Kempe  is  certainly  close  to  the  spiritual  world.  The  attitude 
towards  her  madness  is  therefore  quite  different  to  that  in  Kempe's  description  of 
her  postpartum  psychosis,  which  was  seen  as  a  token  of  sinfulness.  Like 
Langland's  'lunatyk  lollares'  or  Geoffrey  of  Monmouth's  Merlin,  this  madwoman 
combines  elements  of  raving  madness  and  holiness  or  moral  insight.  The 
madwoman's  sanctity  is  further  suggested  by  the  fact  that,  like  the  female  saints  of 
the  prose  legends,  she  is  roughly  treated  by  her  family  and  neighbours.  When  she 275 
sees  angels  surrounding  her  visitor,  then,  she  vicariously  endorses  Kempe  as  a 
'ryth  good  woman'  (178). 
The  main  purpose  of  this  vignette,  of  course,  is  to  establish  Kempe  as  a 
healer  of  the  sick  and  insane,  like  other  holy  men  and  women  referred  to  in  the 
Book.  Kempe  is  therefore  obliged  to  stress  the  woman's  genuine  madness.  The 
unexpected  and  unorthodox  implication  of  the  anecdote  is  that  such  madness  is  not 
incompatible  with  divine  inspiration.  As  we  have  seen,  this  contradicts  both 
patristic  authority  and  the  warnings  of  contemporary  mystics.  It  also  contrasts 
radically  with  the  passage  describing  Kempe's  cryings  and  roarings  at  Calvary.  In 
the  earlier  passage,  Kempe,  in  the  voice  of  the  priest-scribe,  invokes  an 
authoritative  moral  distinction  between  sinful  madness  and  divine  inspiration,  and 
makes  it  clear  that  Kempe's  behaviour  is  of  the  latter  sort.  This,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  a  distinction  Kempe  insists  on  elsewhere  in  the  Book.  Here,  however,  the 
distinction  is  abandoned:  far  from  separating  man  from  God,  madness  has  become 
a  token  of  saintliness.  Thus  Chapter  75  shows  Kempe's  readiness  to  employ  very 
different  conceptions  of  madness  to  achieve  different  effects.  Clearly,  Kempe  is 
more  interested  in  validating  her  own  behaviour  than  in  maintaining  a  consistent 
position,  orthodox  or  otherwise,  on  the  relationship  between  insanity  and 
inspiration.  This  in  itself  is  a  significant  conclusion,  in  view  of  the  desire  of  many 
medieval  critics  to  regard  medieval  texts  as  coherent  expositions  of  a  single 
theological  perspective. 
The  comparison  between  the  anchorite  and  the  madwoman  at  'be  forthest 
ende  of  Pe  town'  implies  not  only  her  sanctity,  but  her  social  alienation.  Like  an 
anchorite,  and  like  Kempe  at  the  beginning  of  the  Book,  this  woman  is  unable  to 
communicate,  deprived  of  subjectivity  and  social  interaction.  In  this  connection, 
we  may  recall  a  monk's  gruff  aside  to  Kempe  in  Chapter  13:  '1  wold  pow  wer 
closyd'  in  an  hows  of  ston  pat  per  schuld  no  man  speke  wyth  Pe'  (27).  There  is  no 
critical  consensus  about  the  precise  meaning  of  these  words.  Possibly  he  wishes 
that  Kempe  were  an  anchorite;  or  perhaps  he  wants  to  have  her  confined  as  a 276 
madwoman.  In  either  case,  Kempe's  incarceration  would  neutralize  the  threat  to 
public  order  posed  by  her  unusual  behaviour.  As  we  shall  see  shortly,  male 
authorities  regarded  madwomen  and  secular  holy  women  as  threats  to  social 
stability  and  upbraided  them  all  in  similar  language. 
Despite  her  abjection,  the  madwoman  is  calm  in  Kempe's  presence  and  is 
eventually  returned  to  her  senses  thanks,  we  are  told,  to  her  visitor's  frequent 
visits  and  prayers.  Kempe  herself  does  not  claim  to  be  able  to  perform  miracles  -- 
a  precondition  for  sainthood.  Nevertheless,  the  woman's  cure  is  generally 
considered 
a  ryth  gret  myrakyl,  for  he  pat  wrot  Pis  boke  had  neuyr  be-for  pat 
tyme  sey  a  man  ne  woman,  as  hym  thowt,  so  fer  owt  of  hir-self  as 
pis  woman  was  ne  so  euyl  to  rewlyn  ne  to  gouernyn,  &  sithyn  he 
sey  hir  sad  &  sober  a-now,  worschip  &  preysyng  be  to  owr  Lord 
wythowtyn  ende  for  hys  by  mercy  &  hys  goodnes  bat  euyr  helpith 
at  nede.  (178-179) 
The  invocation  of  the  original  scribe  at  this  point  is  striking.  This  interjection, 
unlike  the  preceding  passage,  recalls  the  priest-scribe's  justification  of  Kempe's 
outrageous  behaviour  at  Calvary.  Once  again  madness  is  condemned  by  a 
representative  of  orthodoxy;  and  again,  Kempe's  actions  --  this  time  in  the 
interests  of  public  order  --  are  comfortably  endorsed  by  a  male  authority. 
Moreover,  Kempe's  comment  on  the  previously  'ungovernable'  condition 
of  the  madwoman  briefly  but  effectively  reinvokes  a  rhetoric  of  male  censure.  In 
the  Middle  Ages  and  Renaissance,  the  terms  'rule'  and  'governance'  had 
widespread  application.  Very  frequently,  however,  they  were  used  in  antifeminist 
contexts:  male  governance  was  considered  necessary  to  suppress  female  autonomy. 
The  author  of  the  fifteenth-century  Dives  and  Pauper  gives  the  following  warning: 277 
And  therfor  seith  the  lawe  that  the  offys  of  teching  &  chastysyng 
longyth  pout  only  to  the  buschop  but  to  euery  gouernour  aftir  his 
name  &  his  degre,  to  the  pore  man  gouernynge  his  pore  houshold, 
to  the  riche  man  gouernynge  his  mene,  to  the  housebond  gouernyng 
his  wif. 
106 
That  the  author  feels  such  instruction  necessary  implies  his  concern  that  powerful 
women  might  reject  male  rule:  for  every  Constance  there  is  a  Wife  of  Bath.  Such 
anxiety  is  evident  in  even  the  least  historically-specific  genres  of  medieval 
literature:  thus,  in  the  popular  lyric  La  Belle  Dame  Sans  Merci,  an  implacable 
mistress  tells  her  enthralled  suitor  that  she  will  not  'be  Rulyd  by  mannys 
gouernance'. 
107 
Since  such  a  degree  of  autonomy  was  generally  abhorred  as  unnatural  and 
even  mad,  the  causal  connection  between  madness  and  indiscipline  was  reversed, 
so  that  insane  women  were  described  as  'ungovernable'  or  'unrulable'.  These 
terms  often  referred  to  the  relationship  between  the  madwoman  and  her  relatives, 
especially  with  the  rise  of  the  bourgeois  nuclear  family.  In  his  examination  of  the 
case  notes  of  the  seventeenth-century  physician  Richard  Napier,  Michael 
MacDonald  has  shown  the  close  connection  between  female  insanity  and  domestic 
disobedience.  The  'frantic  and  raging'  Rose  Bateman,  for  example,  would  'not  be 
ruled  by  her  parents  and  friends'.  108  Indeed,  madwomen  were  often  described  as 
'unrulable'  or  'ungovernable'  until  at  least  the  nineteenth  century.  109 
Lay  religious  women  were  frequently  condemned  for  similar  reasons  and  in 
identical  language.  A  sixteenth-century  Spanish  writer,  for  example,  complains 
that  some  of  these  women 
no  longer  want  to  take  advice,  they  do  not  want  to  submit 
themselves  to  anyone.  [...  ]  Such  women  are  obedient  only  in  little 
ways,  [...  ]  but  in  all  the  rest,  in  important  matters,  they  question 278 
everything,  and  argue,  and  want  to  govern,  and  even  rule  their 
masters. 
110 
Kempe,  of  course,  is  constantly  made  aware  of  such  attitudes.  In  Chapter  43,  for 
example,  an  anchorite  demands  that  Kempe  be  'gouernyd'  by  him  (103).  Kempe 
refuses,  saying  that  God  does  not  wish  this,  indicating  that  divine  will  overrides 
male  governance.  Kempe's  unruliness  is  widely  recognized.  Everywhere  she  goes 
she  is  accused  of  being  a  heretic  and  of  abandoning  her  proper  role;  thus  the 
inhabitants  of  the  countryside  around  Beverley  advise  her  to  go  home  and  spin  like 
other  women  (129).  111  Moreover,  her  autonomy  is  considered  to  have  a 
corrupting  effect  on  others.  In  Beverley,  for  example,  she  is  accused  of  advising 
Lady  Greystoke,  the  daughter  of  Lady  Westmoreland,  to  leave  her  husband  --  an 
allegation  she  vehemently  denies  (133).  Kempe's  cure  of  the  madwoman  is 
therefore  important  in  vindicating  her  reputation  as  a  woman  of  probity.  By 
bringing  an  unruly  madwoman  to  order,  she  acquits  herself  of  the  charge  of  being 
a  disruptive  influence. 
Chapter  75,  then,  contains  a  characteristically  stealthy,  double-edged 
attempt  by  Kempe  to  vindicate  her  behaviour.  On  the  one  hand  it  suggests  that  'the 
holy  might  be  located  in  areas  where  we  are  not  usually  prepared  to  find  it':  since 
the  madwoman  is  a  seer,  she  is  able  to  endorse  Kempe's  sanctity.  112 
Nevertheless,  the  potentially  heretical  implications  of  such  subjective  validation 
are  shrewdly  offset  by  other,  more  orthodox,  strategies.  First,  Kempe's  cure  of  the 
madwoman  places  her  comfortably  in  the  eminent  company  of  those  like  Sir 
Gowther  who  abandon  the  madness  of  sin  to  become  saints  with  the  power  to  cure 
madness.  Furthermore,  by  couching  the  madwoman's  previously  'ungovernable' 
condition  in  the  well-established  rhetoric  of  male  censure,  Kempe  emphasizes  her 
religious  and  political  orthodoxy  and  negotiates  the  dualistic  'either/or'  thinking 
that  is  applied  to  her  throughout  the  Book.  113  Describing  her  privileged 
relationship  with  God  in  language  well-pleasing  to  His  representatives  on  earth, 279 
she  ensures  that  her  vicarious  authority  is  endorsed,  as  it  were,  from  both  above 
and  below.  Recent  research  suggests  that  this  careful  balancing  of  orthodox  and 
potentially  dangerous  ideas  is  a  feature  of  other  late-medieval  visionary 
autobiographies. 
114 
Regarded  as  an  historical  document,  the  Book  provides  some  simple 
conclusions  about  the  history  of  madness.  For  example,  both  Kempe's  experience 
of  insanity  and  that  of  the  madwoman  in  Chapter  75  indicate  that  madness 
involved  suffering  and  anxiety  rather  than  a  life  of  ease.  In  this  regard,  the 
treatment  of  madness  in  the  Book  corresponds  with  that  in  Hoccleve's  Series. 
Although  Hoccleve  and  Kempe  would  have  felt  little  kinship,  there  are  other, 
more  fundamental  similarities  between  the  Series  and  the  Book.  Stephen  Medcalf 
notes  that  Hoccleve  and  Kempe,  both  apparently  autobiographers,  were  also 
mentally  disturbed.  115  Indeed,  in  both  the  Series  and  the  Book  insanity  has  an 
important  structural  function:  as  a  radical  crisis  of  identity,  madness  constitutes  the 
inner  transformation  necessary  for  the  writing  of  autobiography. 
Kempe's  bouts  of  melancholia  are  isolating  and  private  experiences;  her 
apparent  mania,  on  the  other  hand,  renders  her  a  public  spectacle.  Her  experiences 
of  madness  are  therefore  a  source  of  alienation  and  self-consciousness.  Sarah 
Beckwith  fairly  refers  to  Kempe's  'acute  sense  of  audience',  concluding  that  'in 
place  of  the  "harmony  of  her  inner  and  outer  life"  which  Denise  Despres  has 
found  in  the  book,  I  find  rather  a  disjunction  of  inner  and  outer'.  116  Like 
Hoccleve,  Kempe  seeks  to  refute  public  allegations  of  madness  by  relating  her 
subjective  experiences;  as  she  herself  puts  it,  'kei  knewyn  ful  lytyl  what  sche  felt' 
(69).  Thus  her  account  of  madness,  like  Hoccleve's,  challenges  the  widespread 
assumption  that  medieval  authors  spoke  only  with  a  public  voice. 
In  other  ways  Kempe's  and  Hoccleve's  experiences  diverge  significantly. 
The  Book  illustrates  differences  between  the  female  and  male  experiences  of 
madness.  Hoccleve's  madness  is  precipitated  by  a  combination  of  professional  and 
financial  anxieties.  Kempe's  madness,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  product  of  her 280 
confusion  and  guilt  about  her  relation  to  her  husband,  her  uncontrollable  sexual 
urges  and  the  oppressions  of  various  civic  and  ecclesiatical  figures. 
Kempe's  social  rehabilitation,  too,  is  in  a  sense  more  ambiguous  and 
difficult  than  Hoccleve's.  Hoccleve's  bid  for  respectability  depends  upon  his 
eschewing  the  stigma  of  insanity  and  unruliness.  Kempe,  on  the  other  hand,  not 
only  behaves  in  such  as  way  as  to  court  allegations  of  insanity,  but  also  presents 
symptoms  of  genuine  madness.  The  public  reactions  to  Hoccleve  and  Kempe  after 
their  recoveries  also  differ  markedly.  Although  Hoccleve's  friends  think  him  still 
mad  after  his  recovery  and  shun  his  company,  their  attitude  towards  him  is 
essentially  sympathetic;  Kempe,  like  many  female  ecstatics,  is  widely  regarded  as 
possessed  by  demons.  This  attitude  stems  from  the  widespread  clerical  view  of 
women's  religious  activities  as  interchangeably  appealing  and  dangerous;  117 
and  it 
explains  why  Kempe  paradoxically  complements  her  insistence  on  the  separateness 
of  madness  and  divine  ecstasy  with  the  much  riskier  view  that  madness  can  be  a 
blessed  condition.  The  very  inclusion  of  such  an  unorthodox  viewpoint  attests  to 
the  radicalism  of  the  Book.  But  in  an  age  in  which  religious  heterodoxy  carried 
with  it  the  danger  of  burning  at  the  stake,  Kempe  treads  carefully.  Like  the 
Hoccleve  of  Jonathas  and  Fellicula,  she  ends  her  book  by  invoking  the  traditional 
male  rhetoric  on  female  unruliness  in  order  to  establish  herself  as  a  woman  of 
probity. 281 
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Conclusions 
Despite  the  dangers  of  generalizing  about  madness,  we  can  draw  a  number  of 
broad  conclusions  about  the  significance  of  madness  in  the  Middle  Ages  and  the 
function  of  insanity  in  the  medieval  texts  discussed  here.  Some  of  these 
conclusions  belong  to  the  domains  of  psychiatric  or  cultural  history,  others  to 
literary  criticism.  Since  we  have  so  far  not  endeavoured  to  separate  purely  literary 
considerations  (whatever  that  phrase  might  mean)  from  other  concerns,  there  is  no 
need  to  do  so  now.  In  any  case,  it  is  seldom  either  possible  or  necessary  to  decide 
when  a  theory  is  illuminating  a  text  or  vice  versa. 
In  the  Introduction  it  was  suggested  that  rather  than  interpret  texts  in  the 
light  of  a  pre-established  theory,  we  must  be  critically  flexible,  taking  account  of 
the  different  ways  in  which  medieval  writers  adapted  the  available  concepts  of 
madness  to  their  artistic  design  and  vision.  It  was  also  suggested  that  the  lack  of 
critical  consensus  about  the  definition  of  madness  has  been  a  considerable,  but 
hitherto  unacknowledged  obstacle  to  discovering  its  significance.  In  particular,  the 
tendency  of  critics  to  conflate  the  concepts  of  madness  and  folly  has  led  to 
alarmingly  widespread  disagreement  about  the  meaning  of  madness.  In  the  Middle 
Ages,  it  was  suggested,  madness  was  not  synonymous  with  folly;  on  the  contrary, 
legal,  theological,  and  literary  works  distinguished  madness  from  folly  in  all  of  its 
forms.  Although  frequently  associated  with  folly  of  various  kinds,  'madness'  or 
'woodness'  usually  referred  to  mania  or  melancholia.  Finally,  madness,  contrary 
to  a  vast  body  of  literary  critical  opinion,  was  not  generally  considered  a  blessed 
condition. 
Even  working  with  a  relatively  clear  definition  of  madness,  the  significance 
of  madness  in  medieval  literature  and  society  is  less  one-sided  than  certain 
psychiatric  historians  and  literary  critics  have  implied.  Perceptions  of  madness  and 
madmen  depended  on  a  writer's  social  position.  Theologians  stressed  the  causal 294 
connection  between  insanity  and  spiritual  turpitude.  Medical  writers,  however, 
generally  regarded  madness  as  an  organic  affliction  to  be  treated  by  rational 
methods.  Moreover,  as  Hoccleve's  Complaint  suggests,  the  theory  of  demonic 
possession  was  not  credited  by  all  elements  of  medieval  society. 
The  few  texts  examined  here  exhibit  a  striking  diversity  of  attitudes 
towards  madness.  Sometimes  madness  is  used  as  a  metaphor  for  sinfulness  or 
social  disintegration;  at  other  times  it  is  interpreted  as  an  occasion  for  sympathy, 
or  even,  in  exceptional  circumstances,  as  a  sign  of  sanctity.  Many  literary  texts 
contain  a  number  of  conflicting  views  of  madness.  Medieval  authors  clearly  saw 
madness  as  a  relatively  fluid  concept  which  could  be  used  to  achieve  various,  often 
contradictory  effects.  The  language  of  madness  can  be  used  either  to  articulate 
condemnation  of  the  politically  or  socially  unorthodox  or  to  register  dissent  from 
social  or  political  norms.  Indeed,  the  subversive  potential  of  madness  lies  in  its 
protean  nature,  its  capability  of  bearing  different  meanings  in  different 
circumstances. 
The  powerful  association  of  madness  and  sin  ensured  that  insanity 
functioned,  in  didactic  contexts  at  least,  as  a  metaphor  for  sin  and  its  punishment. 
Madness  has  this  significance  in  all  of  the  works  examined  here.  As  the  medieval 
chivalric  romances  demonstrate,  however,  madness  and  allegations  of  madness  can 
have  secular,  as  well  as  Christian  meanings.  As  well  as  evoking  a  Golden  Age  of 
chivalry,  Malory's  works  present  madness  as  the  outcome  of  a  struggle  for  a 
degree  of  autonomy  within  a  competitive  and  repressive  society.  At  this  level, 
Malory,  quite  as  much  as  Margery  Kempe,  presents  madness  in  a  recognisably 
fifteenth-century  social  context.  In  fact,  many  of  the  texts  we  have  examined 
undermine  the  view  that  madness  had  no  social  or  political  significance  until  after 
the  Middle  Ages. 
Some  romances,  especially  clerical  adaptations  like  Sir  Gontiher  or  the  Tale 
of  Beryn,  emphasize  the  sinfulness  of  madness.  Gowther,  Robert  of  Sicily  and 
Beryn  --  like  Margery  Kempe  --  all  progress  from  unholy  to  holy  folly  via  a  period 295 
of  penitential  madness.  In  these  romances  madness  is  clearly  viewed  as  an 
undesirable  and  often  sinful  state.  Other  romances  draw  on  the  increasingly 
positive  view  of  the  Wild  Man  and  therefore  reflect  a  more  tolerant,  even 
reverential  attitude  towards  the  mad  hero.  Malory's  works,  for  example,  view  the 
mad  knights  as  bestial  but  well-natured  and  present  madness  as  an  extreme 
symptom  of  social  alienation  from  a  culture  which  leaves  little  room  for 
autonomous  self-expression. 
The  latter  point  is  vividly  contextualized  in  the  works  of  Chaucer  and 
Gower.  Both  writers  reflect,  in  their  different  ways,  the  language  of  madness  in 
which  the  representatives  of  official  culture  stigmatized  the  peasantry  at  the  time 
of  the  Peasants'  Revolt.  In  the  dream  in  Book  I  of  the  Vox,  madness  is  imputed 
collectively  to  the  unrulable  peasantry  and  is  seen  as  the  consequence  of  their 
violation  of  the  divinely-ordained  social  order.  In  this  way,  opposition  to  authority 
is  rescripted  as  insanity.  The  peasant  disorder  necessitates  the  dreamer's  pathetic 
life  of  exile  and  madness.  Thus  Book  I  describes  both  the  contemptible  frenzy  that 
leads  to  the  breaking  of  social  bonds  and  the  pitiable  mental  distraction  of  others 
that  follows.  In  this  sense,  the  Vox  affirms  Malory's  view  of  madness  as  an 
implicit  rejection  of  civilized  values.  Gower's  view  of  human  nature,  however,  is 
more  pessimistic  and  more  typically  medieval  than  Malory's.  For  Gower  insanity 
is  linked  to  the  dominant  concerns  of  the  late  Middle  Ages,  Original  Sin  and  the 
Last  Judgement.  The  Vox  is  a  lament  for  mankind  as  it  degenerates  to  the  level  of 
beasts  through  the  sinful  madness  of  the  peasantry. 
In  the  Miller's  and  Summoner's  tales  Chaucer  is  also  concerned  with  the 
relation  between  madness  and  social  class.  Whereas  the  Vox  is  characterized  by  a 
terrible  sincerity,  however,  these  tales  are  essentially  parodic  or  satirical.  Peasant 
madness  is  again  described  and  defined  by  the  distinctly  clerical  discourse  of 
reason.  Chaucer,  however,  deconstructs  Gower's  ideological  opposition  of 
madness  and  reason.  In  the  Miller's  Tale  the  allegations  of  madness  against  the 
carpenter,  however  deserved,  are  undermined  by  a  variety  of  formal  techniques 296 
which  cast  doubt  upon  traditional  clerical  interpretations  of  madness  and  reveal  the 
constructedness  of  insanity.  By  inviting  us  to  compare  one  dubious  allegation  of 
madness  with  another,  the  text  solicits  suspicion  about  the  language  of  madness 
and  the  social  groups  that  make  use  of  it.  Similar  'undercutting'  techniques  are  at 
work  in  the  Summoner's  Tale,  in  which  the  imputations  of  peasant  madness  are 
deflected  by  Jankyn's  foolish,  satirical  but  essentially  conservative  scientific 
demonstration.  The  tale  nevertheless  has  radical  implications.  Jankyn's  solution  to 
the  problem  of  the  fart  is  couched  in  scholarly  terminology  which  recalls  the 
unpleasant  class  antagonism  of  the  Miller's  Tale. 
Predictably,  Chaucer's  fabliaux  present  their  mad  protagonists  as  objects  or 
comic  spectacles.  Other  works  of  literature,  however,  emphasize  a  different  side 
of  insanity.  In  the  major  works  of  Hoccleve,  madness  does  not  function  simply,  or 
even  mainly,  as  a  spectacular  moral  emblem.  Indeed,  if  discovering  the 
significance  of  madness  in  the  romances  involves  looking  beyond  the  moral 
surface  of  the  texts,  the  case  of  Hoccleve  suggests  the  dangers  of  privileging 
`deep'  Christian  interpretations  of  texts  at  the  expense  of  `surface'  meanings.  The 
Series,  it  has  been  seen,  concerns  the  social  as  well  as  the  moral  meaning  of 
madness.  Hoccleve  rejects  common  wisdom  about  madness,  suggesting  that 
insanity  is  subjective,  secret  and  hidden.  This  contradicts  a  basic  assumption  of 
psychiatric  history  which  would  never  have  attained  such  currency  if  translations 
of  Hoccleve's  works,  like  Margery  Kempe's,  were  more  easily  available  to 
historians  of  psychiatry. 
Hoccleve's  writings  about  madness,  like  the  medieval  romances,  attest  to  a 
growing  interest  in  expressions  of  individual  experience.  For  I!  occlevc,  as  for  the 
knights  of  the  romances,  recovery  from  madness  involves  feelings  of  deep  shame 
and  self-consciousness.  Furthermore,  five  centuries  before  Freud,  madness  is 
perceived  by  a  medieval  author  as  the  'enemy  within'.  Indeed,  Iloccleve's  Series, 
Kempe's  Book  and  the  medieval  romances  all  point  to  the  close  association  of 
madness  and  subjectivity  or  self-consciousness.  In  the  works  of  iloccleve  and 297 
Kempe,  madness  constitutes,  among  other  things,  the  radical  crisis  of  identity 
which  is  the  prerequisite  of  autobiographical  writing. 
Like  the  Series,  The  Book  of  Margery  Kempe  suggests  the  one-sidedness  of 
many  modern  assumptions  about  madness.  One  of  the  most  widespread  of  these  is 
that  madness  and  religious  devotion  went  hand  in  hand.  Kempe  generally  upholds 
the  orthodox  opinion  that  insanity  and  divine  ecstasy  are  essentially  incompatible; 
like  the  moralizing  Hoccleve  of  the  end  of  the  Series,  she  frequently  distances 
herself  from  the  mad  or  riotous  behaviour  of  others  in  order  to  validate  her  own 
unusual  conduct. 
Nevertheless,  the  Book,  rather  like  Hoccleve's  Series,  presents  another, 
more  positive  attitude  towards  madness.  It  is  perhaps  because  Kempe  herself 
exhibits  symptoms  of  what  many  of  her  contemporaries  regard  as  madness  that  the 
madwoman  whom  she  brings  to  health  in  Chapter  75  displays  the  signs  of  divine 
inspiration.  Even  the  insane,  Kempe  implies,  can  be  blessed.  Thus,  while 
describing  the  madwoman's  cure  as  a  triumph  of  male  'governance'  over  female 
'unruliness',  Kempe  implies  that  a  woman,  in  all  her  madness,  may  perceive  and 
interact  with  an  order  higher  than  that  supervised  by  men.  Like  Iloccleve,  Kempe 
overturns  orthodox  ideas  about  madness  to  gain  credibility  in  her  own  right.  Both 
authors  write  about  madness  not  simply  because  it  is  a  convenient  metaphor  for 
sinfulness,  but  because  by  doing  so  they  are  able  to  express  and  eventually 
overcome  their  sense  of  social  alienation.  In  this  sense,  Kempe's  Book,  of  all  the 
texts  considered  here,  constitutes  the  most  detailed  illustration  of  madness  as  an 
individual  response  to  the  often  oppressive  ideologies  of  late  medieval  society. 
Whatever  conclusions  about  madness  we  have  arrived  at,  and  however 
much  a  full  understanding  of  madness  in  literature  depends  an  appreciation  of 
historical  context,  it  is  hoped  that  this  discussion  has  contributed  to  the 
appreciation  of  the  aesthetic  qualities  of  some  of  the  works  discussed.  The 
discussion  of  madness  in  Chaucer's  tales,  for  example,  increases  critical 
understanding  of  their  well-known  formal  complexity.  Similarly,  the  analysis  of 298 
representations  of  madness  in  The  Book  of  Margery  Kempe  reveals  Kempe's  too 
rarely  acknowledged  literary  virtuosity. 
This  dissertation  also  raises  a  more  general  point  about  late-medieval 
literary  aesthetics.  All  of  the  works  discussed  here  manipulate  a  variety  of  often 
incompatible  attitudes  towards  madness.  The  consideration  of  such  textual 
contradictions  is  no  doubt  encouraged  by  recent  trends  in  critical  theory;  but  it  is 
also  sanctioned  by  the  inherently  inclusive  nature  of  many  late-medieval  texts,  by 
what  might  be  called  a  Gothic  tendency  to  juxtapose  apparently  incongruent  ideas. 
The  critic's  task  is  not  necessarily  to  discern  the  aesthetic  consistency  of  medieval 
texts,  but  to  draw  out  and  account  for  the  multiple  perspectives  they  contain. 
Perhaps  the  chief  theoretical  conclusion  of  this  dissertation,  however,  is 
that  the  common  deterministic  approach  to  the  history  of  madness,  tacitly  endorsed 
by  scholars  as  diverse  as  Michel  Foucault  and  Penelope  Doob,  is  less  valuable  than 
one  which  takes  account  of  the  interactions  between  subjects  and  history.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  language  of  madness  is  used  to  articulate  and  consolidate  political 
and  moral  authority;  but  representations  of  madness  may  also  be  used  by 
individuals  to  question  or  subvert  orthodox  values.  After  so  long  a  period  of 
resistance,  it  is  necessary  for  historians  and  literary  critics  to  take  account  of  the 
individual  voices,  as  well  as  the  official  pronouncements,  of  the  Middle  Ages. 299 
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